MICHIGAN STATE POLICE TROOPERS ASSN V STATE OF MICHIGAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MICHIGAN STATE POLICE TROOPERS
ASSOCIATION,
UNPUBLISHED
September 2, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN and DEPARTMENT OF
STATE POLICE,
No. 242907
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 02-000502-CL
Defendants-Appellees.
MICHIGAN STATE POLICE TROOPERS
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN and DEPARTMENT OF
STATE POLICE,
No. 243948
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 02-000756-CL
Defendants-Appellants.
MICHIGAN STATE POLICE TROOPERS
ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
STATE OF MICHIGAN and DEPARTMENT OF
STATE POLICE,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Neff and White, JJ.
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No. 245567
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 02-001409-CL
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 242907, plaintiff Michigan State Police Troopers Association (MSPTA)
appeals as of right the Court of Claims’ grant of summary disposition to defendants State of
Michigan and Department of State Police. In Docket No. 243948, defendants State of Michigan
and Department of State Police appeal by leave granted the Court of Claims’ denial of their
motion summary disposition. In Docket No. 245567, plaintiff MSPTA appeals as of right the
Court of Claims’ grant of summary disposition and sanctions to the same defendants. This Court
consolidated the appeals. We reverse and remand in 242907, reverse in part in 245567, and
affirm in 243948.
I
The MSPTA and Michigan State Police (MSP) are parties to a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA). Two of the three consolidated appeals (docket nos. 242907 & 245567) began
as a grievance the MSPTA brought on behalf of probationary State Police Trooper Jason
Mercier, after the MSP notified Mercier of its intent to terminate him. The termination resulted
from a complaint lodged by a female recruit against Mercier regarding an incident on February 2,
2001, at which time Mercier was also a recruit, at the State Police Training Academy. The
MSP’s UD-93 “Complaint Against Member” form, case number IA-026-01, stated:
II
The allegation is that Recruit Jason D. Mercier made an inappropriate, offensive
comment to a female recruit, Kimberly Noble, in violation of department policy,
state and federal law. The alleged statement is “We could use a cup of coffee –
bitch.”
Noble lodged the complaint on February 9, 2001, the same day Mercier graduated from the MSP
Recruiting School. In March 2001 (more than 30 days after Mercier graduated from recruit
school) an investigation took place, and the MSP recommended Mercier be terminated under the
“Termination of Probationary Employee” provisions of Article 11, Part B, § 3 of the CBA.
The MSPTA and Mercier filed a grievance on April 23, 2001.1 The grievance proceeded
to arbitration. The MSP asserted Mercier’s termination was not grievable pursuant to the
1
The grievance stated:
Tpr Mercier was interviewed on March 15, 2001 pursuant to IA-026-01, about
alleged misconduct. March 27, 2001, Capt Darling wrote a memo to Tpr Mercier
stating “ . . my intention to separate you. .” from the Dept. Tpr Mercier appeared
before Capt Sturdivant on Apr 12, 2001, with MSPTA Counsel, who advised that
IA-026-11 should be conducted as a “misconduct,” not “probationary” procedure.
Capt Sturdivant wrote to Tpr Mercier on Apr 19, 2001, “it is my recommendation
to uphold the termination.” Tpr Mercier is entitled to MSPTA representation
(continued…)
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Probationary Employee provisions of the CBA (Article 11, Part B) and thus was non-arbitrable.
Following a December 19, 2001 hearing at which one witness testified for each side, the
arbitrator bifurcated the proceedings, requesting post-trial briefing on the question whether
Mercier’s termination was appealable through the grievance and arbitration procedure before
considering the substance of the grievance. The parties filed briefs, and the arbitrator concluded
that the MSPTA’s grievance was non-arbitrable, and that she had no authority to address the
mertits of the grievance.
In April 2002, the MSPTA filed a verified complaint to vacate the arbitration award and
remand for additional arbitration. The MSP moved for summary disposition, and the court
granted the motion under MCR 2.116(C)(8), concluding that the arbitrator’s award drew its
essence from the CBA. The court denied the MSPTA’s motion for reconsideration. The
MSPTA’s appeal of this dismissal is Docket No. 242907.
