IN RE TERRANCE LEWIS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of TERRANCE LEWIS, Minor.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 27, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 252464
Genesee Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-116238-DL
TERRANCE LEWIS,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Hoekstra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In this delinquency case, respondent, a minor, appeals by leave granted1 from the order of
disposition entered after a jury found him guilty of second-degree child abuse, MCL
750.136b(3). The order of disposition placed respondent on formal probation and in an out-ofstate residential facility. We affirm.
Respondent argues on appeal that he was in police custody when initially questioned
regarding the incident and therefore he should have been given Miranda2 warnings. Respondent
further argues that because neither the police, nor the protective services worker who was acting
in concert with the police, gave him Miranda warnings, his subsequent statements should be
suppressed. We disagree.
After a Walker3 hearing, the trial court denied respondent’s motion to suppress, finding
that respondent was not in custody at the time of questioning and that his statements were
voluntarily made. In reviewing suppression hearing findings, we defer to the trial court’s factual
findings unless they are clearly erroneous. People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 395; 633
NW2d 376 (2001). However, we review de novo whether respondent was “in custody” at the
1
Because respondent’s appeal as of right was not timely filed, this Court considered it as an
application for delayed leave, which this Court granted.
2
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
3
People v Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich 331; 132 NW2d 87 (1965).
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time he made the statements, id., as well as the trial court’s ultimate decision regarding a motion
to suppress, People v Williams, 240 Mich App 316, 319; 614 NW2d 647 (2000).
“Miranda warnings are necessary only when the accused is interrogated while in custody,
not simply when he is the focus of an investigation.” Herndon, supra at 395, citing People v
Hill, 429 Mich 382, 387-393; 415 NW2d 193 (1987). “Custodial interrogation is questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” Herndon, supra at 395-396 (internal
quotations omitted), quoting Hill, supra at 387, quoting Miranda, supra at 444. The inquiry
focuses on whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant would have reasonably
believed that he was not free to leave. People v Mendez, 225 Mich App 381, 382-383; 571
NW2d 528 (1997). The fact that an individual has become the focus of an investigation does not
trigger the Miranda requirement absent a finding that the individual was in police custody. Hill,
supra at 389-391. “The determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the
interrogation rather than the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the
person being questioned.” People v Zahn, 234 Mich App 438, 449; 594 NW2d 120 (1999).
Here, the Walker hearing testimony established that everyone who had contact with the
eleven-month-old victim that day was asked to go to the police station for questioning and
everyone voluntarily complied with the request, including respondent and his mother. The mere
fact that the interviews were conducted at the police station is not alone sufficient to trigger
Miranda warnings. Mendez, supra at 383-384. Respondent’s mother was on the premises
during his interview and she neither objected to nor requested to attend his interview.
Furthermore, the undisputed testimony at the Walker hearing established that respondent was
neither threatened nor induced into speaking and never tried to leave nor requested to leave
during the interview. Also, respondent had the intellectual ability to understand the nature of the
questioning. Finally, respondent was allowed to return home after the interview. We find that
these facts weigh heavily against a finding that respondent reasonably believed that he was not
free to leave at any time during the interview. Therefore, we conclude that respondent was not in
custody at the time of the interview, and thus, Miranda warnings were not required.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress on this basis.
Furthermore, because Miranda warnings were not required, whether the protective
services worker was acting in concert with the police is inapposite. Also, to the extent that
respondent further argues that his interview with the protective services worker amounted to an
interrogation, and therefore, Miranda warnings were required before the questioning began, his
argument is without merit because Miranda warnings are necessary only when the accused is
interrogated while in custody. Herndon, supra at 395. Because respondent was not in custody at
the time of the interrogation, Miranda warnings were not required.
Respondent also argues that his statements were involuntary, and therefore, should have
been suppressed. In support of this assertion, respondent contends that he was not read his
Miranda rights, he was only twelve years old at the time of the interview, he had no prior
experience with the police, he was separated from his mother at the police station, he was
intellectually deficient, he was held at the police station for over three hours, the police delayed
formal arrest, and the interviewing techniques used during his interview were coercive and
designed to elicit incriminating responses.
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Even if respondent were in custody at the time of the interview, his statements would not
warrant suppression unless they were involuntary. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 331; 429
NW2d 781 (1988). The test of voluntariness is whether, considering the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances, the challenged statement was the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker or whether the maker’s will has been overborne and his
capacity for self-determination critically impaired.” People v Peerenboom, 224 Mich App 195,
198; 568 NW2d 153 (1997), quoting Cipriano, supra at 333-334 (citations omitted). With
regard to the admissibility of a juvenile’s statements, the factors to be considered in applying the
totality of the circumstances test include:
(1) whether the requirements of Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602;
16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966), have been met and the defendant clearly understands and
waives those rights, (2) the degree of police compliance with MCL 764.27; MSA
28.886 and the juvenile court rules, (3) the presence of an adult parent, custodian,
or guardian, (4) the juvenile defendant's personal background, (5) the accused's
age, education, and intelligence level, (6) the extent of the defendant's prior
experience with the police, (7) the length of detention before the statement was
made, (8) the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning, and (9) whether
the accused was injured, intoxicated, in ill health, physically abused or threatened
with abuse, or deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention. [People v Givans,
227 Mich App 113, 121; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).]
The issue here regarding whether the Miranda requirements were met is but one of the
factors to be considered in applying the totality of the circumstances test and is not outcome
determinative. Furthermore, there was no indication that the police did not comply with both
MCL 764.27, which involves procedures to be used when a juvenile is arrested, and with the
juvenile court rules. Again, the testimony from the Walker hearing established that the police
did not take respondent into custody until a petition had been filed and approved by the court.
Respondent’s mother was present at the police station during the interview and neither objected
to the interview nor asked to attend the interview. Although respondent’s I.Q. was on the low
side at that time, his report card grades reflected an average level of intelligence. Furthermore,
the record reveals that respondent was at the police station for no more than one hour before he
was interviewed, which was not unreasonable considering the number of people that were
interviewed that night regarding the incident. Furthermore, after the interview, which lasted
approximately one hour, respondent was reunited with his mother. A protective services
supervisor conducted the interview with respondent, using the forensic interviewing protocol,
which requires the use of open-ended, non-leading questions. Finally, there was no evidence
presented that respondent was injured, intoxicated, ill, abused, threatened, or deprived in any
way during the interview. While the police officer’s comment at the end of the interview
regarding respondent being the only person alone with the victim that day may have been
inappropriate, this was not enough to render the entire interview coercive. Given the totality of
the circumstances, we conclude that respondent’s statements were voluntary. Therefore, the trial
court did not err in admitting the statements at trial.
Finally, respondent argues that without his statements, the evidence was insufficient to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in light of our conclusion that respondent’s
statements were voluntary and properly obtained, they were properly before the jury, and thus
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this argument is inapposite. Nonetheless, we note that with the inclusion of respondent’s
statements, there was sufficient evidence for which a rational jury could have found that the
essential elements of second-degree child abuse were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People
v Knowles, 256 Mich App 53, 57-58; 662 NW2d 824 (2003); MCL 750.136b(3).
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
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