PEOPLE OF MI V JOSE ALBERTO ROLON TORRES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249024
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-179429-FH
JOSE ALBERTO ROLON TORRES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Smolenski and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
A jury convicted defendant of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of
cocaine, MCLA 333.7401(2)(a)(iv). The trial court sentenced him to two to twenty years’
imprisonment as a habitual offender, MCLA 769.12. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
I. Basic Facts and Proceedings
An unnamed person informed police that he had bought cocaine on two separate
occasions from a woman at 48 Marquette Street in the city of Pontiac. Police officers executed a
search warrant on the house. When police entered the house, they found defendant and his wife
sitting on the living room coach. Notably, defendant’s wife physically matches the description
of the woman in the search warrant. Police found three grams of cocaine inside a sock in the
living room closet, and a plate with cocaine residue and a razorblade in the laundry room.
After police found the cocaine, Sergeant Miller advised defendant of his Miranda1 rights,
which defendant then expressly waived in writing. When Sergeant Miller asked defendant if he
took responsibility for the cocaine, defendant stated, “yes.”
II. The Voluntariness of Defendant’s Statements to Police
Defendant argues that his statements to police were involuntary because (1) police
impliedly threatened to arrest his wife for possession/distribution of the found cocaine, and (2)
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1062; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966)
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defendant, who primarily spoke Spanish, could not have voluntarily waived his Miranda rights
without the aid of an interpreter.2 We disagree.
With respect to a Walker3 hearing, this Court will defer to the trial court’s ability to view
the evidence and will not disturb the court’s findings unless they are clearly erroneous. People v
Daoud, 462 Mich 621, 629; 614 NW2d 152 (2000). A decision is clearly erroneous if the
reviewing court is left with a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been made upon
review of the entire record. People v Manning, 243 Mich App 615, 620; 624 NW2d 746 (2000).
A confession must be made without intimidation, coercion, or deception to be voluntary.
Daoud, supra at 633. In People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988), our
Supreme Court set forth several factors that should be considered in determining the
voluntariness of a statement:
[T]he age of the defendant; his lack of education or his intelligence level;
the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged
nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the defendant before he
gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the defendant of his
constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him
before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the defendant was
injured, intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement;
whether the defendant was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether
the defendant was physically abused; and whether the defendant was threatened
with abuse.
No single factor is conclusive. People v Atkins, 259 Mich App 545, 564-565; 675 NW2d 863
(2003). The admissibility of the statement depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Id.
We conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that police did not impliedly
threaten to arrest defendant’s wife for possession/distribution of the found cocaine. The record
reflects that before Sergeant Miller informed defendant of his Miranda rights, he asked
defendant who lived in the house. Defendant mentioned his wife and children. Sergeant Miller
then told defendant that the cocaine found in the house where he and his family live is a “very
serious matter.” After reading defendant his Miranda rights, Sergeant Miller again asked him
who lived in the house. Defendant claims that Sergeant Miller, by twice asking him who lived in
the house and stressing the seriousness of the situation, implicitly threatened to arrest his wife
and thus coerced defendant into taking responsibility for the cocaine. However, Sergeant
Miller’s questions were objectively innocuous, and without additional evidence, simply cannot
give rise to an inference that they caused defendant to confess. Moreover, only after defendant
took responsibility for the cocaine did Sergeant Miller directly ask him whether his wife was
2
We note that defendant’s claim that police threatened to arrest his wife would indicate that he
understood English.
3
People v Walker, 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965)
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involved with the cocaine. Thus, the trial court’s finding that Sergeant Miller’s questions were
not coercive is not clearly erroneous. Further, not one Cipriano factor is implicated to suggest
that defendant’s statement was involuntarily made. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted
defendant’s statement.
We also conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant, who
primarily spoke Spanish, voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. A defendant must have
knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights for a confession to be
admissible. Miranda, supra at 444. A confession must be made with full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Daoud,
supra. Determining whether a defendant’s waiver was knowingly and intelligently made
requires an inquiry into his level of understanding, irrespective of police behavior. Id. at 636.
This determination depends on the circumstances of each case, including defendant’s age,
experience, education, background, intelligence, and capacity to understand warnings given. Id.
at 634.
Before Sergeant Miller began his interrogation, he advised defendant of his Miranda
rights and defendant expressly waived those rights. Sergeant Miller testified that defendant
understood English. Specifically, Sergeant Miller testified that in 1995, he and officer Wendy
Keelty brought defendant to Michigan from Puerto Rico under an extradition writ. Both
Sergeant Miller and Keelty testified that they had several conversations with defendant in
English during the trip. In addition, Detective Maggie Martinez testified that defendant could
understand and answer in English based on several interactions she had with him beginning in
1996. Further, Sergeant Miller testified that defendant understood English based on his
demeanor and his responses to questions during the interrogation. This testimony was
corroborated by several police officers that were present during the interrogation. Indeed,
defendant never asked for explanations of Sergeant Miller’s questions, and he answered the
questions as a person who understood English would.
