PEOPLE OF MI V CHRISTOPHER M MULLINS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 29, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 246891
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-004819-02
RANDY LYNN TINCHER,
Defendant-Appellant.
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 246892
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-004819-01
CHRISTOPHER M. MULLINS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and White and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendants were each convicted, following a joint jury trial, of armed robbery, MCL
750.529, and assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, MCL 750.84.
Defendant Tincher was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of fourteen to thirty years for the
robbery conviction, and 6-1/2 to 15 years for the assault conviction. Defendant Mullins was
sentenced to concurrent prison terms of fifteen to thirty years for the robbery conviction, and 61/2 to 15 years for the assault conviction. Both defendants appeal as of right. We affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
Defendants’ convictions arise from the beating, stabbing, and robbery of Eric
Cunningham. According to Cunningham, he met Tincher at a gathering hosted by Natisha
Baker. Cunningham sold Tincher some cocaine for $20. Tincher and Mullins later came to
Cunningham’s trailer and asked for more cocaine. Cunningham claimed that Tincher and
Mullins then beat him, and Tincher stabbed him with a steak knife. Afterward, defendants bound
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Cunningham’s hands with an appliance cord, and stole clothes, jewelry, knives, a Play Station,
and $400 in cash.
At the preliminary examination, Baker testified that Tincher left her trailer to buy cocaine
from Cunningham, and that he returned angry because Cunningham had sold him fake cocaine.
He then called Mullins and asked him to come over. When Mullins arrived, Tincher urged him
to go to Cunningham’s trailer with him to beat up Cunningham. Mullins and Cunningham then
left Baker’s trailer together.
The prosecutor endorsed Baker as a witness for defendants’ trial. On the second day of
trial, the prosecutor informed the trial court that Baker, who was in the twenty-fourth week of a
high-risk pregnancy, had just been taken to the hospital. The prosecutor asked the court to
declare Baker unavailable, and allow him to admit Baker’s preliminary examination testimony
pursuant to MRE 804(b)(1), redacted to exclude hearsay statements. The court responded that it
would not declare Baker unavailable until the prosecutor provided medical documentation that
she was unable to testify in court. On the third day of trial, the prosecutor supplied a letter from
Baker’s treating physician, Dr. Bryant, who was not one of the physicians who attended to her in
the emergency room. Dr. Bryant indicated that he had ordered bed rest, and that it would pose a
“terrible risk” to Baker’s unborn child if she testified. Baker was instructed to rest on her side as
much as possible and go to Dr. Bryant’s office for a follow-up examination. The prosecutor
acknowledged that Dr. Bryant had not examined Baker during her emergency. Over Tincher’s
objections, the trial court ruled that Baker was not available as a witness, and allowed the
prosecutor to introduce her preliminary examination testimony.
Defendants did not present any witnesses. On the third day of trial, defendants’ attorneys
informed the trial court that they had discovered a new witness, and moved to add him to their
witness lists. The witness, Jimmy Baugh, was an inmate in the Wayne County lockup and a
defendant in an unrelated case. Defendants had met Baugh in the “bull pen” while being
transported from the jail to their respective courtrooms. They learned that Baugh had a
conversation with Cunningham, who was also in the jail, awaiting trial for a charge of reckless
discharge of a firearm. Defendants contended that Cunningham told Baugh things that
contradicted Cunningham’s trial testimony.
The trial court allowed defendants to make an offer of proof as to Baugh’s testimony.
Baugh testified that he had complained to Cunningham that his accomplices were testifying
against him, and Cunningham replied that the same thing was happening to him. Cunningham
then told Baugh that he had been selling drugs with some other men when their supplier
demanded they return the drugs or pay for them. Cunningham did not have enough money, so he
was beaten. The other men were later caught with drugs, and they were now trying to implicate
Cunningham. Cunningham did not say anything about being robbed. Cunningham showed
Baugh a scar on his hand. Baugh believed that Cunningham was a defendant in a drug case, and
he did not know until the morning he talked to defendants that Cunningham was the complainant
in an assault case.
The trial court found Baugh’s testimony irrelevant because it described an incident in
which Cunningham was assaulted over a drug deal involving two other persons, and not the
instant case. It denied defendants’ request to add him to their witness list.
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II. Admissibility of Baker’s Preliminary Examination Testimony
Tincher argues that the trial court erred in declaring Baker unavailable and in permitting
the prosecutor to introduce her preliminary examination testimony. He argues that the
prosecutor failed to show that Baker was unavailable. He also argues that the use of Baker’s
preliminary examination testimony deprived him of an opportunity to impeach Baker’s
testimony, or to elicit testimony that favored defendants.
MRE 804 provides exceptions to the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness. According to the rule, unavailability includes when a declarant “is unable to be present
or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or
infirmity.” MRE 804(a)(4). If the declarant is unavailable, MRE 804(b)(1) provides an
exception for former testimony:
Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or a different
proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or, in a civil
action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
We review a trial court’s finding that a witness is unavailable for clear error. People v Briseno,
211 Mich App 11, 14; 535 NW2d 559 (1995). This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to
admit testimony under MRE 804 for an abuse of discretion. People v Bean, 457 Mich 677, 684;
580 NW2d 390 (1998).
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the prosecutor made a satisfactory
showing that Baker was unable to attend because of her physical condition. Baker’s physician
submitted a letter indicating that Baker required bed rest and that the stress of testifying could
jeopardize her pregnancy. There was no reasonable basis for inferring, as Tincher suggests, that
Baker’s problems would have resolved within a few days.
