PEOPLE OF MI V STEVEN BROWN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 18, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245006
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 99-010005
STEVEN BROWN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Jansen and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317, and was
sentenced to a prison term of twenty-five to fifty years. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant’s conviction arises from the September 1, 1999, fatal shooting of Glenn
Pierce, who was shot while entering a parked car in a bank parking lot after obtaining more than
$2,000 in cash for his employer. Chere Tutt, the only known eyewitness to the crime, saw two
men approach Pierce from different directions. Tutt heard, but did not see, gunshots, and she
saw the two men run across the street and behind a medical clinic. The police determined from
the statements of various witnesses that the two men were defendant and Jerry Swims.
Defendant was subsequently arrested and, while still in police custody two days later, signed a
statement incriminating himself in the offense.1 Defendant was later charged with first-degree
felony-murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony, MCL 750.227b. He was convicted of the lesser offense of second-degree murder and
acquitted of felony-firearm.
I
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of seconddegree murder. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case,
this Court considers whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
would warrant a reasonable juror to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Nowack, 462
1
Swims was never apprehended.
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Mich 392, 399; 614 NW2d 78 (2000); People v Sexton, 250 Mich App 211, 222; 646 NW2d 875
(2002).
To prove second-degree murder, the evidence must establish the following elements: (1)
a death, (2) caused by an act of the defendant, (3) while the defendant had the intent to kill, the
intent to cause great bodily harm, or the intent to perform an act in wanton and willful disregard
of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily
harm, and (4) without justification or excuse. People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 123; 631
NW2d 67 (2001). Here, defendant was also charged under an aiding and abetting theory. To
support defendant’s conviction pursuant to an aiding and abetting theory of guilt, the prosecutor
was required to show that (1) defendant or some other person committed the crime charged, (2)
defendant performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the crime, and
(3) at the time that he gave aid and encouragement, defendant had (a) the requisite intent
necessary to be convicted of the crime as a principal, or (b) knowledge that the principal
intended its commission. People v Barrera, 451 Mich 261, 294; 547 NW2d 280 (1996); People
v Tanner, 255 Mich App 369, 418-419; 660 NW2d 746 (2003), rev’d on other grounds 469 Mich
437 (2003).
Defendant indicated in his statement to Officer Simon that Swims shot Pierce, but
defendant admitted that he aided and encouraged Swims by agreeing to the robbery and standing
in back of Swims. The jury could also infer defendant’s participation in the crime from evidence
that defendant and Swims lingered around the party store where Pierce worked until Pierce left
on his banking errand, that they then followed Pierce to the bank, and that they simultaneously
approached Pierce from opposite sides of the parking lot after he completed the banking
transaction.
Nonetheless, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he
possessed the requisite intent for second-degree murder. He contends that there was no evidence
showing that he knew Swims intended to shoot Pierce or knew that Swims was armed. We
disagree.
The requisite level of malice for second-degree murder is the same as that for first-degree
felony-murder. People v Flowers, 191 Mich App 169, 176; 477 NW2d 473 (1991). We
therefore rely on this Court’s remarks in Flowers, supra at 178, regarding proof that an aider and
abettor possessed the requisite malice for felony-murder:
In situations involving the vicarious liability of cofelons, the individual
liability of each felon must be shown. It is fundamentally unfair and in violation
of basic principles of individual criminal culpability to hold one felon liable for an
unforeseen death that did not result from actions agreed upon by the participants.
In cases where the felons are acting intentionally or recklessly in pursuit of a
common plan, liability may be established on agency principles. [People v]
Aaron, [409 Mich 672,] 731[; 299 NW2d 304 (1980)]. . . .
In order to convict one charged as an aider and abettor of a first-degree
felony murder, the prosecutor must show that the person charged had both the
intent to commit the underlying felony and the same malice that is required to be
shown to convict the principal perpetrator of the murder. Therefore, the
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prosecutor must show that the aider and abettor had the intent to commit not only
the underlying felony, but also to kill or to cause great bodily harm, or had
wantonly and wilfully disregarded the likelihood of the natural tendency of this
behavior to cause death or great bodily harm. Further, if it can be shown that the
aider and abettor participated in a crime with knowledge of his principal’s intent
to kill or to cause great bodily harm, he was acting with wanton and wilful
disregard sufficient to support a finding of malice.
