PEOPLE OF MI V DEANDRE L WILSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 17, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247211
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-006850
DEANDRE L. WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Smolenski and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of first-degree premeditated
murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), three counts of assault with intent to commit murder, MCL 750.83,
felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (felony-firearm), second offense, MCL 750.227b. The trial court
sentenced defendant as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to mandatory life imprisonment
for the first-degree premeditated murder conviction, life imprisonment for each of the three
assault with intent to commit murder convictions, six to ten years’ imprisonment for the felon in
possession of a firearm conviction, and five consecutive years’ imprisonment for the felonyfirearm conviction. We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedure
In early September 2000, defendant approached Ruby Griswold, who lived with
Cornelius Terry Moore at a house on Acacia Street, and asked her if Moore lived there. When
Griswold asked defendant to identify himself, defendant responded, “[J]ust tell him I’ll be back.”
At about midnight on September 17, 2000, Griswold and Moore were in their bed in the
basement of the Acacia Street house, when Griswold heard knocking on the front door of the
home. When she went to the door, she saw a young woman, who told her that she was “Fred’s
daughter” and that she required Moore’s assistance in helping her board up her property after a
break-in. Griswold attempted to awaken Moore, but when he was unresponsive, she retrieved a
hammer and nails and told the woman that she would help. After Griswold stepped out of the
house onto the porch, defendant approached her, put a gun to her head, and told her to open the
door. Griswold opened the door and defendant pushed her inside toward the back of the house.
Defendant was angry and kept asking Griswold, “[W]here is he at?” The unidentified woman,
who was now holding a gun, then pushed Griswold into the bathroom. Defendant proceeded to
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one of the bedrooms and knocked on the door. Griswold began struggling with the woman and
the woman’s gun discharged. The bullet hit Griswold in the back of her ear and exited her
cheek. Griswold continued to struggle with the woman when defendant entered the bathroom
and struck her, knocking her into the bathtub. Defendant then shot Griswold in the arm as she
raised it to defend herself. Griswold managed to escape by climbing out of the bathroom
window.
Meanwhile, Wanna Powell, the owner of the Acacia Street house, and her boyfriend,
Jerry Boyd, became concerned when they heard knocking on their bedroom door and then
gunshots. Boyd grabbed a club and Powell opened the door. Powell was immediately
confronted by defendant and the unidentified woman, who both began shooting. Defendant shot
Powell in the leg and the woman entered the bedroom and attacked Powell, hitting her in the
head with a hammer. Boyd grabbed defendant and the two began to “tussle.” During the
struggle, defendant shot Boyd four times. Powell and Boyd kept asking defendant and the
woman who they were looking for. Defendant yelled, “[W]here’s the ****er at?” Powell was
able to wrestle the hammer away from the woman, but the woman grabbed Powell’s neck and
began strangling her. The woman then abruptly got up and left with defendant.
After defendant and the woman left, Powell walked across the hall to the bedroom of her
daughter, Tiara Powell, who was also Moore’s daughter. Powell discovered Tiara in her bed
with a bullet wound in her face. Tiara was still breathing at that point, but died a short time later.
When Moore emerged from the basement, defendant and the woman were gone.
II. Analysis
A. Bad Acts Evidence
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence that
he shot and killed Edward Burton on July 5, 2000.1 The trial court’s decision whether to admit
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 412; 670
NW2d 659 (2003). When the underlying decision involves preliminary questions of law, such as
whether a rule of evidence precludes admission, the question is reviewed de novo. Id. The
evidence of the July 5, 2000, shooting was admitted under MRE 404(b)(1), which provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, scheme, plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident when the same is material, whether such other
crimes, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the
conduct at issue in the case.
1
In a separate trial regarding the events of July 5, 2000, a jury convicted defendant of firstdegree premeditated murder, MCL 750.83(1)(a), felon in possession of a firearm, MCL
750.224f, and felony-firearm, second offense, MCL 750.227b. These convictions are the subject
of defendant’s appeal in Court of Appeals Docket No. 246893.
