IN RE JAMIE BARENS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JOLENE BARENS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
July 13, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250179
Luce Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-000867-NA
MARILEE A. KLEEMAN,
Respondent-Appellant.
In the Matter of JAMIE BARENS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 250180
Luce Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 97-000868-NA
MARILEE A. KLEEMAN,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Gage, P.J., and O’Connell and Zahra, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent appeals as of right from the probate court’s order terminating her parental
rights in her two daughters pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j).1 We reverse.
1
Termination was also requested under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(ii) and (g), but the court found
these statutory grounds were not established.
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I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
Respondent has had ongoing relations with petitioner Family Independence Agency
(FIA) since her arrest for selling marijuana in 1989. Since that time, the FIA has twice
successfully petitioned the court to assume jurisdiction over the minor children. Respondent
unquestionably has a history of mental illness involving issues of self-control.
However, the proceedings relevant to the termination of parental rights began with the
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the minor children on September 13, 2000.2 Shortly after
this adjudication, the minor children were allowed to return to respondent’s home. Then, on
January 8, 2001, respondent went to Jolene’s school and spoke with the school counselor,
Kristen Derusha. Respondent purportedly stated to Derusha that, “[n]ow we need to take care of
your husband. I hope someone puts a bullet in him and someday somebody will.” Because the
FIA perceived the statement as a “death threat,” it filed a motion to supplement its petition for
jurisdiction over the minor children. Following hearings, the court granted the FIA petition on
November 7, 2001, finding the FIA proved that respondent engaged in a pattern of inappropriate
behavior creating a risk of psychological and physical harm to her children. The court noted the
pattern of behavior was evidenced by one admitted suicide threat, and numerous threats and
statements regarding death since 1988. The court observed that respondent made threats when
under stress, and that respondent deflects onto others blame for her own actions. The court
summarized respondent’s mental condition, stating that, “respondent has a pattern of speaking
before she thinks sometimes and many times not understanding the harm that may be caused by
such statements and threats.” The court concluded that respondent’s pattern of behavior creates
a risk of psychological and physical harm to the children.
The minor children were placed in foster care, and respondent was granted at least two
supervised visits a week. In April 2002, the FIA decided it would petition the court to terminate
respondent’s parental rights. However, before the FIA filed this petition, the court conducted a
dispositional review hearing in September 2002. Following the hearing, the court granted
respondent’s request for unsupervised visitation. Nonetheless, the FIA petitioned to terminate
respondent’s parental rights in October 2002. Following extensive hearings, the court granted
the FIA petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights on June 17, 2003.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
On appeal, respondent contends that the trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights
was not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We agree.
A. Standard of Review
2
Since this case involves whether the conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist,
evidence relating to events occurring after the adjudication is particularly relevant under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i).
-2-
We review for clear error both the trial court’s decision that a ground for
termination of parental rights has been proved by clear and convincing evidence
and, where appropriate, the court’s decision regarding the child’s best interests. A
circuit court’s decision to terminate parental rights is clearly erroneous if,
although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence
is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. [In re
JK, 468 Mich 202, 219-210; 661 NW2d 216 (2003) (internal citations omitted).]
B. Analysis
In this case, respondent’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (j), which provide:
(3) The court may terminate a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, 1 or more of the following:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this
chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial
dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either
of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
time considering the child’s age.3
***
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of
the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the
home of the parent.
If permanent termination of parental rights is sought, the petitioner bears the burden of
showing a statutory basis for termination by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo Minors,
462 Mich 341, 351, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). “Clear and convincing evidence” is
evidence which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction
as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established; evidence so clear, direct
and weighty and convincing as to enable the factfinder to come to a clear
conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.
Uncontroverted evidence can fail to be clear and convincing, and contradicted
evidence can be clear and convincing. [Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611,
625; 617 NW2d 351 (2000).]
3
The November 7, 2001, petition for jurisdiction merely supplemented the basis for the court’s
jurisdiction.
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In regard to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), the court found the following conditions that led to
the adjudication continued to exist.
One, the mental illness admitted by respondent not adequately treated
which affects and influences her conduct placing the children at risk of abuse and
neglect including the earlier suicide statements and threats, and inability to follow
through with her treatment to the extent of successfully addressing and
counseling—that maybe should say in counseling—the issues identified by the
Court and Dr. Shaul.
Two, a repetitive behave—a repetitive pattern of behavior of respondent
creating risks of physical and psychological harm and actual psychological harm
to her children.
