PEOPLE OF MI V KEVIN SCOTT HEARINGTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 10, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245015
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2001-410812-FC
KEVIN SCOTT HEARINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Judges Whitbeck, CJ, and Owens and Schuette, JJ
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of first-degree felony murder, MCL
750.316(1)(b), second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole
for the first-degree felony murder conviction, 480 to 1,200 months’ imprisonment for the
second-degree murder conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm
conviction. He appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions and sentences of firstdegree felony murder and felony-firearm, but vacate his conviction of second-degree murder.
I
Defendant argues that a new trial is required because the jury was exposed to extrinsic
influences that affected its verdict. Specifically, defendant maintains that disruptions by Juror
33, which resulted in Juror 33’s dismissal from the jury on the fourth day of trial, adversely
affected the jury. We conclude that this issue is not preserved because defendant did not raise
this issue at the time Juror 33 was dismissed. People v Connor, 209 Mich App 419, 422; 531
NW2d 734 (1995) (issues not considered by the trial court are unpreserved). Unpreserved issues,
constitutional and nonconstitutional, are reviewed for plain error affecting substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
In People v Budzyn, 456 Mich 77, 88-89; 566 NW2d 229 (1997), our Supreme Court
stated:
In order to establish that the extrinsic influence was error requiring
reversal, the defendant must initially prove two points. First, the defendant must
prove that the jury was exposed to extraneous influences. Second, the defendant
must establish that these extraneous influences created a real and substantial
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possibility that they could have affected the jury’s verdict. Generally, in proving
this second point, the defendant will demonstrate that the extraneous influence is
substantially related to a material aspect of the case and that there is a direct
connection between the extrinsic material and the adverse verdict. If the
defendant establishes this initial burden, the burden shifts to the people to
demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . . . . because
the error is constitutional in nature. [Citations omitted.]
Regarding the first part of the test articulated in Budzyn, it is apparent that the jury was
exposed to disruptive comments by Juror 33 during the course of the trial. However, the second
part of the test has not been established. Defendant has not shown that Juror 33’s disruptive
comments related to any material aspect of the case or that there was a direct connection between
his comments and the adverse verdict. Defendant never requested a hearing to determine what
Juror 33 said to the jury. Also, during a post-trial hearing, defendant failed to explore the issue
with the other jurors. His appellate argument is based on unsupported speculation that Juror 33’s
disruptive comments may have influenced the jury’s decision. But Juror 33 was removed from
the jury several days before deliberations began, and the jury was given a cautionary instruction
at that time. Under the circumstances, defendant has not met his burden of establishing that
Juror 33’s comments created a real and substantial possibility of affecting the verdict. Budzyn,
supra. Because he has not met his initial burden of proof, a harmless error analysis is
unnecessary. Id. Reversal on the basis of this issue is not warranted.
Defendant additionally argues that a communication between a court officer and another
juror, which was heard by additional jurors, warrants reversal. Juror 32 questioned the court
officer about whether defendant could be retried if the jury concluded that the charged offense
did not occur in Michigan. The court bailiff informed Juror 32 that he believed double jeopardy
would prevent a retrial. This extraneous influence, legal advice imparted to the jury by the
bailiff, was the subject of defendant’s motion for a new trial. Following an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied the motion. We review a trial court’s denial of a new trial motion for an
abuse of discretion. People v Cress, 468 Mich 678, 691; 664 NW2d 174 (2003).
At a post-trial evidentiary hearing, the jurors were individually questioned. Their
testimony reveals that the conversation between the bailiff and Juror 32 occurred before the jury
was instructed or began deliberations.1 Many of the jurors did not hear the conversation at all.
Some of the jurors, who admitted to hearing Juror 32 ask the question, did not recall if the court
officer answered the question or what he said. All of the jurors, both those who heard the
conversation and those who did not, testified that the issues of double jeopardy, retrial
possibilities, and comments made by, or information given by, the court officer were never
raised during deliberations and were not a factor in their decision. Each of the jurors who
1
The trial court relied on People v France, 436 Mich 138; 461 NW2d 621 (1990), when
analyzing whether defendant was entitled to a new trial. That case involves communications
with deliberating juries or jurors. Id. at 142. The communication at issue here did not involve a
deliberating jury and is more properly treated as an extrinsic influence on the jury, i.e., extrinsic
information learned during the course of trial.
