CHRISTOPHER D BENTFIELD V BRANDON'S LANDING BOAT BAR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTOPHER D. BENTFIELD,
UNPUBLISHED
August 31, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
BRANDON’S LANDING BOAT BAR, DAVID
WATTS, INC., and DAVID WATTS,
No. 248795
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 02-039613-NO
Defendant-Appellees.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Meter and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from a trial court order granting defendants’ motion for
summary disposition, pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10), in this slip-and-fall negligence case. We
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
I
Plaintiff lived in the upstairs portion of Brandon’s Landing Boat Bar. In January 2000,
plaintiff left the premises to go shopping. Upon returning, plaintiff claims that he slipped and
fell on an accumulation of ice and suffered a physical injury.
Plaintiff filed a complaint on April 1, 2002, alleging that “on or about January 18, 2000,
[p]laintiff was lawfully upon [d]efendants’ premises as a business invitee and tenant, when he
slipped on an unreasonably dangerous accumulation of ice and/or snow, fell down, and suffered
physical injury.” Plaintiff contended that defendants failed to inspect and maintain the premises
in question. On December 18, 2002, defendants, in a motion for summary disposition,
contended that the condition encountered was open and obvious and that there was no evidence
that defendants had notice. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary disposition
because there was no genuine issue of material fact with regard to whether the danger posed by
the snow and ice was open and obvious, and that there were no special aspects. Plaintiff, then,
moved for reconsideration arguing that defendants motion should have been denied because
plaintiff was owed a statutory duty under MCL 554.139 to keep the premises in reasonable
repair. Plaintiff further contended that that open and obvious doctrine cannot be used as defense
with respect to a violation of MCL 554.139. In response, defendants’ contended that plaintiff’s
argument with regard to MCL 554.139 was untimely. The trial court denied the motion, stating
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that plaintiff “merely present[s] the same issues as ruled upon previously by this Court either
expressly or by reasonable implication.”
II
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition because the
danger posed by the ice covered by snow was not in fact open and obvious and that if it was,
special aspects existed, which removed it from the open and obvious doctrine. We disagree.
On appeal, a trial court's decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de
novo. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). Under MCR
2.116(C)(10), summary disposition is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.” A
motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support
for a claim. Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); Mino v
Clio School District, 255 Mich App 60, 67; 661 NW2d 586 (2003). When deciding a motion for
summary disposition, a court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions and
other documentary evidence submitted in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Corley v Detroit Bd of Ed, 470 Mich 274, 278; 681 NW2d 342 (2004); J & J Farmer Leasing,
Inc v Citizens Ins Co, 260 Mich App 607, 612; 680 NW2d 423 (2004).
To establish a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) that the defendant breached the duty; (3) that the
defendant's breach of duty proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries; and (4) that the plaintiff
suffered damages. Case v Consumers Power Co, 463 Mich 1, 6; 615 NW2d 17 (2000).
Generally, an invitor owes a duty to his invitees to exercise reasonable care to protect them from
an unreasonable risk of harm caused by a dangerous condition on the land. Lugo v Ameritech
Corp, 464 Mich 512, 516; 629 NW2d 384 (2001). Defendants do not dispute that plaintiff, as a
tenant, was an invitee. An invitor owes a duty to his invitees to inspect the premises and make
any necessary repairs or warn of discovered hazards. Stitt v Holland Abundant Life Fellowship,
462 Mich 591, 597; 614 NW2d 88 (2000). An invitor’s liability must arise from active
negligence, through an unreasonable act or omission, or through a condition of which the invitor
knew or a condition of such a character or duration that the invitor should have known of it.
Clark v Kmart Corp, 465 Mich 416, 419; 634 NW2d 347 (2001); Hampton v Waste Mgt of
Michigan, Inc, 236 Mich App 598, 604; 601 NW2d 172 (1999). This duty does not extend to
conditions from which an unreasonable risk cannot be anticipated or to dangers so obvious that
an invitee can be expected to discover them himself. Williams v Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc,
429 Mich 495, 500; 418 NW2d 381 (1988); Ellsworth v Hotel Corp of America, 236 Mich App
185, 195; 600 NW2d 129 (1999). An invitor must warn of hidden defects, but is not required to
eliminate or warn of open and obvious dangers unless he should anticipate the harm despite the
invitee's knowledge of it. Lugo, supra; Riddle v McLouth Steel Products, 440 Mich 85, 90-96;
485 NW2d 676 (1992). Basically, the "open and obvious doctrine," attacks the duty element that
a plaintiff must establish in a prima facie negligence case. Lugo, supra at 516. "The test for an
open and obvious danger is whether 'an average user with ordinary intelligence [would] have
been able to discover the danger and the risk presented upon casual inspection.'" Abke v
Vandenberg, 239 Mich App 359, 361-362; 608 NW2d 73 (2000) quoting Novotney v Burger
King Corp (On Remand), 198 Mich App 470, 474-475; 499 NW2d 379 (1993).
