RICHARD V STOKAN V HURON COUNTY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
RICHARD V. STOKAN,
UNPUBLISHED
July 8, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,
v
No. 242645
Huron Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000732-CK
HURON COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellant/CrossAppellee.
RICHARD V. STOKAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243489
Huron Circuit Court
LC No. 99-000732-CK
HURON COUNTY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., Gage and Zahra, JJ.
ZAHRA, J. (dissenting.)
I respectfully dissent. While I agree with the majority that the language of Resolution 2383 is unambiguous, I disagree that Resolution 23-83 entitles plaintiff to renew his participation in
the county health care benefit plan some seven years after he ceased participation in this plan. I
conclude that the plain language of Resolution 23-83 entitles a retiree to receive some level of
health care benefits under the plan only if, at the time of retirement, the employee elects to
remain under the county health care benefit plan. A former employee cannot elect to remain
under the county health care benefit plan where, as here, that employee left the plan several years
before his attempted election. I would reverse the trial court’s order granting summary
disposition to plaintiff on the issue of liability, and remand for entry of judgment of no cause for
action.
The language of Resolution 23-83, in relevant part, states:
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BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the premium for the county
employee health care benefit plan . . . shall be paid by the County for current
employees, including elected officials . . . upon retirement from county service
after the date of this resolution . . . if an election is made by them to remain under
such plan[.] [Emphasis added.]
Resolution 23-83 must be construed so that every word or phrase is given effect. Klapp v
United Ins Group Agency, Inc, 468 Mich 459, 467; 663 NW2d 447 (2303) (construction of
contract—every word or phrase is given effect); Danse Corp v Madison Heights, 466 Mich 175,
182; 644 NW2d 721 (2302) (construction of statute—every word is given effect); Morris &
Doherty, PC v Lockwood, 259 Mich App 38, 57; 672 NW2d 884 (2303) (construction of
statute—every phrase is given effect).1 The majority has ignored that a condition precedent to
receipt of retirement health care benefits under Resolution 23-83 is that the employee remain
under the health care benefit plan. Resolution 23-83 expressly requires employees entitled to
retirement health care benefits to elect “to remain under” the county health care benefit plan.
This election must be made at the time the employee retires from the county and before the
employee ceases being covered under the county health care benefit plan. Should an employee
no longer be covered under the county health care benefit plan, he obviously cannot elect to
remain in a plan under which he is no longer covered.
Here, plaintiff ended his employment with the county and received health care coverage
through another employer, the Michigan Sheriffs’ Association. Plaintiff could not later elect to
remain under the county employee health care benefit plan because he left that plan some seven
1
The majority construes the Resolution as an employment contract. However, the adoption of
Resolution 23-83 is governed by MCL 46.12a, which provides in relevant part:
A county board of commissioners at a lawfully held meeting may do 1 or more of
the following:
(a) Provide group life, health, accident and hospitalization, and disability
coverage for a county employee, retired employee, or an employee of an office,
board, or department of the county, including the board of county road
commissioners, and a dependent of an employee, either with or without cost
participation by the employee, and appropriate the necessary funds for the
insurance. . . .
Since the defendant’s board of commissioners exercised statutory authority to adopt the
Resolution, the Resolution could be viewed as social or economic legislation. See Downriver
Plaza Group v City of Southgate, 444 Mich 656, 666; 513 NW2d 807 (1994) (construing
resolution adopted by a city council pursuant to the Michigan Drain Code as an economic
legislative measure for purposes of a due process challenge). This distinction makes no
difference in the outcome of this case, however, since the first rule of construction for statutes
and contracts is identical—determine whether the plain language under review is unambiguous.
Here, while I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of Resolution 23-83, I agree with the
majority that the Resolution is unambiguous.
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years prior when he ceased his employment with the county. Therefore, I conclude that
summary disposition in favor of plaintiff was improper. I would remand this case to the trial
court to enter judgment for no cause of action in favor of defendant.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
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