IN RE ROBERT SCOTT MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DAVION DAVIS and
DEARIOUS DAVIS, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
August 19, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 252346
Berrien Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2002-000113-NA
HOLLY COPE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DOUGLAS DAVIS,
Respondent.
In the Matter of ROBERT SCOTT, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 253346
Berrien Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2003-000040-NA
HOLLY COPE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ROBERT SCOTT,
Respondent.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cooper and Kelly, JJ.
-1-
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondent-appellant appeals from two orders, the first
terminating her parental rights to the minor children Davion Davis and Dearious Davis pursuant
to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g), the second terminating her parental rights to the minor child
Robert Scott pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (l). We affirm.
The two older children, Davion and Dearious, came into care when respondent-appellant
was arrested and incarcerated. Robert was in the care of his paternal grandmother under a power
of attorney, but respondent-appellant revoked that instrument while incarcerated, leaving Robert
without a suitable caregiver. Prior to her incarceration, respondent-appellant had a long-standing
drug problem, and indeed tested positive for cocaine and marijuana when arrested. She had no
stable housing and was moving among several residences. She had a criminal history, including
possession with intent to distribute illegal substances. Respondent-appellant was subject to
severe domestic violence in her relationship with the father of Davion and Dearious, to the point
that she avoided prenatal care when pregnant with Dearious because of the signs of abuse on her
body. During the proceedings in the instant matter, respondent-appellant was sentenced to
incarceration for eighteen months to four years for conspiracy to commit unarmed robbery.
Respondent-appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for termination,
asserting on appeal that termination was improper because petitioner failed to provide any
services directed at reunification. In general, when a child is removed from the custody of the
parents, the agency is required to make reasonable efforts to rectify the conditions that caused the
child’s removal by adopting a service plan. MCL 712A.18f(1), (2), (4). However, services are
not required in all situations. In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26, n 4; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).
MCL 712A.18f(1)(b) requires the agency to justify its decision not to provide services to a
family. Id. We conclude that it is reasonable for the agency to defer services until a parent is
released from incarceration. We note that, after her conviction for conspiracy to commit
unarmed robbery, respondent-appellant was imprisoned in Plymouth, Michigan, a substantial
distance from Berrien County where these proceedings took place. Respondent-appellant never
contacted her social worker while incarcerated.
The trial court did not clearly err by finding with respect to all three children that at least
one statutory ground for termination was established by clear and convincing evidence. MCL
712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 364-365; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The principal
conditions that led to adjudication concerning Davion and Dearious were respondent-appellant’s
incarceration, her lack of stable housing, and her failure to properly care for the children, as
evidenced by the fact that Dearious was ill with mucus over half his face and respondentappellant lacked any clothing or supplies for him. The conditions of adjudication concerning
Robert similarly included respondent-appellant’s incarceration and the absence of any
appropriate person to care for the child.
As respondent-appellant remained incarcerated at the time of both termination trials,
clearly the primary condition of both adjudications continued to exist. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Moreover, the trial court correctly found that the conditions of adjudication would not be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the ages of the children. At the time of the first
termination trial relating to Davion and Dearious, respondent-appellant’s earliest possible release
date was seven months away. Upon release she would need to carry out her parent-agency
-2-
agreement and address several substantial barriers to reunification including her history of drug
use, lack of stable housing, and long-term emotional instability. A social worker testified that
this process would take six months at a minimum. Even that timetable was highly uncertain
since respondent-appellant had not completed a psychological and parenting assessment due to
her incarceration. We cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it found that waiting
thirteen months at a minimum for the possibility of reunification was an unreasonable time
considering the children’s ages. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i). Similarly at the time of the
termination trial relating to Robert, respondent-appellant was approximately five months from a
possible early release, and eleven months at a minimum from being in a position to care for the
minor child. Again, given the young age of the child, and as he had not seen respondentappellant since he was two months old, the trial court properly found eleven months was too long
to wait.
The trial court’s termination of parental rights to all three children under MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) was also warranted by the evidence. Clearly, respondent-appellant failed to
provide proper care and custody for Davion and Dearious when she became incarcerated, and for
Robert when she revoked the power of attorney of his caregiver while incarcerated. The same
evidence that showed there was no reasonable likelihood that the conditions of adjudication
would be rectified within a reasonable time, considering the ages of the children, equally
established that there is no reasonable likelihood that respondent-appellant will be able to
provide proper care and custody for the children within a reasonable time considering their ages.
MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). The trial court did not clearly err in so finding.
Respondent-appellant’s parental rights to Robert were also terminated under MCL
712A.19b(3)(l). The earlier termination of parental rights to Davion and Dearious supplied the
basis for this action. The trial court’s action was not clearly erroneous. Respondent-appellant’s
contention that this result was not intended by the Legislature is defeated by the plain statutory
language of subsection (l). The Legislature must have intended the language it plainly
expressed, and the statute must be enforced as written. Frasier v Model Coverall Service, Inc.,
182 Mich App 741, 744; 453 NW2d 301 (1990). We note that subsection (l) is, however, subject
to the provision of MCL 712A.19b(5), permitting the trial court to deny termination where
statutory grounds have been established if “termination of parental rights to the child is clearly
not in the child’s best interests.” Id.
However, no clear error appears in the trial court’s best interests determinations. Robert
was fifteen months old at the time of the termination trial and, having last seen respondentappellant at two months of age, was not bonded with her. He was doing well in a foster family
that wishes to adopt him. Respondent-appellant could not resume care of Robert for nearly a
year. Her prospects for rehabilitation thereafter are uncertain, as she had not undergone any
assessment or carried out the parent-agency agreement due to her incarceration. Under these
circumstances, the trial court’s determination that termination was consistent with Robert’s best
interests was not clearly erroneous. Similarly, Davion and Dearious are young children facing a
-3-
lengthy wait preceding even a possibility of reunification. The record indicated that both children
did well in foster care, appeared happy, and made progress learning boundaries and rules. The
trial court properly found that termination was not contrary to their best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
-4-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
