RONALD RADULSKI V JOSEPH SALOME
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RONALD RADULSKI and PATRICIA
RADULSKI,
UNPUBLISHED
July 22, 2004
Plaintiffs-Appellants/CrossAppellees,
No. 245790
Macomb Circuit Court
LC No. 00-003189-CE
v
JOSEPH SALOME,
Defendant/CounterplaintiffAppellee,
and
BENINATI CONTRACTING, INC.,
Defendant/CounterdefendantAppellee/Cross-Appellant,
and
STANLEY R. REKEN, KURSTAN, INC.,
CAPITAL VENTURES OF NEVADA, GIANNO
AUGUSTUS FERRARI, and PAUL BENINATI,
Defendants.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Meter and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right, and defendant Beninati Contracting, Inc. (hereinafter
“Beninati Contracting”) cross appeals, from a judgment, following a jury trial, awarding
plaintiffs $35,000 in compensatory damages on their trespass claim against defendants Joseph
Salome and Beninati Contracting. The jury rejected plaintiffs’ claim for treble damages under
the timber trespass statute, MCL 600.2919. We affirm.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants Salome and Beninati Contracting were liable for treble
damages pursuant to MCL 600.2919 for intentionally trespassing on their property and
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destroying trees and vegetation on the property. Defendants did not dispute that they committed
a trespass that led to the destruction of trees and vegetation on plaintiffs’ property, but contested
plaintiffs’ entitlement to treble damages under MCL 600.2919. The jury awarded plaintiffs
compensatory damages of $35,000, but rejected plaintiffs’ claim for treble damages.
We begin by addressing Beninati Contracting’s claims on cross appeal that the trial court
erred in denying both its motion for partial summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and
its motion for a directed verdict at trial, with regard to plaintiffs’ claim for treble damages.
A trial court's grant or denial of summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is
reviewed de novo on appeal. Liberty Mutual Ins Co v Michigan Catastrophic Claims Ass'n, 248
Mich App 35, 40; 638 NW2d 155 (2001). A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether
there is factual support for a claim. Universal Underwriters Group v Allstate Ins Co, 246 Mich
App 713, 720; 635 NW2d 52 (2001). The moving party has the initial burden of supporting its
position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other documentary evidence. Smith v Globe
Life Ins Co, 460 Mich 446, 455; 597 NW2d 28 (1999). Summary disposition is appropriate if the
documentary evidence shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Universal Underwriters, supra at 720.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for a directed verdict is also reviewed de novo.
Sniecinski v Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 131; 666 NW2d 186 (2003).
We review all the evidence presented up to the time of the motion to determine whether a
question of fact existed, and, in doing so, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and resolve any conflicts in the evidence in that party’s favor. Kubczak v
Chemical Bank & Trust Co, 456 Mich 653, 663; 575 NW2d 745 (1998); Thomas v McGinnis,
239 Mich App 636, 643-644; 609 NW2d 222 (2000). If reasonable jurors could honestly have
reached different conclusions, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury.
Wiley v Henry Ford Cottage Hosp, 257 Mich App 488, 491; 668 NW2d 402 (2003).
Beninati Contracting argues that the undisputed evidence showed that any trespass that
occurred was the result of its good faith, albeit mistaken, belief that it was only clearing trees and
vegetation on defendant Salome’s property, thus, precluding treble damages under MCL
600.2919. Insofar that Beninati Contracting raised this argument in its motion for summary
disposition, we conclude that the motion was properly denied because Beninati Contracting did
not submit any documentary evidence in support of its motion and, therefore, failed to carry its
initial burden of supporting its position by affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other
documentary evidence showing that there was no genuine issue for trial. Smith, supra at 455.
We conclude, however, that the trial court erred when it denied Beninati Contracting’s
motion for a directed verdict on the treble damages claim at trial.
The provision in MCL 600.2919 that allows for treble damages is not designed to impose
liability absent active misconduct. Stevens v Creek, 121 Mich App 503, 509; 328 NW2d 672
(1982), or a knowing and intentional trespass. Governale v Owosso, 59 Mich App 756, 759; 229
NW2d 918 (1975). Thus, a defendant’s good faith and honest belief that he possessed the legal
authority to commit the complained-of act will preclude liability for treble damages. Id. Further,
“[t]reble damages under MCL 600.2919 . . . may not . . . be awarded where the trespass was
merely negligent.” Iacobelli Construction Co, Inc v The Western Casualty & Surety Co, 130
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Mich App 255, 262; 343 NW2d 517 (1983). Under the statute, a plaintiff need not show that a
defendant acted with malice or an intent to do injury, but the trespass must be more than
negligent for treble damages to be awarded. Id. at 261, 263. While the plaintiff has the burden
of proving that the cutting was done without his permission, the defendant has the burden of
proving that the trespass was casual and involuntary, rather than wilful, to avoid treble damages.