In September 2002, the MSPTA filed a second complaint to vacate the arbitration award
and remand for additional arbitration, alleging that the award was obtained by fraud, which came
to light through newly discovered evidence. The court dismissed this second complaint with
prejudice under MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (C)(8), and assessed attorney fees, costs and sanctions
totaling $6,000 against the MSPTA’s counsel under MCR 2.114 and MCL 600.2591. The
MSPTA’s appeal of this dismissal is Docket No. 245567.
The issue in Docket No. 243948 is whether the arbitrator’s decision in the Mercier matter
collaterally estops arbitration of two subsequent grievances of MSP Troopers Steven League and
Randy Wilkins. The MSPTA filed a complaint in May 2002 requesting that the circuit court
order the MSP to proceed to arbitration on the League and Wilkins grievances. In July 2002, the
MSP moved for summary disposition on a number of grounds, under MCR 2.116(C)(4), (7), (8)
and (10), including collateral estoppel. The circuit court denied MSP’s motion and granted the
MSPTA’s cross-motion, concluding that the MSPTA’s appeal of the Mercier matter before this
Court (docket no. 242907), stayed the preclusive and binding effect of the arbitration decision in
the Mercier matter,2 and ordering the parties to promptly proceed to arbitration in the League and
Wilkins matters, under CBA Article 9.
(…continued)
under Articles 8 & 9, as well as other Articles associated with misconduct &
affirmative action. The allegation is false, and does not violate the Code of
Conduct; and/or comes within the definition of affirmative assistance.
***
The proposed discipline should be set aside or significantly reduced. The
investigation, memoranda, & all references to the matter, & the grievance should
be destroyed. The grievant should be Made Whole Otherwise for all losses.
2
The circuit court also concluded that the question whether the Mercier arbitration decision
binds and precludes subsequent arbitration proceedings between the same parties regarding the
(continued…)
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II
A – The Collective Bargaining Agreement
Management Rights are set forth at Article 4 of the CBA, including:
It is agreed that (except as limited by terms of this Agreement), the Employer
retains the right to manage the affairs of the Department and to direct the working
forces. Such functions of Management include (but are not limited to) the right
to:
***
c. Direct the work of the employees covered by this Agreement, including
the right to hire, to discharge . . . to establish job duties, to determine the
amount of work needed . . . , subject to the provisions expressly set forth
in this Agreement.
***
h. Determine the basis for selection, retention and promotion of
employees for classifications within or not within the bargaining unit, as
established in this Agreement, and as governed by any applicable Civil
Service Regulation.
Defendants maintain they had the discretion to terminate, and did terminate, Mercier
pursuant to Article 11, Part B, § 3, governing probationary employees:
[ARTICLE 11]
Section 1.
PART B. PROBATIONARY EMPLOYEES
Probationary Period.
For the purposes of exercising rights under this contract all employees
undergoing the required initial probationary period for the purposes of evaluation
and training, including the time spent in “recruit school”, shall be deemed
probationary employees. . . .
Section 2.
Rights of Probationary Employees.
a.
A probationary employee, while assigned to the Michigan State
Police Academy, and prior to being “sworn” as a Michigan State Police
Trooper, shall only be entitled to the basic wage and fringe benefit
provisions of this contract.
(…continued)
same issues is a matter to be resolved by an arbitrator before seeking review by a trial court.
-4-
b. Upon graduation from recruit school and taking the sworn oath of
office as a Michigan State Police Trooper, a probationary employee shall
have all the rights afforded to any other employee covered by this
Agreement, except the following:
(1) The employee shall not be entitled to the protections of the
discipline provisions of this Agreement until thirty (30) days after
graduation from recruit school;
***
(6) The probationary employee shall not be entitled to the benefits
or protections of the affirmative assistance provisions of this
contract.
Section 3.
Termination of Probationary Employee.
a.
Written evaluations shall be prepared by the post commander or
other assigned personnel summarizing job performance of all
probationary employees at three (3), six (6), nine (9) and eleven (11)
month intervals, which report shall be reviewed with the probationary
employee. These evaluations shall extend, but are not limited to, such
subjects as work performance, attendance, personality, temperament,
ability to deal with the public (if the probationary employee is assigned
such work) and other related areas of police work. These evaluations may
be considered by the Employer in determining to retain the employee or to
terminate his/her employment with the Department.
b.
