PEOPLE OF MI V LUIGI GUYDONALD RAY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 24, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247510
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-011850-02
LUIGI GUYDONALD RAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Murphy, P.J., and Jansen and Cooper, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted, following a jury trial, of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317,
assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89, and possession of a firearm during the
commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b.1 He was sentenced to 10 to 25 years’ imprisonment on
the murder conviction, 5 to 20 years’ imprisonment on the assault conviction, and 2 years’
imprisonment on the felony-firearm conviction. On appeal, defendant argues that the prosecutor
engaged in misconduct during trial, that improper bad acts evidence was presented to the jury,
that the convictions for both assault with intent to rob and murder, which resulted from the
assault, violate double jeopardy protections, and that a sentencing variable was scored
incorrectly, skewing the minimum guidelines range. We disagree and affirm.
I. BASIC FACTS
This case involves the March 1994 murder of James Childers in which he was shot one
time from close range while near the front doorway of his home. The .32 caliber bullet entered
and exited Childers’ left arm and then pierced the left side of his chest cavity, killing him. A
single .32 caliber shell casing was found on the front, outdoor porch of the house. The porch is
attached directly to the front of the home, a bungalow. Blood was found on the door.
Through the testimony of a codefendant-accomplice, Eric Goleniak,2 and a statement
made by defendant to police, it was established that defendant, Goleniak, Brian Brown, and an
1
Defendant was acquitted of felony-murder, MCL 750.316(1). The felony-murder charge was
predicated on the underlying crime of larceny.
2
Goleniak pled guilty to second-degree murder and agreed to testify against defendant in
(continued…)
-1-
individual named “Paco” were at Brown’s home drinking when they decided to steal drugs from
Childers. Childers allegedly had a large quantity of marijuana in his possession. All four of the
perpetrators, including defendant, were armed with various firearms, and they proceeded to
Childers’ home in Goleniak’s vehicle.
Once at Childers’ home, a physical confrontation
between the group and the victim occurred on the porch and in the front doorway of the house,
and Childers was shot. The police found Childers’ lifeless body in the living room of the home
eight to twelve hours after the shooting. The police also discovered an overturned chair and coat
rack in the living room.
According to Goleniak, all four of the perpetrators, including defendant, were on the
porch of Childers’ home when Childers attempted to push them away and keep them out of the
house. Goleniak testified that Brown then shot Childers. Goleniak, Brown, defendant, and
Paco immediately fled the crime scene. Goleniak testified that he was carrying a shotgun,
Brown was carrying a .32 caliber weapon, and that defendant and Paco were carrying .38 caliber
weapons.
According to the statement given by defendant to police, defendant did not go on the
porch with the other three during the commission of the crime but remained nearby, close to
some bushes on the side of the house. Defendant claimed that he acted as a lookout, and he
asserted that Goleniak was the shooter. Defendant informed police that he was carrying a
weapon, he knew the others were carrying weapons, and that he had gone along with the plan to
go to Childers’ home to commit a robbery.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant presents two claims of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. A claim of
prosecutorial misconduct is generally reviewed de novo. People v Pfaffle, 246 Mich App 282,
288; 632 NW2d 162 (2001). This Court examines the entire record in context to determine
whether the defendant was denied a fair and impartial trial because of the alleged misconduct.
People v Goodin, 257 Mich App 425, 432; 668 NW2d 392 (2003).
Defendant first argues that the prosecutor elicited testimony concerning Goleniak’s plea
deal, including Goleniak’s agreement to provide truthful testimony, in a manner that suggested to
the jury that the prosecutor had personal knowledge of Goleniak’s truthfulness and was vouching
for him. We disagree.
The relevant testimony given by Goleniak during the prosecutor’s direct examination,
which defendant maintains offended his constitutional rights, was as follows:
Q. Did you make an agreement to testify here?
(…continued)
exchange for a sentence recommendation of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment and the dismissal of
other pending charges.
-2-
A. Yes.
Q. Can you outline the terms of that agreement for the jurors?
A. Ten to twenty years, second-degree murder.
Q. You pled guilty to second degree murder?
A. Yes.
Q. All the other charges were dismissed?
A. Yes.
Q. In exchange for your truthful testimony?
A. Right.
Defendant objected on the grounds that the questioning was leading, but there was no
vouching objection. The prosecutor proceeded to present the details of the plea agreement form
executed by Goleniak, which included a statement that Goleniak agreed to “testify truthfully
against Luigi Ray, Brian Brown and Paco.”
