PEOPLE OF MI V GREGORY JOHNSON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245497
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 01-010099
GREGORY JOHNSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Wilder, P.J., and Hoekstra and Kelly, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his convictions by jury of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, felon
in possession of a firearm, MCL 750.224f, possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony (felony-firearm), MCL 750.227b, and two counts of felonious assault, MCL 750.82. The
trial court sentenced defendant to serve concurrent terms of imprisonment of 168 months to forty
years for the carjacking conviction, two to five years for the felon in possession of a firearm
conviction, and two to six years each for the felonious assault convictions, to run consecutive to
a two-year term of imprisonment for the felony-firearm conviction. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal on one of the two assault with intent to murder charges and that insufficient
evidence was presented at trial to support his convictions of two counts of felonious assault
because the prosecution presented evidence of only one gunshot being fired. We disagree.
“In assessing a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, a trial court must consider the
evidence presented by the prosecution to the time the motion is made and in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” People v Riley
(After Remand), 468 Mich 135, 139-140; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). Our review of the trial court's
decision on a motion for directed verdict is de novo. People v Werner, 254 Mich App 528, 530;
659 NW2d 688 (2002). Further, “[w]hen a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
in a criminal case, this Court considers whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to
the prosecution, would warrant a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
In the present case, defendant was charged with two counts of assault with intent to
murder, one count each for allegedly assaulting two undercover police officers. The evidence at
trial established that two undercover police officers observed defendant carjack the victim at
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gunpoint. The officers pursued defendant and during the chase defendant fired one gunshot at
the officers while the officers were together in their vehicle. On the basis of this evidence, the
jury convicted defendant on two counts of the lesser offense of felonious assault.
In essence, defendant argues that one shot fired at two officers in a vehicle cannot support
separate assault charges on each officer. Assault is defined as “‘either an attempt to commit a
battery or an unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an
immediate battery.’” People v Grant, 211 Mich App 200, 202; 535 NW2d 581 (1995), quoting
People v Johnson, 407 Mich 196, 210; 284 NW2d 718 (1979). Viewing the evidence in a light
most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could quite reasonably
infer that a single gunshot could place more than one person in reasonable apprehension of
receiving an immediate battery. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on one count of assault with intent to
murder and that the evidence was sufficient to support both felonious assault convictions.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to impeach
him with his post-arrest, post-Miranda assertion of his constitutional right to silence. We agree,
however, we conclude that defendant is entitled to no relief because the error was harmless. We
review constitutional issues de novo. People v Cain, 238 Mich App 95, 108; 605 NW2d 28
(1999).
Ordinarily, when defendants exercise their constitutional right to silence, that exercise
cannot be used against them at trial. People v Taylor, 245 Mich App 293, 304; 628 NW2d 55
(2001). However, a defendant who takes the stand in his own defense waives the privilege
against self-incrimination. People v Dixon, 217 Mich App 400, 405; 552 NW2d 663 (1996).
Such defendants may be impeached with silence both pre- and post-arrest so long as this silence
occurred before they were advised of their Miranda rights. Dixon, supra at 405-406. However,
the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process bars a defendant’s silence after having been
advised of Miranda rights from being used as impeachment. Id. at 406. An exception exists,
however, where a defendant claims to have told the police an exculpatory story at arrest or that
the trial was the first opportunity to tell his story. Id.; People v Crump, 216 Mich App 210, 214215; 549 NW2d 36 (1996).
Twice during the trial defendant’s counsel endeavored to introduce evidence that
defendant attempted to tell a police officer, in whose police car defendant was being held shortly
after his arrest in connection with this incident, his version of what had happened. The first time
was during cross-examination of the officer and the other was during direct examination of
defendant. Both times the prosecutor raised hearsay objections that the trial court sustained, thus
preventing defendant from establishing the extent of his efforts to explain his non-involvement in
the incident that gave rise to the charges made against him. In contrast, the prosecution, over
defendant’s objection, was permitted by the trial court to introduce the fact that after defendant
was transported to a police station, defendant was interviewed by a police sergeant and did not
say or volunteer any information about the carjacker. Consequently, the prosecution “had it both
ways.” It was able to exclude the evidence of defendant’s attempt to volunteer a statement about
the carjacker, but was allowed to show at another point that defendant invoked his right to
remain silent. We believe that these circumstances constitute a clear violation of defendant’s
constitutional right to remain silent.