Stevens, supra.
Viewing the trial evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we conclude that no
reasonable juror could have found that Beninati Contracting intentionally trespassed on
plaintiffs’ property so as to give rise to treble damages under MCL 600.2919. The evidence
demonstrated that Beninati Contracting had a good faith and honest belief that it had the legal
authority to enter the property to clear it of trees and vegetation. Specifically, defendant Salome
provided Paul Beninati, the owner of Beninati Contracting, and Otis Gibson, an employee of
Beninati Contracting, with site plans of the property and instructed Gibson about the property
line. Beninati testified that it was his understanding that Gibson was on Salome’s property.
Elbert Tharp, a Chesterfield Township supervisor who reported to the property after the clearing,
similarly testified that Gibson sincerely believed that he was on Salome’s property. Plaintiffs
failed to introduce evidence that would allow a rational trier of fact to infer that Beninati
Contracting’s trespass arose to a level of active misconduct. Although the trial court expressed
that Beninati Contracting should have obtained a survey before commencing work on clearing
defendant Salome’s property, any failure in this regard would only constitute evidence of mere
negligence, not active misconduct. Therefore, the trial court’s decision denying Beninati
Contracting’s motion for a directed verdict on the question of treble damages under MCL
600.2919 was erroneous.
In light of our decision with regard to Beninati Contracting’s cross appeal, plaintiffs’
claim of instructional error is technically moot with respect to Beninati Contracting. But because
defendant Salome has not similarly filed a cross appeal claiming entitlement to a directed
verdict, review of plaintiffs’ instructional issue is still necessary in relation to defendant Salome.
Regardless, it is apparent that plaintiffs have not established any instructional error warranting
appellate relief against either defendant.
In Michigan Land & Iron Co v Deer Lake Co, 60 Mich 143, 145-146; 27 NW 10 (1886),
our Supreme Court found no error where the trial court instructed the jury that, in determining
whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover treble damages under the statute, “there must be
some evidence of willfulness, wantonness, or evil design” on the part of the defendant. See also
Schankin v Buskirk, 354 Mich 490; 93 NW2d 293 (1958) (affirming a judgment awarding treble
damages where the jury found that the defendant’s employees were “guilty of ‘wilfulness,
wantonness, or evil design’ in cutting the trees”), and Miller v Wykoff, 346 Mich 24; 77 NW2d
264 (1956) (finding no error in trebling damages where the jury found that the defendant wilfully
and wantonly trespassed upon their land). The trial court’s jury instruction on treble damages
accurately stated the applicable law as reflected in these decisions.
Lastly, we find no merit to plaintiffs’ claim regarding the status of Otis Gibson. First,
plaintiffs do not cite any legal authority in support of their position. A party may not merely
announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim.
In re Pensions of 19th District Judges Under Dearborn Employees Retirement System, 213 Mich
App 701, 707; 540 NW2d 784 (1995). Where a party merely announces a position and provides
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no authority to support it, we consider the issue waived. See Mudge v Macomb Co, 458 Mich
87, 104-105; 580 NW2d 845 (1998). Second, the record discloses that when this issue arose at
trial, plaintiffs’ counsel agreed that Gibson was never properly served and would have to be
subpoenaed if plaintiffs wanted to call him as a witness. Error requiring reversal must be that of
the trial court, and not error to which the aggrieved party contributed by plan or negligence.
Smith v Musgrove, 372 Mich 329, 337; 125 NW2d 869 (1964); Farm Credit Services, PCA v
Weldon, 232 Mich App 662, 683-684; 591 NW2d 438 (1998). A party cannot stipulate to a
matter, or waive objection and then argue on appeal that the resultant action was error.
Chapdelaine v Sochocki, 247 Mich App 167, 177; 635 NW2d 339 (2001); Weiss v Hodge (After
Remand), 223 Mich App 620, 636; 567 NW2d 468 (1997). Therefore, appellate relief is not
warranted.
The judgment awarding plaintiffs compensatory damages of $35,000 is therefore
affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
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