A prosecutor cannot vouch for the credibility of witnesses to the effect that he or she has
some special knowledge concerning the witness’ truthfulness. People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261,
276; 531 NW2d 659 (1995). Testimony regarding a plea agreement containing a requirement
that the individual testify truthfully does not, in itself, constitute grounds for reversal. Id.
Generally, such testimony does not insinuate governmental possession of information not heard
by the jury, and the prosecutor cannot be taken to have expressed a personal opinion on the
witness’ truthfulness. Id. It is improper, however, for the prosecutor to suggest that he or she
has some special knowledge that the witness is testifying truthfully. People v Enos, 168 Mich
App 490, 492; 425 NW2d 104 (1988).
We find no improper conduct by the prosecutor in eliciting Goleniak’s testimony
regarding the plea agreement. The questioning does not suggest that the prosecutor had special
knowledge or inside information unknown to the jury that Goleniak was testifying truthfully.
Rather, the testimony merely recited in a straightforward manner the nature of the plea
agreement, including Goleniak’s pledge to testify truthfully. There was no improper vouching.
We conclude that defendant has failed to show a plain error affecting his substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999).
Defendant next argues that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing
argument, including statements denigrating defense counsel. A prosecutor may not denigrate
defense counsel, People v Kennebrew, 220 Mich App 601, 607; 560 NW2d 354 (1996), nor may
the prosecutor suggest that defense counsel is intentionally attempting to mislead the jury.
People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 592; 629 NW2d 411 (2001). Prosecutors are permitted to
argue on the basis of the evidence presented and all reasonable inferences arising from the
evidence as it relates to the theory of the case. Bahoda, supra at 282. Moreover, prosecutors
-3-
are given wide latitude and need not confine their arguments to the blandest of all possible terms.
People v Kris Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 112; 631 NW2d 67 (2001).
Defendant challenges the following comments made during the prosecutor’s rebuttal
argument:
Think about even what Mr. Cripps had said in opening statement
regarding what you were going to hear, that this was an inside job and that the
crime occurred inside the house.
Well, that obviously wasn’t the case. You’ve got physical evidence and
Mr. Cripps didn’t bring that up again because that wasn’t the truth anymore and it
became obvious that it wasn’t.
The same way that he had asked questions of, this I think was probably the
most telling one, was with Dr. Kanluen. He was somehow suggesting that
because Dr. Davidson had been fired for falsifying documents that we didn’t
know Mr. Childers had been shot at close range and the bullet had entered his arm
and exited and reentered.
So, I had to on redirect enter a morgue photo, a morgue photo of Mr.
Childers because of this red herring, an attempt to hide the truth, attempt to hide
the truth. Well, that’s part of what the defense attorney does, to hide the truth.
But this is about the truth --.
Defense counsel objected to the conceived personal attack, which the trial court
overruled, stating “[h]e’s rebutting what was said during the defense’s closing argument.”
For the most part, the statements by the prosecutor were permissible as they reflected
commentary on the evidence presented at trial, reasonable inferences arising therefrom, and on
defense counsel’s opening statement as it related to the actual proofs submitted. The prosecutor
was not so much saying that defense counsel was lying as he was saying that counsel tried to
deflect the jury’s attention from the pertinent facts to inconsequential matters and was
misinterpreting the evidence. To the extent that the prosecutor crossed the line by stating that a
defense attorney’s job includes hiding the truth, we find the error to be minimal and harmless,
and it did not prejudice defendant’s right to a fair trial. MCL 769.26; People v Lukity, 460 Mich
484, 495; 596 NWd 607 (1999). A miscarriage of justice did not result from the prosecutor’s
comments.
B. Prior Bad Acts
Defendant argues that error occurred when evidence of defendant’s outstanding child
support warrant was admitted contrary to MRE 404(b). Defendant contends that the prosecutor
failed to show that any probative value attached to the evidence outweighed its inherently
prejudicial character under MRE 401-403 analysis. Defendant further claims that evidence of
his arrest for a warrant on outstanding child support payments, and verification of the existence
of the warrant, was in no way probative in regard to whether defendant actually committed the
crimes charged. Defendant’s argument not only lacks merit, it is disingenuous.
