IN RE COLLINS-EL MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TARIQ COLLINS-EL, JESSE
JUXTIN COLLINS-EL, and ROBERT LANCE
COLLINS-EL, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
August 12, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 252204
Macomb Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 95-041694-NA
TERRY GENE COLLINS-EL,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DESAHANNA NICOLE TERRY,
Respondent.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Cooper and Kelly, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating his
parental rights to the minor children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (h). We affirm. This
appeal is being decided without oral argument pursuant to MCR 7.214(E).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Trejo Minors, 462
Mich 341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The principal conditions that led to adjudication
were environmental neglect and respondent-appellant's unavailability to care for the children
because of his incarceration in the county jail for domestic violence against the children’s
mother. The children were living in a one-bedroom apartment with their mother and maternal
grandmother. They suffered severe developmental delays and other conditions indicative of
neglect. At the time the trial court terminated respondent-appellant's parental rights, he was
again incarcerated, this time serving a sentence of four years, two months to fifteen years on a
conviction for assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, in violation of MCL
750.84. The victim again was the children’s mother.
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Because of his incarceration, respondent-appellant is unable to visit the children and
unavailable to work meaningfully on his Parent Agency Agreement. When the trial court issued
its termination order, the children were ages four, three, and two and had not seen respondentappellant in more than a year. We find no clear error in the trial court's determination that the
conditions of adjudication continue to exist and would not be rectified within a reasonable time
considering the children's ages. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
Further, respondent-appellant’s imprisonment would continue for more than three years
when the trial court issued its order. Thus, the evidence showed that the children will be
deprived of a normal home during that time because their mother’s parental rights were also
terminated and respondent-appellant made no provision for the children to be cared for while he
was in prison. There is also no reasonable expectation that respondent-appellant will be able to
provide proper care and custody for the minor children within a reasonable time considering the
children's ages. MCL 712A.19b(3)(h). Thus, two statutory grounds were proven by clear and
convincing evidence. Only one statutory ground need be established to terminate parental rights.
MCL 712A.19b(3); Trejo, supra at 354, 355.
Further, the evidence failed to show that termination of respondent-appellant's parental
rights was clearly not in the children's best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); Trejo, supra at 356-357.
Although respondent-appellant loved his children, there was evidence that a strong emotional
bond was lacking. The children had been badly damaged by parental neglect and will need years
of remedial services and therapy. They need a permanent, safe, stable home, which respondentappellant cannot provide. Consequently, the trial court did not clearly err in terminating
respondent-appellant's parental rights to the children.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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