WEXFORD MEDICAL GROUP V CITY OF CADILLAC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MCLAREN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER
and MCLAREN MEDICAL MANAGEMENT,
INC.,
UNPUBLISHED
August 24, 2004
Petitioners-Appellants,
v
No. 244386
Tax Tribunal
LC No. 00-268590
CITY OF OWOSSO,
Respondent-Appellee.
WEXFORD MEDICAL GROUP,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v
No. 250197
Tax Tribunal
LC No. 00-276304
CITY OF CADILLAC,
Respondent-Appellee.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and White and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In Docket No. 244386, petitioners McLaren Regional Medical Center (“MRMC”) and
McLaren Medical Management, Inc. (“MMM”), appeal as of right from the judgment of the
Michigan Tax Tribunal denying their requests for exemption from respondent City of Owosso’s
ad valorem taxation of their real property under the General Property Tax Act, MCL 211.1 et
seq., for tax years 1999 and 2000. Petitioners sought exemption from taxation under MCL
211.7r (hospital or public health purposes) and MCL 211.7o (charitable institution). In Docket
No. 250197, petitioner Wexford Medical Group (“Wexford”) appeals as of right from the Tax
Tribunal’s judgment denying its request for exemption from respondent City of Cadillac’s ad
valorem taxation of Wexford’s real and personal property for tax years 2000 and 2001. Wexford
also sought exemption under MCL 211.7r and MCL 211.7o, as well as MCL 211.9(a) (personal
property of charitable institution exempt). We affirm.
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The standard governing our review of a decision of the Tax Tribunal is set forth in
ProMed Healthcare v Kalamazoo, 249 Mich App 490, 491-492; 644 NW2d 47 (2002), quoting
Rose Hill Center, Inc v Holly Twp, 224 Mich App 28, 31; 568 NW2d 332 (1997):
Judicial review of a determination by the Tax Tribunal is limited to determining
whether the tribunal made an error of law or applied a wrong [legal] principle.
Generally, this Court will defer to the Tax Tribunal's interpretation of a statute
that it is delegated to administer. The factual findings of the tribunal are final,
provided that they are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence
on the whole record. [Citations omitted.]
A petitioner must establish its entitlement to exemption by a preponderance of the evidence.
ProMed Healthcare, supra at 495. Tax exemption statutes are strictly construed in favor of the
taxing authority. Michigan United Conservation Clubs v Lansing Twp, 423 Mich 661, 664; 378
NW2d 737 (1985).
Docket No. 250197
On appeal, Wexford argues that it was entitled to the charitable institution exemptions
under MCL 211.7o and MCL 211.9(a), because its health care services at the subject property are
available to the general public without restriction, regardless of the ability to pay, and lessen the
burdens of government. We disagree.
As in ProMed Healthcare, supra at 500, Wexford failed to present evidence that its
“provision of charitable medical care constituted anything more than an incidental part of its
operations.” Specifically, the evidence indicated that Wexford provided no-cost services to only
two people in 2000, and eleven people in 2001, which amounted to writing off $129.13 in 2000,
and $2,229.09 in 2001. Thus, the Tax Tribunal properly concluded:
This case cannot be distinguished from Pro[M]ed [Healthcare]. While, unlike
Pro[M]ed [Healthcare], Petitioner is able to document the number of individuals
it has served under its charity care policy, serving 13 patients under that program
in [a] two-year time period is not sufficient for a medical practice that has up to
44,000 patient visits per year . . . [and] that Petitioner’s current operating budget
was approximately $10 million.
Further, the Tax Tribunal did not err in concluding that Wexford’s financial losses from
maintaining an open-door policy and accepting an unlimited number of Medicare and Medicaid
patients did not render it a charitable institution. The services provided to these patients was not
charity. Rather, they were performed in exchange for payment from the governmental programs.
That the amount of payment under these programs often does not cover the cost of providing the
service does not change the character of the service from service in exchange for payment to
charity. Further, it is undisputed that Wexford’s aim is to become profitable.
Nor did the Tax Tribunal err in rejecting Wexford’s argument that it qualified as a
charitable institution because it provided health care services in a “health professional shortage
area.” While Wexford’s presence in the community is laudable, as is the presence of other health
care professionals, the services were, nevertheless, with the exception of thirteen patients,
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performed in exchange for compensation. The Tribunal did not err in concluding that Wexford
failed to establish that it was a charitable institution.
