PEOPLE OF MI V JEFFERSON WILLIAMS FEW JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
September 7, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247650
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-185413-FC
JEFFERSON WILLIAMS FEW, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Smolenski and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of manufacturing or possessing with
intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), conspiracy to
manufacture or possess with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine, MCL 750.157a and
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), and possession with intent to deliver 50 or more but less than 225 grams
of cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii). He was sentenced to prison terms of twenty to forty years
each for the manufacturing or possessing with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine and
conspiracy convictions, and ten to twenty years’ imprisonment for the possession with intent to
deliver 50 or more but less than 225 grams of cocaine conviction, all sentences to be served
consecutively. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
I
Defendant’s convictions stem from an undercover operation in which the police arranged
a controlled buy of cocaine by an informant from codefendant Ronald Graves, Jr. Graves agreed
to sell the informant an eighth of a kilogram of cocaine, which Graves said would be delivered
by defendant to the informant in the parking lot of Charlies’ Roost, a bar in Pontiac. When
defendant arrived with the eighth kilogram of cocaine (125 grams), formed in a compressed ball
known as a “big eight,” police arrested him. Defendant later led police to a house at 514
Highland Street, owned by his aunt, that was used for a cocaine operation. Police found another
sixteen “big eight” balls of cocaine in the house, as well as packaging materials, a scale, and
other items associated with preparing cocaine for distribution.
Defendant was charged with possession with intent to deliver the cocaine seized from
him in the bar parking lot under subsection (2)(a)(iii) (50 or more but less than 225 grams of
cocaine). He was charged with manufacturing or possessing with intent to deliver the cocaine
seized from the house under subsection (2)(a)(i) (650 or more grams).
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II
Defendant first argues that the district court erred in binding him over on counts 1
(manufacturing or possessing with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine) and 2
(conspiracy to manufacture or possess with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine).
Defendant maintains that the prosecutor presented insufficient evidence at the preliminary
examination to connect him to the drug operation at 514 Highland. But because we conclude
that none of defendant’s issues successfully challenge the fairness or reliability of the lower court
proceedings, any evidentiary deficiency at the preliminary examination is not a ground for
vacating or reversing defendant’s conviction. People v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 124 n 2; 659 NW2d
604 (2003); People v Hall, 435 Mich 599, 601-603; 460 NW2d 520 (1990). Therefore, we need
not review this issue.
III
Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress the search warrant
and the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. The trial court denied the motion on the
ground that defendant lacked standing, but further stated that the affidavit was sufficient to
support probable cause for issuing the search warrant. (Appendix C, pp 4-6.)
“The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of persons to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” People v Lombardo, 216 Mich App 500, 504; 549 NW2d
596 (1996), citing US Const, Am IV; Const 1963, art 1, § 11. In reviewing a claim of a Fourth
Amendment violation, the court must first ascertain whether the defendant has standing to
challenge the search. People v Powell, 235 Mich App 557, 561; 599 NW2d 499 (1999); People
v Duvall, 170 Mich App 701, 705; 428 NW2d 746 (1988). The test to determine whether a
person has a constitutionally protected privacy interest so as to confer standing is whether he had
an expectation of privacy in the object of the search and seizure and whether the expectation is
one that society recognizes as reasonable. Powell, supra at 560; Lombardo supra at 504. The
defendant has the burden of establishing standing. Id. at 505; Powell, supra at 561. The court
deciding the issue should consider the totality of the circumstances. Id.
Here, the trial court did not err in finding that defendant lacked standing to challenge the
search warrant. The court concluded that defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the house because he was not living at the house; there was no evidence that he had
exclusive control over the premises; he failed to corroborate his claim that he was paying rent;
and he took no steps to prevent Graves from entering the house without a key. These findings
are supported by the record. Furthermore, evidence established that the house was in an
uninhabitable condition because there was no running water and no proper source of electricity,
and defendant merely claimed that he was repairing the house.