If, during the portion of the initial probationary period subsequent
to recruit school, the Department has reason to believe based upon the
evaluations of supervisory personnel that a probationary employee’s
employment should be terminated, the Employer shall advise the
employee and the Association in writing at least thirty (30) calendar days
before the termination of the probationary period. The employee, if he/she
desires to contest such determination, shall, within five (5) calendar days,
of receipt of notice request a conference with the immediate superior of
the person making the determination to terminate his/her employment.
After such conference, the officer reviewing same shall make his/her
determination within five (5) calendar days and either rescind the order of
termination or affirm the same, immediately providing written notice to
the employee affected.
If the employee desires to contest this determination, he/she shall, within five (5)
calendar days of receipt of notice, file a request for a hearing with the Director. A
hearing will be conducted within five (5) calendar days by the Director or his/her
designee, and within five (5) calendar days of the conclusion of said hearing, the
Director may either rescind such termination or affirm the same, notifying the
employee affected. No employee who has requested a review or a hearing shall
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be terminated from employment until after completion of the conference and
hearing procedures, and until receipt of the Director’s final determination. The
Director’s determination shall not be appealable through the grievance procedure
of this agreement.
Plaintiff MSPTA maintains that pursuant to Article 11, Part B, § 2(b)(1), quoted supra,
which provides that 30 days after graduation from recruit school probationary employees are
entitled to the protections of the CBA’s discipline provisions (Art 8), Mercier should have been
disciplined under Articles 8 and 9, which provide in part:
ARTICLE 8
DISCIPLINE AND AFFIRMATIVE ASSISTANCE
PART A. DISCIPLINE MISCONDUCT
Section 1. Scope
The Employer will utilize disciplinary action only for just cause toward
employees who engage in violations of the Code of Conduct. It is the intention of
the Employer to utilize discipline by progression, when feasible.
Section 2. Definitions.
a. Disciplinary Action. For the purposes of review thereof, disciplinary
action shall mean a written warning, written reprimand, suspension
without pay, and discharge. For the purposes of this Part, counseling,
retraining, conditional service ratings and demotions are not disciplinary
action. Nothing in this Part is intended to preclude a supervisor from
verbally discussing isolated instances of minor misconduct with an
employee in lieu of administering disciplinary action.
b. Investigatory Leave. Upon verbal notification followed within twentyfour (24) hours by written delineation of the reasons, an employee may be
placed upon investigatory leave with pay for up to fifteen (15) calendar
days as a result of the Employer’s reasonable belief that the employee
participated in an event of significant consequence to the Department, the
employee, or the public. Such investigatory leave with pay shall be for the
purpose of investigating the event. . . . Investigatory leave with pay shall
create no negative inferences with reference to the affected employee,
shall not be considered discipline, and is not subject to appeal.
***
Section 3. Application.
The various disciplinary actions are described as follows:
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a. Written Warning. A written warning delineates minor
violation(s) of the Code of Conduct not involving a violation of law and
advises the employee that official notice has been taken thereof and that
further misconduct of a similar nature will subject the employee to further
disciplinary action. . . .
b. Written Reprimand. A written reprimand includes the personal
discussion accompanied by a written notice that delineates violation(s) of
the Code of Conduct. Its purpose is to advise the employee that further
misconduct may result in additional disciplinary action including
discharge. . . .
c. Suspension or Discharge After Investigation. If an investigation
establishes just cause for disciplinary action, a suspension without pay not
to exceed thirty (30) calendar days or a discharge may be issued after a
hearing by the Discipline Appeal Board. . . .
d. Immediate Suspension Without Pay. When the Director or
Acting Director forms a reasonable belief that an employee has committed
a felony, as defined by the Michigan Penal Code, or in the event of a
misdemeanor for which a warrant has been issued, he/she may suspend the
employee without pay for such period as is required to reach a final
determination through the procedures of this Agreement. . . .
Section 4. Association Participation.
Whenever the Employer and the employee mutually request or the
employee requests assistance from the Association in helping work with an
employee who may have engaged in conduct for which the employee may be, or
has been disciplined, the Association shall cooperate in rendering necessary
assistance.
Section 5. Grievances, Appeals, Hearings and Arbitration.
a. Written Warning or Written Reprimand. If an employee
believes that any written warning or written reprimand is unfair, unjust or
inaccurate, the employee may appeal within fifteen (15) calendar days
after notification in writing to their District or Division Commander, who
shall promptly schedule a Discipline Panel pursuant to Section 6. The
decision of the Discipline Panel shall be final.
b. Suspension or Discharge. Upon receipt of written notice of the
reasons for a . . . discharge, an employee may file a grievance pursuant to
Article 9 of this Agreement commencing at Step 3. Upon receipt of a
written Step 3 answer, the Association, on behalf of the employee, may
within fourteen (14) calendar days, give written notice of the grievant’s
desire to convene a Discipline Appeal Board.
