KIMBERLY BERMUDEZ V JANET A LEE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KIMBERLY BERMUDEZ, Personal
Representative for the Estate of ANTHONY
BERMUDEZ, DIANE CRANMER, Next Friend
of Shaun Cranmer and Kyle Cranmer, Minors, and
GLENN T. HEINTZELMAN, Personal
Representative for the Estate of JARED A.
HEINTZELMAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2004
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 249609
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 02-000384-NI
JANET A. LEE,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
CAPITAL AREA TRANSPORTATION
AUTHORITY, GLENN T. HEINTZELMAN and
KATHY L. HEINTZELMAN,
Defendants.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Hoekstra, JJ.
FITZGERALD, J. (dissenting).
The majority concludes that it need not decide whether plaintiffs came forward with
sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant Lee’s conduct amounted to gross
negligence because they conclude that plaintiffs did not come forward with sufficient evidence to
support a finding that Lee’s actions were “the” proximate cause of the accident. I disagree.
In denying Lee’s motion for summary disposition, the trial court concluded that there was
a factual issue with regard to whether Lee’s conduct amounted to gross negligence. I agree with
this conclusion.
Gross negligence is defined as “conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack
of concern for whether an injury results.” MCL 691.1407(2)(c). If reasonable jurors could
honestly reach different conclusions as to whether conduct constitutes gross negligence under
-1-
MCL 691.1407(2)(c), the issue is a factual question for the jury. Jackson v Saginaw County, 458
Mich 141, 146-147; 580 NW2d 870 (1998).
In this case, plaintiffs alleged that defendant Lee operated the CATA bus in a reckless
manner by failing to keep the bus under control, failing to maintain a proper look-out for other
traffic and traffic conditions, failing to obey traffic devices, failing to yield to traffic with the
right-of-way, and failing to operate the bus at a careful and prudent speed. Viewing the facts in
the light most favorable to plaintiffs, defendant Lee expressed that she was in a hurry to run her
route, she went through an amber light at the intersection immediately preceding the intersection
where the collision occurred, she was traveling in excess of the posted speed limit, and she
passed through a red light when proceeding through the intersection where the collision
occurred. Reasonable minds could conclude that defendant Lee should have recognized that
speeding in a bus through an intersection without the right of way could result in a collision.1
Reasonable minds could disagree about whether such conduct demonstrated “a substantial lack
of concern for whether an injury results.” MCL 691.1407(2).
The trial court did not address the issue of whether Lee’s actions were “the” proximate
cause of the injuries. The majority states that “even considering the evidence in a light most
favorable to the plaintiffs, the light was not red on Shiawassee when the bus entered the
intersection,” and that “a reasonable fact finder would almost certainly conclude that, when
plaintiffs’ car entered the intersection, the light on Larch was red.” Thus, the majority concludes
that Lee’s actions were at most “a” proximate cause of the accident. I disagree.
Defendant Lee argues on appeal, consistent with the argument at the hearing on the
motion, that Lee could not be “the” proximate cause of the accident because the plaintiffs alleged
in their complaint that the conduct of Jerald Heintzelman was a proximate cause of the accident.
However, an accident can have more than one proximate cause. The issue is whether Lee was
“the” proximate cause of the accident. At the hearing on the motion, counsel for plaintiffs and
defendant Lee agreed that there was conflicting testimony, and that a credibility contest would be
presented, with regard to the color of the lights on both Larch and Shiawassee at the time the
parties entered the intersection. Under these circumstances, I would affirm the order denying
Lee’s motion for summary disposition.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
1
I am cognizant of past Supreme Court decisions holding that “mere excessive speed by itself
does not constitute willful and wanton misconduct in the operation of an automobile” or gross
negligence. See, e.g., Piscopo v Fruciano, 307 Mich 433, 437; 12 NW2d 329 (1943); Bielawaski
v Nicks, 290 Mich 401; 287 NW 560 (1939). The present case is factually distinguishable in that
it involves a city bus, as well as additional allegations of negligence beyond mere excessive
speed.
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.