In any event, the trial court correctly determined that the affidavit was sufficient to
establish probable cause. A search warrant may be issued only on a showing of probable cause
that is supported by oath or affirmation. Const 1963, art 1, § 11; People v Nunez, 242 Mich App
610, 612; 619 NW2d 550 (2000). Probable cause exists when a reasonably cautious person
would be justified in concluding that evidence of criminal activity could be found in a stated
place to be searched. Id. In reviewing the magistrate’s determination regarding probable cause,
the search warrant and underlying affidavit must be read in a common-sense and realistic
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manner, and the reviewing court must give deference to the magistrate’s conclusion that probable
cause existed. Id. at 612-613.
Detective Niedjelski swore in the affidavit that there was probable cause to find Graves
and evidence of drug trafficking based on defendant’s statement that Graves gave him drugs
from the house on Highland. Although the affidavit does not indicate that defendant gave any
information that additional drugs could be found at the Highland house, Niedjelski stated that,
based on his experience in drug investigations, drug traffickers store drugs, drug-related
equipment, and other evidence of drug transactions at “easily accessible locations” to facilitate
drug transactions. Niedjelski’s experience is relevant to the existence of probable cause. People
v Darwich, 226 Mich App 635, 639; 575 NW2d 44 (1997). A reasonably cautious person could
infer that defendant’s and Niedjelski’s combined statements provided probable cause to believe
that evidence of criminal activity could be found in the Highland house. Nunez, supra at 612.
Defendant contends that the affidavit did not set forth sufficient information from which
the magistrate could conclude that his statement to the police was sufficiently reliable. Probable
cause may be founded on hearsay. People v Harris, 191 Mich App 422, 425; 479 NW2d 6
(1991). Contrary to defendant’s argument, a magistrate’s reliance on hearsay is not subject to
rigid requirements. Instead, when probable cause is predicated on hearsay information, the
magistrate must “make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances
set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of
a crime will be found in a particular place.” People v Hawkins, 468 Mich 488, 502 n 11; 668
NW2d 602 (2003), quoting Illinois v Gates, 462 US 213, 238; 103 S Ct 2317; 76 L Ed 2d 527
(1983). Furthermore, MCL 780.653 provides that a magistrate may base a finding of probable
cause on information supplied to the affiant by a named person if the affidavit contains
“affirmative allegations from which the magistrate may conclude that the person spoke with
personal knowledge of the information.” MCL 780.653(a). These requirements are satisfied
here. The magistrate could conclude that defendant’s knowledge was based on his own
observations and experiences with the Highland house, and he was able to describe the house.
IV
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the
statements he made to the police. In the first statement, given shortly after his arrest on June 6,
2002, defendant stated that he had been delivering the one-eighth kilogram of cocaine to the
informant pursuant to Graves’ instructions, and that he had obtained the cocaine from the house
on Highland Street in Pontiac. In the second statement, defendant gave more information
regarding the drug operation on Highland, and he admitted that an eighth-kilogram of cocaine
found in a kitchen vent belonged to him.
In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress an incriminating statement, we
review the record de novo, but we review the trial court’s underlying findings of fact for clear
error. People v Adams, 245 Mich App 226, 230; 627 NW2d 623 (2001). We will affirm the trial
court’s decision unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred.
People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822 (2000). If the question of
voluntariness turns on the credibility of witnesses, this Court will defer to the trial court. Id.
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Defendant contends that his statement was involuntary because the police failed to advise
him of his Miranda1 rights before the first interview, and the police failed to ask him if he
needed food, rest, or medical attention before the second interview. Although the police failed to
have defendant sign a written waiver of rights before the first interview, Officer Cronin testified
that defendant was orally advised of his rights, and voluntarily agreed to waive them. Cronin
also testified that defendant did not appear to be under the influence of drugs during the
interview, and he did not request an end to the interview, or complain of sleep deprivation.