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In the present case, plaintiff argues that the ice he slipped on was concealed by snow and,
thus, was not open and obvious. Plaintiff testified that he could not remember whether there had
been snow on the ground at the time of his fall; nor could David Watts remember the pertinent
weather conditions. Sarah Tait, plaintiff’s girlfriend, however, testified that she “clearly”
remembered the existence of snow, and Mark Anderson testified that there was snow
“everywhere.” Moreover, plaintiff testified that, after he fell, he noticed water dripping from an
overhang into the area. Plaintiff also testified that he had informed defendants about the dripping
water at certain times in the past and that he had seen ice in the past at the spot where he fell.
The evidence establishes the existence of an open and obvious condition, even when
viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Given the snow on the ground, the dripping
overhang, and the history of ice being at the spot in question, we conclude that an average person
with ordinary intelligence would have realized that a danger of slipping existed and would have
been able to discover the danger and risk of the ice upon casual inspection. See, generally, Joyce
v Rubin, 249 Mich App 231, 239; 642 NW2d 360 (2002).
Plaintiff further contends that even if the condition was open and obvious, it still was
unavoidable and presented an unreasonable risk of harm. As discussed, the danger of the ice was
open and obvious and a failure to warn theory cannot establish liability. Bertrand v Alan Ford,
Inc, 449 Mich 606, 614; 537 NW2d 185 (1995). But “if special aspects of a condition make
even an open and obvious risk unreasonably dangerous, the premises possessor has a duty to
undertake reasonable precautions to protect invitees from that risk.” Lugo, supra at 517.
Specifically, in Lugo, supra at 517-519, our Supreme Court provided the following with regard
to open and obvious conditions:
[W]ith regard to open and obvious dangers, the critical question is whether there
is evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether there
are truly "special aspects" of the open and obvious condition that differentiate the
risk from typical open and obvious risks so as to create an unreasonable risk of
harm, i.e., whether the "special aspect" of the condition should prevail in
imposing liability upon the defendant or the openness and obviousness of the
condition should prevail in barring liability. . . . Only those special aspects that
give rise to a uniquely high likelihood of harm or severity of harm if the risk is
not avoided will serve to remove that condition from the open and obvious
danger doctrine. [Citations and footnotes omitted.]
Basically, special aspects are those conditions that create a high risk of harm or severity of harm
if not avoided. Lugo, supra at 518-519. The Lugo Court provided two scenarios to demonstrate
when a condition could be considered unavoidable or unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 518-519.
The Lugo Court noted that in the following situation the open and obvious doctrine would not
apply because the condition would be essentially unavoidable:
[A] commercial building with only one exit for the general public where
the floor is covered with standing water. While the condition is open and
obvious, a customer wishing to exit the store must leave the store through
the water. In other words, the open and obvious condition is effectively
unavoidable. [ Id. at 518.]
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Lugo, supra, next discussed the special aspects of a thirty foot unguarded and unmarked pit in a
parking lot as posing an unreasonable risk of severe harm as:
The condition might well be open and obvious, and one would likely be
capable of avoiding the danger. Nevertheless, this situation would present
such a substantial risk of death or severe injury to one who fell in the pit
that it would be unreasonably dangerous to maintain the condition, at
least absent reasonable warnings or other remedial measures being taken.
[Id.]
Lugo has clearly established a high standard for determining what constitutes a special aspect.
Without the existence of “special aspects,” an action premised on a typical open and obvious
condition will be barred by the open and obvious danger doctrine. Id. at 519-520.
Applying the principles established in Lugo, supra, we do not find that the alleged danger
in the instant case was unavoidable or that it presented a uniquely high likelihood of severe harm
or death. Here, plaintiff acknowledged that he could have taken another route to the door of the
building instead of traversing the area where he had seen ice in the past. Thus, there was no
unavoidable risk like that in Lugo, as plaintiff was not forced to traverse the path he did; he could
have taken the path he had safely taken earlier. Moreover, and significantly, there was nothing
particularly unusual about a layer of ice and a layer of snow existing on the sidewalk such that
the danger caused by it was unreasonable.1 See, generally, Joyce, supra at 243; see also Corey v
Davenport College of Business (On Remand), 251 Mich App 1, 7; 649 NW2d 392 (2002). The
condition that led to plaintiff’s fall simply did not have “special aspects” that made it
“unreasonably dangerous.” See Joyce, supra at 242. The trial court correctly determined that
there were no special aspects alleged by the plaintiff making the path unreasonably dangerous.