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deliberated and reached a verdict testified that they determined that the crime occurred in
Michigan beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented at trial. Venue of the
crime was questioned during deliberations only in conjunction with the testimony of one witness.
The record reveals that the witness’s testimony was unclear and determined not to be credible by
the jury. None of the jurors considered double jeopardy when deciding the case, and the jurors
unanimously testified that any improper communication with the court officer had no affect on
their decision in any manner.
We conclude that the first part of the test articulated in Budzyn, supra, was met in this
case. Some of the members of the jury were exposed to an extraneous influence, i.e., the court
officer’s opinion that defendant could not be retried if the jury found that the crime occurred in
Indiana. The second part of the test, however, has not been established. Defendant was required
to show a real and substantial possibility that the extraneous influence could have affected the
verdict. This inquiry is an objective one. In Budzyn, supra at 89 n 10. When determining
whether an extrinsic influence created a real and substantial possibility of prejudice, a court may
consider: (1) whether the material was actually received by the jury, and if so how; (2) the length
of time the information was available; (3) the extent to which the jurors discussed and considered
it; (4) whether the material was introduced before the verdict was reached and if so, at what point
during deliberation; and (5) any other matter “which may bear on the issue of the reasonable
possibility of whether the extrinsic material affected the verdict.” Id at 89 n 11, citing Marino v
Vasquez, 812 F2d 499, 506 (CA 9, 1987).
In this case, not all of the jurors were exposed to the extraneous influence. Although the
conversation occurred, the jurors did not discuss the information they received from the bailiff.
Some of the jurors who heard the conversation could not recall if the bailiff answered or what his
answer was. The court officer’s statement, and related topic of whether defendant could be
retried, was never discussed by the jury or considered during deliberations. Defendant offers no
evidence or information to support his claims that the matter was considered, was or may have
been an issue during deliberations, or possibly affected the verdict. Instead, his argument is
based on unsupported speculation and innuendo.
In reaching our conclusion, we note that, while defendant raised venue as an issue, only
one witness presented any testimony that arguably was relevant to the issue whether the crime
occurred somewhere other than Buchanan, Michigan. The witness testified that, sometime
before the victim’s disappearance, he observed the victim driving his mother’s car toward
Indiana. But the witness was uncertain about his testimony. He could not state with any degree
of certainty when he made his observation. It was never established that this observation
occurred on the morning the victim disappeared. The evidence that the crime occurred on the
property of defendant’s brother on Rangeline Road in Buchanan, Michigan, however, was
overwhelming. Defendant was aware of the property and its seclusion, and he had previously
shot an animal on the property. On the morning of the victim’s disappearance, shooting was
heard coming from the property. A neighbor testified that he heard several shots, a pause, and
one final shot. The forensic pathologist testified that the pattern of bullet wounds on the victim’s
head suggested that two bullets were fired rapidly in time and the third was fired separate in
time. A car matching the description of the car the victim was using was observed leaving the
property on the morning of the shooting. The witness who saw the car noted it because he
thought it was odd that a luxury car was being driven in that area. When the victim’s body was
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subsequently found in the trunk of the car, several witnesses noticed that the undercarriage of the
vehicle was dirty with debris. There was a fine layer of dirt on the car. The victim’s body and
the trunk of the car contained debris similar to that found near the brush pile on the Rangeline
Road property, and drag marks were found near the brush pile on the property. The victim had
drag marks on his back. In light of the substantial evidence pointing to the Rangeline Road
property as the crime scene, and the absence of competent evidence suggesting another location,
the jurors could easily have set aside any questions or thoughts about whether defendant could be
retried if the crime occurred in Indiana. Contrast, for example, Budzyn, supra at 97-100
(wherein the Court found a real and substantial possibility existed that the jury considered
extraneous influences when deliberating).
Accordingly, we conclude that defendant has not established that there was a real and
substantial possibility that the court officer’s communication with the jurors affected the verdict.
Thus, reversal is not required.