Cronin and Detective Jennings testified that Cronin read defendant his Miranda rights before the
second interview, and that defendant indicated that he understood the rights, but would waive
them. He did not request an attorney, request an end to the interview, or complain of sleep
deprivation.
Defendant testified that the officers did not advise him of his Miranda rights before the
first interview, and that they instructed him to sign the form before the second interview, without
explaining his rights or verifying that he understood them. He also testified that the officers
ignored his request for an attorney and denied him access to a phone. The question of
voluntariness thus turned on the credibility of the witnesses. The trial court found that the
officers were credible, and that defendant was not. Because we defer to the trial court’s
evaluation of witness credibility, we find no error in the trial court’s decision to deny the motion
to suppress. Sexton, supra at 752.
V
Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized
during a patdown search. He argues that the patdown search was an unjustified intrusion on his
Fourth Amendment rights.
Police officers may make a valid investigatory stop if they possess “reasonable
suspicion” that criminal activity is occurring. Terry v Ohio, 392 US 1; 88 S Ct 1868; 20 L Ed 2d
889 (1968); People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 98; 549 NW2d 849 (1996). The detaining officer
must have had a “particularized and objective basis for the suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. at
98-99. “An officer who makes a valid investigatory stop may perform a limited patdown search
for weapons if the officer has reasonable suspicion that the individual stopped for questioning is
armed and thus poses a danger to the officer.” Id. at 99.
These requirements were satisfied when the officers ordered defendant to the ground and
Pawlowski conducted the patdown search after defendant rode his motorcycle into the Charlies’
Roost parking lot. The officers had reasonable suspicion that defendant was delivering an
eighth-kilogram of cocaine, based on the informant’s arrangements with Graves. The officers
also had reasonable suspicion that defendant was armed and thus posed a danger to the officers.
Pawlowski testified that their informant described defendant as violent and short-tempered, and
that he knew from experience that narcotics traffickers often carry guns. Defendant was wearing
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
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a loose-fitting sweatshirt, so the officers could not rule out the possibility that he was armed
without conducting the search.
If an officer conducting a patdown search feels something that, under the totality of the
circumstances, has an immediately-apparent incriminating character, and the officer has probable
cause to believe that the object is contraband, the “plain feel” exception to the search warrant
requirement authorizes the officer to remove the object for further examination. Champion,
supra at 110-114, 118. These requirements were satisfied. While conducting the lawful
patdown search of defendant, Pawlowski felt a round bulge. Pawlowski, an experienced
narcotics investigator, surmised from the object’s shape, size, and hardness, that it was the
eighth-kilogram of cocaine the informant was expecting. The plain feel exception thus justified
further search of the item. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the suppression motion.
VI
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict on
the counts of conspiracy and manufacturing or possessing with intent to deliver 650 or more
grams of cocaine. He contends that the only evidence linking him to the larger quantity of
cocaine at the Highland house was Graves’ inadmissible hearsay. “When reviewing a trial
court's decision on a motion for a directed verdict, this Court reviews the record de novo to
determine whether the evidence presented by the prosecutor, viewed in the light most favorable
to the prosecutor, could persuade a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime
charged were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 122;
631 NW2d 67 (2001).
MCL 750.157a provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who conspires together with 1 or more persons to commit an
offense prohibited by law, or to commit a legal act in an illegal manner is guilty
of the crime of conspiracy . . . .
Establishing a conspiracy requires evidence of specific intent to combine with others to
accomplish an illegal operation. People v Blume, 443 Mich 476, 481; 505 NW2d 843 (1993).
Each conspirator is deemed criminally responsible for the acts of his coconspirators committed
in furtherance of the conspiracy’s goal. People v Houseman, 128 Mich App 17, 24; 339 NW2d
666 (1983). It is not necessary to show that each conspirator knew the full extent of the
conspiratorial enterprise. People v Meredith (On Remand), 209 Mich App 403, 412; 531 NW2d
749 (1995).
