PEOPLE OF MI V CORNELL MCCREARY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 22, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
CORNELL MCCREARY, a/k/a MICHAEL
GRIFFEN, CARNELL GRIFFEN, and CARNELL
MCCREARY,
No. 240822
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-002771-01
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and White and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of aggravated stalking predicated on the
violation of a restraining order, MCL 750.411i(2)(a). He was sentenced as a habitual offender,
fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to fifteen to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. He appeals as of
right. We affirm.
I. Appellate Counsel’s Issues
A. 1998 PPO
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously allowed the prosecutor to introduce
evidence that the victim previously obtained a personal protection order against him in 1998.
With regard to the victim’s testimony on direct examination, defendant has waived his right to
review. The only defense objection relative to the 1998 PPO on direct examination occurred
when the victim, responding to a question about when she obtained a PPO, referred to the 1998
PPO, rather than the October 5, 2000, PPO that was the subject of the charged offense. The trial
court sustained the objection and ordered that the testimony concerning the 1998 PPO be
stricken. Defense counsel expressed approval of this remedy, thus waiving any claim that a
mistrial should have been ordered instead. See People v Riley, 465 Mich 442; 636 NW2d 514
(2001). A waiver extinguishes any error. People v Carter, 462 Mich 206, 216; 612 NW2d 144
(2000). Indeed, notwithstanding the trial court’s ruling, defense counsel later referred to the
victim’s stricken testimony (that the 1998 PPO was obtained in January 1998) during his closing
argument to argue that inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony about relevant dates affected her
credibility.
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Defendant also argues that the testimony elicited about the 1998 PPO during redirect
examination of the victim was improperly admitted pursuant to MRE 404(b). Because defendant
did not object to the prosecutor’s questioning on redirect examination, we consider defendant’s
challenge to the victim’s testimony on redirect under the plain error standards for unpreserved
issues. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-765; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). We find that
defendant’s reliance on MRE 404(b).
Evidence may be relevant and admissible independent of MRE 404(b). People v Hall,
433 Mich 573, 580; 447 NW2d 580 (1989) (Boyle, J.). Here, the challenged testimony was
responsive to issues raised by defense counsel during his cross-examination of the victim about
the 1998 events. Thus, MRE 404(b) was not implicated. Cf. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484,
499; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). Also, it is apparent that the prosecutor fairly responded to the
issues raised by defense counsel’s cross-examination regarding whether the victim had a motive
to lie that developed beginning with her first encounter with defendant in 1998. A witness’ bias
toward or against a party may be induced by the witness’ like, dislike, or fear of a party, or the
witness’ self-interest. People v Layher, 464 Mich 756, 762; 631 NW2d 281 (2001). We
therefore conclude that defendant has not shown plain evidentiary error. Carines, supra.
B. Ear Biting Incident
Defendant next argues that the trial court erroneously allowed the prosecutor to question
the victim, on redirect examination, about an incident in 1998 in which defendant allegedly bit
off part of the ear of the victim’s sister, Chalkney Perry. Defendant again argues that this
evidence was inadmissible under MRE 404(b), and further contends that it was more prejudicial
than probative. At trial, defense counsel objected to this testimony only on hearsay grounds. He
did not argue that it was excluded by MRE 404(b) or unfairly prejudicial. Defense counsel’s
objection grounded on prejudice was directed only at the photographic evidence offered by the
prosecutor, not the victim’s testimony. “To preserve an evidentiary issue for review, a party
opposing the admission of evidence must object at trial and specify the same ground for
objection that it asserts on appeal.” People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 113; 631 NW2d 67
(2001). Therefore, defendant has failed to preserve this issue for appeal. Hence, defendant must
show a plain error affecting his substantial rights. Carines, supra at 763. We conclude that
defendant has failed to show any such error.