-4-
The admission of prior acts evidence pursuant to MRE 404(b) is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 378; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). If the admission
of evidence involves a preliminary question of law such as whether a particular rule of evidence
precludes admissibility, this Court reviews the issue de novo. Lukity, supra at 488. The Knapp
panel stated:
Pursuant to MRE 404(b), evidence of other crimes or wrongs "is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith." However, other acts evidence may be admissible "for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, scheme,
plan, or system in doing an act, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident when the same is material." MRE 404(b). Other acts evidence must be
offered for a proper purpose under the rule, the evidence must be relevant, and its
probative value must not be substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.
[Knapp, supra at 378-379, citing People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52, 55; 508
NW2d 114 (1993), amended 445 Mich 1205 (1994).]
Defendant focuses on the following questioning of a police witness by the prosecutor
during trial:
Q. And when Mr. Ray was placed under arrest, what was he told about the, what
was he told was the basis for the arrest?
A. He had an outstanding child support warrant. And that’s what we told him
we were arresting him for in front of his home.
Q. And why did you tell Mr. Ray he was being arrested for a child support
warrant?
A. Well, when you say the word homicide, that raises everything. People’s
emotions get elevated and the potential for conflict raises. And I didn’t want
to raise that issue at that time.
Q. You were concerned about what would happen for the arrest?
A. Yes.
Q. Did Mr. Ray in fact have a child support warrant outstanding for him?
A. Yes. He did.
There was no objection to the elicited testimony by defendant. Unpreserved appellate
claims of error are reviewed for plain error affecting a defendant’s substantial rights. Carines,
supra at 763-764. We find, however, that the doctrine of waiver, as opposed to forfeiture, is
applicable here. A defendant who waives his rights under a rule may not then seek appellate
review of a claimed deprivation of those rights, for his waiver has extinguished any error.
People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 215; 612 NW2d 144 (2000). Waiver is defined as the
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. Id.
-5-
During opening statements, defense counsel, without any reference to the child support
warrant being made during the prosecutor’s opening statement, remarked:
And that’s all going to go in terms of how much weight, if any, you should
give to the paper that my client signed that they later claimed that he made,
statement that he made to the police. Because you’re going to hear when the
police go out and arrest him, they go out and arrest Mr. Ray, they don’t come out
and arrest him and say you’re under arrest as a suspect in a homicide case of
James Childers. They don’t tell him that.
They don’t come out and honestly tell him that. What they do is they say
we’re coming to arrest you for a child support warrant. They’re conducting a
ruse from the start.
Because why? Well, obviously, they don’t have enough belief or reason
to arrest him for the homicide at that point in time or they would have arrested
him for the homicide.
They obviously have some questions in their own mind about this
Goleniak version of events that was given to them. But they arrest him on this
child support. [Emphasis added.]
Additionally, during cross-examination of police witnesses, defense counsel emphasized
the so-called police ruse and trickery used in detaining defendant, focusing on the issue of the
child support warrant. Clearly, defendant made a tactical decision from the beginning to attack
the police reasoning for the arrest in an attempt to minimize and call into question the legitimacy
of defendant’s incriminating statement.
Defendant brought out the issue of the outstanding
child support warrant before the matter was raised by the prosecutor. Defendant cannot now
claim on appeal that error occurred where the jury was subjected to information about the child
support warrant. The issue was effectively waived by defendant.
Moreover, the evidence of defendant’s failure to pay child support, when considered in
the context of a murder prosecution and the facts of this particular case, did not prejudice
defendant’s right to a fair trial and was harmless, MCL 769.26; Lukity, supra at 495, nor did the
evidence affect defendant’s substantial rights assuming plain error, Carines, supra at 763-764.
C. Double Jeopardy
Defendant argues that his convictions and sentences for both assault with intent to rob
while armed and second-degree murder violate the protection against double jeopardy because
both crimes arose out of the same assault. Defendant maintains that the Legislature did not
intend multiple punishments for a single assault. Defendant raised the issue at sentencing, and
the trial court rejected the argument on the ground that the crimes have different elements.
A double jeopardy challenge presents a question of constitutional law that is reviewed de
novo by this Court. People v Nutt, 469 Mich 565, 573; 677 NW2d 1 (2004). The United States
and Michigan Constitutions protect individuals from being twice placed in jeopardy for the same
offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; Nutt, supra, 574 “The prohibition against
-6-
double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) it protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal; (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same
offense after conviction; and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.”
Id. (citations omitted). Here, we are addressing a claim asserting multiple punishments for the
same offense.