In People v Turner, 213 Mich App 558; 540 NW2d 728 (1995), this Court applied these
principles in reviewing the convictions of three defendants, Turner, Ingram, and McDonald, who
were convicted of first-degree felony-murder under aiding and abetting theories. Turner,
Ingram, McDonald, and a fourth codefendant, Johnson, jointly robbed several persons, and
Johnson fatally shot one victim. Id. at 563. This Court concluded that there was sufficient
evidence to sustain the felony-murder convictions of Turner, Ingram, and McDonald, because
they knew that Johnson had a gun when they set out to commit the robberies. This Court held
that “knowledge that Johnson was armed during the commission of the armed robbery is enough
for a rational trier of fact to find that Turner, as an aider and abettor, participated in the crime
with knowledge of Johnson’s intent to cause great bodily harm.” Id. at 572. The Court stated
that a rational trier of fact could find that Turner was acting with the requisite “wanton and
willful disregard” sufficient to support a finding of malice. Id. at 572-573. The Court applied
this reasoning in upholding the convictions of Ingram and McDonald as well. Id. at 574, 580581.
Here, although there was no direct evidence that defendant was aware that Swims was
armed, or that defendant himself was armed, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for the
jury to infer that defendant and Swims jointly planned to commit an armed robbery. There was
evidence that the robbery was carefully planned in advance. It occurred on a day of the month
when the store kept large reserves of money on hand in order to cash customers’ government
checks. Swims and defendant were observed lingering around the store for at least two hours,
and they then followed Pierce when he left to go to the bank. They coordinated their movements
so that they both approached Pierce from different directions at the same time. Their behavior
afterward also suggested that they had formulated a plan to park their car away from the bank,
and to entail the aid of Glenda Lewis in getting back to their car without going past the bank.
The jury could infer from this careful planning that Swims’ use of the gun was not an unforeseen
circumstance. Furthermore, although defendant denied in his statement planning to kill Pierce,
he did not deny knowing that Swims would be armed with a gun during the robbery.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed
verdict on the felony-murder charge. “When reviewing a trial court's decision on a motion for a
directed verdict, this Court reviews the record de novo to determine whether the evidence
presented by the prosecutor, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecutor, could persuade
a rational trier of fact that the essential elements of the crime charged were proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Aldrich, supra at 122.
To prove felony murder under an aiding and abetting theory, the prosecution must show
that the defendant (1) performed acts or gave encouragement that assisted the commission of the
killing of a human being, (2) with the intent to kill, to do great bodily harm, or to create a high
risk of death or great bodily harm with knowledge that death or great bodily harm was the
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probable result, (3) while committing, attempting to commit, or assisting in the commission of
the predicate felony. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 755; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). To satisfy
the malice standard for aiding and abetting felony-murder, the prosecution must show that the
aider and abettor either intended to kill, intended to cause great bodily harm, or wantonly and
willfully disregarded the likelihood that the natural tendency of his behavior was to cause death
or great bodily harm. People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 140-141; 659 NW2d 611 (2003). Here, the
same evidence that supports the second-degree murder conviction also supports the felonymurder charge. Evidence that a defendant participated in a robbery knowing that his co-felon
was armed is sufficient to establish that the defendant acted “in wanton and wilful disregard of
the possibility that death or great bodily harm would result,” and, therefore, is sufficient to
establish a felony-murder conviction. Carines, supra at 760.
II
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his custodial
statement. Defendant raises a three-part argument regarding the statement. First, he claims that
the police coerced the statement by detaining him in a squalid cell while he was seriously ill and
by delaying his arraignment for five days. Second, he claims that the police violated his rights
by ignoring his requests to consult an attorney. Third, he contends that his statement was the
fruit of an unlawful arrest without probable cause.
This Court reviews de novo the entire record when reviewing a trial court's decision
regarding a defendant's motion to suppress an incriminating statement. People v Adams, 245
Mich App 226, 230; 627 NW2d 623 (2001). A trial court's underlying factual findings, however,
are reviewed for clear error. Id.