Here, the evidence established that defendant and Graves combined for the illegal
purpose of narcotics trafficking. Defendant admitted that he was delivering cocaine on Graves’
instructions, that Graves kept a cocaine press at the Highland house, and that Graves pressed
cocaine there. Although defendant tried to suggest that Graves entered the house without
defendant’s permission, he never contacted the police or took other steps to eject Graves from
the house. A trier of fact could infer from these circumstances that defendant willingly agreed to
contribute to the conspiracy by lending his aunt’s house and making at least one delivery. This
evidence supports both defendant’s conviction of conspiracy and manufacturing or possessing
with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine. Blume, supra; Houseman, supra.
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The principal crux of defendant’s argument is that the prosecution improperly relied on
Graves’ statements to establish the conspiracy, and that these statements were inadmissible
hearsay. This is an evidentiary issue, so we evaluate it as such. A trial court's decision to admit
or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Manser, 250 Mich App 21,
31; 645 NW2d 65 (2002).
MRE 801(d)(2)(E) provides that statements made by a coconspirator in furtherance of a
conspiracy and in the course of the conspiracy, if there is independent proof of a conspiracy, are
not hearsay. Defendant contends that the two statements by Graves, which the prosecutor
introduced before defendant’s jury, do not qualify under this rule.
The first of the two statements was introduced when Cronin was testifying before
defendant’s jury alone, during redirect examination, following defendant’s cross-examination.
Cronin testified that he questioned Graves about defendant’s involvement in the operation, and
that Graves told him that defendant processed cocaine with Graves at the Highland house. A
coconspirator’s statement to the police following arrest is not made in furtherance of the
conspiracy or during the course of the conspiracy, and is therefore not admissible pursuant to
MRE 801(d)(2)(E) against another coconspirator. People v Cadle, 204 Mich App 646, 653; 516
NW2d 520 (1994), overruled on other grounds People v Perry, 460 Mich 55, 64-65; 594 NW2d
477 (1999). Graves made this statement during the police interview, following his arrest, so
MRE 801(d)(2)(E) does not apply. But the trial court overruled defendant’s objection on the
ground that defendant had opened the door by questioning Cronin about Graves’ statements
during cross-examination. The trial court was referring to defendant’s questions to Cronin
regarding Graves’ statements about Graves’ access to the Highland house and Graves’ admission
that he did not obtain the cocaine press from defendant.
The trial court correctly ruled that defendant had opened the door by questioning Cronin
about statements Graves made that tended to minimize defendant’s involvement in the
conspiracy. See People v Verburg, 170 Mich App 490, 498; 430 NW2d 775 (1988). Defendant
attempted to use Graves’ statements to show that defendant did not grant Graves permission to
use the Highland house, and that defendant was not involved in the installation of the cocaine
press. Having done so, he opened the door to the statements Graves made during the same
interview regarding defendant’s involvement in processing cocaine at the house.
The second of Graves’ statements was introduced when the prosecutor introduced a taped
telephone call in which Graves told the informant that defendant would deliver the cocaine to
Charlie’s Roost. Defendant contends that this statement was inadmissible because there was no
independent evidence of a conspiracy. We disagree. Evidence that defendant permitted Graves
to process cocaine in the home (even if that permission was passive rather than active), and his
assistance in delivering cocaine, was sufficient to establish the existence of a conspiracy.
Graves’ statements during the phone call were made in furtherance of the conspiracy’s goal of
selling cocaine, and before police intervention ended the conspiracy. The requirements of MRE
801(d)(2)(E) were therefore satisfied.
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VII
Defendant next raises claims of prosecutorial misconduct. This Court reviews preserved
claims of prosecutorial misconduct case by case, examining the remarks in context to determine
whether the defendant received a fair and improper trial. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10,
29-30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002). The propriety of a prosecutor’s remarks depends on all the facts of
the case. Id.
