PEOPLE OF MI V JENNIFER ANNE JONES
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 10, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 246842
Calhoun Circuit Court
LC No. 02-001599-FC
v
JENNIFER ANNE JONES, a/k/a JENNIFER
ANNE RUTHRUFF,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Markey and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of three counts of first-degree criminal
sexual conduct (CSC I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a), one count of CSC II, MCL 750.520c(1)(a), and
three counts of gross indecency between a male and a female, MCL 750.338b. She was
sentenced to concurrent terms of 225 to 420 months’ imprisonment for each CSC I conviction,
84 to 180 months’ imprisonment for the CSC II conviction, and 17 to 30 months’ imprisonment
for each gross indecency conviction. She appeals of right, and we affirm.
This case arose when defendant became a participant in her husband’s sexual abuse of his
adolescent adopted daughter. The victim was born on February 24, 1989. She testified that her
adoptive father began engaging in fellatio and cunnilingus with her from the age of nine or ten.
Before defendant married the victim’s father in November 2000, he asked the victim if she
would like to participate in sexual acts between him and defendant. She expressed indifference.
Soon afterward, defendant and the victim’s father had sexual intercourse and the father had the
victim watch. Defendant knew the victim was watching, but was laughing during the incident.
The victim testified that she and her father moved into defendant’s trailer after the
marriage. Her father continued to sexually molest her during this period, but her father did not
violently fight with defendant until after the victim began participating in the couple’s sexual
activities. About a month after the marriage, the victim’s father began gathering the victim and
defendant in his bedroom and telling the victim to perform cunnilingus on defendant. He then
watched and masturbated while she complied. During these sexual sessions defendant
occasionally performed cunnilingus on the victim, and, on one occasion, penetrated the victim’s
vagina with her finger. Defendant also frequently touched the victim’s breasts. While defendant
testified that she acted only at the direction of and under duress from her husband, the victim
testified that defendant always engaged fully in the sexual acts and occasionally encouraged the
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victim’s participation. The prosecutor introduced the following evidence to demonstrate that
defendant voluntarily participated in her step-daughter’s molestation.
One of the victim’s friends often stayed overnight with the victim, sometimes for several
days in a row. Once, while the victim’s father watched a pornographic video in the living room
with the girls, defendant brought them some wine from the refrigerator. The girls did not like it,
so defendant went to the store and brought back some wine coolers. The girls moved into a
bedroom, but defendant approached them and told them “Come out here because we’re going to
show you how to have sex; how it’s done right.” The girls went back into the living room and
watched as defendant and the victim’s father had sexual intercourse.
On one occasion, defendant asked the children if they would like to “do some stuff” with
her and her husband. When the victim refused, defendant repeatedly asked her why. When the
victim stated that she did not want to participate in the sexual activities anymore and that her
father always told her she could stop any time, defendant grew antagonistic and repeatedly
inquired into her reasons. Defendant persisted in questioning the victim after she began crying,
and eventually sent the victim to bed. While no sexual activity occurred that night, defendant,
the victim, and her friend engaged in sexual activities together on numerous other occasions.
Once when defendant and the victim picked up the victim’s friend for an overnight stay,
defendant told the girls that she and her husband had “something planned for you girls tonight,”
and that night all four of them engaged in group sex.
On another occasion, defendant walked into the living room where the victim and her
friend were watching television and told the victim to describe the “popcorn game” for her
friend. Defendant then pulled off her pants and underwear and placed a kernel of popcorn on her
vagina. She asked the victim to lick it off, but she refused. Although the victim’s father was
present, defendant initiated the entire incident. Testimony also indicated that defendant violently
argued with her husband about him having sex with the victim’s friend when defendant was not
there to participate.
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted evidence
of defendant’s various uncharged acts offered only to prove defendant’s character contrary to
MRE 404(b). We disagree. We review for abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to admit
evidence of other acts. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). We note
that some of the controverted evidence does not amount to evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or
acts” because one of the incidents was never introduced at trial and the other was actually a
charged act. MRE 404(b)(1). The other two challenged incidents were the popcorn incident and
the incident when the victim refused to comply with defendant’s sexual requests.