MRE 404(b) was not implicated because the prosecutor did not offer the victim’s
testimony to prove that defendant actually bit Perry’s ear or to draw any intermediate inference
from this act regarding the aggravated stalking charge. Rather, the prosecutor offered the
evidence about what the victim was told by others about the ear-biting incident,1 the victim’s
observation of Perry’s injury, and her conclusion about defendant’s role in causing the injury to
1
Defendant does not argue that the information about what the victim was told by others was
inadmissible hearsay. In passing, we note that a statement offered to show its effect on the
hearer, rather than the truth of the matter asserted, is not precluded by the hearsay rule. People v
Fisher, 449 Mich 441, 449; 537 NW2d 577 (1995). In the case at bar, the record indicates that
the victim’s testimony about what she was told was offered to show its affect on the victim’s
state of mind.
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refute issues raised by defendant regarding whether the victim was truly fearful of defendant and
her motivation to lie.
Additionally, the victim’s state of mind was relevant because “stalking” requires proof of
a defendant’s wilful course of conduct of harassment that “actually causes the victim to feel
terrorized, frightened, intimidated, harassed, or molested.” MCL 750.411i(1)(e). Although the
harassment must be directed at the victim, MCL 750.411i(1)(d), the victim’s state of mind about
defendant, when receiving his repeated telephone calls in the latter part of 2000, was probative of
whether she actually felt frightened. Further, the probative value of the victim’s testimony was
not plainly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. MRE 403; People v Mills, 450 Mich
61, 76; 537 NW2d 909 (1995), mod 450 Mich 1212 (1995). Lastly, defense counsel opened the
door to the prosecutor’s questions on re-direct examination about the 1998 events when he crossexamined the victim about the 1998 events in order to attack her credibility. Lukity, supra at
499. Hence, we find this unpreserved issue does not warrant reversal.
C. Photographs
Defendant also challenges the trial court’s decision to admit photographs of Perry’s ear
during the prosecutor’s cross-examination of defendant. Although defendant properly preserved
his claim that the photographs were more prejudicial than probative, we conclude that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs. MRE 403; Lukity, supra at 488,
Mills, supra at 76. Defendant’s direct testimony conflicted with the victim’s testimony about
what the photographs depicted concerning Perry’s injury. If, as defendant testified, the
photographs merely depicted an ear and earring, the jury might have questioned the victim’s
testimony regarding her state of mind. Under the circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the photographs in order to allow the jury to draw its own conclusions
about the extent of Perry’s injury.
D. Sentencing
Defendant further argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a
disproportionate sentence outside the sentencing guidelines’ recommended range. A trial court
may impose a sentence outside the guidelines’ range only for substantial and compelling reasons.
MCL 769.34(3); People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 272; 666 NW2d 231 (2003). A substantial
and compelling reason must be objective, verifiable, keenly or irresistibly grab the court’s
attention, and must be of considerable worth in deciding the length of a defendant’s sentence.
Babcock, supra at 272.
We review for clear error the existence of a particular sentencing factor. Id. at 273.
Whether a factor is objective and verifiable is reviewed de novo. Id. And whether the factor
constitutes a substantial and compelling reason to depart from the sentencing guidelines is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 274.
The unenhanced guidelines’ range for defendant’s aggravated stalking conviction was ten
to twenty-three months, but the upper limit of this range is increased by one hundred percent to
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account for defendant’s habitual offender fourth status. MCL 777.21(3). Therefore, defendant’s
guidelines’ range was ten to forty-six months.2 He was sentenced to fifteen to twenty-five years’
imprisonment. The trial court justified this departure by noting defendant’s violent past
behavior, only some of which was taken into account by the guidelines, and his utter disrespect
and contempt for the law and the court.
After an extensive review of the record, we conclude that the trial court enunciated
objective and verifiable factors to support its departure, and that these factors constituted
substantial and compelling reasons to depart.3 First, we address defendant’s violent nature. We
recognize that the prior record variables take into consideration defendant’s past convictions, but
they do not adequately account for the frequency of a defendant’s criminal behavior. Here,
defendant’s relationship with the criminal justice system began in early 1991 at age nineteen. He
was twenty-nine when he committed the instant offense. During that time period defendant
accumulated seven convictions, five felonies (not including the instant offense) and two
misdemeanors. While on probation for his first offense, possession of under twenty-five grams
of cocaine, defendant committed his second felony, felonious assault, sixteen months after his
first. Defendant was charged with two counts of felonious assault, but pled guilty to one.