Tincher also argues that MRE 804(b)(1) does not apply because he did not have the same
attorney at the preliminary examination and, therefore, did not have an opportunity to crossexamine Baker. We disagree. MRE 804(b)(1) requires only that the party in the current
proceeding, not the party’s present counsel, had an the opportunity for cross-examination.
Tincher also argues that the use of Baker’s preliminary examination testimony in lieu of
live testimony denied him his constitutional right to confront a witness. In People v Meredith,
459 Mich 62, 67; 586 NW2d 538 (1998), our Supreme Court held that “[e]ven when evidence of
an unavailable witness is admissible under the Michigan Rules of Evidence, it is still necessary
to determine whether use of the testimony would violate a defendant’s constitutional right to
confront prosecution witnesses.” The Court noted that it had previously explained this principle
in People v Poole, 444 Mich 151, 162; 506 NW2d 505 (1993), wherein it quoted Ohio v Roberts,
448 US 56, 66; 100 S Ct 2531; 65 L Ed 2d 597 (1980),1 which stated:
1
In Crawford v Washington, ___ US ___; 124 S Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), the United
(continued…)
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“In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at
trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that he is unavailable.
Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears adequate “indicia of
reliability.” Reliability can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence
falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.”
In Meredith, this Court had held that the witness’ preliminary examination testimony was not
reliable because the witness (a courier in the charged drug transaction) avoided testifying at the
trial by asserting the Fifth Amendment and explaining that she might subject herself to perjury
charges if she testified at trial. Meredith, supra at 68. Our Supreme Court found two problems
with this Court’s analysis. First, the witness’ assertion of her Fifth Amendment rights did not
necessarily mean that she committed perjury at the preliminary examination; it could also mean
that she would commit perjury if she gave exculpatory testimony at trial. Id. at 69. The Court
then stated:
Second, and more importantly, Poole and Roberts teach that the reliability
requirement is satisfied “without more” if the proposed testimony falls within a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule. 444 Mich 162. To determine the
admissibility of the courier’s prior testimony in this case, we will thus look at
whether MRE 804(b)(1) is a firmly rooted exception.
This Court has not previously found MRE 804(b)(1) to be firmly rooted,
but the federal courts have so characterized FRE 804(b)(1), which is worded
nearly identically. Indeed, the exception has been described as “deeply embedded
in American jurisprudence.” United States v McKeeve, 131 F3d 1, 9 (CA 1,
1997). [Id. at 69-70.]
Similarly, in People v Adams, 233 Mich App 652, 659-660; 592 NW2d 794 (1999), this
Court held that the trial court erred in dismissing charges against a defendant after the
complainant refused to testify at trial. The complainant testified against the defendant at the
preliminary examination, but left the courthouse and disappeared on the day of trial, possibly
because the defendant’s friends had threatened her. Id. at 654-655. The trial court denied the
prosecutor’s motion to use the complainant’s prior testimony under MRE 804(b)(1), and
dismissed the charges. Id. at 656. Citing Meredith, this Court held that the preliminary
examination testimony could be admitted without violating the defendant’s right to confront
witnesses because MRE 804(b)(1) was a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception. Id. at 659-660.
Accordingly, Tincher’s right to confront prosecution witnesses was not violated when the
trial court permitted the prosecution to introduce Baker’s preliminary examination testimony.
Tincher contends that if Baker had testified at trial, she might have exculpated defendants, or if
(…continued)
States Supreme Court overruled Roberts to the extent that Roberts permitted testimonial hearsay
statements where the defendant had not had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Because the instant case involves preliminary examination testimony, where defendant had the
opportunity to cross-examine Baker, the decision in Crawford does not undermine the decisions
in Meredith and Poole.
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she had not, he would have called witnesses to testify that Cunningham threatened to harm Baker
if she did not testify against defendants. These are purely speculative claims, unsupported by
any record evidence. Further, the admission of Baker’s preliminary examination testimony did
not preclude Tincher from calling witnesses to testify about any alleged threats. Moreover,
although both defendants contended that Baker was an essential witness, neither defendant
moved to adjourn the trial until the completion of Baker’s pregnancy. We therefore find no
error.
III. Denial of Request to Add a Witness
Both defendants claim that the trial court erred in denying their motions to add Baugh as
a defense witness. We disagree. A trial court’s decision on a motion for late endorsement of a
witness is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Canter, 197 Mich App 550, 563; 496
NW2d 336 (1992).
We find no abuse of discretion here because the trial court correctly determined that
Baugh’s proposed testimony was irrelevant. Relevant evidence is evidence “having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” MRE 401; People
v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67 (2001). Generally, all relevant evidence is
admissible, unless otherwise provided by law, and evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible. MRE 402; Aldrich, supra at 113.
Because defendants failed to show that Baugh’s testimony was relevant to their theory
that Cunningham received his injuries not from defendants, but from some other enemies, it was
properly excluded. The primary feature of Baugh’s testimony was Cunningham’s complaint that
his accomplices in a drug delivery offense were trying to implicate Cunningham. There was no
indication that Tincher or Mullins ever sold drugs with Cunningham, or that they tried to
implicate Cunningham in any criminal activity. Although defendants argued that Baugh’s
testimony would reveal that Cunningham was falsely accusing Tincher and Mullins, Baugh
never said anything about Cunningham making false accusations. On the contrary, Baugh did
not even know that Cunningham was the complainant in an assault case. There was no error in
this regard.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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