-7-
c. Except as provided in Section 3(d) of this Article, no suspension
or discharge shall be invoked against any employee who has not accepted
the discipline until a determination is reached by the Discipline Appeal
Board.
d. Within fourteen (14) calendar days following the determination
of the Discipline Appeal Board, the Association may give the Employer
written notice of the Association’s intent to convene a new hearing
pursuant to the Step 4 arbitration procedures set forth in Article 9 of this
Agreement.
* * *3
ARTICLE 9
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
Section 1. Grievance Defined.
A grievance shall mean a complaint of violation, misapplication, or
misinterpretation of this Agreement, a claim of unreasonable and arbitrary work
order, or a claim that rules and regulations are not reasonable or involve
discrimination in application, or a claim of discipline without just cause.
Section 2. Filing A Grievance.
Whenever an employee or the Association acting on behalf of any
employee, or on behalf of all members of the Association, believes a cause for a
grievance exists, the grievance procedure provided in this Article shall be
followed. . . . .
***
Section 6. Presenting a Grievance.
In processing any grievance, the following steps shall be observed . . .
[description of Steps 1 through 3]
Step 4: Arbitration. In the event any employee, Association or
group grievance is not resolved at Step 3, such grievance(s) may be
referred to arbitration by the Association. . . .
3
Article 8, Part B addresses Affirmative Assistance (counseling, retraining, demotion,
etc.).
-8-
***
The arbitrator shall have no authority except to pass upon alleged
violations of the expressed written provisions of this Agreement, the
unreasonableness or misapplication of a rule and regulation . . . or a claim
of suspension, discharge or demotion without just cause.
The arbitrator shall have no power or authority to add to, subtract from,
ignore or modify any of the terms of this Agreement and shall not
substitute his/her judgment for that of the Employer where the Employer
is given discretion by the terms of this Agreement.
The arbitrator shall construe this Agreement in a manner which does not
interfere with the exercise of either the Employer’s or the employees’ and
the Association’s rights and responsibilities, except to the extent that such
rights and responsibilities may be expressly limited by the terms of this
Agreement.
***
The arbitrator may take steps necessary to correct any abuse or to provide
a fair resolution to the grievance or issues presented; however, the
arbitrator is without authority to change or rewrite any provisions of the
Agreement or insert his/her wisdom for that of the Employer or
Association. . . .
There shall be no appeal of the decision of the arbitrator if made in
accordance with the jurisdiction and authority conferred upon the
arbitrator by this Agreement. However, any decision of the arbitrator,
which a party fails to comply with, shall be enforceable by law.
***
Section 11. Scope of Review.
Wherever review is provided elsewhere in this Agreement (e.g., certain
limited forms of disciplinary action, hardship and employee conduct transfers,
probationary employees, and unfair labor practice charges), such review shall be
exclusive and not appealable under any circumstances under this Article.
B - Arbitrability
Defendants raised an arbitrability challenge. The arbitrator bifurcated the arbitrability
issue from the substance of the grievance following the arbitration hearing, at which two
witnesses testified, Capt. Richard Darling for the MSP, and Sgt. Michael Herendeen, President of
the MSPTA, for the MSPTA. The parties were asked to brief the issue:
-9-
“Whether the Association has the right to challenge the Department’s decision
regarding how to terminate a probationary employee under Article 11, Part B?”
The arbitrator’s Opinion and Award answered the question in the negative:
A. After careful analysis of the evidence and the arguments of the parties, I find
that the Association does not have the right to challenge, in the grievance
arbitration procedure of Article 9, the Department’s decision regarding how to
terminate a probationary employee under Article 11, Part B.
My finding is based on the following reasoning:
1. As arbitrator, my primary obligation to the parties is to respect their
bargain by enforcing the clear and unambiguous terms of the Agreement.
Article 11, Part B, Section 3(b) clearly and unambiguously states that the
“Director’s determination shall not be appealable through the grievance
procedure.”