One year later, before being sentenced on this second felony, defendant was charged, and
subsequently pled guilty to, his first misdemeanor offense, assault and battery. Less than two
months after being released from jail, defendant committed his third felony, carrying a concealed
weapon. He had also been charged with discharging a weapon in a building. Defendant was
released from prison on December 26, 1997, and six months later was arrested for aggravated
domestic violence. While awaiting sentencing on that charge, which did not occur until
September 2000, defendant was charged with, and ultimately pled no contest to, two separate
incidents of assault on a prison employee that occurred in December 1998 and May 1999,
respectively. Defendant was eventually discharged on September 8, 2000, and was arrested on
the instant offense exactly three months later. Notably, although defendant was not arrested until
December 8, 2000, the evidence established that shortly after the victim obtained a personal
protection order against defendant on October 7, 2000, the threatening phone calls began.
Additionally, defendant’s prior convictions are only classified in terms of low or high
severity for the felony convictions and no distinction is made as to the misdemeanor convictions.
There are no other distinctions as to the type of offenses committed. In defendant’s case,
although his past felony convictions were all for “low severity” offenses,4 three of the five
convictions were for assaultive behavior.5 And both his misdemeanor convictions were also for
2
Although the court did not specifically mention this point on the record, it is clear from the
court’s comments at sentencing that it was aware of the effect of defendant’s habitual offender
status.
3
Defendant appears to concede this point, the thrust of his resentencing argument being that the
extent of the departure was disproportional. Because the nature of these factors directly relates
to our proportionality analysis, we list these factors in specific detail.
4
MCL 777.52(2) states that low severity offenses are those listed in offense class E, F, G, or H.
5
It is possible that defendant’s felony conviction for CCW could be aptly characterized as
(continued…)
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assaultive behavior. There was also evidence of uncharged conduct demonstrating extreme
violence. In 1998, defendant bit off the earlobe of his to-be wife, which required 350 stitches.
Defendant was not prosecuted because the victim refused to cooperate.
Also demonstrative of defendant’s violent nature and explosive personality are the
incidents of his unruly courtroom behavior and disrespect for law enforcement. For instance, at
nearly every court appearance defendant constantly interrupted the court, ignored the court’s
admonishments to cease talking, and severely disrupted the proceedings. At the final conference
defendant initially refused to come out of his cell. When he did appear in court and was refused
the opportunity to ramble, defendant stated that he would grieve the judge and concluded with
“F**k with you all.” The officer present told defendant to watch his mouth, to which defendant
responded, “F**k you, man.” Further, defendant had to be physically removed, i.e., carried,
from a pretrial conference on June 19, 2001, because he refused to leave and shouted derogatory
comments at the prosecutor. And he was nearly removed from a subsequent motion hearing
because his continuous interruptions made it very difficult to move the proceeding forward.
After returning to jail that day, defendant allegedly said, “I’ll break all the laws, I just may kill a
judge and a cop.” The preparer of the memorandum, a jail officer, indicated that he heard similar
statements by defendant on a daily basis.6
Defendant’s trial was similarly laced with outbursts, combativeness, and general
disruptions by him, despite the court’s repeated admonishments, culminating in his removal from
the trial on two separate occasions. In addition, following the trial, defendant’s behavior in jail
was so disruptive, assaultive, and threatening towards the law enforcement officers that
defendant was sentenced from jail to avoid the increasingly difficult task of transporting him.7
We must, therefore, determine whether these factors justify the particular departure in
this case, i.e., whether defendant’s sentence is proportional in light of the offense committed and
the reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines. A trial court abuses its sentencing
discretion with regard to the principle of proportionality when the resultant sentence falls outside
the permissible range of outcomes. Babcock, supra at 274.
The court’s main reasons for departing from the sentencing guidelines were that
defendant demonstrated himself to be “dangerously assaultive and lack[ing] any measure of selfcontrol.” Defendant’s frequency of criminal activity demonstrates his inability to conform to the
(…continued)
assaultive in nature given that defendant was also charged with discharging a weapon in a
building; however, the particular circumstances of the offense are not known by this Court.