To be admissible under MRE 404(b), other-acts evidence generally must satisfy three
requirements: (1) it must be offered for a proper purpose, (2) it must be relevant, and (3) its
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 496; 577 NW2d 673 (1998). In this case, the prosecutor
introduced the challenged evidence to demonstrate that defendant often took the initiative and
encouraged the illicit sexual activity. This evidence rebutted defendant’s claims that she suffered
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from battered woman’s syndrome,1 and that her husband had always brutally coerced her into
participating in the sex acts. Therefore, the prosecutor introduced the evidence for the valid
purpose of showing defendant’s motivated, intentional, and voluntary participation in a general
plan to perpetuate a sexual relationship with the victim. MRE 404(b)(1); McCormick, Evidence
(5th ed), § 190, p 664-666. The evidence was relevant because the crimes attempted were
identical to the most severe crimes charged, and the circumstances of the other acts revealed
defendant’s personal desire to participate in sexual acts with the victim.2 People v Sabin (After
Remand), 463 Mich 43, 64-65; 614 NW2d 888 (2000). Further, the challenged evidence was
relatively mild compared to the other evidence of pervasive abuse by defendant. Therefore, the
likelihood of additional, undue prejudice was negligible compared to the probative value of
demonstrating that defendant initiated and encouraged the sexual contact and was not merely
complying with her husband’s demands under duress. Starr, supra. Therefore, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion when it admitted this evidence.
Defendant next argues that the trial court misinstructed the jury on the crime of gross
indecency. We disagree. We review a defendant’s claim of instructional error de novo. People
v Lowery, 258 Mich App 167, 173; 673 NW2d 107 (2003). The statute that proscribes gross
indecency states, “Any female person who, in public or in private, commits . . . any act of gross
indecency with a male person shall be guilty of a felony . . . .” MCL 750.338b. The trial court’s
instructions differed from the model jury instructions because they explained to the jury that
defendant’s sexual acts only needed to be “open and perceivable” by the minor victim, rather
than requiring that they occurred in a public place. People v Drake, 246 Mich App 637, 642;
633 NW2d 469 (2001).
In Drake, this Court observed, “In order to constitute grossly indecent behavior, the acts
must be overt in the sense that they are open and perceivable.” The Legislature, through its
somewhat vague explanation of what constitutes grossly indecent behavior, provided the
judiciary with latitude to discern what conduct fits the legislative description on a case by case
basis. People v Jones, 222 Mich App 595, 602; 563 NW2d 719 (1997). In Jones, we found the
public act of sexual intercourse by a married couple to fall within the statute’s ambit because the
potential lookers-on included nonconsenting adults and children under the age of consent. Id. at
604. Because the court’s instructions comported with the elements of the crime as described in
Drake and Jones, i.e., that a sexual act occurred and the act was open and perceivable by a child
under the age of consent, the court did not commit error requiring reversal. People v Caulley,
197 Mich App 177, 184; 494 NW2d 853 (1992).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it scored defendant’s offense
variable (“OV”) 7 at fifty points and scored her OV 10 at fifteen points. We disagree. We
review for clear error the score a trial court gives to a sentencing guidelines variable. People v
1
This defense alone opens the door for introduction of the evidence under MRE 404(a)(1).
2
We note that the prosecutor only brought three charges of CSC I, but defense counsel did not
object to the victim’s testimony that she performed cunnilingus on defendant more times than
she could count. The pervasive nature of defendant’s criminal acts lends credence to the theory
that defendant instituted a tacit plan of molestation.
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Hicks, 259 Mich App 518, 522; 675 NW2d 599 (2003). “Scoring decisions for which there is
any evidence in support will be upheld.” People v Elliott, 215 Mich App 259, 260; 544 NW2d
748 (1996). Here, the trial court did not err in scoring OV 7 at fifty points because the evidence
supported its finding of sadism. MCL 777.37. The statute defines sadism as “conduct that
subjects a victim to extreme or prolonged pain or humiliation and is inflicted to produce
suffering or for the offender’s gratification.” Id.
Here, defendant exposed the young victim and her close friend to sexual activities;
dunned the victim with probing, humiliating questions and coercively punished her when she
displayed an emotional aversion to the deviant behavior; and perpetuated the illicit activity for
years. Further, the evidence nauseatingly substantiates that defendant encouraged and fully
engaged in the detestable acts for her own sexual gratification. Thus, the evidence supported the
court’s finding that defendant subjected the victim to acts that generated prolonged humiliation
and that defendant received gratification from those acts.
Likewise, the trial court did not err in scoring OV 10 at fifteen points because the
evidence supported a finding of predatory conduct. MCL 777.40. Under the statute, the
sentencing court must assign OV 10 a score of fifteen points where “predatory conduct” is
involved. Id. The statute defines “predatory conduct” as “preoffense conduct directed at a
victim for the primary purpose of victimization.” MCL 777.40(3)(a). The evidence
demonstrated that when the victim refused to participate in sexual activity with her friend,
defendant, and her husband, defendant yelled at the victim, humiliated her, and punished her
refusal to comply. On other occasions defendant plied the victim with wine and other alcoholic
beverages and primed her for sexual activity with pornographic videos. Because the prosecutor
presented evidence of preoffense conduct directed at the victim for the purpose of victimization,
the trial court did not err in scoring fifteen points for OV 10.
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
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