PEOPLE OF MI V CECIL ARTHUR BURROUS JR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 31, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249440
Van Buren Circuit Court
LC No. 02-012842-FC
CECIL ARTHUR BURROUS, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Owens and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his conviction by a jury of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a). The trial court sentenced him to a term of 2 to 25 years
in prison. We affirm.
I. FACTS
The instant case stems from allegations that defendant sexually abused his godson when
the victim would spend the night at his house. The victim testified that he used to refer to
defendant and defendant’s wife as his aunt and uncle and acknowledged that they were his
godparents. The victim used to go over to their house between two and five times per week and
often stayed overnight. At the time, he had wanted to get away from his parents and he enjoyed
being over at defendant's house. Defendant sometimes took naps with the victim and often gave
him back rubs.
When asked if anything ever happened at defendant's house that he did not like, the
victim responded that defendant "stuck his penis in my butt." Although he did not remember
how many times this occurred, he thought it was more than ten times and could not remember a
time he stayed overnight at defendant's house when this did not happen. He did not remember
how old he was when defendant first did this, but he thought it was before he was in third grade.
The last time occurred on the day before the victim disclosed the abuse to his mother.
Defendant testified he was very close to the victim and thought of him as a son. The
victim used to spend the night at his home at least twice a week. During these visits, he would
often give the victim back rubs before he went to bed. The victim usually requested the back
rubs and always remained clothed during the massages. He never gave the victim a massage
when the victim did not want one. Additionally, defendant denied ever inserting his penis into
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the victim's rectum or touching his private parts for sexual gratification. He did not know why
the victim would make false allegations against him, but stated that before the accusations, the
victim was the most truthful child he had ever known. Following instructions and closing
argument, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Defendant appeals as
of right.
II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Defendant contends that the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to sustain his
conviction. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo challenges to convictions based on the sufficiency of the evidence.
People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). The prosecution must
introduce evidence sufficient to justify a rational trier of fact in concluding that all of the
essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Johnson, 460
Mich 720, 723; 597 NW2d 73 (1999). When reviewing the sufficiency, this Court examines the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452;
569 NW2d 641 (1997).
B. Analysis
Under MCL 750.520b(1)(a), a person is guilty of CSC-I if the person engages in sexual
penetration with another person and the victim is under the age of thirteen. People v Hack, 219
Mich App 299, 303; 556 NW2d 187 (1996). MCL 750.520a(o) defines sexual penetration as
“sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight,
of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another
person’s body.”
In the instant case, evidence of sexual penetration existed in that the victim testified that
on numerous occasions when he spent the night at defendant's home, defendant "stuck his penis
in my butt." He further explained that defendant's penis would actually be up inside of his
"bottom." In addition, a pediatrician, Dr. Collette Gushurst, testified that she examined the
victim, discovered an irregularity on the folds of his anal opening, and opined that these physical
findings were consistent with the victim's allegations. This testimony provided sufficient
evidence on the element of sexual penetration. It is undisputed that the victim is under age
thirteen. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could have found
that the prosecution proved all elements of CSC-I beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, defendant contends that insufficient evidence existed because the testimony
of the victim was not credible. He asserts that, under People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 643-644;
576 NW2d 129 (1998), a trial court may substitute its view of the credibility of a witness for that
of the jury where the witness’ testimony defies the physical realities or is so inherently
implausible that it could not be believed by a reasonable juror. However, defendant’s argument
confuses the standard for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with the standard trial
courts employ when ruling on a defendant’s motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury’s
verdict went against the great weight of the evidence. Id., 633-634. In deciding whether to grant
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such a motion, trial courts may weigh the credibility of witnesses in the limited fashion cited by
defendant. Id., 643-644. But even when reviewing a trial court’s decision regarding the great
weight of the evidence, “this Court may not attempt to resolve credibility questions anew.”
People v Gadomski, 232 Mich App 24, 28; 592 NW2d 75 (1998).
When considering claims of insufficient evidence, this Court must view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the prosecution. Lemmon, supra, 627. This includes all determinations
concerning the credibility of witnesses. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 514-515; 489 NW2d
748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Furthermore, under MCL 750.520h, “[i]t is a well
established rule that a jury may convict on the uncorroborated evidence of a CSC victim.”
Lemmon, supra, 643, n 22. Thus, sufficient evidence existed and we affirm defendant’s
conviction.
III. PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT
Next, defendant asserts that the prosecution engaged in misconduct by presenting
testimony from Trooper Erin Ginn regarding the two instances when investigators interviewed
defendant. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
Defendant failed to preserve the issue; therefore, we review it for plain error affecting his
substantial rights. People v Goodin, 257 Mich App 425, 431-432; 668 NW2d 392 (2003). We
review claims of prosecutorial misconduct on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the
defendant received a fair and impartial trial. People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629
NW2d 411 (2001). A prosecutor's good-faith effort to admit evidence cannot provide the basis
for a finding of prosecutorial misconduct. People v Abraham, 256 Mich App 265, 278-279; 662
NW2d 836 (2003).
