IN RE BRANDON SCOTT MEADE MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of BRANDON SCOTT MEADE,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 20, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 253665
Tuscola Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-008136-NA
GLORIA GUILFOIL,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
MARTIN MEADE,
Respondent.
Before: Jansen, P.J., and Meter and Cooper, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court’s order terminating her
parental rights to her youngest child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (b)(ii), (c)(i), and (j). We
affirm.
The testimony of the child and the child’s foster mother indicated that Ralph Vermillion
and Shawn Jefferson sexually abused the child. Respondent-appellant’s granddaughter was also
involved as a victim in this sexual abuse. The trial court found from the evidence that
respondent-appellant failed to stop this sexual abuse and that, in fact, she was present during it
and took photographs. Moreover, despite the fact that Vermillion impregnated respondentappellant’s daughter when she was fifteen years old and was subsequently extremely violent,
respondent-appellant did not take sufficient steps to remove Vermillion from her household.
Respondent-appellant’s psychological evaluation, her history of making poor choices with regard
to her children and grandchildren, and her denial of the sexual abuse of the child evidenced that
respondent-appellant would be unable to protect the child in the future, despite extensive services
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provided to her. In light of all the evidence, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that
statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR
3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).1
Further, the evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant’s parental
rights was clearly not in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich
341, 356-357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). The child had at one point stated that he did not want to
return to respondent-appellant until he was older and could protect himself. Expert testimony
indicated that reunification would destabilize the child’s feelings of safety. There was also
evidence showing a risk of future harm from respondent’s shortcomings and her failure to protect
the child. The trial court did not err in terminating respondent-appellant’s parental rights to the
child.
Affirmed.
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
1
We note that only statutory ground is necessary to support a termination order. In re Powers
Minors, 244 Mich App 111, 118; 624 NW2d 472 (2000).
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