Although his argument is not entirely clear, plaintiff seems to contend that summary disposition
was inappropriate because the ice on which he slipped was formed “unnaturally.” Plaintiff
seems to imply that “unnatural” formations of ice are exempt from the open and obvious
doctrine. However, plaintiff has abandoned this argument by failing to cite any case law to
support it. See Palo Group Foster Care, Inc v Michigan Dept of Social Services, 228 Mich App
140, 152; 577 NW2d 200 (1998).
III
Plaintiff next argues that summary disposition was not proper with regard to his claim
because defendants’ breached statutory duties imposed by MCL 554.139. Plaintiff did not
specifically raise this claim until his motion for reconsideration.
1
We note that plaintiff likely would have had an easier time traversing the sidewalk had he not
been carrying so many items in his hands. Plaintiff, during his deposition, stated “[I]f I didn’t
have any bags in my hands, I probably could have seen down.” Over his counsel’s objection,
plaintiff reiterated that “could have” seen the icy patch if he had looked down before his fall, but
refused to state he “would have.”
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With regard to a motion for reconsideration, MCR 2.119(F)(3) provides:
Generally, and without restricting the discretion of the court, a motion for
rehearing or reconsideration which merely presents the same issues ruled on by
the court, either expressly or by reasonable implication, will not be granted. The
moving party must demonstrate a palpable error by which the court and the
parties have been misled and show that a different disposition of the motion must
result from correction of the error.
We review for an abuse of discretion a trial court’s ruling on a motion for reconsideration.
Churchman v Rickerson, 240 Mich App 223, 233; 611 NW2d 333 (2000). To the extent plaintiff
raises a question of law, we will address the issue de novo. See Eggleston v Bio-Medical
Applications of Detroit, Inc, 468 Mich 29, 32; 658 NW2d 139 (2003).
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration arguing that defendants’ motion should have been
denied because plaintiff was owed a statutory duty under MCL 554.139 to keep the premises in
reasonable repair. The trial court denied the motion, stating that plaintiff “merely present[s] the
same issues as ruled upon previously by this Court either expressly or by reasonable
implication.”
MCL 554.139 imposes a statutory obligation upon lessors of residential premises.
Plaintiff correctly points out that the open and obvious doctrine cannot be used to avoid a
specific statutory duty. Woodbury v Bruckner, 467 Mich 922, 922; 658 NW2d 482 (2002);
O'Donnell v Garasic, 259 Mich App 569, 581-582; 676 NW2d 213 (2004); see also Jones v
Enertel, Inc, 467 Mich 266, 170; 650 NW2d 334 (2002). In O'Donnell, supra 518, this Court
recently provided:
The open and obvious danger doctrine is not available to deny liability to
an injured invitee or licensee on leased or licensed residential premises
when such premises present a material breach of the specific statutory
duty imposed on owners of residential properties to maintain their
premises in reasonable repair and in accordance with the health and
safety laws, as provided in MCL 554.139(1)(a) and (b).
Based on the recent case law and on the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint,2 it was
“palpable error,” MCR 2.119(F)(3), for summary disposition to be granted on plaintiff’s claim
based on the open and obvious doctrine, without taking into account defendant’s statutory duties
under MCL 554.139. The trial court in its denial of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration
provided that the issue was “ruled upon previously by this Court either expressly or by
reasonable implication.” The trial court did not address “expressly or by reasonable implication”
the elements of MCL 554.139 and, if it did, it errantly granted summary disposition in favor of
defendants based on an application of the open and obvious danger doctrine. Thus, we find that
2
Plaintiff, in his complaint, did base his claims on the fact that he was on defendant’s premises
as a “tenant.”
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the trial court has abused its discretion in denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration,3 or if it
has addressed that issue, plaintiff has demonstrated error, and we reverse the trial court's grant of
summary disposition and remand to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with
O'Donnell, supra; i.e., to determine whether defendants’ maintained the premises “in reasonable
repair and in compliance with state and local safety laws.” Like in O’Donnell, supra, factual
questions exist in the present case, regarding the applicability of these exceptions to the open and
obvious danger doctrine.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
3
Typically, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny a motion for reconsideration
where a legal theory or facts could have been argued before entry of the trial court’s original
order. See Charbenau v Wayne Co Gen Hosp, 158 Mich App 730, 733; 405 NW2d 151 (1987).
But we note that in light of the fact that trial court did not base its denial on the fact that plaintiff
did not specifically make the claim prior to the trial court’s original order and the recentness of
the case law supporting defendant’s claim; an abuse of discretion exists. The case supporting
plaintiff’s position was decided December 26, 2002. Plaintiff’s complaint was filed April 1,
2002 and brief in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary disposition was filed March 13,
2003. Technically, plaintitff could have raised the issue in his brief in opposition to defendants'
motion for summary disposition or at the hearing, but, instead, did not raise the issue until his
motion for reconsideration.
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