The Tax Tribunal also did not err in determining that Wexford was not entitled to an
exemption on the basis that the property was used as a hospital or for public health purposes
under MCL 211.7r. In Rose Hill Center, Inc, supra at 33, the Court looked to a dictionary
definition of “public health”:
[t]he art and science of protecting and improving community health by means of
preventative medicine, health education, communicable disease control, and the
application of the social and sanitary sciences. [Id., quoting The American
Heritage Dictionary: Second College Edition.]
In ProMed Healthcare, supra at 500, this Court held that the public health exemption under
MCL 211.7r is not available for "a fairly typical medical practice, where patients are expected to
pay for medical care received, either through private or governmental insurance programs." The
Court reasoned:
If we were to accept ProMed’s argument and reverse the Tax Tribunal’s ruling in
the present case, we would in effect be granting tax-exempt status to every
doctor’s office in the state, as well as every organization offering health-related
services, as long as those organizations are structured as nonprofit corporations
and maintain policies of offering some “appropriate” level of charity medical
care to indigent persons. We cannot conclude that the Legislature intended MCL
211.7o and 211.7r to create such a result. [ProMed Healthcare, supra at 500501.]
The Tax Tribunal found that Wexford’s operations were similar to the previous Medical
Arts Group and those provided by Dr. Betts-Barbus at her own private medical practice, and that
Wexford’s operations parallel a typical private medical clinic, rather than an organization that
provides public health services. The Tax Tribunal further found that the services that Wexford
claims as serving public health purposes were “inherent to the medical profession.” These
findings are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record.
Because the evidence disclosed that the property was used to operate a fairly typical medical
office, the Tax tribunal did not err in concluding that the exemption under MCL 211.7r was not
available. ProMed Healthcare, supra at 500-501.
Docket No. 244386
The Tax Tribunal did not err in finding that MRMC and MMM were not entitled to the
charitable exemption under MCL 211.7o. Under ProMed Healthcare, supra at 499, petitioners
were required to show that “the organization’s activities, taken as a whole, constitute a charitable
gift for the benefit of the general public without restriction or for the benefit of an indefinite
number of persons.” Neither MMM nor MRMC made that showing. Rather, the evidence
disclosed that the total revenue for the subject property was $533,082.08 in 1998 and
$579,792.12 in 1999. During the same time, the family medical practice operated by MMM
granted only $271.40 of services to charity patients, and generally only when its collection
efforts failed. Further, there was no evidence that the laboratory draw station, the weight
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management clinic or the physical therapy program operated by MRMC granted any charity.
And, to the extent MMM and MRMC argue that the clinic’s open-door policy and its acceptance
of Medicaid patients without limitation renders it a charitable institution, it is no different from
Wexford. Thus, the Tax Tribunal did not err in finding that neither MRMC nor MMM were
entitled to an exemption as a charitable institution.
The Tax Tribunal also did not err in concluding that MRMC and MMM were not entitled
to the hospital or public health exemption under MCL 211.7r. Regarding MMM, the Tax
Tribunal concluded that MCL 211.7r did not apply because MMM did not own the property
during the tax years in question. We need not review this issue because we conclude that like
Wexford, MMM did not establish that it operated other than as a typical private medical clinic,
rather than an organization that provides public health services. ProMed Healthcare, supra. The
focus of the services provided was the individual patient, rather than the public at large. While
some public health services were indeed provided, these were limited and would not support a
finding that the property was used for public health purposes.
The Tax Tribunal also properly concluded that MRMC was not entitled to the hospital or
public health exemption under MCR 211.7r. First, MRMC did not operate a hospital at the
subject property as defined by MCL 333.20106. An MRMC representative acknowledged that
the subject property was not a hospital, and that the laboratory draw station, and the weight
management and physical therapy programs operated by MRMC on the premises were
“extensions of hospital outpatient departments.” Accordingly, the Tax Tribunal did not err in
finding that “MRMC is not using the subject property for purposes unique to the operation of an
inpatient hospital but for purposes that are commonly performed in non-hospital settings.”
Further, MRMC did not establish that it was entitled to the public health exemption under
MCR 211.7r. The record adequately supports the Tax Tribunal’s finding that “[t]he central focus
of MRMC's activities . . . is medical care and treatment of individual patients and not the
community at large.” The Tax Tribunal’s conclusion that the Legislature did not intend that
“every nonprofit organization offering health-related services would qualify for a public health
exemption” is consistent with this Court’s decision in ProMed Healthcare, supra. The Tax
Tribunal did not err in finding that MRMC was not entitled to the public health exemption under
MCR 211.7r.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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