JENNIFER LYNN HIGGINS V KENNETH ROLAND LOVELAND JR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JENNIFER LYNN HIGGINS,
UNPUBLISHED
August 5, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 252116
Presque Isle Circuit Court
LC No. 99-001872-DP
KENNETH ROLAND LOVELAND, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murray, P.J., and Markey and O’Connell, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals of right from an order denying his motion to change custody of the
parties’ minor child. We affirm.
This Court has held that three standards of review apply to custody cases:
The great weight of the evidence standard applies to all findings of fact. A
trial court’s findings regarding the existence of an established custodial
environment and regarding each custody factor should be affirmed unless the
evidence clearly preponderates in the opposite direction. An abuse of discretion
standard applies to the trial court’s discretionary rulings such as custody
decisions. Questions of law are reviewed for clear legal error. A trial court
commits clear legal error when it incorrectly chooses, interprets, or applies the
law. [Phillips v Jordan, 241 Mich App 17, 20; 614 NW2d 183 (2000) (citations
omitted).]
Defendant first argues that the trial court applied the wrong law when it analyzed the
propriety of changing the child’s custody. A party seeking a change in the custody status of a
minor child must first establish either “proper cause” or “a change of circumstances.” Vodvarka
v Grasmeyer, 259 Mich App 499, 508; 675 NW2d 847 (2003). Otherwise, the court simply will
not consider the issue. Id. at 508-509.
Defendant argues that the trial court looked only at the alleged changes in circumstances
and ignored the conditions, such as plaintiff’s substance abuse, that existed before the initial
custody order. We disagree. Regarding the substance abuse, the trial court acknowledged the
concern this evidence generated, but specifically found that plaintiff had stopped abusing drugs.
-1-
It also ordered plaintiff to continue random drug testing as a precautionary measure. Regarding
the other allegations, the court found that most of them lacked credible evidential support. The
remaining incidents, such as the child’s somewhat limited exposure to cigarette smoke, were
relatively minor and would not meet the high standard of constituting “proper cause” because the
parties were presumably aware of them when they stipulated to the initial order. Id. at 515.
Moreover, defendant’s counsel, probably aware of the unlikelihood of establishing “proper
cause,” agreed on the record to limit the scope of the trial court’s review to the “change in
circumstances” standard. We will not now reevaluate the trial court’s decision based on an error
defendant fostered. Phinney v Perlmutter, 222 Mich App 513, 537; 564 NW2d 532 (1997).
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it disregarded defendant’s evidence
that plaintiff smokes around the child, physically and verbally abuses the child, and uses illegal
drugs. We disagree. The record shows that the trial court placed a great deal of emphasis on
plaintiff’s history of drug use to the extent that it dedicated more than half its opinion to the issue
and ordered plaintiff to undergo continued random drug screening. Far from disregarding
defendant’s evidence, the trial court simply gave credence to the contrary evidence which
showed that plaintiff’s substance abuse had stopped. Although plaintiff’s history of drug abuse
was uncontested, two unannounced drug tests corroborated her avowal that she had quit using
drugs, and a great deal of testimony demonstrated that she was a good mother when she was not
using drugs. Therefore, the evidence did not clearly preponderate against the trial court’s finding
that plaintiff’s substance abuse had ceased.
While defendant presented a great deal of testimony indicating that plaintiff verbally and
physically abused her child, plaintiff countered this testimony with witnesses who extensively
observed plaintiff with her child and saw no signs of abuse. Moreover, there was testimony that
at least some of the witnesses who testified about plaintiff’s abusive behavior had reputations for
dishonesty and ulterior motives for injuring plaintiff. The trial court found that the proofs
presented by both parties had credibility problems, and the conflicting testimony in the record
supports that conclusion. While “a court may not immunize its findings from review by
purporting to base them on pure credibility determinations in the face of other evidence,” we
duly defer to the trial court’s first-hand opportunity to discern the credibility of witnesses.
Bowers v Bowers, 198 Mich App 320, 324; 497 NW2d 602 (1993). In this case, the testimony
was so equivocal and contradictory that it falls well short of clearly preponderating in either
direction. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court’s finding that defendant failed to
substantiate his allegations of abuse.
Regarding the smoking allegations, the evidence was undisputed that the child was under
doctors’ orders to avoid cigarette smoke and that plaintiff continues to smoke. However, the trial
court apparently did not consider the smoking issue particularly relevant because both parties
were aware of the condition before the initial stipulated order. The trial court heard evidence
that plaintiff took precautions to minimize her child’s exposure to the smoke, and it further found
that the issue as presented did not rise to the level of a changed circumstance. The evidence does
not preponderate in favor of a contrary conclusion.
-2-
Affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.