A. Coercion and Prearraignment Delay
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits use of an involuntary
statement coerced by police conduct. US Const, Am XIV; People v Wells, 238 Mich App 383,
386; 605 NW2d 374 (1999). The question of whether a statement was made voluntarily is
generally determined by an examination of police conduct. People v Howard, 226 Mich App
528, 538; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). When this Court reviews a trial court’s determination of
voluntariness, it is required to examine the entire record and make an independent determination
of the issue as a question of law. Wells, supra at 386. However, this Court will affirm the trial
court’s decision unless it is left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court erred.
People v Sexton (After Remand), 461 Mich 746, 752; 609 NW2d 822 (2000). If the question of
voluntariness rests on a disputed factual question that turns on the credibility of witnesses or the
weight of the evidence, this Court will defer to the trial court, given its superior opportunity to
evaluate these matters. Id.
In evaluating police conduct, the factors the trial court should consider include
[t]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent
of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of
the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the
statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional
rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a
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magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured,
intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the
accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused
was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse.
[Sexton, supra at 753.]
The absence or presence of any one of these factors is not necessarily conclusive on the issue of
voluntariness. The ultimate test of admissibility is whether the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made. Id.
Defendant argues that the totality of the circumstances, including the delay in his
arraignment, his sickness, the allegedly abhorrent conditions in his cell, and inducements of
leniency and medical treatment, demonstrate that his custodial statement was improperly
coerced. As the trial court noted in its opinion, several of these matters turn on the question of
witness credibility. The trial court found that although defendant was indeed ill, his illness was
not serious, did not manifest its worst symptoms until the morning after his confession, and did
not require any treatment other than time. The trial court gave credence to the officers’
testimony that defendant did not appear to be sick. We do not find any of these findings to be
clearly erroneous. Sexton, supra at 752. The trial court did not err in finding that the police did
not take advantage of defendant’s illness to force him to sign the statement.
We also find no clear error in the trial court’s finding that the delay in defendant’s
arraignment was not, in itself, a basis for suppressing defendant’s statement. See People v
Manning, 243 Mich App 615, 620; 624 NW2d 746 (2000), holding that delay in arraignment is
only one factor to be considered among the totality of the circumstances for determining whether
a confession was made voluntarily. Id. at 644-645. Although defendant was not arraigned until
five days after he was taken into custody, the confession that he sought to suppress was given
after he had been in custody for fifty-one hours, just three hours past the forty-eight-hour target.
Id.
Defendant argues that Simon induced his confession with a false promise of leniency.
The trial court found defendant’s testimony unconvincing, given his eleventh-grade education
and his prior experience with the criminal justice system. We cannot say that the trial court’s
finding rose to the level of clear error and, in any event, a promise of leniency is just one factor
to be considered in the evaluation of the voluntariness of a defendant's statements. People v
Shipley, 256 Mich App 367, 373; 662 NW2d 856 (2003).
Here, the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant’s statement does not
indicate that the police improperly coerced the statement.
B. Miranda rights
Defendant also argued below that his statement should be suppressed because the police
continued to interrogate him despite his repeated demands for an attorney. When a defendant
claims that his statement should have been suppressed because the police did not honor his
request for counsel, this Court reviews the record de novo, but reviews the trial court’s factual
findings under the clearly erroneous standard. Adams, supra at 230, 235.
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Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions guarantee the right against compelled
self-incrimination. US Const Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. This right encompasses an accused
person’s right to cease a custodial police interrogation by asserting his right to counsel. Adams,
supra at 230-231. When an accused invokes the right to have counsel present during a custodial
interrogation, the accused cannot be subjected to further police questioning until counsel has
been made available, unless the accused initiates further communication. Id. at 237, citing
Edwards v Arizona, 451 US 477, 484-485; 101 S Ct 1880; 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981).
Although defendant testified that he requested an attorney several times and that he was
told that consulting an attorney would be a waste of time and money, the trial court did not find
this testimony credible. Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determination, we find
no clear error with respect to this finding. Therefore, defendant is not entitled to relief on his
claim that his statement was taken in contravention of his constitutional right to counsel.
C
Defendant lastly contends that the police arrested him without probable cause, and that
his statement should be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. We disagree.
