PEOPLE OF MI V WAYNE ALLEN RUSSELL
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
June 1, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243747
Kalkaska Circuit Court
LC No. 02-002198-FH
WAYNE ALLEN RUSSELL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Whitbeck, C.J., and Griffin and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right from his jury trial convictions of first-degree home
invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), assault with intent to commit sexual penetration, MCL 750.520g(1),
attempted first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a(2), attempted second-degree home
invasion, MCL 750.110a(3), and indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person, MCL
750.10a and MCL 750.335a.1 Defendant was sentenced as an habitual offender, third offense,
MCL 769.11, to 217 to 480 months’ imprisonment for his first-degree home invasion conviction,
a consecutive 100 to 240 months’ imprisonment for his assault conviction, two 80 to 120 months
terms of imprisonment for the attempted first- and second-degree home invasion convictions
(both concurrent to his first-degree home invasion conviction) and 1 day to life for his indecent
exposure conviction (also concurrent to his first-degree home invasion conviction). We affirm.
Defendant’s convictions stem from a series of incidents occurring at the victim’s home in
August and September 2001. On August 18, 2001, the victim awoke and discovered a naked
man standing at the foot of her bed. When she yelled, the man fled. The victim could not see the
man’s face, but she noticed that he had a distinctive gait while running. On August 23, 2001, the
victim heard a noise coming from her dining room. She investigated and discovered a man
attempting to enter her home through a sliding glass door. The victim was again unable to see
1
Defendant was tried before two separate juries. At the trial by the first jury panel, defendant
was convicted of first-degree home invasion, assault with intent to commit sexual penetration,
attempted first- and second-degree home invasion, and indecent exposure. At the second jury
trial, defendant was convicted of being a sexually delinquent person. See People v Helzer, 404
Mich 410, 422; 273 NW2d 44 (1978). The issue raised on appeal relates to the first trial.
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the man’s face, but she did observe that he ran in the same distinctive way as the man from the
earlier incident. After this second incident, the victim installed a video camera in her home. The
camera could record continuously for a twenty-four hour period. On September 3, 2001, a man
was videotaped at the victim’s sliding glass door. The victim identified the man from his walk as
being the same individual from the two earlier incidents. Subsequent laboratory analysis
identified the presence of defendant’s semen on the victim’s bedroom carpet and bedspread.
The prosecution served notice that it intended to introduce evidence under MRE 404(b)
of a prior assault involving defendant as proof of his motive, intent, scheme, plan, or system in
doing the charged acts. Defendant objected on the basis that there was a lack of similarity
between the events. The court admitted the evidence for the purpose of proving intent.
Defendant’s sole argument on appeal is that the court erred in admitting this evidence. We
disagree.
Defendant argues that the evidence lacked sufficient similarity to the present case to
support admission under MRE 404(b). Further, defendant argues that the probative value of this
evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In support of this
assertion, defendant notes that a juror submitted some questions inquiring about whether
defendant had received a jail term for the prior assault and whether he had been in trouble with
the law since. This Court reviews the trial court’s admission of other-acts evidence for an abuse
of discretion. People v Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 383; 582 NW2d 785 (1998).
For other-acts evidence to be admissible under MRE 404(b), the following evidentiary
requirements must be satisfied: (1) the other-acts evidence must be offered for a proper purpose
under MRE 404(b); (2) the evidence must be relevant to an issue of fact of consequence at trial
under MRE 402, as enforced through MRE 104(b); (3) under MRE 403, the probative value of
the evidence must not be substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice in view of
the availability of other means of proof and other facts appropriate for making decisions of this
kind; and (4) the trial court, on request, may provide a limiting instruction under MRE 105.
People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 55-56; 614 NW2d 888 (2000).
In the present case, the prosecution proffered the prior assault evidence at the first trial to
prove (1) motive, (2) intent, and (3) plan, system, or scheme in doing an act, all of which are
proper purposes under MRE 404(b). Thus, the first prong of the test is satisfied. Further,
although not requested by defendant, the trial court provided a clear limiting instruction on three
separate occasions, thereby satisfying the fourth prong. Therefore, resolution of this issue
focuses on the second and third prongs of the above test.
The issue of relevance turns on the similarity between the prior assault and the present
charged acts. At the motion hearing, the trial court admitted the prior testimony to prove intent.
During closing argument, the prosecution argued that evidence was offered “for the limited
purpose of deciding what the defendant’s intent was, what was his plan, what was his scheme,
why was he there.” Each of the crimes in issue was a specific intent crime.2 “It is well
2
First-degree home invasion can be both a specific and general intent crime. MCL 710.110a(2).
