PEOPLE OF MI V JACOB STAR MARTIN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
August 5, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
JACOB STAR MARTIN, a/k/a BIG COUNTRY,
No. 247429
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 02-002860-FC
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., and Donofrio and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2), assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89, felonious assault, MCL
750.82, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. He was
sentenced to ten to forty years’ imprisonment for the home invasion conviction, ten to fifty
years’ imprisonment for the assault with intent to rob while armed conviction, two to eight years’
imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction, and two years’ imprisonment for the felonyfirearm conviction. Defendant appeals as of right, and we affirm.
Defendant’s convictions arise out of entry into an apartment. The female victim woke
when a masked man grabbed her and demanded money while he held a shotgun to her head.
When she refused, the man assaulted her. The female victim called out to her male roommate.
He entered the room and was told not to move by the assailant. The female victim believed that
her assailant was trying to disguise his voice. However, when he continued to speak and based
on the phrases he used, the female victim identified her assailant as defendant, an acquaintance
she had met in high school that had been to her apartment twice in recent weeks before this
assault.
After seeing defendant with the shotgun, the male victim retreated down the hallway
toward his bedroom. Defendant grabbed the female victim and dragged her down the hallway.
When defendant entered the bedroom, the male victim grabbed the shotgun and wrestled with
defendant. During the struggle, defendant’s ski mask came off and was discovered in the
bedroom the next day. The female victim was able to jump over the men as they wrestled and
went to a neighbor’s apartment to call police. As the female victim stood in the hallway,
defendant passed by her, and she was able to see his hair color and the back of his head. The
female victim was nearsighted and was not wearing her glasses at the time of the assault.
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However, based on the height, build, weight, hair color, voice, and phrases used, she told police
that her assailant was a man known to her as “Jake” or “Big Country.”1
Defendant first alleges that he was deprived the right to effective assistance of counsel
when his attorney failed to investigate and call exculpatory witnesses, failed to investigate
critical DNA evidence, and failed to request a continuance to adequately prepare for a surprise
witness. We disagree. When presented with the question of effective assistance of counsel, the
trial court must first find the facts and then decide whether those facts constitute a violation of
the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579;
640 NW2d 246 (2002). On appeal, this issue presents a mixed question of law and fact, with the
factual findings reviewed for clear error. Id. Effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and
the defendant bears a heavy burden of proving otherwise. People v Effinger, 212 Mich App 67,
69; 536 NW2d 809 (1995). The defendant must overcome the presumption that the challenged
action might be considered sound trial strategy. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 385-386;
624 NW2d 227 (2001). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
norms and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. Id.
Following a two-day Ginther2 hearing, the trial court concluded that counsel did not
render ineffective assistance. We cannot conclude that the factual findings are clearly erroneous.
LeBlanc, supra. At the hearing, there was testimony that defendant provided the name of an
alibi witness to police and named a different alibi witness to trial counsel. However, trial
counsel’s investigation of an alibi defense was not substantiated. Consequently, defendant
provided the name of the alleged actual perpetrator as Aaron Peterson.3 While Peterson testified
that he gave the ski mask to defendant (and thus, it was possible that Peterson’s DNA could be
on the mask), Peterson did not match the physical description of the perpetrator of the offense.
Peterson was an African-American male of lesser height and build than defendant with braided
hair to his neck at the time of the incident. Trial counsel explained that, under the circumstances,
it was more appropriate to attribute any DNA on the mask to another person, rather than
Peterson. Moreover, trial counsel did not deem it necessary to adjourn to investigate the
“surprise” witness because of his admissions regarding his prior record and testimony regarding
1
Defendant was approximately 6’6” and 300 pounds. The male victim testified that he could not
identify the perpetrator’s face, but noted that he was tall (6’1”) and the perpetrator was taller and
had a bigger build.
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
3
While appellate counsel attacked trial counsel’s efforts to locate Peterson before trial, Peterson
did not testify during the first day of the Ginther hearing, and an investigator testified regarding
his unsuccessful efforts to locate Peterson. Before the second day of the evidentiary hearing
began, the trial judge indicated that his staff had located defendant because of a case before
another judge. Consequently, Peterson’s presence was secured, and he testified at the continued
Ginther hearing. Peterson denied any involvement in the robbery and indicated that he would
submit to a lie detector test.
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his motive to lie.4 The trial court concluded that the course of action taken at trial was proper,
and we cannot conclude, on this record, that the factual determination was clearly erroneous.
LeBlanc, supra.
Defendant next alleges that the trial court erred in refusing to allow a Ginther hearing
regarding the failure to request a live line-up. We disagree. The decision to grant a motion for a
lineup lies within the discretion of the trial judge, and an entitlement to a lineup arises when
eyewitness identification has been established to be a material issue and when there is a
reasonable likelihood of mistaken identification that a lineup would tend to resolve. People v
McAllister, 241 Mich App 466, 471; 616 NW2d 203 (2000). In McAllister, this Court rejected a
challenge to the denial of a motion for a lineup where the lineup would not have resolved any
“mistaken identification” because the victim sat in a vehicle with the defendant before the assault
and clearly identified the defendant as his assailant. Id.