In People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 631; 588 NW2d 480 (1998), this Court
summarized how the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to custodial statements
following an improper arrest:
A police officer may arrest an individual without a warrant if a felony has
been committed and the officer has probable cause to believe that the individual
committed the felony. MCL 764.15(c); People v Champion, 452 Mich 92, 115;
549 NW2d 849 (1996). In reviewing a challenged finding of probable cause, an
appellate court must determine whether the facts available to the arresting officer
at the moment of arrest would justify a fair-minded person of average intelligence
in believing that the suspected individual has committed the felony. People v
Oliver, 417 Mich 366, 374; 338 NW2d 167 (1983); People v Russo, 439 Mich
584, 603-604; 487 NW2d 698 (1992); People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 168; 538
NW2d 380 (1995).
The Court in Kelly further explained that “[t]he mere fact of an illegal arrest ‘does not per se
require the suppression of a subsequent confession.’” Id. at 634, quoting People v Washington,
99 Mich App 330, 334; 297 NW2d 915 (1980).
The police may not detain a suspect for questioning when there is insufficient probable
cause for arrest. Brown v Illinois, 422 US 590, 605; 95 S Ct 2254; 45 L Ed 2d 416 (1975); Kelly,
supra at 633-634. However, an officer’s characterization of an arrest is not determinative of its
legality. Id. at 633.
Reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude that the police had amassed sufficient
information to establish probable cause for arrest as of September 8, 1999. Tutt informed the
police that Pierce’s two assailants ran behind the Motor City Medical Clinic after Pierce was
shot. This corresponded with the statement of Jeffrey Moore that he saw two men, Swims and a
man he did not know, run from the alley behind the medical clinic and into the home of Glenda
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Lewis. Lewis and her daughter told the police that Swims and another man, whom Lewis had
seen before, came to their house and asked for a ride. When the police showed Lewis a
photograph of Swims and defendant, Lewis identified defendant as the man who came to her
house with Swims. Furthermore, Lewis told the police that Swims directed her to drive to a
location near the bank, but by using a circuitous route that avoided the bank. Additionally, two
of defendant’s neighbors saw him and Swims get out of a car and remove their shirts. This was
sufficient information “to justify a fair-minded person of average intelligence in believing that
the suspected individual has committed the felony.” Kelly, supra at 631.
In sum, the trial court did not err in finding that the police had sufficient probable cause
to arrest defendant, and that his statement was therefore not the product of an unlawful arrest.
The trial court also did not err in finding that defendant’s allegations of coercion and denial of
his requests for an attorney were not credible. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied
defendant’s motion to suppress his statement.
III
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial by several instances of prosecutorial
misconduct. This Court reviews preserved claims of prosecutorial misconduct case by case,
examining the remarks in context to determine whether the defendant received a fair and
impartial trial. People v Rodriguez, 251 Mich App 10, 29-30; 650 NW2d 96 (2002).
Defendant claims that the prosecutor made misleading comments during jury voir dire
and falsely suggested to the jury that aiding and abetting a robbery in itself is sufficient to
establish murder if the victim is killed. We have reviewed the prosecutor’s comments, and do
not agree that the prosecutor made such insinuations. Moreover, during this exchange, the trial
court twice instructed the jurors that it alone had the authority to instruct the jurors on the law.
Defendant also claims that the prosecutor made improper appeals to the jurors’ fears and
sense of civic duty in his rebuttal argument. Defendant’s arguments are based on remarks taken
out of context. The prosecutor’s comments about Moore having “no place to hide” were not
intended to urge the jurors to convict defendant to protect Moore’s safety, but rather to cast
doubt on Moore’s professed inability to identify defendant. The prosecutor’s advice to “be
careful” did not suggest that the jurors were at risk from defendant; rather, viewed in context, the
prosecutor was urging the jurors to be careful in analyzing the evidence. Consequently, there
was no improper civic duty argument.
We also reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly denigrated defense
counsel during rebuttal argument. Defendant correctly argues that a prosecutor may not
personally attack defense counsel. People v Phillips, 217 Mich App 489, 498; 552 NW2d 487
(1996). However, we believe it is an exaggeration to claim that the prosecutor here personally
attacked defense counsel, or attempted to inflame the jurors, by using expressions such as
“tricks” or “straw men.” Defense counsel had attempted to undermine the prosecution’s case by
calling the jury’s attention to various discrepancies in the witnesses’ testimony. The prosecutor
was entitled to argue that these discrepancies were too insignificant to detract from the important
evidence, and he was not restricted to the “blandest of all possible terms” in making his
argument. Aldrich, supra at 112.
