JONATHON MOORE V CITY OF FLINT
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
JONATHON MOORE,
UNPUBLISHED
May 4, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245027
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 2001-069767-CZ
CITY OF FLINT,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Jansen and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals by leave granted from the trial court’s order denying its motion for
summary disposition of plaintiff’s claims for discrimination and retaliation under the Persons
With Disabilities Civil Rights Act (PWDCRA), MCL 37.1101 et seq. We reverse.
Plaintiff was formerly employed by defendant as an internal auditor. Plaintiff suffers
from arthritis of the spine, which, according to plaintiff, causes him severe stiffness in the
morning upon waking. Due to this condition, plaintiff was often unable to report to work at his
designated starting time, and frequently was absent. Plaintiff was repeatedly disciplined
throughout his employment, due in large part to his inability to meet the work and attendance
requirements. In 1999, plaintiff ’s tardiness was temporarily accommodated by defendant, which
allowed him to work later hours in order to make up the time he missed after arriving late. In
March 2000, plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), charging defendant with discrimination. That charge was dismissed in December 2000,
and plaintiff filed this lawsuit in February 2001. In 2002, defendant hired a new finance director,
who became plaintiff’s new supervisor.
In the present action, plaintiff alleges that, after filing the EEOC complaint, defendant
was no longer willing to accommodate his disability, and began a progressive pattern of
disciplinary actions against him, primarily due to his tardiness and absenteeism. Plaintiff alleged
counts for both discrimination and retaliation under the PWDCRA.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary
disposition of plaintiff’s discrimination claim under the PWDCRA. We agree that summary
disposition of this claim was warranted pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10).
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A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual support for
a claim. The court must consider the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, and other
documentary evidence submitted by the parties. MCR 2.116(G)(5). Summary disposition
should be granted if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Babula v Robertson, 212 Mich App 45, 48; 536 NW2d 834 (1995).
In our de novo review of the record, we conclude that plaintiff failed to submit sufficient
evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he was discriminated
against within the meaning of the PWDCRA. As this Court stated in Chiles v Machine Shop,
Inc, 238 Mich App 462, 473; 606 NW2d 398 (1999):
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the [PWDCRA], a
plaintiff must show that (1) he is “disabled” as defined by the statute, (2) the
disability is unrelated to the plaintiff ’s ability to perform the duties of a particular
job, and (3) the plaintiff has been discriminated against in one of the ways set
forth in the statute.
The PWDCRA defines “disability” as follows:
(i) A determinable physical or mental characteristic of an individual,
which may result from disease, injury, congenital condition of birth, or functional
disorder, if the characteristic:
(A) For purposes of article 2, substantially limits 1 or more of the major
life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s ability to
perform the duties of a particular job or position or substantially limits 1 or more
of the major life activities of that individual and is unrelated to the individual’s
qualifications for employment or promotion. . . . [MCL 37.1103(d).]
At his deposition, plaintiff testified that he would not know whether he could go to work,
or go into work late, until he woke up in the morning and assessed how much pain he was in
each day. As such, plaintiff admittedly reported late for work, and missed work completely,
repeatedly throughout his employment. According to his supervisors, plaintiff ’s erratic schedule
caused problems in the office because someone else had to assume plaintiff ’s duties if he was
absent.
As indicated by defendant, it is well-settled that a person who cannot appear for work on
a reasonably regular and predictable schedule is not able to perform the essential duties of his job
and, therefore, is not disabled within the meaning of MCL 37.1103(d)(i). Cf. Jovanovic v InSink-Erator Div of Emerson Electric Co, 201 F3d 894, 899-900 (CA 7, 2000); Gantt v Wilson
Sporting Goods Co, 143 F3d 1042, 1047 (CA 6, 1998); Jackson v Veterans Admin, 22 F3d 277,
278-279 (CA 11, 1994); Barfield v Bell South Telecom, Inc, 886 F Supp 1321, 1326-1327 (SD
Miss, 1995). As the court explained in Haschmann v Time Warner Entertainment Co, LP, 151
F3d 591, 602 (CA 7, 1998),
it is not the absence itself but rather the excessive frequency of an employee’s
absences in relation to that employee’s job responsibilities that may lead to a
finding that an employee is unable to perform the duties of his job.
