PEOPLE OF MI V DAVID D DANIELS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 20, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247558
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-180760 FC
DAVID D. DANIELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Talbot and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions of felony murder, MCL 750.316,
assault with intent to murder, MCL 750.83, two counts of armed robbery, MCL 750.529,
conspiracy to commit armed robbery MCL 750.157a; MCL 750.529, felonious assault, MCL
750.82, and seven counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. Defendant was sentenced, as an habitual offender, fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to life
in prison without parole for the felony murder conviction, twenty to thirty years in prison for the
assault with intent to murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery and both armed robbery
convictions, ten to fifteen years in prison for the felonious assault conviction, and two years’
imprisonment for each of the seven convictions of felony-firearm. We vacate defendant’s
conviction and sentence on one count of armed robbery and one count of felony-firearm, and
affirm in all other respects.
This case arises out of the armed robbery of an alleged drug house by defendant and
codefendant, Terrill Boyles, which resulted in the shooting death of Kevin Stephens. Defendant
argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of felony murder and of assault with
intent to murder. We disagree.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and in a light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hunter,
466 Mich 1, 6; 643 NW2d 218 (2002); People v Herndon, 246 Mich App 371, 415; 633 NW2d
376 (2001). The elements of felony murder are: (1) the killing of a human being, (2) with the
intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a very high risk of death or great bodily harm
with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the probable result [i.e., malice], (3) while
committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of any of the felonies
enumerated in [the statute, including armed robbery]. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 759; 597
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NW2d 130 (1999), citations omitted. A jury may infer malice from evidence that the defendant
intentionally set in motion a force likely to cause death or great bodily harm or from the fact that
the defendant used a deadly weapon. Id.
The elements of assault with intent to murder are: (1) an assault; (2) with an intent to
kill; (3) which if successful, would make the killing murder. People v Davis, 216 Mich App 47,
53; 549 NW2d 1 (1996). Intent to kill may be proven by inference from any facts in evidence.
Id. A conviction on an aiding and abetting theory requires proof that: (1) the underlying crime
was committed by either defendant or some other person; (2) the defendant performed acts or
gave encouragement that aided and assisted the commission of the crime; and, (3) the defendant
intended the commission of the crime or had knowledge that the principal intended its
commission at the time of giving aid or encouragement. People v Smielewski, 235 Mich App
196, 207; 596 NW2d 636 (1999). Such intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence.
People v Wilson, 196 Mich App 604, 614; 493 NW2d 471 (1992). “Aiding and abetting”
describes all forms of assistance, including all words and deeds that may support, encourage, or
incite the commission of crime. Id.
Ample evidence was adduced at trial to support defendant’s felony murder conviction
under an aiding and abetting theory. A witness to the shootings testified that defendant and
codefendant came to Stephens’ house together, and once inside, they both pulled guns,
demanded “the stuff,” and threatened to kill everyone if they did not get what they wanted. An
occupant of the house testified that defendant shot Stephens in the leg, and, after more threats on
Stephens’ life, codefendant shot Stephens in the back of the head, killing him. The fact that
defendant threatened the life of the occupants of the house and used a weapon to shoot Stephens
in the leg shows his intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm. By virtue of codefendant’s
instruction to defendant to kill everyone, defendant had knowledge of codefendant’s intent to
kill, if necessary, to get what he was after. Defendant gave aid and encouragement by shooting
Stephens in the leg, presumably to get him to tell where “the stuff” was located, by ransacking
Stephen’s bedroom and carrying away goods, and by helping to corral the occupants of the
house. The fact that defendant was not present in the room when codefendant shot and killed
Stephens does not negate the fact that defendant gave aid and encouragement to codefendant
during the entire joint endeavor.
There was also sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of assault with
intent to murder Kenneth Hayes. There was testimony at trial that, after shooting Stephens,
codefendant pointed the gun at Hayes, who was lying on the bed, and pulled the trigger. This
testimony established that codefendant assaulted Hayes with the intent to murder him. As stated
above, defendant’s participation in the armed robbery of the occupants of Stephens’ house in the
face of codefendant’s threats to kill everybody, defendant’s threats to kill the occupants, his use
of a weapon during the robbery and his shooting of Stephens in the leg was sufficient for a jury
to infer that defendant had knowledge that codefendant intended to kill on the occupants of the
house, including Hayes, and that defendant aided and abetted codefendant in this crime.