A
Defendant claims that the prosecutor unfairly prejudiced him by alluding to John Gotti,
the Gambino crime family, and the mafia, and insinuating that defendant and Graves’ cocaine
operation was tied to a larger and more widespread trafficking scheme. Defendant preserved this
claim with a timely objection. Id. at 30. Defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s earlier
statements that, while defendant and Graves’ organization involved only four persons,2 it was
“[t]o some degree … much larger than that because cocaine comes from . . . Columbia, Bolivia,
South America,” “comes into this country through Florida, Louisiana, Texas, New Mexico,
Arizona, [and] California,” is shipped “up here” into other states, and “to some degree … this
entire organization was involved.” We review this unpreserved claim for plain error affecting
the defendant’s substantial rights. People v Thomas, 260 Mich App 450, 453-454; 678 NW2d
631 (2004).
The prosecutor’s analogy to John Gotti, the Gambino crime organization, the mafia, and
organized crime, and his reliance on other large-scale cocaine operations for argument in this
case, unnecessarily raise a question of error by focusing attention beyond the immediate and
proper considerations before the jury. Even though the prosecutor tempered his arguments by
emphasizing that the jury must base its decision on the facts and evidence in this particular case,
the references were, at the very least, imprudent. Nonetheless, given the evidence in this case,
we conclude that any error does not require reversal. We cannot conclude that defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial, or that any error affected his substantial rights.
B
Defendant further argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the
remarks about international drug trafficking. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must show (1) that the attorney's performance was objectively unreasonable in light of
prevailing professional norms and (2) that, but for the attorney's error or errors, there is a
reasonable probability that a different outcome would have resulted. People v Carbin, 463 Mich
590, 599-600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001); People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 531; 640 NW2d
314 (2001). This Court’s review is limited to the facts contained on the record. Rodriguez,
supra at 38. Given our above conclusion that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by the
2
The other two coconspirators, Ernesto Gonzalez and Raymond Graves, were not tried with
defendant and Ronald Graves.
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prosecutor’s remarks, defendant’s ineffective assistance claim fails. Defendant has failed to
show a reasonable probability that the error, if any, was outcome determinative.
Defendant additionally claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to vigorously crossexamine, to investigate, and to object to repeated prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant has failed
to properly argue the merits of these claims. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588
NW2d 480 (1998). In any event, defendant’s claims fail because no mistake of counsel is
apparent on the record. Rodriguez, supra at 38.
VIII
Defendant contends that the sentencing court erred in imposing consecutive instead of
concurrent sentences. We disagree.
As in effect on June 6, 2002, the date of defendant’s offenses, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i)
prescribed a mandatory minimum sentence of twenty years for manufacturing or possessing with
intent to deliver 650 or more grams of cocaine. This version of MCL 333.7401 also provided in
subsection (3) that terms of imprisonment imposed pursuant to subsection (2)(a) “shall be
imposed to run consecutively with any term of imprisonment imposed for the commission of
another felony. . . .”
MCL 333.7401 was subsequently amended by 2002 PA 665, effective March 1, 2003, to
eliminate the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence for offenses involving more than 650
grams of cocaine. Additionally, in subsection (3), the word “may” was substituted for the word
“shall,” thereby giving a sentencing court discretion whether to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences. Also, MCL 777.13m, as enacted by 2002 PA 666, became effective
March 1, 2003, and provided that the legislative sentencing guidelines applied to drug-related
offenses, including those defined by MCL 333.7401.
Defendant argues that the sentencing court erred in failing to recognize that it had
discretion to impose concurrent and shorter terms of imprisonment under MCL 333.7401, as
amended, and MCL 777.13m, which were both in effect on the date of his sentencing, March 18,
2003. In a recent decision, this Court determined that 2002 PA 665 applied prospectively only,
and “only to offenses committed on and after the effective date of the legislation, March 1,
2003.” People v Doxey, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (Docket No. 247767, issued July 20,
2004), slip op pp 4-5. Accordingly, defendant’s claim that he was entitled to sentencing under
the amended statute fails.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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