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Although consideration of the degree of excessiveness may in some cases present a
factual issue for the jury, id., the undisputed evidence in this case demonstrates that there is no
genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was excessively absent from work and was not able to
work a reasonably regular schedule due to his arthritis.1 Further, defendant demonstrated that
plaintiff’s repeated absences affected its operations. The work needed to be performed by
someone else if plaintiff was absent, and defendant incurred overtime and other expenses in
order to complete the work.
We also reject plaintiff’s argument that defendant may reasonably accommodate his
condition by allowing him to work later hours in order to make up for missed time, thus causing
him to fall within the statutory definition of “disability.” MCL 37.1103(d)(i)(A) and (1)(i).
Although such an accommodation would partially address the tardiness problem, it would not
become a solution for plaintiff ’s excessive absenteeism. Plaintiff failed to show that this
suggested accommodation would allow him to make up enough time for the excessive number of
days of missed work. Such unpredictable absences can create an undue hardship on employers.
In Jackson, supra at 279, the court held that an employer was not required to accommodate the
plaintiff ’s unpredictable absences due to his arthritis because it created an undue hardship on the
employer to find someone to do the plaintiff ’s work on short notice. While an employer has a
duty to accommodate an employee’s disability, the evidence in this case established that the
proposed accommodation was unreasonable and unduly burdensome. Rourk v Oakwood Hosp
Corp, 458 Mich 25, 28; 580 NW2d 397 (1998).
In this case, plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact that he was disabled
because he was not able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without a
reasonable accommodation. Moreover, because plaintiff was not disabled, defendant had no
independent statutory duty to accommodate plaintiff. MCL 37.1210. Accordingly, defendant
was entitled to summary disposition on plaintiff ’s discrimination claim, and the trial court erred
in concluding otherwise.
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary
disposition of plaintiff’s retaliation claim. We agree.
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under the PWDCRA, a plaintiff must prove
the following:
“(1) that he engaged in a protected activity; (2) that this was known by the
defendant; (3) that the defendant took an . . . action adverse to the plaintiff; and
(4) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse . . . action.” [Bachman v Swan Harbour Assoc, 252 Mich App 400, 435;
653 NW2d 415 (2002), quoting DeFlaviis v Lord & Taylor, Inc, 223 Mich App
432, 436; 566 NW2d 661 (1997).]
1
Plaintiff asserts that several of his absences from work were attributable to suspensions and a
medical leave of absence for hip replacement surgery. We have not considered those absences in
deciding this issue.
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Defendant argued below that plaintiff could not establish the fourth element, a causal
connection between the protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action. In a case
involving retaliation under the analogous retaliation provision of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights
Act, MCL 37.2701(a), this Court held that in order to establish a causal connection, the plaintiff
must show that his participation in the protected activity was a “significant factor” in the
employer’s adverse employment action, not merely that there was a causal link between the two
events. Barrett v Kirtland Community College, 245 Mich App 306, 315; 628 NW2d 63 (2001).
In denying defendant’s motion on the retaliation claim, the trial court ruled as follows:
With respect to the retaliation claim, the Defendant raises the position–or
raises the point that timing cannot be used exclusively to show the causal
connection. But, in this case, I think an argument can be made that it is more than
just the timing. I think it is admitted a little bit that there was some tolerance in
an effort to work out these issues prior to the filing of the complaint, and, then,
subsequent to the filing of the complaint, there were discipline issues not only
related to the timing but they were also, arguably, related to the level of tolerance
that would be permitted. So it’s more than just that discipline began after the
filing of the EEOC complaint, there is also an issue raised on these fact that there
was less tolerance than before, which, in my view, creates an issue of fact as to
whether or not there was a causal connection.