Defendant next argues that his conviction of felony-firearm and his acquittal of the
companion charge of assault with intent to murder Jerean Tidwell, resulted in an impermissible
inconsistent verdict. Again we disagree. A jury may render an inconsistent verdict, which
acquits a defendant of the predicate felony and yet convicts a defendant of felony-firearm.
People v Lewis, 415 Mich 443, 449-453; 330 NW2d 16 (1982); People v Vaughn, 409 Mich 463,
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466; 295 NW2d 354 (1980). The only requirement is that there be proof that defendant
committed the underlying felony. People v Burgess, 419 Mich 305, 310; 353 NW2d 444 (1984).
There was sufficient evidence that defendant aided and abetted codefendant in the assault
with the intent to murder Jerean Tidwell. Hayes testified that, after shooting Stephens in the
head, codefendant shot at the back of Tidwell’s head. Another victim of the armed robbery
testified that she saw codefendant point a gun at Tidwell’s head and fire. Tidwell testified that a
gunshot grazed the back left side of his head. The emergency room doctor corroborated this
testimony by stating that he treated Tidwell for a small laceration on the back of his skull, which
could have been the result of a gunshot. This testimony was sufficient to establish that
codefendant assaulted Hayes with the intent to murder him. As stated supra, codefendant’s
threats to kill everybody, defendant’s threats to kill the occupants, defendant’s use of a weapon
during the robbery, and his shooting and injuring of Stephens was ample evidence from which a
jury could infer that defendant aided and abetted codefendant with knowledge of his intent to
kill. Because the prosecutor presented evidence that defendant committed an assault with the
intent to murder Tidwell under an aiding and abetting theory, defendant’s conviction of felonyfirearm may stand regardless of the fact that he was not convicted of the underlying felony.
Defendant also contends that his convictions and sentences for felony murder, the
predicate felony of armed robbery, and its accompanying felony-firearm charge violate the
proscriptions against double jeopardy. We agree. It is well settled that a defendant’s convictions
and sentences for both felony murder and the underlying, or predicate, felony violate a
defendant’s protection against double jeopardy under the federal and state constitutions. People
v Coomer, 245 Mich App 206, 224; 627 NW2d 612 (2001); People v Bigelow, 229 Mich App
218; 581 NW2d 744 (1998). The appropriate remedy is to vacate the conviction and sentence for
the underlying felony. Id. If the substantive crime underlying a felony-firearm conviction must
be vacated, the accompanying felony-firearm conviction must also be vacated. People v
Harding, 443 Mich 693, 716; 506 NW2d 482 (1993).
In this case, while the information indicated and the trial court instructed the jury that the
predicate felony for the felony murder conviction was larceny, defendant was never charged with
larceny. The prosecutor, however, argued below and acknowledges on appeal that armed
robbery was the predicate felony. Because defendant was convicted of both felony murder and
the predicate felony of armed robbery, defendant’s right against double jeopardy was violated,
and we vacate defendant’s conviction and sentence for armed robbery, as well as the
accompanying felony-firearm conviction. Harding, supra, 443 Mich at 716.
The prosecution asks that this Court reexamine the issue of whether convictions and
sentences for both felony murder and the underlying felony violate the proscriptions against
double jeopardy. The prosecution argues that the Legislature intended to “allow cumulative
punishment for armed robbery and felony murder.” However, in Harding, supra, 443 Mich at
712, our Supreme Court unequivocally stated that the Legislature did not intend to impose
punishments for both the offenses of felony murder and the predicate felony of armed robbery,
and that sentencing a defendant for both crimes violates the double jeopardy clauses of the
federal and state constitutions. The prosecution’s argument is without merit.
Defendant’s judgment of sentence indicates that each of his sentences is to be served
consecutively. Defendant was on parole at the time he committed the instant offenses.
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Defendant argues on appeal that his sentences for the multiple counts of felony-firearm should be
served concurrently, consecutive to his sentence for the parole violation, and that the sentences
for the remaining felony convictions should be concurrent with each other and consecutive to the
two-year-term for felony-firearm. We agree. People v Chavies, 234 Mich App 274, 280-281;
593 NW2d 655 (1999); People v Sawyer, 410 Mich 531, 534-535; 302 NW2d 534 (1981).
Defendant’s conviction for one count of armed robbery and one count of felony-firearm
are vacated. In all other respects, defendant’s convictions are affirmed. We remand for clerical
correction of defendant’s judgment of sentence. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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