II
Next, defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for
second-degree murder and felony murder.2 We disagree. When reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence in a criminal case, the reviewing court “must view the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the
essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Hoffman, 225
Mich App 103, 111; 570 NW2d 146 (1997), citing People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489
NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992). Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences
drawn from it are sufficient to establish the elements of a crime. People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458,
466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993). All conflicts with regard to the evidence must be resolved in favor
of the prosecution. People v Terry, 224 Mich App 447, 452; 569 NW2d 641 (1997). We will
not interfere with the jury’s role of determining the weight of the evidence or the credibility of
witnesses. Wolfe, supra at 514-515.
The elements of felony murder are (1) the killing of a human being, (2) with malice,
which is defined as “the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of
death or great bodily harm with knowledge” that the act will probably result in death or great
bodily harm, and (3) “while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of
any of the felonies enumerated” in MCL 750.316(1)(b), including robbery. People v Nowack,
462 Mich 392, 401; 614 NW2d 78 (2000), citing Carines, supra at 758-759. “‘The facts and
circumstances of the killing may give rise to an inference of malice.’” Id., quoting Carines,
supra at 759.
2
In his argument, defendant also states that there was insufficient evidence to support his felonyfirearm conviction. We find that this issue is abandoned because defendant does not discuss,
explain, or support his position with authority. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588
NW2d 480 (1998). Moreover, the issue was not raised in the statement of questions presented.
Review is therefore inappropriate. People v Miller, 238 Mich App 168, 172; 604 NW2d 781
(1999).
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Viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to
establish that defendant killed the victim. Defendant and the victim were overheard by more
than one witness, including defendant’s brother, talking about a marijuana deal involving $1,000.
The night before he was killed, the victim possessed a large sum of cash and talked about
meeting defendant the next morning to buy marijuana. The next morning, defendant spoke to the
victim two times by telephone. In one of the conversations, the victim was overheard telling
defendant that he would pick him up in a few minutes. On the same morning, defendant’s
girlfriend heard defendant speaking on the telephone. He told someone to wait fifteen or twenty
minutes. The victim left his home after his second conversation with defendant. He thereafter
stopped at an ATM machine and withdrew $200. He was not seen again. On the same morning,
defendant left his girlfriend’s house after his telephone calls with the victim and after calling his
brother about a boat motor.
The evidence was undisputed that the victim died of three gunshot wounds to the head on
the morning of September 16, 1998. The victim was shot with .22 caliber bullets. Shane
Hearington, Tim Freeman, and James Lawson all testified that defendant possessed a .22 caliber
handgun, which was black with pearl or white handles. Defendant stored the gun at Shane’s
house. Lawson believed defendant had stolen the gun. Dale Nelson testified that his gun, a .22
caliber black handgun with pearl handles, was stolen along with other property, including a
suitcase with identifiable initials. Nelson’s suitcase was later recovered by the police at Shane’s
house based on information Shane provided, specifically that defendant was storing the suitcase
at Shane’s house.
At 10:29 a.m. on the morning of the offense, the victim’s car was seen on videotape
arriving at a Meijer parking lot in South Bend. Two minutes later, a man was captured on
videotape entering the Meijer store. The man purchased items of clothing in the store.
Defendant’s girlfriend testified that she believed the man inside the store, who was depicted in
photographs, was defendant. Moreover, when defendant arrived home later that day, he was
wearing the same clothes that were purchased at Meijer. Defendant’s girlfriend and Shane
Hearington both remembered the clothing. Shane gave defendant a ride that morning and saw
that he was wearing new clothes. Defendant paid Shane to drive him home from Kmart, and he
told Shane to lie to the police about how he got to Kmart.
Defendant also told numerous different stories to different people throughout the days
leading up to the discovery of the body and thereafter. He also provided information about the
crime to his acquaintances before the information was reported by the media. Moreover,
defendant’s brother testified that, after finding out that the victim was missing, he searched his
Rangeline Road property. He knew defendant and the victim were trying to engage in a drug
transaction, and he believed they may have taken care of their business on his property.
Defendant was familiar with the property and had access to it. Defendant tried to blame other
people for the crime, but the police checked out the location and alibis of the others and found
nothing tying them to the crime. Defendant also confessed the crime to Jerry Price while in a
drunken state at a bar. Later, when defendant became aware that Price may try to identify him as
the man who confessed, he changed his appearance before a lineup could be conducted.