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The following factors must be present for “bad acts” evidence to be admissible: (1) the
prosecutor must offer the evidence under something other than a character or propensity theory;
(2) the evidence must be relevant under MRE 402;2 and (3) the probative value of the evidence
must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under MRE 403.3 People v Knox, 469
Mich 502, 509; 674 NW2d 366 (2004).
Defendant contends that evidence of the events of July 5, 2000, should not have been
admitted under MRE 404(b), because the prejudice from the admission of the evidence
substantially outweighed its probative value. We disagree. The disputed evidence showed that
on July 5, 2000, Burton drove Moore to the home of Fred Jones and defendant’s mother, Gail
Wilson. When they arrived, Burton stopped the car and sounded the car horn to summon Jones.
Defendant emerged from behind the house, appearing agitated and yelling profanities at Burton
for blowing the horn in front of his mother’s house. Defendant walked up to the driver’s side of
the car and punched Burton in the face. Burton pulled into the driveway of the home, striking
Gail’s parked car. Defendant picked up a cinderblock and threw it at Burton’s front windshield,
breaking the glass. When Moore grabbed defendant, defendant told Gail to “get the gun.” Gail
ran into the house and came back out holding a gun. Burton drove away, but after a few blocks,
he noticed a small red car following them. Burton unsuccessfully tried to evade the red car, and
eventually pulled into an alley. Egress from the alley was blocked by a parked van. Defendant
stopped his car, got out, and ran into the alley. Moore fled the car on foot when he saw
defendant entering the alley with a gun. Moore then heard gunshots. A witness saw defendant
jog out of the alley, throw a gun into the backseat of the car, and drive away. When Moore
returned to the alley a short time later, he found Burton in the driver’s seat of his car with a fatal
gunshot wound in his head.
The prosecution offered the evidence surrounding Burton’s murder for the proper
purpose of rebutting defendant’s theory that he was mistakenly identified as the male shooter at
the Acacia Street house, and to show that he had a motive to shoot the people in the Acacia
Street house. The evidence showing that defendant murdered Burton and that Moore witnessed
the murder is relevant to show that defendant’s motive for entering the Acacia Street house was
to find and kill Moore, who was the only witness who both saw defendant with a gun at the scene
of the shooting and could identify defendant as the murderer. This evidence supported the
prosecution’s theory that defendant shot anyone who got in his way in his search for Moore.
Therefore, this evidence was introduced for a proper purpose and was relevant.
Additionally, the trial court did not err in determining that the probative value of the
evidence concerning the July 5, 2000, events was not substantially outweighed by the danger of
2
Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence.” MRE 401.
3
“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
MCR 403.
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unfair prejudice under MRE 403. The evidence surrounding Burton’s murder was highly
prejudicial against defendant, especially given the apparent complete lack of justification for the
murder and the execution-style killing of Burton, a seventy-two-year-old man who defendant had
chased down and trapped in an alley before killing. However, “[t]he fact that evidence is
damaging and harms the opposing party does not indicate that it is unfairly prejudicial.”
