PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLIE ANTHOM WASHINGTON
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 13, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 247127
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-011228-01
CHARLIE ANTHOM WASHINGTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Saad, P.J., and Sawyer and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
I
Defendant appeals his jury trial conviction of first-degree murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a),
and his sentence of life imprisonment without parole, and we affirm.
Defendant’s conviction arises from the stabbing death of Donald Thomas. Defendant
denied stabbing Thomas or possessing a knife, and theorized that Thomas fell on his own knife
as he was running away from defendant.
II
A. DEFENDANT’S REQUEST FOR SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his request for substitute counsel.
A trial court’s decision regarding substitution of counsel will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. People v Traylor, 245 Mich App 460, 462; 628 NW2d 120 (2001). As this Court
stated in Traylor, supra at 462:
An indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel; however, he is
not entitled to have the attorney of his choice appointed simply by requesting that
the attorney originally appointed be replaced. Appointment of a substitute
counsel is warranted only upon a showing of good cause and where substitution
will not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process. Good cause exits where a
legitimate difference of opinion develops between a defendant and his appointed
counsel with regard to a fundamental trial tactic. [Quoting People v Mack, 190
Mich App 7, 14; 475 NW2d 830 (1991).]
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The record discloses that defendant did not establish good cause for substitution, nor did he show
that substitution would not have unreasonably disrupted the judicial process. Defendant’s
request for substitute counsel was made on the first day of trial. Thus, substitution would have
required an adjournment, thereby disrupting the judicial process. Further, although defendant
and counsel claimed that there had been a breakdown in communication, neither indicated that a
“fundamental” issue was involved. And, while defendant complained that he had just recently
received his discovery materials, counsel explained that this was because defendant did not ask
for them earlier, and defendant did not explain below, nor does he indicate on appeal, how his
allegedly untimely receipt of the discovery materials affected the case. Counsel explained that
he had met with defendant several times and was making efforts to find a possible defense
witness that defendant identified. Nothing in the record suggests that there was “a legitimate
difference of opinion” between defendant and counsel over any “fundamental trial tactic” in the
case. Defendant’s general dissatisfaction and lack of confidence were not enough to establish
good cause for substitute counsel. Id. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying defendant’s request for substitute counsel.
B. PREMEDITATION
Defendant also asserts that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and specific
intent to kill to support his conviction of first-degree murder. We review claims that the
prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to support a conviction de novo in the light most
favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found that
the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Hampton,
407 Mich 354, 368; 285 NW2d 284 (1979); People v Oliver, 242 Mich App 92, 94-95; 617
NW2d 721 (2000). The standard of review is deferential and this Court is required to draw all
reasonable inferences and make credibility choices in support of the jury’s verdict. People v
Nowack, 462 Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000); People v Griffin, 235 Mich App 27, 31; 597
NW2d 176 (1999). “First-degree murder is the intentional killing of another, done with
premeditation and deliberation.” People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 660; 509 NW2d 885
(1993). “Although there is no specific time requirement, sufficient time must have elapsed to
allow the defendant to take a ‘second look.’” People v Plummer, 229 Mich App 293, 300; 581
NW2d 753 (1998). Among the factors that may be considered to establish premeditation are the
previous relationship between defendant and the decedent, the defendant’s actions before and
after the crime, and the circumstances of the killing, including the weapon used and the location
of the wounds. Id.
The evidence established that defendant had a history of animosity with Thomas, who
was involved in an intimate relationship with defendant’s former girlfriend. Defendant’s
relationship with his former girlfriend had ended and she obtained a personal protection order
against him. Nevertheless, defendant arrived at her house; he had been drinking and was armed
with a knife. Defendant ignored requests to leave, and defendant and Thomas exchanged angry
words. Testimony indicated that Thomas damaged defendant’s van, and that defendant
subsequently pulled out a knife and chased Thomas into a nearby field. Thomas slipped and fell
as he was running from defendant. While Thomas was lying on his back, he told defendant “to
stop,” but defendant stabbed him in the chest. The single stab wound was forceful enough to
collapse Thomas’ lung and bisect his heart. According to the medical examiner, Thomas’ wound
was inconsistent with a fall on a knife held in his own hand. When the police arrived, defendant
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fled the scene and subsequently left the state. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, the evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant had sufficient time for a “second look” before he pulled out a
knife and also while he chased Thomas. He also had another opportunity to pause when Thomas
fell and asked him to “stop.” The single, slicing wound that bisected Thomas’ heart also
supports an inference that defendant acted with a specific intent to kill. Thus, there was
sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of first-degree murder.
Further, defendant maintains that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel.
Because defendant did not raise this issue in a motion for a new trial or request for a Ginther1
hearing, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the record. People v Williams, 223 Mich
App 409, 414; 566 NW2d 649 (1997). To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden
is on defendant to show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as
the “counsel” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that the deficient performance so
prejudiced the defense as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145,
156; 560 NW2d 600 (1997). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was
reasonable. Id.
Although defendant asserts that counsel failed to call witnesses, investigate the case, or
produce documentary evidence to bolster his claim that Thomas fell on his own knife, he does
not indicate what additional evidence was available that was not produced, nor does he explain
what other witnesses were available to testify who were not called, except for Rocky Manuel.
With regard to Manuel, defendant did not made a record, or submit an affidavit, to show what
testimony Manuel could have provided, and it is not apparent from the record that Manuel could
have provided testimony favorable to defendant. Neither defendant nor any of the witnesses
suggested that Manuel was in a position to observe Thomas’ fatal injury. Additionally, the
record indicates that defense counsel did not call Manuel as a witness because he could not be
located. Counsel informed the court that he began looking for Manuel two or three weeks before
trial, and was informed that he “lives on the street.” Even Manuel’s mother had no idea where
he could be found. On this record, defendant has not overcome the presumption that counsel’s
conduct was reasonable, nor has defendant shown that he was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
present any evidence or call any witnesses.
Affirmed.
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
1
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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