While Detective Martinez testified that defendant does not understand English onehundred percent and that he had difficulty answering in complete sentences, this evidence is not
inconsistent with the testimony of several police officers, including Detective Martinez, that
defendant understood and knowingly waived his Miranda rights. Moreover, given defendant’s
previous dealings with the criminal justice system, there is evidence that defendant was fully
aware of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to
abandon it. Thus, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that defendant voluntarily and
knowingly made his statements.
III. The Aiding and Abetting Jury Instruction
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in giving the aiding and
abetting jury instruction. We disagree. This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to give a
specific jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. People v Ho, 231 Mich App 178, 189; 585
NW2d 357 (1998). An abuse of discretion is found only in extreme cases in which the result is
so palpably and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences a perversity of will, a
defiance of judgment, or the exercise of passion or bias. People v Jackson, 467 Mich 272, 277;
650 NW2d 665 (2002).
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The mere presence jury instruction states that, “[m]ere presence, even with knowledge
that an offense is about to be or is being committed, is insufficient to establish that a defendant
aided or assisted in the commission of the crime.” CJI2d 8.5; People v Wilson, 196 Mich App
604, 614; 493 NW2d 471 (1992). Here, defendant’s request for the mere presence instruction
entitled the prosecution to request an instruction on aiding and abetting. Therefore, it cannot be
said that the trial court abused its discretion.
Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to instruct the jury on a theory of aiding and
abetting. An aiding and abetting instruction is proper where there is evidence that (1) more than
one person was involved in the commission of a crime, and (2) the defendant’s role in the crime
may have been less than direct participation. People v Head, 211 Mich App 205, 211; 535
NW2d 563 (1995). Defendant may not have been the only one involved in the distribution of
cocaine. Defense counsel asserted that defendant was not the person that sold the cocaine from
the house, and that police were actually looking for a Hispanic female. The primary target of the
search warrant was a female, and defendant’s wife met the physical description of the woman
listed in the search warrant. Because of this evidence and defendant’s admitted responsibility for
the found cocaine, there is sufficient evidence indicating that more than one person may have
been involved in the distribution of cocaine. In addition, defendant may have been less than a
direct participant, based on evidence that someone else in the house was directly involved in
distribution of cocaine. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in giving the aiding and
abetting instruction.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial was not legally sufficient to justify a
finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. When reviewing a sufficiency of
evidence challenge, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe (Amended Opinion), 440 Mich 508, 515516; 441 Mich 1201; 489 NW2d 748 (1992).
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects an accused person
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged.” In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364; 90 S Ct 1068;
25 L Ed2d 368 (1970); US Const, Am XIV. To sustain a conviction for this particular
possession crime, the prosecution must show that (1) the required substance was cocaine; (2) the
cocaine was a mixture weighing less than fifty grams; (3) the accused was not authorized to
possess the cocaine; and (4) the accused knowingly possessed the cocaine with the intent to
deliver it. People v Catanzarite, 211 Mich App 573, 577; 536 NW2d 570 (1995). Possession
can be actual or constructive. Wolfe, supra at 520. Constructive possession exists when the
totality of the circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the
contraband. Id. at 521. Actual delivery of narcotics is not required to prove intent to deliver. Id.
at 524. Intent to deliver can be inferred from the quantity of narcotics in a defendant’s
possession, the way in which those narcotics are packaged, and other circumstances surrounding
the arrest. Id.
To convict defendant of being an aider or abettor, the prosecution must prove that: (1) the
crime charged was committed by defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant performed
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acts or gave encouragement which aided and assisted the commission of the crime; and (3)
defendant intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its
commission at the time of giving aid. People v Norris, 236 Mich App 411, 419; 600 NW2d 658
(1999). Mere presence is insufficient to establish that a defendant aided in the commission of the
crime. Wilson, supra.
Although defendant did not have actual possession of the cocaine, there is sufficient
evidence that defendant constructively possessed the cocaine. Police discovered three grams of
cocaine at defendant’s home. Defendant was at home when it was discovered, approximately ten
feet away from where he sat. Defendant answered “yes” when Sergeant Miller asked him
whether he took responsibility for the cocaine. While defendant maintains that he only
confessed to protect his wife, defendant’s reasons for making the confession do not prevent it
from being admitted and used against him. See Daoud, supra at 639; People v Swetland, 77
Mich 53, 60-61; 43 NW 779 (1889). Thus, defendant’s admission provides a sufficient nexus
between defendant and the contraband to prove that he had constructive possession of it.
There is also sufficient evidence that defendant intended to deliver or assist in delivery of
the cocaine. In spite of the absence of typical distribution paraphernalia found at defendant’s
house, other circumstantial evidence shows defendant had the requisite intent. Cocaine had been
sold from defendant’s house just two days before the execution of the search warrant. Defendant
admitted that he had sold cocaine from the house in the past, including the week before the
search. This evidence shows that defendant not only intended to possess the cocaine, but to
distribute it to others. Such circumstantial evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, shows that defendant either directly or indirectly intended to assist someone in
delivery of cocaine. Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the trial court did not err in
finding sufficient evidence to convict defendant.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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