B. Analysis
Contrary to defendant’s assertions, Trooper Ginn’s testimony concerning defendant’s
demeanor at the first interview was relevant in that it had some tendency to make a fact at issue
more or less probable. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 66; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod, remanded
450 Mich 1212; 539 NW2d 504 (1995). The record contains no indication that defendant ever
invoked his right to remain silent; therefore, her testimony concerning the second interview does
not implicate his rights under the Fifth Amendment. See People v Solmonson, __Mich App __;
__NW2d __ (#245178, rel’d 4/29/04) slip op p 4. None of the testimony elicited from Trooper
Ginn provides support for defendant’s claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, no plain error
occurred and we decline to further review the issue.
IV. ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY
Defendant also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the
prosecution to introduce testimony bolstering the truthfulness of the victim when the defense did
not attack his character for truthfulness. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
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We review decisions on whether to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. People v
Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). An abuse of discretion exists where “an
unprejudiced person would find no justification for the ruling made.” People v Rice (On
Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 439; 597 NW2d 843 (1999).
B. Analysis
Under MRE 608(a), a party may present reputation or opinion evidence supporting a
witness’ character for truthfulness “only after the character of the witness for truthfulness has
been attacked by opinion or reputation evidence or otherwise.” Lukity, supra, 489. The
prosecution may present such evidence on direct examination if a defense counsel attacks a
witness’ character for truthfulness in an opening statement. Id., citing United States v Cruz, 805
F2d 1464, 1479-1480 (CA 11, 1986); United States v Jones, 763 F2d 518, 522 (CA 2, 1985).
In Lukity, supra, 489-490, the defense counsel stated during opening arguments that the
alleged incident of sexual abuse never occurred and that testimony would show that the
complainant suffered from serious problems that may affect her ability to recount and describe
the incident. The trial court found that this statement attacked the complainant’s credibility and
allowed the prosecution to present evidence supporting her character for truthfulness. Id., 490.
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, our Supreme Court stated as follows:
Credibility may be attacked in numerous ways, e.g., demonstrating a witness'
inability to perceive or remember the event at issue. Attacking a witness'
character for truthfulness is one of the means by which a witness' credibility may
be attacked. Thus, the two terms are not synonymous; rather, character for
truthfulness is a specific aspect of credibility. [Id.]
The Court then stated that the defense counsel “did not accuse complainant of intentionally
lying,” but rather stated that she was unworthy of belief due to her emotional problems. Id.
Because the opening statement attacked the complainant’s credibility but “did not attack her
character for truthfulness, i.e., it did not suggest that she was lying” the Court held the trial court
abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to present testimony supporting the victim’s
character for truthfulness. Id., 490-491.
In contrast with Lukity, defense counsel in the instant case specifically attacked the
victim’s character for truthfulness. During his opening statement in the instant case, defense
counsel asserted that the victim enjoyed spending time with defendant and his wife Linda
because they paid attention to him and that he often complained about his own parents being too
busy to listen to him. He then raised a question as to why the victim would accuse defendant and
stated, “[O]nly [the victim] can answer that, but I think as the evidence unfolds, we may get a
glimpse of what motivated him and how the idea got into his head.” Counsel further stated that
the victim’s story contained numerous discrepancies and that investigators had made no effort to
“look for a possible motive to falsify the accusations.” Defense counsel questioned the
truthfulness of the victim’s character in his opening statement. In addition to his opening
statement, when arguing that the victim’s statements to the doctor who examined him were not
admissible under MRE 803(4), defense counsel stated that the victim had “had plenty of time to
falsify, plenty of time to decide what his story was going to be."
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Furthermore, defense counsel’s questioning of the victim’s parents made it clear that his
theory of the case was that the victim fabricated the allegations against defendant in order to get
attention from his parents. Counsel asked them numerous questions concerning the amount of
time they spent with the victim before and after the allegations were disclosed. He also inquired
into whether they initially believed the victim’s allegations.
In allowing the prosecution to present testimony concerning the victim’s character for
truthfulness, the trial court found that defendant’s arguments clearly suggested that the victim
was lying about being abused and that he fabricated the allegations in order to get attention from
his parents. Based on defense counsel’s statements, an unprejudiced person could not find that
the trial court’s determination lacked any justification. Because it found that defendant attacked
the victim’s veracity, it did not err in permitting the prosecution to present character witnesses
supporting his character for truthfulness pursuant to MRE 608(a). Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion and we affirm defendant’s conviction.