In the circumstances of this case, however, the crime charged was a specific intent crime.
(continued…)
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established in Michigan, as well as in most jurisdictions, that all elements of a criminal offense
are ‘in issue’ when a defendant enters a plea of not guilty.” People v Mills, 450 Mich 61, 69;
537 NW2d 909 (1995). Thus, the specific intent element of each crime charged was in issue.
Proof of a common plan, system, or scheme can be used to prove intent. People v
Engelman, 434 Mich 204, 220; 453 NW2d 656 (1990); McCormick on Evidence (5th ed, 1999), §
190, p 661 (observing that the existence of a common scheme or plan is “relevant as showing
motive, and hence the doing of a criminal act, the identity of the actor, or his intention”). “When
other acts are offered to show intent, logical relevance dictates only that the charged crime and
the proffered other acts ‘are of the same general category.’” People v VanderVliet, 444 Mich 52,
80; 508 NW2d 114 (1993), quoting Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, § 3:11, p
23. In Sabin (After Remand), supra at 66, the Court observed that the charged and uncharged
acts in issue in that case “contained common features beyond mere commission of acts of sexual
abuse.” Conversely, the Court also acknowledged that “the uncharged and charged acts were
dissimilar in many respects.” Id. at 67. Nonetheless, the Court held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the other-acts evidence in issue:
This case thus is one in which reasonable persons could disagree on
whether the charged and uncharged acts contained sufficient common features to
infer the existence of a common system used by defendant in committing the acts.
As we have often observed, the trial court’s decision on a close evidentiary
question such as this one ordinarily cannot be an abuse of discretion. [Id.]
The August 18 incident and the prior assault bore strong similarities. Both victims were
elderly women who lived alone in homes located in a residential area. Both incidents happened
at night while the victims were asleep in their bedrooms with the television or a light on. Sexual
activity was involved in both incidents. In the present incident, the breezeway door was propped
open, and in the prior incident it can be reasonably argued the door could have been propped
open with an out-of-place flowerpot.
No two incidents are ever exactly the same, so the defendant rightly points out that there
are some facts which distinguish the incidents. For example, while violent physical contact
ensued in the prior assault, there is no evidence that the victim in this case was touched in any
way. Further, there is less of an age difference between defendant and the present complainant
than there was between defendant and the prior victim. However, the fact that no physical
assault occurred in the present case may be due to the fact that the victim awoke screaming,
which scared defendant from her premises. We find the age gap a miniscule matter that cannot
stand as a basis for finding an abuse of discretion. Further, reasonable persons could disagree
regarding whether the prior and present incidents “contained sufficient common features to infer
the existence of a common system used by defendant in committing the acts.” Id.
(…continued)
Further, any attempt to commit an offense is a specific intent crime. People v Langworthy, 416
Mich 630, 644-645; 331 NW2d 171 (1982). Finally, assault with intent to commit sexual
penetration is also a specific intent crime. People v Evans, 173 Mich App 631, 634; 434 NW2d
452 (1988).
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Turning to the issue of unfair prejudice, MRE 403 provides, in pertinent part, that
“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . .” The probative value of evidence is the tendency the
evidence possesses to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Mills, supra
at 67.
Although the potential for prejudice always exists when introducing similar-acts
evidence, the evidence introduced was highly probative of defendant’s purpose in being in the
victim’s bedroom on August 18. It also is probative on the issue of what defendant intended to
do when he tried to enter the victim’s home on August 23 and September 3. Further, the record
does not establish a tendency that this evidence would be given preemptive or undue weight.
Unfair prejudice is not established merely because of the abhorrent nature of prior assault.
People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 500; 577 NW2d 673 (1998).
Moreover, the juror’s questions should not be seen as establishing that defendant was
unfairly prejudiced by the admission of this other acts evidence. One of the questions raised –
relating to how defendant came to know where the complainant lived – had nothing to do with
the other acts evidence at all. As for the other two questions, they can reasonably be understood
as an attempt to determine what weight to give to the prior assault evidence. In any event, even
assuming the existence of the danger of unfair prejudice, the circumstances do not support the
conclusion that the probative value was substantially outweighed by this assumed danger. To
bolster this contention, we point to the fact that the trial court took extra precautions to ensure
that the prejudicial effect of the evidence was held to a minimum by instructing the jury three
times on the limits to which the evidence could be put. Both these factors tend to establish that it
is unlikely that the evidence would be weighed “out of proportion to its logically damaging
effect.” Sclafani v Peter S Cusimano, Inc, 130 Mich App 728, 735; 344 NW2d 347 (1983).
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting otheracts evidence under MRE 404(b).
Affirmed.
/s/ William C. Whitbeck
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
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