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However, the existence of constitutional error does not necessarily entitle a defendant to
relief in the form of a new trial. Nonstructural constitutional error, which is at issue here, People
v Gilbert, 183 Mich App 741, 747; 455 NW2d 731 (1990), see also People v Anderson (After
Remand), 446 Mich 392, 405-406; 521 NW2d 538 (1994), is harmless if it is clear beyond a
reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error,
People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 640 n 29; 628 NW2d 540 (2001). The party who benefited from
the error must demonstrate, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there is no reasonable possibility
that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Anderson, supra at
406. Here, we are persuaded that the error in admitting defendant’s silence did not contribute to
defendant’s conviction. Even though the trial court prevented defendant from revealing to the
jury the details of what he was trying to tell to the officer in the police car shortly after his arrest,
he was able to convey to the jury the fact that he was attempting to explain the situation, but that
the officer refused to listen to him. And defendant’s counsel argued that point to the jury in his
closing argument. On the prosecution side, we note that the trial court severely limited the
evidence that the prosecutor could admit regarding defendant’s silence at the police station and
the prosecutor did not argue or rely on this evidence in his closing argument. Moreover, the
evidence of defendant’s guilt presented at trial was overwhelming. Under these circumstances,
we find that the error was harmless.
Defendant next argues that he was denied a fair trial by several instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. We disagree. Concerning preserved issues of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court
evaluates the prosecutor’s comments in context to determine if the defendant was denied a fair
and impartial trial. People v Truong (After Remand), 218 Mich App 325, 336; 553 NW2d 692
(1996).
It is misconduct for a prosecutor to denigrate defense counsel with prejudicial remarks;
the focus must remain on the evidence, not on the personalities involved. See People v Bahoda,
448 Mich 261, 283; 531 NW2d 659 (1995); People v Phillips, 217 Mich App 489, 497-498; 552
NW2d 487 (1996). However, a prosecutor need not confine argument to the blandest of terms.
See People v Marji, 180 Mich App 525, 538; 447 NW2d 835 (1989).
In this case, defendant maintains that the prosecutor denigrated defense counsel in two
ways. The first claim is that the prosecutor questioned defense counsel’s veracity and suggested
that he was trying to mislead the jury by cross-examining defendant based on apparent
inconsistencies between defendant’s testimony on direct examination and defense counsel’s
opening statement. Apparently, defendant relies on the fact that the prosecutor’s questions to
defendant referenced whether defendant heard his defense attorney’s assertions when delivering
his opening statement to the jury. But defendant fails to explain how these references to the
opening statement of defense counsel in any way disparages defendant’s counsel, or for that
matter, constitutes impermissible cross-examination. Thus, defendant has essentially abandoned
the argument. See People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 45; 597 NW2d 176 (1999) (“A party may
not merely state a position and then leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for
the claim.”). In any event, read as a whole and evaluated in light of defense arguments and the
relationship they bear to the evidence admitted at trial, we cannot say the complained of remarks
prejudiced defendant. People v Ackerman, 257 Mich App 434, 452-453; 669 NW2d 818 (2003).
Next, defendant argues that the prosecutor’s assertion in his rebuttal argument that the
claims made by defense counsel in his closing argument contained “absolute damn lies”
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undermined the fairness of the trial. Because no objection was made to this comment, it is
unpreserved; therefore, we review this claim for plain error that affected his substantial rights.
People v Thomas, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (2004) [Docket No. 243817, issued
February 3, 2004]. To reverse, we must determine that, although defendant was actually
innocent, the plain error caused him to be convicted, or if the error “seriously affected the
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings” regardless of innocence.
Ackerman, supra at 448-449. Although the comment may have constituted an overly harsh
characterization of defense counsel’s argument, we cannot conclude that the comment caused
defendant’s conviction or seriously affected the proceedings.
Finally, defendant objects to the prosecutor referring to defendant in his closing argument
as “the one who’s consistently giving me hard looks during the trial.” However, the comment
was objected to and the trial court sustained the objection and ordered the remark stricken and
instructed the jury to not consider the remark.
The purpose of registering objections is to afford the trial court the opportunity to cure
any potential prejudicial effect of a prosecutor’s comment and in that way preventing a
miscarriage of justice. See People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 586; 629 NW2d 411 (2001).
Although defendant argues that the damage was done despite the trial court’s sustaining the
objection or ordering the comment stricken and disregarded, we believe that defendant suffered
no prejudicial effect under the circumstances, and consequently, defendant was not denied a fair
trial. People v Daniel, 207 Mich App 47, 56; 523 NW2d 830 (1994).
In sum, defendant has not established entitlement to relief on the basis of the alleged
instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
Finally, defendant argues that he must be resentenced because offense variable (OV) 12
was improperly scored. However, we need not address the merits of defendant’s challenge to the
scoring of OV 12 because even were we to agree, defendant is not entitled to be resentenced. As
scored at sentencing by the trial court, the guideline range was 126 to 262 months. If OV 12
were rescored at zero, as defendant maintains on appeal is appropriate, the guideline range would
be 108 to 225 months. In this case, the trial court imposed a minimum sentence of 168 months,
which is comfortably within the guideline range of each scoring. Further, the comments of the
trial court at sentencing reveal that it gave considerable thought to the particular circumstances
presented in arriving at its sentence. Under these circumstances, we are persuaded that
resentencing would not result in the trial court imposing a different sentence. Cf. People v
Mutchie, 468 Mich 50, 52; 658 NW2d 154 (2003).
Affirmed.
/s/ Kurtis T. Wilder
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
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