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We also reject defendant’s claim that the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of
proof by commenting on defense counsel’s failure to explain “Spud.” The prosecutor was not
shifting the burden of proof, but commenting on a weakness in defendant’s claim that the police
fabricated his confession. The prosecutor pointed out that the confession included a statement
that defendant solicited someone called “Spud” to commit a robbery, and that this portion of the
statement was corroborated by witnesses who testified that defendant approached them about
committing a robbery. The prosecutor did not ask defense counsel to prove defendant’s
innocence, but rather to resolve a discrepancy in defendant’s own claim of fabrication.
Defendant claims that the prosecutor slipped in inadmissible, prejudicial evidence of his
criminal history through the testimony of Officer Fisher and State Trooper Oswald-Debottis. We
disagree. Fisher’s reference to defendant’s history was in response to a question by defense
counsel, not the prosecutor. Accordingly, there is no basis for a prosecutorial misconduct claim
here. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, Oswald-Debottis did not give any testimony that was
prejudicial to defendant. She merely referred to a 1991 traffic stop involving defendant, and,
while this was of questionable relevance, it was not prejudicial.
We agree that the prosecutor erroneously read from a medical reference book during
rebuttal, but this error did not prejudice defendant. In defining the term “syncope,” the
prosecutor merely confirmed that defendant told ER personnel that he had collapsed in his cell.
It did not strengthen the prosecutor’s position, nor did it weaken defendant’s position. The
prosecutor also explained that the medical records showed that defendant acknowledged that he
was not experiencing the more serious symptoms of blood in his stool and vomit. Defendant
never claimed that his symptoms were this serious, so again, the prosecutor’s improper citations
to a medical text did not weaken or strengthen either party’s position.
Finally, defendant claims that the prosecutor failed to provide discovery regarding res
gestae witnesses. MCL 767.40a(1) requires the prosecutor to notify the defendant of all known
res gestae witnesses. People v Burwick, 450 Mich 281, 288-289, 292; 537 NW2d 813 (1995).
Here, the record does not factually support defendant’s implied argument that the prosecutor
failed to notify defendant of known res gestae witnesses. There is no indication that the
prosecution knew of any person other than Tutt who was present in the parking lot when Pierce
was shot. Defendant complains that the prosecutor did not provide certain information
concerning potential res gestae witness Sylvia Glenn, who was with Moore when he saw the men
running from behind the medical clinic, but he does not claim that the prosecution violated any
requirement of the statute with respect to Glenn.
If there had been evidence of a violation of MCL 676.40a(1), the remedy would be a
remand for an evidentiary hearing pursuant to People v Pearson, 404 Mich 698; 273 NW2d 856
(1979). People v Calhoun, 178 Mich App 517, 521-522; 444 NW2d 232 (1989). Although the
Pearson hearing originated before MCL 676.40a(1) was amended,2 this Court held in Calhoun
that the hearing was still valid to determine whether an unlisted witness could have been located
and produced, and whether the witness’ absence at trial was prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at
2
Before the amendment, the statute required the prosecutor to produce res gestae witnesses.
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522-523. Here, defendant has not requested a Pearson hearing, and we find no basis to remand
for one. Accordingly, there is no merit to defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct based
on discovery violations.
IV
Defendant argues that he was denied a fair trial by the cumulative effect of several errors.
This Court reviews this issue to determine if the combination of alleged errors denied defendant
a fair trial. People v Knapp, 244 Mich App 361, 387; 624 NW2d 227 (2001). The cumulative
effect of several minor errors may warrant reversal even where individual errors in the case
would not. Id. at 387-388. Reversal is warranted only if the effect of the errors was so seriously
prejudicial that the defendant was denied a fair trial. Id. at 388. Here, we have found only two
minor errors: the irrelevant, but innocuous testimony of Trooper Oswald-Debottis, and the
prosecutor’s reference to a medical dictionary in closing argument. These errors, even when
combined, did not deny defendant a fair trial.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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