In Nutt, our Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the term “same offense.” The
Court concluded that the same-elements test is to be applied, and it overruled People v White,
390 Mich 245; 212 NW2d 222 (1973), which had required use of the same-transaction test.
Nutt, supra, 574-575. The same-elements test focuses on the statutory elements of the crimes,
and if each requires proof of a fact that the other does not, the test is satisfied and the offenses
are not the same, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in the proof offered to establish the
crimes. Id., 576. The Nutt Court, however, limited it analysis to cases involving successive
prosecutions, noting that “[w]e wish to stress at the outset that we are not here concerned with
the meaning of the term ‘offense’ as it applies to the double jeopardy protection against multiple
punishments.” Id., 575 n 11, citing, in part, People v Herron, 464 Mich 593; 628 NW2d 528
(2001) and People v Robideau, 419 Mich 458; 355 NW2d 592 (1984)(emphasis in original).
Accordingly, we shall not render our ruling predicated on Nutt.
In Herron, supra at 600, the Supreme Court stated that the concept of multiple
punishment in regard to double jeopardy analysis has as its purpose the avoidance of more than
one punishment for the same offense arising out of a single prosecution. “The Double Jeopardy
Clause prohibits a court from imposing more punishment that that intended by the Legislature.”
Robideau, supra at 469. Whether punishments are unconstitutionally multiple is essentially a
question of legislative intent. Id.3
When ascertaining the legislative intent, relevant considerations include whether the
criminal statutes involve violations of distinct social norms,4 the amount of punishment expressly
authorized by the Legislature, the elements of the offenses and distinguishing or comparable
features of the crimes, whether compound and predicate offenses are at issue, and whether the
3
In People v Calloway, 469 Mich 448, 450-451; 671 NW2d 733 (2003), the Supreme Court,
quoting People v Sturgis, 427 Mich 392, 400; 397 NW2d 783 (1986), explained the difference
between successive or multiple prosecution situations and multiple punishment cases, stating:
The Court can enforce the constitutional prohibition against multiple
prosecutions through judicial interpretation of the term “same offense” as
intended by the framers of the constitution. Judicial examination of the scope of
double jeopardy protection against imposed multiple punishment for the “same
offense” is confined to a determination of legislative intent. In the latter case, the
core double jeopardy right to be free from vexatious proceedings is simply not
present . . . .
4
Where distinct social norms are addressed by the two statutory prohibitions, it can generally be
determined that multiple punishments are permissible. Robideau, supra at 487.
-7-
statutes are hierarchical.5 Robideau, supra at 487-488; People v Walker, 234 Mich App 299,
311-313; 593 NW2d 673 (1999).
With respect to the crime of assault with intent to rob while armed, the elements are: (1)
an assault with force and violence; (2) an intent to rob or steal; and (3) the defendant being
armed. People v Akins, 259 Mich App 545, 554; 675 NW2d 863 (2003).
With respect to the crime of second-degree murder, the elements are (1) a death, (2)
caused by the defendant’s act, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification. People v Mendoza,
468 Mich 527, 534; 664 NW2d 685 (2003). Malice is defined as the intent to kill, the intent to
cause great bodily harm, or the wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural
tendency of the defendant’s behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. People v Aaron,
409 Mich 672, 728; 299 NW2d 304 (1980).6
We conclude that there is no double jeopardy violation in allowing the second-degree
murder and assault convictions and sentences to stand. Distinct societal norms are addressed in
the relevant statutes in that the second-degree murder statute, MCL 750.317, clearly reflects the
Legislature’s intent to protect life and prohibit unjustifiable killings, while the “assault with
intent to rob while armed” statute reflects the Legislature’s intent to prohibit robberies or theft
through the use of assaultive, violent behavior and weaponry. Although in general, both crimes
seek to prohibit assaultive behavior, the focus differs as to the intent of the perpetrator in
committing the crimes, i.e., an intent to kill or cause great bodily injury and an intent to rob.
The distinct societal norms sought to be protected by the Legislature are society’s desire to be
free of unjustified killings and society’s desire to be free of violent robberies and theft.
Next, in regard to the authorized punishments, second-degree murder and assault with
intent to rob while armed are both punishable by a maximum term of life imprisonment.
