PEOPLE OF MI V REGINALD CARPENTER
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 20, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247543
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-011587-01
REGINALD CARPENTER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Talbot and Wilder, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his bench trial convictions for carrying a concealed weapon
(CCW), MCL 750.227, felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, and possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b. The trial court
sentenced defendant to seven months to five years’ imprisonment for the CCW conviction and
seven months to five years’ imprisonment for the felon in possession of a firearm conviction, to
be served consecutively to two years’ imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We
affirm.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions. In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal bench trial, this Court must review the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether a rational trier of
fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. People v Harmon, 248 Mich App 522, 524; 640 NW2d 314 (2001). “This Court must
resolve all evidentiary conflicts in favor of the prosecution.” Id.
Defendant first argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he possessed or
carried a firearm. Possession is required to support convictions for both felon in possession of a
firearm and felony-firearm. See MCL 750.224f; People v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 505; 597
NW2d 864 (1999). “Possession” includes both actual and constructive possession. People v
Hill, 433 Mich 464, 470-471; 446 NW2d 140 (1989). “[A] defendant has constructive
possession of a firearm if the location of the weapon is known and it is reasonably accessible to
the defendant.” Id.
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The CCW statute prohibits a person from “carrying” a pistol in a vehicle. MCL
750.227(2). In order to “carry” a firearm under the CCW statute, there must be additional proof
of “carrying” beyond mere operation of a vehicle with knowledge that it contains a weapon.
People v Green, 260 Mich App 392, 404; 677 NW2d 363 (2004). Our Supreme Court has noted
factors considered in determining whether a weapon was “carried” for purposes of CCW:
Hard and fast rules regarding what circumstantial evidence is sufficient to
sustain a conviction of carrying a weapon in a motor vehicle have not evolved.
The decisions have, however, emphasized the relevancy of the following factors
either alone or in combination: (1) the accessibility or proximity of the weapon to
the person of the defendant, (2) defendant’s awareness that the weapon was in the
motor vehicle, (3) defendant’s possession of items that connect him to the
weapon, such as ammunition, (4) defendant’s ownership or operation of the
vehicle, and (5) the length of time during which defendant drove or occupied the
vehicle.
We do not wish to be understood, by reference to the foregoing factors, as
expressing any view with regard to their relevancy or importance. [People v
Butler, 413 Mich 377, 390 n 11; 319 NW2d 540 (1982) (citations omitted).]
Here, the police saw defendant drive a car to a stop, get out, and begin talking to the
driver of a parked SUV. Defendant’s sister, Juanita Kimbrough, who was a passenger in the car
driven by defendant, got out of the car and walked away. When police vans approached the
scene to make arrests for a suspected drugs transaction involving the passenger of the SUV and
another person, defendant began walking away from the scene. After detaining defendant, a
police officer looked into the car defendant had been driving and saw the barrel of what he
believed to be a handgun under the driver’s seat. The officer searched the car, found a loaded
handgun, and arrested defendant. Defendant told the officer that the gun was not his, the vehicle
was not his, and that he had not been driving the vehicle. However, a search of defendant
revealed that he was carrying the keys to the vehicle. Defendant’s father then approached the
scene and told the officer that the car belonged to him, but that the gun was not his and had never
been in his car.
We conclude that this evidence was sufficient to prove that defendant possessed and
carried the gun in the vehicle. We must draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility
choices in support of the jury verdict. People v Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78
(2000). “ ‘ “Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can
constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.” ’ ” Id., quoting People v Carines, 460
Mich 750, 757; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). The trial judge could infer that defendant knew that the
gun was in the car for several reasons: (1) defendant drove the car with the gun in plain view;
(2) defendant walked away from the car when the police arrived; (3) defendant lied to the officer
about having driven the car and therefore could have lied about owning the gun; (4) defendant’s
father, who owned the car, denied ownership of the gun; and (5) defendant possibly drove the car
on a regular basis, as he lived with his father, who was the owner of the car. The gun was also
reasonably accessible to defendant, because it was under the driver’s seat in the car that he was
driving. Therefore, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to find that defendant
possessed and carried the gun when he was driving the car where the police found the gun.
