IN RE BREWER/TALLEY MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of NATHANIEL AARON
BREWER, NATALIE FAITH NICOLE TALLEY,
and KATLYNN TONDOLIA TALLEY, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 248534
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-385468
SHANE AARON TALLEY,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
ANTHONY DEWAYNE JACKSON,
Respondent.
In the Matter of NATHANIEL AARON BREWER,
NATALIE FAITH NICOLE TALLEY, SHANE
AARON TALLEY, JR., and KATLYNN
TONDOLIA TALLEY, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 249690
Wayne Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 00-385468
JENNIFER LYNN BREWER,
Respondent-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
-1-
MEMORANDUM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents Shane Aaron Talley and Jennifer Lynn Brewer
appeal as of right from the orders of the trial court terminating their parental rights to their minor
children pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (g), and (j).1 We affirm.
Respondents argue that termination was premature because the agency failed to provide
them with services to assist them in reunification with their children. We disagree. Although the
agency charged with the care of the children is required to report to the trial court the efforts
made to rectify the conditions that led to the removal of the child, MCR 3.973(E)(2), services are
not mandated in all situations. See In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 26 n 4; 610 NW2d 563
(2000). Respondent Talley was incarcerated during much of the time that the case was pending
before the trial court, making it difficult for the agency to provide services. When not
incarcerated, respondent Talley failed to take advantage of the services offered, failed to
maintain contact with the agency, seldom visited the children, and was difficult to locate.
Similarly, respondent Brewer, who was using drugs, neglected the children, had no verifiable
source of income at the time of the adjudication, and failed to avail herself of the services offered
until shortly before termination.
Respondent Talley also contends that the trial court impermissibly permitted the
introduction of hearsay evidence regarding Katlynn, a child born during the pendency of the
proceedings regarding the older children, during the adjudicative stage of the proceedings
regarding her. A review of the record demonstrates that respondent Talley’s parental rights to all
of his children were terminated based upon his failure to comply with the agency’s directives and
his repeated incarceration, not upon hearsay testimony.
The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding that statutory grounds for termination had
been established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331,
337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Similarly, termination of respondents’ parental rights was not
contrary to the best interests of the children. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
1
Although respondent Talley contends that the trial court also terminated his parental rights
under MCL 712A.19b(3)(h), a review of the record indicates that the trial court declined to
terminate his parental rights on this ground.
-2-
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