6
Although the court alluded to many other instances of defendant’s combative behavior outside
the courtroom, few were preserved in the record for review save for the court’s mention of them.
Thus, we cannot consider these incidents in determining whether there were substantial and
compelling reasons to justify the court’s sentencing departure.
7
Apparently, defendant threatened several officers with a writing instrument and spit on one
officer while being transported to his cell. It appears that defendant also sent a threatening letter
his wife while awaiting sentencing that was admitted into evidence at the sentencing hearing.
However, a copy of the letter was not included in the lower court record and, therefore, is not
subject to review.
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rules of society or, for that matter, the rules of confinement. Notably, defendant did not
successfully complete his two-year probation sentence for his first felony offense in 1991,
committing an unknown probation violation in January 1992 and his second felony offense in
June 1992. With regard to most of defendant’s other convictions he served the maximum
imposed sentence or nearly so. Even while incarcerated defendant could not conform his
conduct to the law, committing two separate assaults on prison employees and abusing the
officers in the jail where defendant was held pending trial on the instant offense.
Defendant’s behavior towards the court and court personnel throughout the history of this
case further support the notion that he is indeed a danger to society. Under these circumstances,
we cannot say that the court’s sentence fell outside the permissible range of outcomes. While the
extent of the departure was extraordinary given defendant’s guidelines range and the nature of
the conduct involved (phone contact rather than physical contact), defendant’s behavior, past and
present, was equally extraordinary. Accordingly, we do not find that the trial court abused its
discretion in sentencing defendant to fifteen to twenty-five years’ imprisonment.
Moreover, defendant’s due process challenge to his sentence is not properly before us
because it is not set forth in the statement of the questions presented. MCR 7.215(C)(5); People
v Albers, 258 Mich App 578, 585; 672 NW2d 336 (2003). Further, defendant did not present
this specific claim to the trial court. Nevertheless, we note that defendant’s reliance on Apprendi
v New Jersey, 530 US 466; 120 S Ct 2348; 147 L Ed 2d 435 (2000), is misplaced. In Apprendi,
supra at 490, the Supreme Court stated that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” The relevant inquiry under
Apprendi is not how the aggravating factor is designated in a statute, but rather its effect, i.e.,
“‘does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than authorized by the
jury’s guilty verdict?’” People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 635; 628 NW2d 540 (2001), quoting
Apprendi, supra at 494. Here, defendant was not sentenced beyond the prescribed statutory
maximum for a fourth habitual offender. MCL 769.12. Thus, the due process principles
announced in Apprendi were not violated.
II. Defendant’s Pro Se Issues
A. Appropriateness of Charged Offense
In his Standard 11 brief, defendant challenges the trial court’s decision denying his
motion to quash the information on the ground that he was overcharged and that the victim
fabricated testimony. Because we find that defendant was fairly convicted at trial, we decline to
consider his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence at the preliminary examination. People
v Yost, 468 Mich 122, 124 n 2; 659 NW2d 604 (2003); People v Hall, 435 Mich 599, 601-603;
460 NW2d 520 (1990).
And we find no merit to defendant’s claim that the Legislature did not intend that a
person be charged with aggravated stalking under MCL 750.411i(2)(a) unless he is first charged
and convicted of stalking under MCL 750.411h. This argument runs counter to the plain
language of the statute. Where a statute is unambiguous, judicial interpretation is neither
necessary nor permitted. People v Koonce, 466 Mich 515, 518; 648 NW2d 153 (2002). Under
MCL 750.411i(2)(d), a previous conviction under MCL 750.411h merely serves as another
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possible aggravating circumstance; it is not a prerequisite to a conviction. Pursuant to MCL
750.411i(2), an individual who engages in stalking is guilty of aggravated stalking if the
violation involves any of the four listed circumstances. People v White, 212 Mich App 298, 307308; 536 NW2d 876 (1995).