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Defendant also argues that there is insufficient evidence to prove that the gun was
concealed for purposes of his CCW conviction. However, to be convicted for CCW under MCL
750.227(2), the prosecutor need not prove that a gun carried in a vehicle is concealed: “A person
shall not carry a pistol concealed on or about his or her person, or, whether concealed or
otherwise, in a vehicle operated or occupied by the person . . . .” MCL 750.227(2) (emphasis
added). Therefore, the was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s CCW conviction.
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant argues that his trial counsel’s failure to thoroughly investigate the case, file
pretrial motions, cross-examine witnesses, and call witnesses on his behalf constituted
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant preserved this issue for review in his motion for a
new trial. See People v Wilson, 242 Mich App 350, 352; 619 NW2d 413 (2000). However,
because the trial court denied defendant’s request to hold an evidentiary hearing, our review is
limited to the facts on the record. Id.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must first show that the
performance of his counsel was below an objective standard of reasonableness under the
prevailing professional norms. People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302; 613 NW2d 694 (2000). The
reviewing court indulges a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance, and defendant bears the heavy burden of proving
otherwise. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 689; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984);
People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999). The alleged errors must be so
serious that counsel was not functioning as “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.
People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Second, the defendant must show
that the representation was so prejudicial to him that he was denied a fair trial. Toma, supra at
302. In order to show prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
Carbin, supra at 600. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.” Id., quoting Strickland, supra at 694.
Defendant first argues that his trial counsel’s failure to call Kimbrough as a witness
denied him the effective assistance of counsel. Decisions regarding whether to call witnesses are
presumed to be matters of trial strategy. People v Garza, 246 Mich App 251, 255; 631 NW2d
764 (2001). In an affidavit submitted with defendant’s post-conviction motions, Kimbrough
stated that she did not see a gun in the car when defendant was driving on the day of the offense.
She also stated that she did not see defendant with a gun before or after he entered the car.
[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient
before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged
deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s
performance. If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of
lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should
be followed. [People v Reed, 449 Mich 375, 400-401; 535 NW2d 496 (1995),
quoting Strickland, supra at 697.]
We conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s failure to call Kimbrough
as a witness. Regardless whether Kimbrough actually saw a gun, the evidence shows that the
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police found a gun in the car that was driven by defendant. That Kimbrough did not see the gun
in the car does not prove that it was not there.
Next, defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to call witnesses
who owned, operated, or rode in the car in which the gun was found. As discussed, decisions
regarding whether to call witnesses are presumed to be matters of trial strategy. Garza, supra at
255. There is no evidence on the record that these witnesses’ testimony would have benefited
defendant in any way. Therefore, defendant has not shown that trial counsel’s failure to call
these witnesses was a mistake or that it was prejudicial to him.
Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to vigorously crossexamine prosecution witnesses. Decisions whether to question witnesses are also presumed to be
matters of trial strategy. Id. There is no evidence on the record that the prosecution witnesses
would have testified favorably for defendant if defendant’s trial counsel would have crossexamined them differently. Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel’s cross-examinations
were deficient or prejudicial to him.
III. Double Jeopardy
Defendant argues that his convictions for both felony-firearm and felon in possession of a
firearm are violative of his right against double jeopardy. We disagree. A double jeopardy
challenge presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. People v Herron, 464
Mich 593, 599; 628 NW2d 528 (2003). In People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 452; 671 NW2d
733 (2003), our Supreme Court held that convictions of both felony-firearm and felon in
possession of a firearm for the same conduct do not violate a defendant’s protections against
double jeopardy. See also People v Dillard, 246 Mich App 163; 631 NW2d 755 (2001). This
Court is required to follow decisions of the Michigan Supreme Court. Boyd v W G Wade Shows,
443 Mich 515, 523; 505 NW2d 544 (1993). Therefore, defendant’s argument must fail.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
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