V. REBUTTAL WITNESS
Defendant next asserts that the prosecution failed to inform him that it intended to call
Robin Zollar as a rebuttal witness until part way through the fourth day of trial and argues that
the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her testimony. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court's decision regarding the appropriate remedy for noncompliance
with a discovery order for an abuse of discretion. People v Davie, 225 Mich App 592, 597-598;
571 NW2d 229 (1997).
B. Analysis
On July 1, 2002, defendant filed a request for discovery under MCR 6.201 that requested
the names and addresses of all lay and expert witnesses that the prosecution intended to call at
trial. MCR 6.201(A)(1) provides for mandatory disclosure and requires a party to disclose such
information upon request. Additionally, MCR 6.201(H) states that if a party “discovers
additional information or material subject to disclosure under this rule, the party, without further
request, must promptly notify the other party.” But where a party violates this rule, the trial
court, “in its discretion, may order that testimony or evidence be excluded, or may order another
remedy.” MCR 6.201(J).
A trial court’s exercise of discretion regarding discovery matters “involves a balancing of
the interests of the courts, the public, and the parties." Davie, supra, 598, quoting People v LoyRafuls, 198 Mich App 594, 597; 500 NW2d 480 (1993), rev'd in part on other grounds 442 Mich
915 (1993). “It requires inquiry into all the relevant circumstances, including ‘the causes and
bona fides of tardy, or total, noncompliance, and a showing by the objecting party of actual
prejudice.’" Id., quoting People v Taylor, 159 Mich App 468, 487; 406 NW2d 859 (1987).
In the instant case, defendant’s trial counsel objected to the presentation of Zollar as a
witness on the grounds that he was unfamiliar with her curriculum vitae and that due to the lack
of notice he had been unable to prepare for cross-examination. In response to this objection, the
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trial court asked defense counsel how long he had known the witness, and stated, “[Y]ou’ve been
aware for at least 15 or 20 years that she was a person who treated abused children and testified
in court as to those areas.” Defense counsel replied, “I know that she’s testified in court with
regard to child abuse cases.” He also testified that he had known of her for quite some time. The
trial court noted:
I don’t want this record to reflect that this is some stranger that you just came
upon and never heard of before. It’s someone from your own county that has
practiced in this area for decades whom you’re well aware of, and you may not
know the CV [curriculum vitae], but I do not want a false impression left on this
record that you’ve been blindsided by some unknown expert that you haven’t a
clue about.
Furthermore, the record indicates that during jury voir dire on the first day of trial, the
prosecution named Zollar as a potential witness.
Under MCR 6.201(H), the prosecution was required to promptly notify defendant that it
intended to call Zollar as a rebuttal witness. However, the trial court had the discretion to allow
the testimony after balancing the interests of the court and the parties. The trial court analyzed
the situation, taking into account defense counsel’s status as a former judge in the area and
Zollar’s status as a local expert who was well-known in the legal community. Further, defendant
was advised on the first day of trial (February 4, 2003) that the prosecution intended to call
Zollar. Zollar testified on February 11, 2003, allowing defense counsel a full week to investigate
her curriculum vitae and prepare for her testimony as a witness. Defendant failed to establish
“actual prejudice” as required by Davie, supra, 598. Thus, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to exclude Zollar’s testimony.
In addition to his assertion that the prosecution failed to comply with the discovery rules,
defendant contends that Zollar’s testimony exceeded the proper scope of rebuttal evidence.
Decisions concerning the admissibility of rebuttal evidence are within the discretion of the trial
court and “will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” People v Figgures, 451
Mich 390, 398; 547 NW2d 673 (1996), citations omitted. But because defendant failed to
preserve his claim that the testimony exceeded the proper scope of rebuttal evidence, we review
the issue for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460 Mich
750, 764-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
In Figgures, supra, 399, our Supreme Court defined the scope of rebuttal as follows:
Rebuttal evidence is admissible to contradict, repel, explain or disprove evidence
produced by the other party and tending directly to weaken or impeach the same.
The question whether rebuttal is proper depends on what proofs the defendant
introduced and not on merely what the defendant testified about on crossexamination.
The Court further stated that the test for whether a trial court properly admitted rebuttal evidence
“is not whether the evidence could have been offered in the prosecution’s case in chief.” Id.
Rather, admissibility depends on “whether the evidence is properly responsive to evidence
introduced or a theory developed by the defendant.” Id., citing People v Bettistea, 173 Mich App
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106; 434 NW2d 138 (1988); Nolte v Port Huron Bd of Ed, 152 Mich App 637, 645; 394 NW2d
54 (1986). “As long as evidence is responsive to material presented by the defense, it is properly
classified as rebuttal, even if it overlaps evidence admitted in the prosecutor's case in chief.” Id.
In the instant case, although some of Zollar’s testimony could have been presented in the
prosecution’s case in chief, the record shows that it was presented in response to evidence
introduced and theories developed by defendant. Based on Figgures, supra, 399, the testimony
did not exceed the scope of proper rebuttal. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and no
plain error occurred.
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Bill Schuette
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