The court further found that there is no reasonable likelihood that these conditions will be
rectified within a reasonable time considering the children’s ages. The court based this finding
on testimony from respondent’s counselor, Dr. Moore, that respondent required an additional
thirty to fifty counseling sessions to treat her mental illness.
The FIA petition to terminate parental rights concerns respondent’s alleged failure to
make significant progress in treating her mental condition. In this context, the first question
presented is whether the FIA established by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed
to make significant progress in treating her mental condition since the adjudication.
A good deal of evidence was presented concerning respondent’s mental condition. The
FIA’s position that respondent’s mental condition has not significantly improved is based upon
Dr. Shaul’s psychological evaluation of respondent, and Dr. Shaul’s April 2001 testimony. Dr.
Shaul diagnosed respondent with a “mixed personality disorder characterized by acute
exacerbation of delusions, distrust, hostility and aggressive behavior, anxiety and depression, and
loss of adaptive ego functions under stress.” The evaluation also stated that, when respondent
was under stress, her judgment, orientation to reality and ability to control her thoughts, feelings
and behavior could seriously be impaired. Dr. Shaul testified that this disorder may be difficult
to treat, and that, in respondent’s case, lack of motivation and lack of trust would impede
progress at therapy. Dr. Shaul’s testimony in this respect is clarified by the following discourse
with the court:
The court:
There may be other problems in her life, but we’re here because of
the children and her relationship with the children and you believe that the key
to that relationship that would enable the Court to maybe allow additional,
whether it’s parenting time or eventual reunification or whatever, the key of
that all goes back to the trust and motivation issues as really what you—the
results you came to in your evaluation?
Dr. Shaul:
Exactly, yes. And, she would need, I think, an individual contact
with a therapist to help her understand maybe her perception of the FIA and
the Court and these other places in order to gain a sense of commitment to the
process and understand that these people are not her enemies. You know, it’s
very much wrapped up into a lot of things that she’s had to deal with on an
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individual basis, as well. So, that’s why I would recommend that she attend
individual therapy, as well as family therapy and I see them very closely
related and you’re not going to be successful with one without dealing with
the aspects of the other.
Dr. Shaul further stated that respondent’s progress in dealing with her condition could be
measured by progress reports from her therapist and the evaluations by FIA case-workers. Dr.
Shaul made clear that FIA case-workers could observe respondent’s progress with therapy
because they had frequent contact with respondent.
At the termination hearings, the FIA presented the testimony of four FIA employees and
respondent. FIA worker Chris Stabile had never had any contact with respondent or the minor
children. FIA worker Lori Miller stated that she had not had contact with respondent since April
2001. FIA worker Judith Engel had one contact with respondent since February 2001. Last,
current FIA case-worker Karen Bontrager had only two direct contacts with respondent from
June 2002 to November 2002.
Dr. Shaul indicated that progress of respondent’s condition could be measured by FIA
employees who had ongoing continual relationship with respondent. The period relevant to
determining whether respondent had made significant progress in therapy was from the ending of
the adjudication, September 2000, to the filing of the FIA petition to terminate parental rights,
October 2002. However, none of the FIA witnesses had significant contact with respondent
during the latter half of this period. The lapse in contact with respondent corresponds to a lapse
in evidence concerning a period crucial to determining whether respondent made progress in
therapy. Absent evidence from the FIA that respondent failed to make progress during this
period, there is insufficient evidence to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, that
respondent had not made progress in therapy.
This conclusion is further warranted given that respondent presented substantial evidence
of significant progress made in therapy. Dr. Moore testified that respondent made monumental
progress in dealing with her mental condition. And although Bontrager testified that the FIA
does not “feel” respondent has made sufficient progress, Bontrager admitted that respondent
began to trust her and the FIA more than she had before therapy. Further, Bontrager admitted
that respondent complied with the “bare-bones” of the parent-agency agreement. “[C]ompliance
with the parent-agency agreement is evidence of her ability to provide proper care and custody”
In re JK, supra at 214 (emphasis omitted). Indeed, compliance with the parent-agency “negates
any statutory basis for termination.” Id. at 210. Also, the September 2002 order granting
respondent’s motion to allow for two unsupervised visits a week indicates that respondent made
progress in dealing with mental condition since November 2001.
In addition, the court relied on Dr. Moore’s testimony that respondent required thirty to
fifty more counseling sessions to treat her condition. However, Dr. Moore testified that he did
not believe therapy was “necessary for her to safely and effectively parent her children living in
her home.” Further, Dr. Moore testified that “I don’t think there’s a danger for her children
because of who she [respondent] is.” The court erred in finding that thirty to fifty counseling
sessions were necessary before respondent could provide proper care and custody. Therefore,
the court clearly erred in terminating respondent’s parental rights on the basis that she failed to
make significant progress in therapy.
