CHARLES SIMS V ART VAN FURNITURE INC
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
CHRISTINE V. LEONARD,
UNPUBLISHED
June 8, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 243139
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-201268-CL
v
ART VAN FURNITURE, INC. and RASHID
BARKHO,
Defendants-Appellants.
CHARLES SIMS,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243368
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 02-073063-CL
ART VAN FURNITURE, INC. and ERNIE
DINNINGER,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Neff, P.J. and Wilder and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these employment discrimination cases which have been consolidated on appeal,
defendant Art Van Furniture, Inc. appeals by leave granted orders denying their motions to
compel arbitration and for summary disposition.1 We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
1
We refer to the plaintiffs respectively as Leonard and Sims and to defendant Art Van
Furniture, Inc. as Art Van.
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I. Basic Facts and Procedural History
In docket number 243139, Leonard filed a complaint against Art Van alleging sexual
harassment and retaliation under the Michigan Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101, et seq.,
and assault and battery. In docket number 243368, Sims filed a complaint against Art Van
alleging a violation of the Michigan Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA), MCL 15.361, et
seq., and race discrimination under the CRA. In each case, Art Van filed a motion to compel
arbitration and for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7). Art Van asserted that the
employment application and employee handbook included predispute arbitration agreements. In
response, plaintiffs argued, among other things, that there was no enforceable arbitration
agreement.
With regard to Leonard, the trial court denied Art Van’s motion determining that the
handbook provision allowing Art Van to modify its contents made Art Van’s promises illusory
and any agreement lacking in mutuality. It also determined that the application did not require
the parties to arbitrate because it expressly became null and void after six months. With regard
to Sims, the trial court also denied Art Van’s motion determining that the handbook lacked
mutuality because of the provision that Art Van could modify the handbook. We granted leave
and consolidated the two cases to address whether the trial courts erred in denying Art Van’s
motions to compel arbitration.
II. Analysis
A. Enforceable Predispute Arbitration Agreement
Art Van argues that the trial courts erred in denying its motions to arbitrate and for
summary disposition because the parties entered an enforceable predispute arbitration agreement.
We agree.
We review de novo grants or denials of summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7). DeCaminada v Coopers & Lybrand, 232 Mich App 492, 496; 591 NW2d 364
(1998). We also review de novo issues of contract interpretation. Archambo v Lawyers Title Ins
Corp, 466 Mich 402, 408; 646 NW2d 170 (2002).
“[P]redispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims are
valid if: (1) the parties have agreed to arbitrate the claims (there must be a valid, binding contract
covering the civil rights claims), (2) the statute itself does not prohibit such agreements,2 and (3)
the arbitration agreement does not waive the substantive rights and remedies of the statute and
arbitration procedures are fair so that the employee may effectively vindicate his statutory
rights.” Rembert v Ryan’s Steak Houses, Inc (On Remand), 235 Mich App 118, 156; 596 NW2d
208 (1999).
2
The parties do not contest this element.
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The trial court denied Art Van’s motions under the first criteria concluding that the
parties did not enter into an enforceable predispute arbitration agreement. This ruling was
incorrect. The employment application signed by both plaintiffs states in relevant part:
I agree that this application will be considered only for a period of six months
after its date. After this six-month period, this application will be null and void.
Any continuing interest in employment with the Company must be evidenced by
later applications for employment.
IF HIRED, I AGREE TO SUBMIT TO FINAL AND BINDING ARBITRATION
UNDER THE ARBITRATION PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN THE
COMPANY’S EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK, ANY OF THE FOLLOWING
CLAIMS:
1. ANY CLAIMED VIOLATION OF ANY MICHIGAN OR FEDERAL
EMPLOYMENT STATUTE, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, TITLE
VII OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AS AMENDED, THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, THE ELLIOTT-LARSEN
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT, THE PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT, THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT;
2. ANY COMMON LAW TORT OR OTHER CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF MY
EMPLOYMENT OR THE TERMINATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT.
