PEOPLE OF MI V ARTHUR B CHERRY
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
May 11, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 246792
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 02-005335
ARTHUR B. CHERRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Fitzgerald, P.J., and Jansen and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right his jury trial convictions for first-degree felony murder,1
MCL 750.316, assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89, and possession of a firearm
during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent
terms of life imprisonment, 285 to 600 months, and to a two year consecutive term for felonyfirearm. We affirm.
Defendant first argues that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We
disagree. A motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v Abraham,
256 Mich App 265, 269; 662 NW2d 836 (2003). A verdict is against the great weight of the
evidence if the evidence preponderates “heavily against the verdict so that it would be a
miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand.” People v Lemmon, 456 Mich 625, 627; 576
NW2d 129 (1998).
A verdict may only be vacated when it “does not find reasonable support in the evidence,
but is more likely to be attributed to causes outside the record such as passion, prejudice,
sympathy, or some extraneous influence.” People v DeLisle, 202 Mich App 658, 661; 509
NW2d 885 (1993), citation omitted. Questions regarding the credibility of witnesses and
conflicting testimony do not constitute sufficient grounds for granting a new trial. Lemmon,
supra, 456 Mich 643. When there is conflicting evidence, the question of credibility ordinarily
should be left for the factfinder. Id.
1
The underlying felony was first-degree home invasion, MCL 750.110a.
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There are several very narrow exceptions where the trial court is permitted to make
judgment on the credibility of a witness. Lemmon, supra, 456 Mich 643. These exceptions
include:
when the testimony contradicts indisputable physical facts or laws, where the
testimony is patently incredible or defies physical realities, where a witness’s
testimony is material and so inherently implausible that a reasonable juror could
not believe it, or where the witness’ testimony has been so seriously impeached
and the case marked by uncertainties and discrepancies. [Id. at 643-644 (citations
omitted).]
If one of the tests apply, the court must then determine whether there is “a real concern that an
innocent person may have been convicted,” or that “it would be a manifest injustice” to not
reverse the guilty verdict. Lemmon, supra, 456 Mich 644, quoting Untied States v Sanchez, 969
F2d 1409, 1414 (CA 2, 1992).
Here, accomplice Hampton was the only witness to place defendant at the scene of the
shooting. Hampton admitted to making several different statements after the incident occurred.
Her first statements, given under a false name, indicated that she did not know the men who
entered the house. Hampton stated that she did not tell the police that she knew who the men
were because that would also implicate her in the crime. Hampton later gave police her actual
name and told them that she, along with co-defendant Anthony Adams and defendant, was
involved in the murder. Hampton stated that she had told defendant and Adams not to use a gun
in the robbery, and that she was surprised when defendant came into the house holding a gun.
When she protested about the gun, defendant told her repeatedly to “shut up.”
Defendant claims that Hampton’s testimony was not credible because she was repeatedly
impeached. However, there was other evidence that bolstered Hampton’s version of events.
Decedent’s son, who was in the basement of the home at the time of the robbery, heard a male
voice say “shut up” a number of times. And, although he denied it at trial, there was evidence
that Hunter told the police that defendant carried a gun, and that defendant and Adams were
“always talking about a lick.”
No exception applies in this case that would allow the court to consider the credibility of
the witnesses. Lemmon, supra, 456 Mich 643. Where, as here, there is conflicting evidence, the
question of credibility should be left for the factfinder. Id. at 642-643. The jury chose to believe
Hampton’s testimony that defendant was the perpetrator. We do not find Hampton’s testimony
so inherently implausible, or so seriously impeached and marked by uncertainty and
discrepancies, that reasonable jurors could not believe it. The court did not abuse its discretion
in finding that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence.
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Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his request for a Ginther2
hearing. We disagree. A trial court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. People v Jones, 236 Mich App 396, 404; 600 NW2d 652 (1999).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden is on defendant to
show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel”
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense as
to deprive defendant of a fair trial. People v Mitchell, 454 Mich 145, 156; 560 NW2d 600
(1997). There is a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct was reasonable. Id. This Court
will not substitute its judgment for that of trial counsel regarding matters of trial strategy. People
v Avant, 235 Mich App 499, 508; 597 NW2d 864 (1999). Nor will we assess counsel’s
competence with the benefit of hindsight. People v Rice (On Remand), 235 Mich App 429, 445;
597 NW2d 843 (1999). Decisions about calling and questioning witnesses are matters of trial
strategy. People v Rockey, 237 Mich App 74, 76; 601 NW2d 887 (1999).
Defendant now argues that trial counsel was ineffective because defendant had two
witnesses who would testify on his behalf to defendant’s whereabouts at the time of the crime,
but that counsel failed to raise an alibi defense. During the motion hearing on this matter, the
prosecutor reminded the trial court that defense counsel indicated during trial that he and
defendant had decided, after consultation with defendant’s family, not to present any further
evidence. As the trial court subsequently noted in denying defendant’s motion for a Ginther
hearing, “[t]his defendant was a grown man. The decision of the defendant was an intelligent,
thought out, reflected upon decision which the defendant even had the benefit [of] discussing
with his family members.” Defendant has not overcome the presumption that counsel’s actions
were reasonable or that any alleged defects detrimentally affected the result of the trial. People v
Fike, 228 Mich App 178, 181; 577 NW2d 903 (1998). The trial court did not abuse its discretion
by denying defendant's motion for an evidentiary hearing. Jones, supra, 236 Mich App 404.
Affirmed.
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
2
People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973).
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