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The court also found under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) “a reasonable likelihood, based on the
conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to
the home of the parent.” However, the court noted that evidence supporting termination of
parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) also established grounds for termination under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Thus, the court’s conclusion under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) rests upon its
erroneous finding that respondent failed to make progress in therapy. Moreover, no evidence
was presented that respondent acted inappropriately in the children’s presence since May 2000.
The FIA driver who observed the visitations never saw any inappropriate behavior and stated
that respondent and children appeared to be “very close.” Even the court noted that the family
had suffered a number of “incomprehensible” traumas, and said that they expressed the most
“consistently powerful love and affection” the court had seen “in any case in 10 years.” Also,
the minor children in this case are no longer in their early tender years. Indeed, Jolene (dob: 0225-1988), and Jamie (dob: 08-14-1990), are currently teenagers, and to that extent, not as
vulnerable to the risk of neglect involved in this case. See In re Dahms, 187 Mich App 644, 647648; 468 NW2d 315 (1991) (noting that the ages of the children should be taken into account).
Therefore, the court erred in finding that the FIA established MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) by clear and
convincing evidence.
We disagree with the analysis of our dissenting colleague, which all but disregards the
statutory basis for the termination of parental rights. Rather than adhering to the temporal
strictures of MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), the dissent marshals record evidence of all past neglect,
characterizes4 it in a light most favorable to the FIA, and relies on it to conclude that respondent
lacks the capacity to protect her children from physical and emotional harm. As previously
stated, MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) focuses on evidence arising after the relevant adjudication, not
before it. Nothing underscores the dissent’s failure to adhere to the temporal strictures of MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i) more than its claim that the literal weight of the lower court record equates
with the value of its contents. Had the dissent been able to provide even a colorable argument
within the strictures of the statute, the opinion would not have so extensively discussed events
that occurred well before the relevant adjudication, while giving only cursory treatment to events
that occurred after the adjudication. Only by ignoring the language of the statute and marshaling
irrelevant evidence of past neglect from prior proceedings is the dissent able to conclude that the
trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights was proper.
We also note that the dissent’s sole reliance on respondent’s testimony “denying all
responsibility for her poor parenting and failing to recognize any link between her suicidal
threats and the removal of her children,” to conclude that respondent’s mental condition had not
improved, further illustrates the lack of competent evidence presented by the FIA. The FIA filed
a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights knowing, as stated by Bontrager, the case
“revolved around [respondent’s] mental status.” Yet the FIA presented no evidence from a
qualified mental health professional that respondent failed to significantly improve her mental
4
The dissent’s characterization of respondent as a “confused, sad and desperate creature” is
particularly biased considering that two former caseworkers, two psychologists, respondent’s
doctor, and an FIA driver all testified that termination of parental rights is not appropriate.
-6-
condition. Thus, our dissenting colleague is placed in the precarious position of substituting
respondent’s statements for competent psychological evidence that clearly should have been
presented to support the petition. The result renders the court and the dissent stand-in
psychologists, drawing conclusions in regard to respondent’s mental condition based only upon
her statements. Moreover, that respondent denies she is a poor parent cannot seriously be
considered evidence that her mental condition has not significantly improved. Also, there is no
evidence establishing that a lack of insight is a litmus test for the failure to improve a mental
condition.
Finally, we disagree with the dissent’s assertion that the majority has failed to
acknowledge the possibility that the children’s exposure to their mother could lead to harm.
Clearly there was evidence of past neglect. However, the possibility that the children’s exposure
to their mother could lead to any harm has not been shown to currently exist. Indeed, from the
date of the adjudication, there is no evidence of a single act by respondent that could be
construed as causing any type of harm to her daughters. The dissent mentions only one event
which followed the adjudication that at all concerns respondent’s behavior in front of her
daughters, to which the dissent unfairly claims that respondent “stood by and watched her own
daughter being groped by an older acquaintance.” Respondent’s response to this incident does
not warrant termination of her parental rights. Respondent made her contempt known to the
man, and he immediately stopped fondling her daughter. Respondent soon after informed her
lawyer and the police of the event, but the local prosecutor declined to file criminal charges. The
dissent’s failure to adhere to the statute and attempt to justify the court’s decision on the basis of
past neglect verifies our definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made in this case.
We reverse the court’s order terminating respondent’s parental rights in the minor
children, and remand for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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