We also reject defendant’s claim that a person must be charged with contempt of a
restraining order before being charged with aggravated stalking. MCL 750.411i(2)(a) does not
require proof of a prior contempt finding. It only requires proof that at least one action by
defendant violated a restraining order and that he received actual notice of that restraining order.
Indeed, MCL 750.411i(6) states that “[a] criminal penalty provided for under this section may be
imposed in addition to any penalty that may be imposed for any other criminal offense arising
from the same conduct or for contempt of court arising from the same conduct.” This
demonstrates that the Legislature intended that the same conduct could be used for both
contempt and aggravated stalking charges.
B. Discovery
Next, the record does not support defendant’s claim that the prosecutor denied a
discovery request for the 2000 PPO after the trial court entered its order allowing for additional
discovery on December 20, 2001. As the appellant, defendant has the burden of furnishing a
reviewing court with a record that verifies the factual basis of his claim. People v Elston, 462
Mich 751, 762; 614 NW2d 595 (2000). Defendant has not done so. In any event, the record
indicates that on the first scheduled trial date, January 7, 2002, defense counsel objected to the
prosecutor introducing exhibit evidence of the 2000 PPO unless it was legible. Defense counsel
later objected to the evidence on foundational grounds, which was overruled by the trial court
because the prosecutor offered a certified copy of the 2000 PPO into evidence. A plain
discovery violation is not apparent from the record. Carines, supra at 763. Even if there was
error, a trial court has discretion in determining the appropriate remedy for a discovery violation,
People v Banks, 249 Mich App 247, 252; 642 NW2d 351 (2002), and defendant has not shown
that suppression of the 2000 PPO was required here.
Defendant’s reliance on Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215
(1963), as support for his argument that evidence of the 2000 PPO should have been suppressed,
is misplaced, because we find that the record does not reflect a Brady violation. People v Lester,
232 Mich App 262, 281-282; 591 NW2d 267 (1998). Nor do we find that defendant was entitled
to a Franks8 hearing. The purpose of a Franks hearing is to ascertain if the affiant to a search
warrant deliberately or recklessly provided false information or made material omissions. See
People v Ulman, 244 Mich App 500, 510; 625 NW2d 429 (2001). The 2000 PPO is not the
equivalent of a search warrant. Finally, defendant’s reliance on Pobursky v Gee, 249 Mich App
44; 640 NW2d 597 (2001), is also misplaced because the instant case does not involve a direct
appeal concerning a PPO. Rather, defendant is attempting to collaterally attack the 2000 PPO in
a separate proceeding, which he cannot do. See Jackson City Bank & Trust Co v Fredrick, 271
Mich 538; 545-546; 260 NW 908 (1935).
8
Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154; 98 S Ct 2674; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978).
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C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant also seeks reversal of his conviction based on various claims of prosecutorial
misconduct. We find no merit to these claims. First, defense counsel effectively waived any
claim that the prosecutor knowingly used false testimony to obtain a conviction by expressly
refuting defendant’s pro se position on this issue when moving for a directed verdict at trial.9
With the exception of certain fundamental rights, defense counsel may effectuate a waiver.
Carter, supra at 218. A waiver extinguishes any error. Id. at 216. In any event, mere
inconsistencies in a witness’ testimony do not demonstrate that the prosecutor knowingly used
false testimony to obtain a conviction. Rather, the inconsistencies provide a basis for
impeaching the testimony. See People v Cash, 388 Mich 153, 162; 200 NW2d 83 (1972)
(perjury is established by showing the truth of the contradiction; it is not enough simply to
contradict it), and People v Arntson, 10 Mich App 718; 160 NW2d 386 (1968) (inconsistencies
might inure to a defendant’s benefit by affecting the credibility of witness, but do not establish
perjury). Hence, defendant’s claim that the prosecutor knowingly presented perjured testimony
is without merit.
