EVA DOMACK V RILLIE SPINK
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
EVA DOMACK,
UNPUBLISHED
July 20, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
RILLIE SPINK, GARY SPINK, and PATRICIA
SPINK,
No. 245699
Jackson Circuit Court
LC No. 01-003629-NI
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Neff, P.J., and Zahra and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants appeal by leave granted from an order denying their motion for summary
disposition in this tort case arising from a motor vehicle accident. We reverse.
Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their motion for summary
disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) because there is no evidence that plaintiff suffered a
“serious impairment of body function” so as to meet the pertinent threshold for suit established
by the no-fault act. A decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.
Quality Products & Concepts Co v Nagel Precision, Inc, 469 Mich 362, 369; 666 NW2d 251
(2003). In doing so, we view the pleadings and admissible evidence in a light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Id.
The no-fault act generally abolishes tort liability arising from the ownership,
maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle. MCL 500.3135(3). However, such liability remains for
noneconomic loss from an injury that results in “serious impairment of body function.” MCL
500.3135(1). For this purpose, “serious impairment of body function” is defined as “an
objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person’s
general ability to lead his or her normal life.”
To establish that an impairment is “objectively manifested,” “there must be a medically
identifiable injury or condition that has a physical basis.” Jackson v Nelson, 252 Mich App 643,
653; 654 NW2d 604 (2002), quoting with approval SJI2d 36.11. By using the term “objectively
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manifested” in defining serious impairment of body function the Legislature intended to adopt
the meaning of that term set forth in DiFranco v Pickard, 427 Mich 32; 398 NW2d 896 (1986),
and Cassidy v McGovern, 415 Mich 483; 330 NW2d 22 (1982).1 In this regard, recovery “is not
predicated on serious pain and suffering, but on injuries that affect the functioning of the body.”
Jackson, supra at 650, quoting Cassidy, supra, 415 Mich at 505. In determining whether a
plaintiff has suffered a serious impairment of a body function, it is appropriate to consider
plaintiff’s general lifestyle before and after the injury. May v Sommerfield, 240 Mich App 504,
506; 617 NW2d 920 (2000).
In this case, plaintiff did not present objective evidence of an impairment caused by the
motor vehicle accident that affected the functioning of her body. Plaintiff’s subjective testimony
about pain and other symptoms plainly was not objective evidence. While the radiology report
reflecting that at least one white matter lesion was found in plaintiff’s brain and the x-ray
showing spinal subluxations are objective findings, there was no evidence that these conditions
affected the functioning of her body. Therefore, they did not constitute an objective
manifestation of an impairment. The psychologist’s report years after the accident indicating
that plaintiff may have suffered impairments of cognitive functioning was not based on evidence
of a medically identifiable physical injury attributable to the motor vehicle accident.2
Accordingly, while plaintiff avers that she suffered a closed head injury from the accident, she
presented no medical testimony or other medical evidence to the effect that she has suffered a
1
DiFranco overruled Cassidy. However, by subsequently adopting the current statutory
definition of serious impairment of body function “the Legislature returned the determination of
threshold injury to the trial judge as it existed under Cassidy.” Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich
App 333, 338-339; 612 NW2d 838 (2000).
2
For this reason, the present case is distinguishable from Shaw v Martin, 155 Mich App 89; 399
NW2d 450 (1986), a case cited by plaintiff. In that case, the plaintiff suffered a large cut on his
forehead requiring thirty-two stitches as a result of a motor vehicle accident and about one week
after the accident a doctor recommended that the plaintiff see a neuropsychologist. Id. at 91.
Memory tests that the psychologist had the plaintiff in Shaw take formed the basis for an opinion
by the psychologist that the plaintiff suffered memory loss. This Court concluded that such
evidence of memory loss was evidence of an objectively manifested injury. Id. at 94-95. It is
evident that the psychologist in Shaw examined the plaintiff in that case soon after an accident in
which there was objective evidence of a substantial physical injury to the plaintiff’s head. The
close proximity between the psychologist’s examination in Shaw and the accident in that case
provided a reasonable basis for concluding that the memory loss was attributable to the physical
injury from the accident. In contrast, the results of the psychological testing in the present case
years after the accident cannot reasonably be considered objective medical evidence that
cognitive deficiencies found from that testing were a result of the motor vehicle accident. In
other words, in Shaw, the close proximity between the accident and the psychological testing
showing memory loss reasonably supported an inference that the memory loss was due to the
accident without relying on further subjective reports of memory loss by the plaintiff. In
contrast, the psychological testing years after the accident in this case cannot reasonably support
such an inference, but rather plaintiff’s claim of memory loss attributable to the accident would
have to rely on her subjective claims of memory loss during the time between the accident and
the psychological testing.
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serious neurological injury. Churchman v Rickerson, 240 Mich App 223, 229-231; 611 NW2d
333 (2000). Thus, there was no evidence to support a finding of serious impairment of body
function either under a straightforward application of the definition of that term by MCL
500.3135(7) or under the proviso of MCL 500.3135(2)(a)(ii) that “a question of fact for the jury
is created if a licensed allopathic or osteopathic physician who regularly diagnoses or treats
closed-head injuries testifies under oath that there may be a serious neurological injury.”
Plaintiff’s reliance on Kreiner v Fischer (On Remand), 256 Mich App 680; 671 NW2d 95
(2003), lv gtd 469 Mich 948; 671 NW2d 55 (2003), is misplaced. In Kreiner we held that the
plaintiff created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the significant work restrictions
placed on plaintiff because of the auto accident affected his general ability to lead his normal
life. However, in that case, unlike the instant one, the plaintiff’s hours were reduced at least
25%, and he had to refuse certain types of carpentry work. Id. at 687, n 6. In contrast, before the
accident plaintiff worked part-time as a waitress, while after the accident plaintiff worked a parttime position as a waitress, but also thirty hours a week as an administrative secretary. Plaintiff’s
testimony that she might miss one day a month in the secretarial position because of headaches
does not take this case into the holding of Kreiner. Plaintiff has also continued attending parttime the same community college, where her grades exceeded a 3.4 grade point average in the
fall of 2001, after the accident.
Plaintiff’s complaints about her horseback riding declining from once every two weeks to
only twice since the accident, and her inability to water ski or “tube,” are not sufficient objective
manifestations to establish that the injuries impacted her general ability to lead a normal life.
MCL 500.3135(1). In light of the objective evidence showing plaintiff’s continued ability to
work, go to school, and take care of herself as she had done prior to the accident, we conclude
that the relatively minimal decrease in certain social functions, even for a young adult, do not
cause these injuries to fall within the statutory framework.
The trial court erred by denying defendants’ motion for summary disposition because
there was no evidence to reasonably support a finding that plaintiff suffered a serious impairment
of body function as a result of the accident. We therefore reverse the trial court’s order denying
defendants’ motion for summary disposition and remand this case for entry of judgment in favor
of defendants. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
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