2. This provision coordinates with the clear and unambiguous language in
Article 9, Section 11, which states, “Wherever review is provided
elsewhere in this Agreement (e.g., probationary employees . . . ), such
review shall be exclusive and not appealable under any circumstances
under this Article.”
3. Under Article 9, Section 6, Step 4 of the Agreement I have no authority
to ignore the terms of the Agreement. Granting the Association the right
to grieve a Director’s determination would ignore and violate Article 11,
Part B, Section 3(b) and Article 9, Section 11.
4. No contractual provision grants the Association the right to challenge,
via the grievance arbitration procedure, the Department’s decision
regarding how to terminate a probationary employee.
5. Under Article 9, Section 6, Step 4 of the Agreement, I have no
authority to add such a provision or to modify the terms of the Agreement,
which bar grieving the Director’s determination.
6. Management has the inherent right to initiate employment actions. In
the management rights clause of Article 4, sections c and h, the parties
recognize that management retains the specific rights to discharge and to
the [sic] determine the basis for retention of employees. Included within
these rights is the right to determine how to terminate a probationary
employee.
-10-
7. Under Article 9, Section 6, Step 4, the arbitrator is prohibited from
substituting his or her judgment for that of the Department where the
Department is given discretion by the terms of the Agreement.
8. Although the parties recognize management’s right or discretion to
initiate disciplinary action, they also recognize the Association’s right to
challenge management’s determinations regarding discipline.
For
example, Article 9, Section 1 defines what constitutes a grievance and
what matters may be grieved. In Article 8, Part A, Section 5 and Part B,
Sections 6 and 7, the parties carefully delineated what adverse
employment actions may be grieved and what actions may not be grieved.
These examples show that, whenever the parties intended the Association
to have a right to challenge a management disciplinary determination, they
made that right clear and express and detailed the appropriate procedure.
The absence of a provision granting the Association the right to challenge
how the Department terminates a probationary employee strongly
indicates the parties’ intention that the Association does not possess such a
right.
9. As the Association points out in its Brief, it has “achieved major
inroads into the representation of probationary Troopers.” Absent these
inroads, probationary employees would have few rights and could be
terminated without any appeal, either internal or external. Each of these
“inroads” has been negotiated and is expressed in a contract provision.
None of these “inroads” is based on implication or inference. Granting the
Association the right to challenge how probationary employees are
terminated, in the absence of an express provision, would depend entirely
on implication and inference. Article 9, Section 6, Step 4 limits the
arbitrator’s authority to passing “upon alleged violations of the expressed
written provisions” of the Agreement.
10. Bargaining history shows that the Association understood it could not
challenge the Director’s determination under Section 3(b) in the grievance
arbitration procedure. The notes of the June 30, 1983 session indicate that
the Association opposed adding the last sentence to Section 3(b) because
there would be no right to appeal a Director’s determination. In spite of
the Association’s initial opposition, the parties ultimately agreed to
include the Department’s proposal without change.
11.
Granting the Association the right to grieve the Director’s
determination would have the effect of nullifying Article 9, Section 11 and
the last sentence of Article 11, Part B, Section 3(b).
12. Article 11, Part B, Section 2(b)(1) does not grant probationary
employees a right to be disciplined or the right to be terminated for
disciplinary reasons. It simply provides certain rights and protections
once management has determined that misconduct is the basis for
termination.
-11-
13. The evidence on this record is not sufficient to establish that Section
2(b)(1) has been, or will be, eviscerated, unless the Association has the
right to challenge how probationary employees are terminated. The
evidence shows that no grievances have been filed since 1984 challenging
how probationary employees are terminated until this grievance and
another one were filed in 2001. This indicates that the Department has not
sought to circumvent Section 2(b)(1) by handling all probationary
terminations under Section 3(b). If, in the future, the Association’s fears
materialize and it perceives a developing trend of terminations under
Section 3(b), which it believes should have been handled under Section
2(b), the remedy would be to negotiate an appeal procedure at the
bargaining table. As detailed above, clear contract language in Article 9
and 11 ties the hands of any arbitrator to resolve the dilemma in favor of
the Association’s position.
14. There is a second reason why Section 2(b)(1) is not eviscerated. The
Association has the right to challenge how the Department terminates a
probationary employee in the context of the internal appeal process
detailed in Section 3(b). The Association has the right to represent
probationary employees during this process and raise the issue of whether
the termination should have been handled under Section 2(b)(1).