Defendant additionally asked Freeman to hide a gun on his property after the crime. Viewed
most favorably to the prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to enable the jury to identify
defendant as the victim’s killer beyond a reasonable doubt.
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There was also sufficient evidence of malice. The victim was shot in the back of the head
three times by a .22 caliber weapon. The shooting occurred in a secluded area. There was
evidence that the first shots were fired in rapid succession, followed by a pause, and then a final
shot. Defendant was familiar with shooting a .22 caliber weapon and had previously killed a dog
using the same weapon. The victim’s body was dragged to the trunk of the car, locked inside,
and left to rot. The trunk was wiped clean in the area where a hand would be placed to close it.
The evidence supports the intent to kill.
Finally, there was evidence of robbery. Defendant and the victim discussed exchanging a
pound of marijuana for $1,000. Defendant tried to find marijuana and even went to the home of
a distant relative to find a source. The victim was in possession of a large sum of money the
night before he was killed, and he removed $200 from an ATM machine within an hour of the
shooting. When he was found, there was no money on his person or in his car. Nor was any
marijuana found. After the crime, defendant was observed with a large sum of money. A gas
station attendant testified that defendant always purchased coffee with change or single dollar
bills. But on the Friday after the shooting, she noticed that he had a lot of cash. James Lawson
also confirmed that defendant had a large sum of money during the week of the offense.
The evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence was sufficient to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of felony murder for the death of the victim.
Similarly, there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of seconddegree murder. Second-degree murder is a general intent crime. People v Herndon, 246 Mich
App 371, 386; 633 NW2d 376 (2001). There are four elements: “‘(1) a death, (2) caused by an
act of defendant, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification or excuse.’” People v Aldrich,
246 Mich App 101, 123; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), quoting People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112,
124-125; 600 NW2d 370 (1999). It was undisputed that the victim was killed, and, as previously
discussed, there was sufficient evidence that defendant killed the victim and acted with malice.3
There was also evidence that the victim was shot for money. There was no evidence of
justification or excuse. The evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to establish the elements of second-degree
murder.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant asserts that the testimony of
Price, Freeman, Lawson, and Shane Herrington should be disregarded as being inherently
incredible and devoid of probative value. Defendant acknowledges that “absent exceptional
circumstances, issues of witness credibility are for the jury.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625,
642; 576 NW2d 129 (1998). But conflicting testimony is an insufficient ground for granting a
new trial. Id. at 647. Even when there is directly conflicting evidence and the testimony
supporting the verdict is impeached, the credibility of witnesses is for the jury if “‘it cannot be
3
The malice element of second-degree murder is the same as that for felony murder. That
element requires proof that defendant had an intent to kill, an intent to inflict great bodily harm
or an intent to create a very high risk of death with the knowledge that the act probably would
cause death or great bodily harm. Aldrich, supra at 123.
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said as a matter of law that the testimony thus impeached was deprived of all probative value or
that the jury could not believe it.’” Id. at 643, quoting Anderson v Conterio, 303 Mich 75, 79; 5
NW2d 572 (1942). Exceptions to the general rule include circumstances where the testimony
contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws, where the testimony is patently incredible or
defies physical reality, where the testimony is so inherently implausible that it cannot be believed
by a reasonable person, or where the testimony was seriously impeached and the case was
marked by uncertainties and discrepancies. Id. at 643-644.
Defendant has not demonstrated that the testimony of Price, Lawson, Freeman or Shane
Hearington was devoid of probative value. Defendant has not demonstrated that the evidence of
his guilt was patently incredible or so marked by uncertainty or discrepancy that his convictions
must be reversed. Indeed, in making his argument, he virtually ignores the testimony that
supports the prosecution’s case. He ignores compelling testimony from several additional
witnesses linking him to the victim, the crime scene, and the time frame of the offense. He also
ignores the videotapes from the Meijer store, which place him at the store at virtually the same
time that the victim’s dead body was brought to the parking lot and which show defendant
purchasing new clothes that he immediately wore.
