BENTON HARBOR BD OF EDUC V BENTON HARBOR EDUC ASSN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE BENTON
HABOR AREA SCHOOLS,
UNPUBLISHED
July 27, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 249070
Berrien Circuit Court
LC No. 2002-003863-CL
BENTON HARBOR EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION, MEA/NEA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fort Hood, P.J., Donofrio and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant, Benton Harbor Education Association, MEA/NEA, appeals as of right an
order granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff, Board of Education of the Benton
Harbor Area Schools and denying its motion for summary disposition. Defendant argues that
plaintiff lacked authority to bring the action because plaintiff did not vote in open session to
authorize the lawsuit in violation of the Open Meeting Act, MCL 15.261 et seq. Defendant also
asserts that the trial court erred when it vacated the arbitration award because the award drew its
essence from the agreement. Although we find that plaintiff was not in violation of the OMA
and was authorized to bring the suit in the trial court, we reverse the trial court’s order, and
reinstate the award of the arbitrator.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Carson McMutuary was employed by plaintiff
as a teacher in the Benton Harbor Area Schools. The terms and conditions of teacher
employment are established by the collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff and
defendant.
In November 1999, McMutuary was arrested and charged with felonious assault for
striking his minor son. McMutuary pleaded guilty to misdemeanor domestic assault and battery
involving a minor child pursuant to MCL 750.81(2). On January 14, 2000, plaintiff’s
superintendent, Renee’ Williams, sent a letter to the Michigan Department of Education (the
Department) advising it of McMutuary’s conviction. In the letter, Williams requested that the
Department “investigate this matter and, according to the school code, initiate proceedings for
suspension of Mr. McMutuary’s teaching certificate.” As of the same date, McMutuary was
placed on indefinite administrative leave, with pay, pending the outcome of the Department’s
inquiry.
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In a letter dated May 16, 2000, the Department informed McMutuary that as of the date
of the letter, his teaching certificate was “summarily suspended rendering [him] ineligible for
continued employment in Michigan K-12 Schools.” The letter also informed McMutuary that he
had a right to request an administrative hearing to determine if his teaching certificate should be
revoked, that he could voluntarily surrender his certificate, or he could do neither and petition for
reinstatement of his suspended certificate. McMutuary made a timely request for an
administrative hearing.
On May 26, 2000, plaintiff informed McMutuary that “[a]s the result of suspension of
[his] teaching certificate, and [his] ineligibility for employment as a teacher in Michigan K-12
schools, [his] administrative leave [was] being changed to a leave of absence without pay
effective May 17, 2000.” The letter further stated that plaintiff would “continue to evaluate
[McMutuary’s] employment status with the school district. When a final decision [was] reached
regarding [his] employment with Benton Harbor Area Schools, [he would] be notified at that
time.”
Defendant filed a grievance on June 1, 2000 asserting that plaintiff’s placement of
McMutuary on leave of absence without pay violated the collective bargaining agreement
between plaintiff and defendant. Defendant sought the following relief:
That Mr. McMutuary be maintained on administrative leave with pay pending the
decision(s) rendered by the Michigan Department of Education or be placed in
another bargaining unit position which does not require certification.
Furthermore, Mr. McMutuary is to be made whole for all lost wages, benefits,
conditions and coverages due to the change of his leave status.
Defendant filed a Demand for Arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on July 19,
2000 pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement seeking the identical relief
sought in the grievance. A hearing was held before Arbitrator Mark L. Kahn on February 21,
2002, and Kahn’s opinion and award was ultimately issued on June 10, 2002. As of the date of
the opinion and award, the Department had not issued a decision concerning McMutuary’s
administrative hearing regarding the status of his teaching certificate.1
In his opinion and award, Arbitrator Kahn found that plaintiff was not required to place
McMutuary in a bargaining unit position that did not necessitate a teaching certificate. But also
found that plaintiff improperly violated McMutuary’s rights under the collective bargaining
agreement when it placed him on unpaid administrative leave prior to a decision from the
Department on the status of his teaching certificate.
Plaintiff filed its complaint in the circuit court on September 6, 2002 seeking to have the
arbitration award partially vacated. After agreeing to dispense with formal discovery, defendant
filed motions for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(5) and (C)(10). Plaintiff filed a
1
The Department issued an Order while this case was pending before the circuit court dated
February 21, 2003 stating that McMutuary’s teaching certificate was to remain suspended.
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motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10). On May 7, 2003, the trial court
entertained oral arguments on the motions and issued a bench opinion. The circuit court granted
summary disposition in favor of plaintiff and denied defendant’s motions for summary
disposition in an order dated May 7, 2003. It is from this order that defendant appeals.
Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it determined plaintiff had the
legal authority to bring this action, and for this reason asserts that it was entitled to summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(5). Specifically, defendant claims that plaintiff did not
vote in open session to authorize the lawsuit contrary to MCL 380.1201(1). Plaintiff responds
that the act of filing the action to vacate the arbitration award was only a step in an
administrative process of resolving a labor dispute and was not so dramatic an action that would
require prior board approval at an open meeting.
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(5), this Court reviews the entire record to determine whether the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Franklin Historic Dist Study Comm v Village of
Franklin, 241 Mich App 184, 187; 614 NW2d 703 (2000). Statutory interpretation is a question
of law that is also reviewed de novo. Cruz v State Farm Mut Automobile Ins Co, 466 Mich 588,
594; 648 NW2d 591 (2002).