I FURTHER AGREE THAT THE DECISION OF THE ARBITRATOR IS
FINAL AND BINDING ON THE COMPANY AND ME, AS PROVIDED BY
LAW, AND THAT A CIRCUIT COURT MAY RENDER JUDGMENT ON AN
ARBITRATION AWARD, AS PROVIDED BY LAW. IN CONSIDERATION
OF THAT ARBITRATION REMEDY, I WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO
COMMENCE ANY SUIT OR ACTION AGAINST THE COMPANY
BECAUSE OF THE TERMINATION OF MY EMPLOYMENT.
Based on the express terms of the application, once Art Van hires an applicant, the
employee and Art Van agree to be bound by the arbitration policy in the handbook. In other
words, the arbitration clause is triggered by Art Van’s hiring the applicant; employment is
therefore a condition precedent to the arbitration agreement. “A ‘condition precedent’ is a fact or
event that the parties intend must take place before there is a right to performance.” Mikonczyk v
Detroit Newspapers, Inc, 238 Mich App 347, 350; 605 NW2d 360 (1999). The fact that
employment is a condition precedent to the arbitration agreement is evident from the language
“IF HIRED, I AGREE . . . [to arbitrate employment related claims]” (emphasis added). Further
support for this proposition is the language that requires arbitration of any disputes “arising out
of my employment or the termination of my employment.”
On the other hand, the application becomes “null and void” after six months only if the
applicant is not hired. This is evident from the phrases “application will be considered” and
“continuing interest in employment” which both indicate circumstances under which the
applicant is merely being considered as a future hire. Accordingly, once Art Van employed
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plaintiffs, they were bound by the arbitration policy in the employee handbook as expressly
agreed in the application. Therefore, the trial court erred in ruling that the parties did not enter
into a valid predispute arbitration agreement.
B. Irrevocable Statutory Arbitration Agreement
Leonard also argues that the predispute arbitration agreement is not a statutory, but
rather, a common law arbitration agreement that may be unilaterally revoked. Leonard suggests
that she revoked the agreement when she filed her complaint in the trial court. We disagree.
This Court has held: "The Michigan arbitration statute [MCL 600.5001 et seq.] provides
that an agreement to settle a controversy by arbitration under the statute is valid, enforceable, and
irrevocable if the agreement provides that a circuit court can render judgment on the arbitration
award." Hetrick v Friedman, 237 Mich App 264, 269; 602 NW2d 603 (1999), quoting Tellkamp
v Wolverine Mut Ins Co, 219 Mich App 231, 237; 556 NW2d 504 (1996), citing MCL 600.5001.
We conclude that it is a statutory arbitration agreement because the language of the binding
arbitration agreement clearly states that “a circuit court may render judgment on an arbitration
award, as provided by law.” Accordingly, the arbitration agreement here is a statutory
arbitration agreement and is not unilaterally revocable.
Plaintiffs also argue that if it is a statutory arbitration agreement, it is void because the
employee handbook allows Art Van to unilaterally revoke it. Plaintiffs’ argument is misplaced.
At oral argument, defendant conceded that that the employment handbook itself does not
constitute an enforceable agreement. But the arbitration clause contained in the employment
application does not permit a unilateral revocation by either party. Because the parties only
agreed to be bound by the arbitration policy through the express language of the employment
application, the other terms of the employee handbook are irrelevant.3
C. Other Arguments
Leonard’s argument that the one-year statute of limitation violates her rights is moot
because she instituted her claims within one year. We also decline to address Leonard’s
arguments that the arbitration agreement is procedurally unfair and violates public policy
because they were not addressed by the trial court. Fast Air, Inc v Knight, 235 Mich App 541,
549; 599 NW2d 489 (1999). Even though we may address unpreserved issues, we decline to
address these because they are not adequately briefed on appeal. Yee v Shiawassee County Bd of
Comm’rs, 251 Mich App 379, 406; 651 NW2d 756 (2002).
3
Moreover, MCL 600.5011 mandates that “neither party shall have the power to revoke any
agreement . . . made as provided in this chapter without the consent of the other party[.]”
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Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not
retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Janet T. Neff
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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