Chmielewski v Xermac, Inc, 216 Mich App 707, 710; 550 NW2d 797 (1996), aff’d 457 Mich
593; 580 NW2d 817 (1998). All evidence presented by the prosecution is “prejudicial” against
the defendant to some extent. People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 75; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450
Mich 1212 (1995). But “[e]vidence is unfairly prejudicial when there exists a danger that
marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the jury.” People v
Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). Evidence of Burton’s murder was not
marginally probative, as it was relevant to show defendant’s motive for the Acacia Street house
shootings, and to show that defendant was properly identified as the perpetrator of the Acacia
Street house shootings. Absent the evidence regarding Burton’s murder as background
information, the jury might not have been able to formulate an understanding of the events (e.g.,
why defendant was asking, “[W]here is he at?” while he was shooting people in the Acacia
Street house) or accurately evaluate defendant’s motivation behind the shootings. Furthermore,
the trial court attempted to minimize any prejudice by instructing the jury that it should only
consider the evidence of the Acacia Street house shootings to determine the identity of the
person who committed the crimes and not to show that defendant committed the Acacia Street
house shootings because he is a bad person, is likely to commit other crimes, or is guilty of other
bad conduct. Juries are generally presumed to follow their instructions. People v Rodgers, 248
Mich App 702, 717; 645 NW2d 294 (2001). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the evidence was admissible, as the probative value of the
evidence was not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the
admissibility the photographic lineup identifications of two witnesses (Boyd and Griswold). In
order to preserve the issue of effective assistance of counsel for appellate review, the defendant
must move for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing in the trial court. People v Sabin (On Second
Remand), 242 Mich App 656, 658; 620 NW2d 19 (2000). Where the defendant fails to create a
testimonial record in the trial court with regard to his claims of ineffective assistance, appellate
review is foreclosed unless the record contains sufficient detail to support his claims. People v
Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 408; 552 NW2d 663 (1996). “If review of the record does not
support the defendant’s claims, he has effectively waived the issue of effective assistance of
counsel.” Sabin, supra at 659. Here, defendant failed to move for an evidentiary hearing or a
new trial. Therefore, our review is limited to the facts on the existing record. Id.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must first show that the
performance of his counsel was below an objective standard of reasonableness under the
prevailing professional norms. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). The
defendant must show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
“counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623
NW2d 884 (2001). The reviewing court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct
falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and the defendant bears the
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heavy burden of proving otherwise. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 689; 104 S Ct 2052;
80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984); People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). The
defendant must overcome a strong presumption that the assistance of counsel was sound trial
strategy. Carbin, supra at 600. In addition to showing counsel’s deficient performance, the
defendant must show that the representation was so prejudicial to him that he was denied a fair
trial. Toma, supra at 302. In order to show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. Carbin, supra at 600. “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id., quoting Strickland, supra at 694.
Defendant argues that his trial counsel should have objected to the admission of the
photographic lineup identifications, because defendant had the darkest complexion of all the
individuals in the lineup and the witnesses identified defendant only based on his dark skin color.
There is no evidence before this Court that the lineup was impermissibly suggestive, and
defendant does not argue such. Defendant merely argues that the witnesses picked defendant out
of the lineup solely based on his dark complexion. “The credibility of identification testimony is
a question for the trier of fact . . . .” People v Davis, 241 Mich App 697, 700; 617 NW2d 381
(2000). The credibility of the witnesses making photographic lineup identifications does not
affect the admissibility of the identification testimony. Additionally, “[p]hysical differences
between defendant and the other lineup participants goes to the weight of the identification and
not its admissibility.” People v Sawyer, 222 Mich App 1, 3; 564 NW2d 62 (1997). Because
there is no indication that the photo array was impermissibly suggestive, and there were no other
circumstances that made lineup identifications inadmissible, any motion to suppress the lineup
identifications would have been futile. Defense counsel is not obligated to raise meritless
objections to provide the effective assistance of counsel. People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App 8,
27; 620 NW2d 537 (2000).
Furthermore, defendant attacked the credibility of the lineup identifications through cross
examination of the witnesses. Defense counsel challenged the witnesses’ testimony by
comparing their physical descriptions of defendant to defendant’s actual height and appearance.
Defense counsel also raised the possibility that the witnesses were under the influence of either
drugs or alcohol, as well as the insufficient lighting during the shootings. During closing
arguments, defense counsel argued that Boyd only picked defendant out of the lineup because of
his dark complexion. The decision to move for the suppression of identification testimony is a
matter of trial strategy, People v Carr, 141 Mich App 442, 452; 367 NW2d 407 (1985), and
defense counsel elected to attack the credibility of the witnesses’ identification testimony, rather
than make a futile objection to the admission of the identifications. Because defendant has not
overcome the presumption that defense counsel’s decision not to challenge the admissibility of
the identification testimony was not sound trial strategy, Carbin, supra at 600, we reject
defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Affirmed.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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