MCL 380.11a(5) sets out the general power of school districts, and states as follows:
A general powers school district is a body corporate and shall be governed by a
school board. An act of a school board is not valid unless approved, at a meeting
of the school board, by a majority vote of the members lawfully serving on the
board.
Further, MCL 380.1201(1) states:
The business that the board of a school district is authorized to perform shall be
conducted at a public meeting of the board held in compliance with the open
meetings act, 1976 PA 267, MCL 15.261 to 15.275. An act of the board is not
valid unless the act is authorized at a meeting by a majority vote of the members
elected or appointed to and serving on the board and a proper record is made of
the vote.
The OMA provides in MCL 15.263(2) that: “All decisions of a public body shall be made
at a meeting open to the public.” Pursuant to MCL 15.262(d), “decision” is defined as “a
determination, action, vote, or disposition upon a motion, proposal, recommendation, resolution,
order, ordinance, bill, or measure on which a vote by members of a public body is required and
by which a public body effectuates or formulates public policy.” MCL 15.263(3) provides: “All
deliberations of a public body constituting a quorum of its members shall take place at a meeting
open to the public . . . .” Additionally, MCL 15.270(5) provides that an action taken by a public
body that is not in conformity with the OMA can subsequently be reenacted or ratified by the
public body bringing the act or decision in question in conformity with the OMA. Specifically,
MCL 15.270(5) provides as follows:
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In any case where an action has been initiated to invalidate a decision of a public
body on the ground that it was not taken in conformity with the requirements of
this act, the public body may, without being deemed to make any admission
contrary to its interest, reenact the disputed decision in conformity with this act.
A decision reenacted in this manner shall be effective from the date of
reenactment and shall not be declared invalid by reason of a deficiency in the
procedure used for its initial enactment.
The record reveals that plaintiff publicly voted on its decision to bring the appeal of the
arbitrator’s award at a special meeting of the board on March 4, 2003. Since the record
establishes the formal resolution, by operation of MCL 15.270(5), plaintiff’s
ratification/reenactment of its decision to appeal the arbitration award brings the action into
conformity with the OMA. Although we do not agree with the trial court’s finding that a formal
vote was not required before instituting this action, this Court will not reverse when the trial
court reaches the correct result, albeit for a wrong reason. Ellsworth v Hotel Corp, 236 Mich
App 185, 190; 600 NW2d 129 (1999).
Defendant also argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it vacated the arbitration
award because the arbitration award drew its essence from the agreement. “It is well-settled that
arbitration is a favored means of resolving labor disputes and that courts refrain from reviewing
the merits of an arbitration award when considering its enforcement. To that extent, judicial
review of an arbitrator's decision is very limited; a court may not review an arbitrator's factual
findings or decision on the merits.” Port Huron Area School Dist v Port Huron Ed Ass'n, 426
Mich 143, 150; 393 NW2d 811 (1986).
Review of an arbitration award is “narrowly circumscribed” and limited to determining
whether the arbitration award exceeded the arbitrator's contractual authority. Sheriff of Lenawee
Co v Police Officers Labor Council, 239 Mich App 111, 117-118; 607 NW2d 742 (1999);
Michigan State Employees Ass'n v Dep't of Mental Health, 178 Mich App 581, 583; 444 NW2d
207 (1989). The only issue is whether the arbitrator, in granting the award, disregarded the terms
of his employment and the scope of his authority as expressly circumscribed in the arbitration
contract. Port Huron Area School Dist, supra at 151-152; Police Officers Ass'n of Michigan v
Manistee Co, 250 Mich App 339, 343; 645 NW2d 713 (2002). “Judicial review is limited to
whether the award 'draws its essence' from the contract, whether the award was within the
authority conferred upon the arbitrator by the collective bargaining agreement.” Michigan State
Employees Ass'n, supra at 583-584, quoting Ferndale Ed Ass'n v Ferndale School Dist No 1, 67
Mich App 637, 642-643; 242 NW2d 478 (1976).
In reviewing an arbitration award, judicial review ends if the arbitrator acted within the
scope of his authority set forth in the parties’ contract. Sheriff of Lenawee Co, supra at 118. The
arbitrator is allowed to interpret and apply the agreement. Id. at 119. It is irrelevant whether the
arbitrator’s interpretation is wrong. Michigan State Employees Ass'n, supra, at 583-584.
Moreover, reviewing courts must be careful to avoid reviewing the merits of the underlying
claim. Gordon Sel-Way, Inc v Spence Bros, Inc, 438 Mich 488, 497; 475 NW2d 704 (1991).
Absent express language to the contrary, an arbitration award will be presumed to be within the
scope of the arbitrator’s authority. Id.
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After reviewing the arbitrator’s opinion and award, we find that the arbitrator recognized
and adhered to the contractual limitations on his authority. In conducting his analysis, the
arbitrator carefully considered the agreement language, pointed out two sections he directly
relied on in coming to his conclusion, and did not disregard the terms of his employment and the
scope of his authority as expressly circumscribed in the contract. Thus, our review effectively
ceases. See Police Officers Ass'n of Michigan, supra. This Court will not further consider the
merits of the arbitrator's decision, irrespective whether the arbitrator incorrectly interpreted the
parties’ agreement. Port Huron Area School Dist, supra; Police Officers Ass'n of Michigan,
supra; Michigan State Employees Ass'n, supra at 584.
We reverse the trial court’s order and reinstate the award of the arbitrator. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Pat M. Donofrio
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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