However, concerning the elements of the crimes, it is clear that the crimes are distinct with
varying elements and features as cited above. The assault offense is not a necessarily lesser
included offense of second-degree murder considering the need to show an intent to rob and the
necessity of a defendant being armed, and the assault offense is not a predicate offense for
establishing second-degree murder. Finally, the murder and assault statutes are not hierarchical
in nature.
Taking into consideration the relevant factors in their totality, we hold that the
Legislature intended multiple punishments where a defendant is guilty of assault with intent to
rob while armed and second-degree murder despite a single underlying assault being the basis to
support both crimes.
D. Sentencing Guidelines
5
Hierarchical offenses exist where one statute incorporates most of the elements of a base statute
and then increases the penalty based on the presence of aggravating conduct. People v Walker,
234 Mich App 299, 313; 593 NW2d 673 (1999).
6
We note that the prosecution pursued the convictions under an aiding and abetting theory.
-8-
Defendant contends that the trial court incorrectly scored an offense variable, which, if
scored correctly, would result in a lower minimum guidelines range – 60 to 180 months as
opposed to 120 to 300 months – with regard to the second-degree murder sentence. Defendant
was sentenced to 10 to 25 years’ imprisonment on the murder conviction.
The judicial sentencing guidelines control because the charged offenses occurred before
January 1, 1999. MCL 769.34(1); People v Reynolds, 240 Mich App 250, 253-254; 611 NW2d
316 (2000). In 1994, when the murder took place, offense variable 3 (OV 3) of the judicial
sentencing guidelines dealt with the offender’s intent to kill or injure.7 Ten points is scored
where the offender had an intent to injure or the killing was committed in an extreme emotional
state or where the death occurred because of gross negligence amounting to an unreasonable
disregard for life. A score of ten points is mandatory if the killing is intentional within the
definition of second-degree murder but the death occurred in a combative situation. Twentyfive points is scored if the offender had an unpremeditated intent to kill, the intent to do great
bodily harm, or where the offender knowingly created a very high risk of death or great bodily
harm. The trial court scored OV 3 at twenty-five points. Defendant argues on appeal that OV 3
should have been scored at ten points because the death occurred in a combative situation. At
sentencing, defendant challenged the twenty-five point score, arguing only that gross negligence
was involved. The particular argument raised on appeal, combative circumstances, was not
raised at sentencing, thus defendant must show plain error affecting his substantial rights.
People v Kimble, 252 Mich App 269, 277-278; 651 NW2d 798 (2002), lv gtd 468 Mich 870; 659
NW2d 231 (2003).
A sentencing court has discretion in determining the number of points scored provided
there is evidence that adequately supports a particular score. People v Dilling, 222 Mich App 44,
54; 564 NW2d 56 (1997). Scoring decisions for which there is any supporting evidence will be
upheld. People v Hornsby, 251 Mich App 462, 468; 650 NW2d 700 (2002).
There was sufficient evidence to support a score of twenty-five points for OV 3, where
the testimony established that defendant and his three accomplices went to the victim’s home
each carrying a firearm with the intent to commit an armed robbery, and where the victim was
shot dead in the attempt. Defendant aided and abetted the crime, and a reasonable inference
arising from the evidence is that defendant and the others were prepared and intended to use
deadly force to consummate the robbery. With respect to defendant’s claim that the shooting
occurred in a combative situation, there was evidence that the victim tried to push the
perpetrators out of the doorway, and the overturned furniture could suggest a struggle.
However, there was no evidence that the victim was armed while at the door, and he was
outnumbered. The evidence can just as easily be interpreted as the victim attempting to simply
prevent his demise and prevent the four intruders from entering the home. The overturned
furniture could suggest that the victim was either fleeing or that he struck the furniture after
being shot. We find it difficult if not impossible to believe, on the basis of the evidence, that
defendant and his accomplices killed the victim because they were in a combative posture
defending themselves, especially where they planned and prepared to commit a robbery, went to
7
This factor is now addressed in OV 6, MCL 777.36, of the legislative sentencing guidelines.
-9-
the victim’s home armed, and surprised the victim.
otherwise.
There was no scoring error, plain or
III. CONCLUSION
Defendant argues that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during trial, that improper
bad acts evidence was presented to the jury, that the convictions for both assault with intent to
rob while armed and murder, which resulted from the assault, violate double jeopardy
protections, and that a sentencing variable was scored incorrectly. Defendant’s arguments lack
merit for the reasons stated by us above. There is no legal basis to reverse defendant’s
convictions and sentences.
Affirmed.
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.