Second, defendant forfeited his claim that the prosecutor’s opening statement constituted
misconduct by not objecting to the opening statement at trial. A review of the opening statement
fails to disclose plain error. Carines, supra at 763. And third, defendant’s cursory claim
regarding the evidence introduced by the prosecutor at trial is insufficient to invoke appellate
review. People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998). Lastly, a
prosecutor has broad discretion in filing criminal charges. People v Conat, 238 Mich App 134,
148-149; 605 NW2d 49 (1999). If warranted by the facts, the prosecutor may charge a defendant
under any applicable statute. Id. at 149. In this case, defendant has not established prosecutorial
vindictiveness because the charge brought against him was supported by the facts and was within
the prosecutor’s discretion. People v Ryan, 451 Mich 30, 36; 545 NW2d 612 (1996).
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Next, defendant claims that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel and seeks a
remand to the trial court for a Ginther10 hearing. We note that both the trial court and this Court
previously denied defendant’s request for a Ginther hearing as unnecessary. See People v
McMillan, 213 Mich App 134, 141-142; 539 NW2d 553 (1995) (remand is unnecessary if a
defendant fails to show a factual dispute or an area in which further elucidation of facts might
9
Although the record indicates that defendant was actively involved in his defense and was even
permitted to introduce certain exhibits at trial, it does not reflect that the case involved the type
of “hybrid representation” in which a defendant retains ultimate control over his defense
strategy. See People v Dennany, 445 Mich 412, 440 n 17; 519 NW2d 128 (1994) (Griffin, J.) A
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel or to proceed in propria persona, but not both.
People v Adkins (After Remand), 452 Mich 702, 720; 551 NW2d 108 (1996). There is no
constitutional right to “hybrid representation.” People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 420;
639 NW2d 291 (2001). Because the instant case involves a situation in which defendant was
represented by counsel, we have evaluated defense counsel’s performance in this context.
10
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436, 443; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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advance his position). Limiting our review to errors apparent from the record, defendant has not
established that trial counsel was ineffective. Id. at 141.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show
that his attorney’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness and that this was so prejudicial to him that he was denied a fair
trial. Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 687; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674
(1984); People v Pickens, 446 Mich 298, 303; 521 NW2d 797 (1994). As for
deficient performance, a defendant must overcome the strong presumption that his
counsel’s action constituted sound trial strategy under the circumstances. People
v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 156; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). As for prejudice, a
defendant must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different . . .
.” Id. at 167. [People v Toma, 462 Mich 281, 302-303; 613 NW2d 694 (2000).]
We reject defendant’s claim that defense counsel’s failure to comply with each of
defendant’s requests to take certain actions demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel. “A
difference of opinion between defendant and defense counsel on trial tactics does not mean that
there was ineffective assistance of counsel.” People v Cicotte, 133 Mich App 630, 637; 349
NW2d 167 (1984). Having considered the specific matters raised by defendant in his Standard
11 brief, we find no basis for concluding that defense counsel was ineffective.
First, we find that defense counsel did not act deficiently by failing to move for a directed
verdict until after the close of the prosecutor’s proofs. Under MCR 6.419(A), a motion for a
directed verdict is appropriate after the prosecution rests its case-in-chief and before the
defendant presents his proofs. Counsel is not required to make a futile objection. People v Fike,
228 Mich App 178, 182; 577 NW2d 903 (1998).
Second, the record provides no support for defendant’s claim that defense counsel’s
failure to ask all of the questions that defendant wanted asked amounted to either deficient
performance or caused prejudice. Toma, supra. Although the record supports defendant’s claim
that a conflict with defense counsel occurred in the presence of the jury, it is plain from the
record that the display was caused by defendant’s own lack of self-control in the courtroom,
rather than defense counsel’s performance. Further, the record indicates that defendant was
given wide latitude to provide testimony about his theory that the victim was falsely accusing
him to protect Perry.
Third, defense counsel’s failure to offer the victim’s police statement into evidence does
not provide a basis for finding ineffective assistance of counsel, given the trial court’s decision to
grant defendant’s pro se offer to admit the statement and other exhibits, regardless of whether the
evidence was admissible under the rules of evidence. We also note that defense counsel in fact
used the statement when cross-examining the victim about whether she was afraid of defendant.
Defendant has not shown that counsel’s use of the statement fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. The questioning of witnesses is presumed to be a matter of trial strategy.