B. For the following reasons, I further find that the Mercier’s grievance is not
arbitrable:
1. The evidence establishes that Mercier was terminated pursuant to [Art
11] Section 3 (b). He was never served with a statement of charges, the
document used to initiate disciplinary action. Instead he was served with
notice that the Department intended to separate him from employment
pursuant to Section 3.
2. The basis for discharging Mercier under [Art 11] Section 3(b) was that
his personality and temperament were not suitable for police work, as
evidenced by an alleged statement. Section 3(a) authorizes management
to consider “personality” and “temperament” when determining whether
to retain or terminate probationary employees.
3. Because Mercier’s termination was not disciplinary in nature, the
protections of Article 8 are not available by operation of Article 11, Part
B, Section 2(b)(1).
4. Because Mercier’s termination was non-disciplinary in nature, Section
3(b) bars challenging the Director’s determination in the grievance
arbitration procedure.
5. Management’s failure to issue Mercier written evaluations according to
the terms of [Art 11] Section 3(a) does not spoil its determination to
terminate him under Section 3(b). The last sentence of Section 3(a)
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features permissive, not mandatory language. It states that these
evaluations “may be considered” by management in determining to retain
or terminate employment. This language does not require management to
consider evaluations.
6. Although the Association makes excellent arguments regarding single
acts constituting misconduct and not being sufficient to establish
personality and temperament, I have no authority to pass on the merits of
these arguments because that would constitute testing the Director’s
determination in violation of Section 3(b).
The MSPTA filed an action to vacate the arbitration award and remand for arbitration.
The State defendants moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8), and the court
granted the motion, concluding the arbitrator’s decision derived its essence from the CBA.
III
This Court reviews de novo the circuit court’s grant of summary disposition. Foster v
Cone-Blanchard Machine Co, 460 Mich 696, 701; 597 NW2d 506 (1999). A motion for
summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) examines the legal basis of the complaint and is
tested by the pleadings alone. Horace v Pontiac, 456 Mich 744, 749; 575 NW2d 762 (1998).
Judicial review of labor arbitration awards is limited; a court may not review an
arbitrator’s factual findings or decision on the merits. Port Huron Area Sch Dist v PHEA, 426
Mich 143, 150; 393 NW2d 811 (1986). Further,
The legal basis underlying this policy of judicial deference is grounded in
contract: the contractual agreement to arbitrate and to accept the arbitral decision
as “final and binding.” . . . . An arbitrator’s jurisdiction and authority to resolve a
particular dispute concerning the appropriate interpretation of a collective
bargaining agreement derives exclusively from the contractual agreement of the
parties; an arbitrator possesses no general jurisdiction to resolve such matters
independent of the arbitration contract.
***
Whether an arbitrator exceeded his contractual authority is an issue for judicial
determination. [Id. at 151-152.]
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The CBA provides two methods to discharge probationary employees. The express
language of Article 11, Section 3(b), states that a termination under that section is based upon
mandatory evaluations of the probationary employees.4 The arbitrator’s decision addressed the
MSP’s right to choose whether to proceed under article 8 or article 11. However, this does not
address the argument that the MSP did not, in fact, proceed under article 11, because the decision
to terminate was not based on the supervisory evaluations as contemplated by the CBA, or that if
it did proceed under article 11, it did so in violation of the CBA because it failed to conduct
evaluations as required by article 11. The arbitrator’s only statement in this regard was that the
failure to issue evaluations was not fatal because the last sentence of Section 3(a) stating that
evaluations may be considered is permissive, not mandatory. However, this ignores that
subsection 3(a) states that the evaluations shall be performed, and subsection 3(b), which
defendants claim to have been pursuing, speaks of a decision to terminate that is based upon the
evaluations of supervisory personnel.
4
The MSPTA’s post-hearing brief argued in pertinent part:
Article 11, Part B, contains two distinct ways that a probationary employee may
be separated from the Department during that period of his career:
--by way of misconduct charges, which fall under Part B, Section 2(b)(1); and,
--by way of inadequate performance, as expressed and documented by the
command that the Department shall prepare written evaluations of the job
performance of each probationary employee [Part B, Section 3(a)].
As became apparent at the hearing on this matter, the Department, for its own
reasons, chose some time ago to abandon large chunks of Part B, Section 3. It no
longer conducts evaluations on the stated schedule, claiming that its unilateral
change of the probation time frame (via Civil Service) no longer required its
performance of said evaluations.