As an initial matter, we note that the appellate brief does not comport with the provisions
of MCR 7.212(C)(6) requiring that “[a]ll material facts, both favorable and unfavorable” be
provided without argument or bias. Defendant continues to allege that the identification in this
case was premised solely on the visual of a nearsighted woman who merely viewed the back of
the head of her assailant from a ten feet distance. This assertion ignores the prior relationship
between the female victim and her assailant, his presence at her apartment in the weeks before
the incident, the defendant’s knowledge that she did not have a bank account, the voice
identification, the specific terms spoken, and the uncommon physical height and build of the
perpetrator. When viewed in the context of an accurate reflection of the circumstances contained
within the record, any lineup would not have resolved any reasonable likelihood of a mistaken
identification by the victim, particularly in light of the victim’s prior relationship with defendant.
McAllister, supra. Accordingly, the challenge to the trial court’s denial of a motion for a Ginther
hearing on this underlying basis is without merit.
Defendant next alleges that the prosecutor deprived him of a fair trial by engaging in
misconduct that included: (1) the argument of facts not in evidence, (2) improper shifting of the
burden of proof to the defense during closing argument, and (3) elicitation of improper character
evidence at trial. We disagree. Our review of these unpreserved claims of prosecutorial
misconduct is for plain error affecting defendant’s substantial rights. People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are reviewed case
by case, examining the challenged remarks in context to determine whether the defendant was
denied a fair trial. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 266-267 n 7; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). The
record must be read as a whole, and the allegedly impermissible statements judged in the context
they were made. People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 398; 535 NW2d 496 (1995). A prosecutor may
4
Apparently, trial counsel did discuss the possibility of calling a relative of the surprise witness,
but the relative was in a dispute with the witness and police had found stolen property in her
home. Moreover, trial counsel opined that the surprise witness testimony did not appear to be
credible and did not carry much weight in light of the eyewitness identification by the female
victim. Although the trial court disagreed with trial counsel regarding the weight of the
testimony, the trial court did not take issue with the ability to impeach the witness based on his
prior record, evidence of motive to lie, and lack of credibility.
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argue the facts and reasonable inferences from the facts relative to the theory of the case.
Bahoda, supra at 282.
Review of the prosecutor’s statements in context reveals that the challenge based on
prosecutorial misconduct is without merit. The prosecution noted the DNA findings reported by
the expert hired by the defense in comparison to the findings reported by the expert for the
prosecution. The prosecution expressly noted that he did not understand the procedure, but
stated that defendant could not be ruled out in light of the sample available. Moreover, viewed
in context, it appears that the prosecutor was arguing that it was defendant’s DNA in the hat in
light of all of the evidence in the case, particularly the description of defendant by the female
victim, his acquaintance. The prosecutor’s comments did not impermissibly shift the burden of
proof, but was proper commentary on the evidence and theory presented by the defense. Where
a defendant advances an alternate theory of the case that would, if true, exonerate the defendant,
the prosecutor’s comment on the theory cannot be said to shift the burden of proof to the
defendant. People v Reid, 233 Mich App 457, 478; 592 NW2d 767 (1999).
The contention that the prosecutor improperly elicited character evidence from a police
officer is without merit. An officer’s testimony regarding prior contacts or discussions with a
defendant before an arrest do not constitute prosecutorial misconduct where the prosecutor was
establishing the identity of the defendant and the officer’s basis for the identification. People v
LaPorte, 103 Mich App 444, 448; 303 NW2d 222 (1981). Review of the testimony in context
reveals that it was utilized to establish identification and the location of defendant’s residence,
and the prosecutor did not elicit testimony concerning any prior bad acts or criminal activities of
the defendant. Id. Additionally, we note that defendant’s best friend testified that he knew of
another individual who used the nickname “Big Country.” Accordingly, the contention that this
testimony constituted prosecutorial misconduct is without merit.
Defendant next alleges that the trial court committed reversible error and abused its
discretion by allowing a police witness to testify regarding inadmissible hearsay. We disagree.
A trial court’s decision to admit evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Katt,
468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003). Third-party identification testimony, including
repetition of witness statements by a police officer, does not constitute hearsay and admission of
such testimony is within the discretion of the trial court. People v Malone, 193 Mich App 366,
370; 483 NW2d 470 (1992), aff’d 445 Mich 369 (1994). Moreover, the admission of mere
cumulative evidence is not prejudicial.5 People v Rodriquez (On Remand), 216 Mich App 329,
332; 549 NW2d 359 (1996). The testimony of the police officer regarding the victim’s
identification was cumulative to her testimony regarding how she identified her assailant.
Lastly, defendant contends that a new trial is warranted on the basis of cumulative errors
that occurred during the trial. Because defendant has not established error, there can be no
5
Defendant contends that the testimony was not cumulative because the officer testified that the
female victim indicated that she was 100 percent sure that defendant was her assailant. On the
contrary, the officer testified that the female victim said, “she was nearly 100 percent sure”
regarding the identity of her assailant, and the victim testified that she was 99.9 percent positive
regarding the assailant’s identity.
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cumulative effect of errors warranting reversal. People v Mayhew, 236 Mich App 112, 128; 600
NW2d 370 (1999).
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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