People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
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Fourth, we find that defendant was not prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to file a
witness list because the trial court permitted defense counsel to make an offer of proof with
regard to unlisted witnesses and defense counsel, in fact, succeeded in having defendant’s
brother called as a defense witness. Having considered the offer of proof made by defense
counsel at trial with regard to the other proposed witnesses and evidence, we are not persuaded
that defendant could develop any factual basis for concluding that, but for defense counsel’s
performance, there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have
been different. Contrary to defendant’s argument on appeal, the record does not indicate that
evidence regarding defendant’s work schedule and phone records, or the testimony of assistant
prosecuting attorneys, would have provided him with a substantial defense. People v Daniel,
207 Mich App 47, 58; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
E. Speedy Trial
Next, defendant argues that he was denied a speedy trial and that, during the delay, he
should have been released on personal recognizance. We decline to address the latter issue
because it is moot. B P 7 v Bureau of State Lottery, 231 Mich App 356, 359; 586 NW2d 117
(1998). With regard to the former issue, we conclude that defendant was not deprived of his
right to speedy trial. People v Gilmore, 222 Mich App 442, 459; 564 NW2d 158 (1997). The
delay involved was less than the eighteen months necessary to trigger a presumption of
prejudice. Id. Further, the delay was largely attributable to the need to repeatedly reschedule the
trial in order to accommodate finding a new attorney to represent defendant. Indeed, three
attorneys represented defendant and withdrew their representation within a six-month period in
2001. Additionally, although pretrial incarceration and emotional anxiety are cognizant forms of
speedy trial prejudice, People v Holland, 179 Mich App 184, 196; 445 NW2d 206 (1989), the
most serious inquiry is whether the delay impaired the defense, People v Simpson, 207 Mich App
560, 564; 526 NW2d 33 (1994). Here, there is no indication that defendant was prejudiced in his
ability to defend the charge against him. After considering the relevant factors, we conclude that
defendant’s right to a speedy trial was not violated.
F. Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge
Next, defendant argues that his motion to disqualify Judge Michael Hathaway was
erroneously denied. We review for an abuse of discretion the lower court’s factual findings, but
review de novo the application of the law to the facts. Cain v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich
470, 503; 548 NW2d 210 (1996). A party challenging a judge for bias must overcome a heavy
presumption of judicial impartiality. Id. at 497. The defendant must prove either actual personal
or prejudice. Id. at 503. Here, defendant did not establish any familial relationship that required
disqualification under MCR 2.003(B), and he failed to demonstrate factual support for his claim
of judicial bias. MCR 2.003(B)(1). A party’s mere filing of a complaint with the Judicial
Tenure Commission does not require disqualification. People v Bero, 168 Mich App 545, 552;
425 NW2d 138 (1988). Nor do a judge’s repeated rulings against a party require
disqualification. People v Fox (After Remand), 232 Mich App 541, 559; 591 NW2d 384 (1998).
We also reject defendant’s challenge to the chief judge’s reassignment order under MCR
8.111. Chief judges are invested with authority to take measures with regard to case assignments
that are not prohibited by the letter or spirit of the court rules. Schell v Baker Furniture Co, 461
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Mich 502, 513; 607 NW2d 358 (2000). Defendant has not shown any basis for disturbing the
reassignment order in this case.
G. Change of Venue
Defendant also argues that his request for a change of venue should have been granted.
Having considered defendant’s claim in the context of the argument he presented to the trial
court regarding his lawsuit against the Wayne County Sheriff’s Department, we disagree. The
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because we find there were no
special circumstances to warrant a change of venue. People v Jendrzejewski, 455 Mich 495,
499-500; 566 NW2d 530 (1997).
H. Directed Verdict
Defendant next argues that the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of
defendant because the prosecutor’s evidence was not strong. Again, we disagree. Viewed in a
light most favorable to the prosecution, People v Riley (After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139-140;
659 NW2d 611 (2003), the victim’s testimony was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant repeatedly made phone calls to the victim’s home
and that both the reasonable person and actual causation elements of MCL 750.411i(1)(e) were
proven. Although defendant argues that the victim was not credible, we are required to draw all
reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury’s verdict. People v
Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000).