Yet, we are faced with a disingenuous argument contained within that same
contract paragraph: the Department claims the right to discharge without
impartial review, claiming bits and pieces of the paragraph which is [sic it] wishes
to obey and enforce at its leisure.
All contracts, be they labor or general in nature, include an exchange of promises
and performances. Put another way, with rights come necessary obligations. If
the Department claims the right to discharge outside the grievance procedure via
Part B, Section 3 [of Article 11], it must do so upon its obligation to fairly and
objectively perform evaluations upon the probationary employees.
-14-
Thus, the arbitrator’s award in this regard did not draw its essence from the CBA, and the
matter must be resubmitted to arbitration. In No. 242907, we reverse the circuit court’s grant of
summary disposition to defendant.
IV
Our disposition of No. 242907 makes it unnecessary to address the fraud claim in No.
245567. Because the matter will be resubmitted, the MSPTA will have an opportunity to present
the dealings between the MSPTA and the MSP regarding the Richardson grievance and
arbitration, discussed infra. We must address, however, the court’s assessment of costs against
the MSPTA in No. 245567.
This Court reviews the circuit court’s finding that plaintiff violated MCR 2.114(D) for
clear error. In re Attorney Fees and Costs, 233 Mich App 694, 701; 593 NW2d 589 (1999).
MCR 2.114(D) provides:
Effect of Signature. The signature of an attorney . . . constitutes a certification by
the signer that
(1) he or she has read the document;
(2) to the best of his or her knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry, the document is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
or existing law; and
(3) the document is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
MCL 600.2591 provides:
(1) Upon motion of any party, if a court finds that a civil action or defense to a
civil action was frivolous, the court . . . shall award to the prevailing party the
costs and fees incurred by that party in connection with the civil action by
assessing the costs and fees against the nonprevailing party and their attorney.
***
(3) Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) “Frivolous” means that at least 1 of the following conditions is met:
(i) The party’s primary purpose in initiating the action or asserting the
defense was to harass, embarrass or injure the prevailing party.
(ii) The party had no reasonable basis to believe that the facts underlying
that party’s legal position were in fact true.
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(iii) The party’s legal position was devoid of arguable legal merit.
There was no indication that the complaint was initiated to harass, embarrass or injure the
MSP. Nor was there any indication that the MSPTA lacked a reasonable basis to believe that the
asserted facts were untrue. The basis of the complaint was that after the arbitration, the MSPTA,
in the course of going through records regarding an unrelated matter, discovered phone logs and
e-mails disclosing that when MSP witness Capt. Darling had served as the head of the MSPTA,
he had dealings with the MSP in which he had asserted, and the MSP had accepted, that a
probationary trooper who had been terminated (Richardson) should be able to grieve the
termination under article 8, although the MSP had initially taken the position that the termination
was under article 11. The MSPTA claimed that Darling had led the arbitrator and the MSPTA to
believe that there had never been any understandings or grievances regarding the propriety of
using one article or the other, although he knew of information to the contrary. While the MSP
challenged the relevance of the Richardson arbitration, the MSPTA’s diligence in failing to bring
it forward itself, and the effect that the arbitration would have had on the arbitrator in the instant
case, the underlying factual assertions were not shown to be false.
Further, there was no basis to conclude that the complaint was not warranted by existing
law or a good faith argument for an extension of existing law, or that it was devoid of arguable
legal merit. The MSPTA claimed and supported that the nature of labor relations law is such that
the prior resolution of the issue would be of great relevance and significance. The MSPTA also
cited cases where arbitrations were set aside based on fraud. We conclude that the court abused
its discretion in granting sanctions because none of the factors of MCR 2.114(D) or MCL
600.2591 were present.
VI
Lastly, in Docket No. 243948, we need not address the propriety of the court’s denial of
MSP’s motion for summary disposition regarding the two unrelated grievances in light of our
disposition in Docket No. 242907. We further observe that the MSP cites no authority for the
proposition that a party to a CBA can avoid the dispute resolution mechanisms of the CBA by
asserting collateral estopel before a court, rather than the arbitrator.
We affirm in Docket No. 243948. We reverse and remand in No. 242907. We reverse
the grant of sanctions in No. 245567. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Helene N. White
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