STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INS CO V ALLSTATE INSUR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
UNPUBLISHED
September 9, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 246602
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 02-002575-NF
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
IRA E. JONES, also known as IRA E. JOHNSON,
Defendant.
Before: Donofrio, P.J. and White and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this declaratory judgment action, defendant Allstate Insurance Company appeals as of
right from an opinion and order finding that Ira E. Jones was not domiciled with his sister, who
was insured by plaintiff State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. The trial court
therefore held that Allstate, as the insurer of the motorist who stuck Jones, a pedestrian, was in
the highest order of priority for payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under
MCL 500.3114(1) and MCL 500.3115(1), provisions of the no-fault act. We affirm. This appeal
is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
Allstate argues that the facts establish that Ira Jones was domiciled with his sister,
Dorothy Bettis, rather than with his girlfriend, Patricia Robinson. “The determination of
domicile is a question of fact to be resolved by the trial court, and this Court will not reverse the
trial court's determination unless the evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction.”
Goldstein v Progressive Cas Ins Co, 218 Mich App 105, 111; 553 NW2d 353 (1996). Factors to
be considered in determining domicile include:
(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either
permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he
contends is his “domicile” or “household”; . . . (2) the formality or informality of
the relationship between the person and the members of the household; . . . (3)
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whether the place where the person lives is in the same house, within the same
curtilage or upon the same premises, . . . (4) the existence of another place of
lodging by the person alleging “residence” or “domicile” in the household. . . .
[Workman v DAIIE, 404 Mich 477; 509 NW2d 821 (1979) (citations and
footnotes omitted).]
In addition, the following factors are relevant:
(1) the person’s mailing address; (2) whether the person maintains possessions at
the insured’s home; (3) whether the insured’s address appears on the person’s
driver’s license and other documents; (4) whether a bedroom is maintained for the
person at the insured’s home; and (5) whether the person is dependent upon the
insured for financial support or assistance. [Williams v State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins Co, 202 Mich App 491, 494-495; 509 NW2d 821 (1993); see also
Salinger v Hertz Corp, 211 Mich App 163, 165; 535 NW2d 204 (1995);
Dairyland Ins Co v Auto-Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675, 682; 333 NW2d 322
(1983).]
Allstate argues that Jones’ intent at the time of the accident was to live with his sister, as
evidenced by his giving her address and telephone number at the accident scene, his application
for benefits with his sister’s carrier, his difficulty in describing Robinson’s home, his failure to
declare to Robinson that he had the intent to return to her home, and because he attended church
when he was at his sister’s house. However, we note that Jones did provide a description of
Robinson’s apartment. Moreover, Robinson testified only that she was not always sure Jones
would return when he left mad, but that he never moved out the year of the accident. Jones said
that whenever he went to his sister’s house, his intention was always to return to his girlfriend’s
apartment. That Jones attended church when he was at his sister’s in White Cloud appears to be
indicative of an affiliation with a White Cloud church, but not of Jones’ domicile. Jones and his
girlfriend had previously lived together in White Cloud.
Jones listed his sister’s address on his driver’s license, used his sister’s address as his
primary mailing address, and provided his sister’s address at the accident scene. We note that
Jones actually received mail at both addresses. Jones relationship with his sister was informal
and he stayed in a room in her house, factors which would militate in favor of a finding of
domicile with her. However, these are the only factors that support a finding that he was
domiciled with his sister.
In contrast, the evidence that Jones resided with Robinson was compelling. Both testified
that they began living together within about a year of their eleven-year-old son’s birth. Jones
frequently went to White Cloud and stayed with his sister. He said he would spend from a day to
a week there but was living with his girlfriend and their son. Although still married to someone
else, he characterized the relationship as being like husband and wife. They shared a bedroom
and some furniture, and Jones contributed $300 to $400 of the rent for their $575 apartment. He
kept only a pair of pants, a shirt and a few toiletries at his sister’s, while his remaining clothes
and other possessions were at his girlfriend’s apartment. Although he always used the same
bedroom at his sister’s house, it was a guest room also used by others, and was furnished and
decorated by his sister. While Jones’ sister allowed him to use the room and provided meals
from time to time, the evidence indicated that these amenities were offered to him as a frequent
guest, and not because he was dependent upon his sister for financial support or assistance. We
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agree with the trial court that this evidence, overall, clearly preponderates in favor of a finding
that Jones’ was domiciled with his girlfriend, and did not reside with his sister.
Affirmed.
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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