Further, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one action constituted the aggravating circumstance
in MCL 750.411i(2)(a), violation of a PPO. Contrary to defendant’s claim on appeal, actual
notice is not equivalent to service under MCR 2.105. People v Threatt, 254 Mich App 504, 506507; 657 NW2d 819 (2002). The process server’s testimony about his encounter with defendant
and how he left the 2000 PPO in the mail slot at defendant’s location, viewed in conjunction with
the victim’s testimony that defendant telephoned her shortly thereafter and said, “You just got
me served with this PPO,” was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to infer beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant had actual notice of the 2000 PPO. We find that there was
sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of aggravated stalking.
I. In-Court Identification
Next, defendant argues that the process server’s in-court identification of him at trial was
improper because it was tainted by his opportunity to view him at two earlier hearings. Because
defendant did not challenge the identification testimony in the trial court, we review this
unpreserved issue for plain error. Carines, supra at 763. Considering the process server’s
testimony at trial regarding his prior opportunities to observe defendant, we find no basis for
relief. There is no per se rule that a prior one-on-one identification of a defendant, such as may
occur at a trial or a preliminary examination, renders the situation inherently suggestive. People
v Fuqua, 146 Mich App 133; 143-144; 379 NW2d 396 (1985), overruled in part on other grds
People v Heflin, 434 Mich 482, 456 NW2d 10 (1990); see also People v McElhaney, 215 Mich
App 269, 287; 545 NW2d 18 (1996).
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Here, the process server testified at trial that he saw defendant in the courtroom on two
prior occasions. In neither instance was the process server subjected to any pretrial identification
procedure, let alone a procedure that was unduly suggestive. Further, there is no evidence that
anyone in the courtroom identified defendant while the process server was present. Even if it
could be said that the process server was subject to a suggestive pretrial identification procedure,
it is not apparent that he lacked an independent basis for his in-court identification of defendant
at trial, particularly given that he met defendant twice at defendant’s home in his effort to serve
the 2000 PPO. People v Kachar, 400 Mich 78, 95-96; 252 NW2d 807 (1977). Hence, we
conclude that defendant has not shown that the process server’s identification of him at trial was
plain error.
J. Applicability of the Habitual Offender Statute
Additionally, defendant argues that the habitual offender fourth statute, MCL 769.12,
does not apply to an aggravated stalking offense predicated on the violation of a restraining
order. We review de novo this question of law. Koonce, supra at 518. Our goal in interpreting
the statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Id. The Legislature has
demonstrated its ability to exclude particular categories of felonies from the sentence
enhancement provision of the habitual offender act when it intends to do so. People v
Bewersdorf, 438 Mich 55, 72; 475 NW2d 231 (1991). Neither MCL 769.12 nor MCL 750.411i
exclude aggravated stalking predicated on a violation of a restraining order from the sentence
enhancement provision of the habitual offender statute. Contrary to what defendant argues on
appeal, the instant case does not involve a criminal statute that itself enhances punishment.
Rather, MCL 750.411i(2) provides that the existence of a restraining order is a circumstance that
will elevate a stalking offense to a felony. When the legislative scheme elevates the offense,
courts have found a legislative intent to permit enhancement of the penalty under the habitual
offender act. See generally People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 540-541; 583 NW2d 199
(1998). Hence, we reject defendant’s argument that MCL 769.12 may not be applied to enhance
his sentence for aggravated stalking.
Finally, defendant argues that MCL 769.13 is unconstitutional because it does not afford
a right to a jury trial with regard to the habitual offender charge. We disagree. On de novo
review of this constitutional issue, we conclude that the trial court correctly denied defendant’s
motion for resentencing on this ground. People v LeBlanc, 465 Mich 575, 579; 640 NW2d 246
(2002). Under MCL 769.13(5), the trial court determines the existence of the defendant’s prior
conviction or convictions. Pursuant to Apprendi, supra at 490, the existence of a prior
conviction need not be submitted to a jury.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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