We disagree with the trial court’s conclusion. In West v General Motors Corp, 469 Mich
177, 184-187; 665 NW2d 468 (2003) our Supreme Court analyzed what proofs are necessary to
establish a “causal connection” between protected activity and an adverse employment action. In
doing so, the Court concluded that a plaintiff “must show something more than merely a
coincidence in time between protected activity and adverse employment action.” Id. at 186.
Importantly for this case, the Court held that “[t]he fact that a plaintiff engages in ‘protected
activity’ under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act does not immunize him from an otherwise
legitimate, or unrelated, adverse job action.” Id. at 187.2
The material facts in the record show that plaintiff filed his EEOC complaint on March 8,
2000, and that defendant knew about it, at the latest, in April 2000. The undisputed material
facts also reveal that since 1994, plaintiff received innumerable and varying forms of discipline
for his excessive tardiness and absenteeism. For example, in 1994, plaintiff was disciplined
eight times for tardiness or absences (eleven times in total), ranging from written warnings to a
thirty-two-hour suspension. In 1995, plaintiff was disciplined fives times for tardiness and
absences, and seven times overall. In October 1997, plaintiff was hired by defendant’s finance
department, and was supervised by Sekar Bawa. In 1998, plaintiff was disciplined seven times
for tardiness and absenteeism (eight times overall), ranging from oral reprimands to twenty-fourhour suspensions. In 1999, when defendant was attempting to work through defendant’s
2
Although West was a case brought under the Whistleblowers’ Act, the Court noted that
whistleblower claims are analogous to antiretaliation discrimination cases. West, supra at 186 n
11.
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attendance issues, plaintiff was disciplined only once, for forty hours, and received one other
written warning for insubordination and neglect of duty. In 2000, plaintiff was disciplined
fifteen times for tardiness or absenteeism. In his deposition, plaintiff admitted that the two
incidents that occurred in April and May were correct, and regarding the remaining thirteen
incidents, plaintiff failed to rebut defendant’s evidence that the infractions actually occurred.
In light of the foregoing, we conclude that there was no genuine issue of material fact that
plaintiff’s filing of his EEOC charge was not a significant factor in his discipline. West, supra;
Taylor v Modern Engineering, Inc, 252 Mich App 655, 661-662; 653 NW2d 625 (2002). The
record indisputably shows that plaintiff had a long history of discipline for tardiness and
absenteeism, dating back to 1994. And, although the number of times plaintiff was disciplined
increased in 2000, timing is not enough to establish a causal connection, West, supra. Further,
plaintiff has failed to show that these disciplines were not proper, i.e., that he was incorrectly
disciplined on these occasions. Id. Indeed, at oral argument before this Court, plaintiff’s counsel
conceded that no evidence existed in the record to show that, after he engaged in protected
activity, plaintiff was disciplined for something he did not in fact commit. Absent such proof, or
proof that plaintiff was treated differently than other similar employees, we cannot conclude that
there was a genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff’s EEOC complaint was a significant
factor in these legitimate disciplines.3
Reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
3
Although plaintiff did not file a brief on appeal, he filed an affidavit in the trial court. In that
document, plaintiff stated that his supervisor made personal telephone calls lasting thirty minutes
or more, yet “to the best of his knowledge,” his supervisor was not disciplined. Plaintiff was
disciplined for excessive use of the telephone. However, in discrimination cases, a plaintiff
cannot generally compare his treatment with that of his supervisor. See Ercegovich v Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co, 154 F3d 344, 352 (CA 6, 1998); Mitchell v Toledo Hosp, 964 F2d 577, 583
(CA 6, 1992). Here, plaintiff only offers speculation on whether his supervisor was, or was not,
disciplined. Likewise, the affidavit does not raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the
remaining discipline received by plaintiff, as the assertions in the affidavit lack sufficient
specificity to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
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