Furthermore, the testimony of Price was not inherently implausible or incredible. That
Price was related to Shane Hearington, that he did not report his alleged conversation with
defendant to police for a lengthy period of time, and that he made some inconsistent statements
are not exceptional circumstances that would warrant this Court’s interference with the jury’s
credibility determination. Id. The facts relevant to Price’s credibility were presented and argued
to the jury, which decided the issues. Moreover, the testimony of Shane, Freeman, and Lawson
was not impeached to the point that it was deprived of all probative value. It did not defy
physical reality or physical facts or laws. Their testimony corroborated each other’s testimony in
part, and other portions of their testimony were corroborated by others. We find no reason to
second-guess or interfere with the jury’s role as factfinder.
III
Defendant next argues that reversal is required because of the admission of testimony
about the breaking and entering that occurred at the Nelson home in August 1998. A trial court’s
decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Herndon, supra at 406. We
find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the challenged evidence, but note that we believe
it was unnecessary for the trial court to analyze the evidence under MRE 404(b).
In People v Hall, 433 Mich 573, 575; 447 NW2d 580 (1989), the defendant was
convicted of the armed robbery of a video rental store. At trial, the prosecutor offered testimony
from several witnesses about the defendant’s unrelated arrest on an unrelated charge. Id. at 577578. A majority of the Supreme Court held that the evidence of the unrelated arrest and charge
was relevant and admissible under MRE 401, without reference to MRE 404(b). Id. at 583-584
(Boyle, J.), 589 (Brickley, J.)
Evidence of a defendant’s possession of a weapon of the kind used in the
offense with which he is charged is routinely determined by courts to be direct,
relevant evidence of his commission of that offense. [Id. at 580-581.]
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Specifically, the evidence was relevant to the defendant’s identity. Id. at 581-583.
The fact that establishing defendant’s possession of the shotgun also
necessarily constitutes evidence of a separate crime, wrong, or act (possession of
a sawed off shotgun) does not alone bring the proof within the compass of MRE
404 preclusion. Unlike the “exceptions” contained in MRE 404(b), in which
relevance rests on a circumstantial inference from the other act to the fact in issue,
the shotgun itself was equally as direct an item of evidence of defendant’s
commission of the charged robbery in this case as marked bills or identifiable
jewelry would be in another, while the testimony by various witnesses to the
circumstances of its seizure was relevant to connect the defendant to both it and
the car. [Id. at 583.]
The evidence of the shotgun in Hall was not objectionable on the ground that it was never
conclusively identified as being the same gun used in the robbery of the video store. Id. at 582 n
7. It was sufficient that the gun was seized from the defendant, was in the defendant’s
possession, and was of the same kind used during the charged offense. Id.
In this case, the evidence of the Nelson breaking and entering, and defendant’s possible
connection to that theft, was probative of defendant’s possession and control of the same caliber
weapon used to shoot the victim. The evidence made defendant’s identity as a shooter in the
charged crime more probable than it would be without the evidence. Several witnesses testified
that they saw defendant in possession of the weapon. How defendant came into possession of
the weapon, and the fact that other stolen items from the scene of the prior crime were found
where defendant resided on a part-time basis, lent credence to the testimony that defendant
possessed the gun. Without evidence of the robbery and related suitcase recovered from Shane’s
house, the jury had an incomplete picture of defendant’s possession of the weapon. Several
people lived at Shane’s house and defendant suggested that the gun probably belonged to one of
them. We also note that, contrary to what defendant asserts, the evidence presented at trial about
the Nelson breaking and entering was minimal.
We also disagree that the evidence of the Nelson breaking and entering was extremely
prejudicial and should have been excluded under MRE 403. The probative value was significant
to establish defendant’s identity as the shooter. There was little chance that the jury was
confused by testimony related to the prior breaking and entering. And, the jury was provided
with a specific cautionary instruction with respect to the evidence. In sum, the evidence was
properly admitted. MRE 401; Hall, supra.
IV
Finally, defendant argues that his conviction of second-degree murder must be vacated.
We agree. In People v Clark, 243 Mich App 424, 429; 622 NW2d 344 (2000), this Court held
that “multiple murder convictions arising from the death of a single victim violate double
jeopardy.” A defendant cannot be properly convicted of first-degree felony murder and seconddegree murder for the death of a single victim. Id. Accordingly, we vacate defendant’s
conviction of second-degree murder. Id. at 429-430.
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Affirmed in part and vacated in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Donald S. Owens
/s/ Bill Schuette
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