IN RE ISAIAH BICKHAM MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of ISAIAH BICKHAM, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
V
No. 253209
Berrien Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 2003-000106-NA
PAULA TOWNES,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHARLEY BICKHAM,
Respondent.
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Gage and Owens, JJ.
MEMORANDUM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) and (j). We affirm.
This Court reviews a trial court’s decision to terminate parental rights for clear error.
MCR 3.977(J); In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). If the trial court
determines that the petitioner established the existence of one or more statutory grounds for
termination by clear and convincing evidence, then the trial court must terminate the
respondent’s parental rights unless it determines that to do so is clearly not in the child’s best
interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 353-354; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). We review for clear error
the trial court’s decision with regard to the child’s best interests. Id. at 356-357.
Respondent-appellant previously had her parental rights to three other children
terminated. This earlier termination followed a long history with protective services that
included one confirmed referral for abuse and three confirmed referrals for neglect. The father
of the minor child, Charley Bickham, along with his former wife, also had an extensive history
with protective services. Most of the Bickhams’ history concerned the filthy and unlivable
condition of their home at 1043 Ogden.
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When respondent-appellant gave birth to the minor child in this case, Bickham was told
that the child could not come to the home at 1043 Ogden unless it was made safe. Respondentappellant and the child, however, were found residing at that home, in living conditions as bad as
or even worse than before. Although both respondent-appellant and Bickham denied that they
lived in the house, other evidence presented clearly and convincingly showed the contrary.
As such, it appears that respondent-appellant was continuing with her unsafe and
neglectful parenting techniques and that the prior attempts at rehabilitation were unsuccessful.
Respondent-appellant’s argument that MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) requires an additional showing of
the likelihood of injury or abuse to the child in the foreseeable future ignores the plain wording
of the statute and the well-established doctrine of anticipatory neglect. In re AH, 245 Mich App
77; 627 NW2d 33 (2001).
The same evidence establishes the elements of MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Furthermore, the
evidence did not show that termination of respondent-appellant’s parental rights was contrary to
the child’s best interests. Respondent-appellant was exposing her young child to deplorable
living conditions, and there was no evidence that such conditions would not continue. The child
deserves permanency, consistency, and stability, which respondent-appellant has not been able to
provide.
Affirmed.
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Hilda R. Gage
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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