IN RE LOWE MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of SHAWN LOWE, JR. and SETH
MASON LOWE, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 29, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 251697
Branch Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-002283-NA
JENNIFER LOWE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
SHAWN LOWE, SR.,
Respondent.
In the Matter of SHAWN LOWE, JR. and SETH
MASON LOWE, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 251768
Branch Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-002283-NA
SHAWN LOWE,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
JENNIFER LOWE,
Respondent.
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Before: White, P.J., and Markey and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
In these consolidated appeals, respondents-appellants Jennifer Lowe and Shawn Lowe,
Sr., appeal by right from an order terminating their parental rights to the minor children pursuant
to MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), and (k)(iii). We affirm.
I
Respondent Jennifer Lowe argues that the termination order is invalid because the trial
court held the termination hearing more than sixty-three days after the termination petition was
filed on January 8, 2003, contrary to MCR 5.974(F)(1)(b).1 We agree that the trial court failed to
comply with the time requirements of MCR 5.974(F)(1)(b), but this rule provides no sanctions
for noncompliance. Accordingly, respondents are entitled to relief for this error only if the
violation of the court rule is inconsistent with substantial justice. MCR 2.613(A); In re TC, 251
Mich App 369, 370-371; 650 NW2d 698 (2002). Here, respondents have failed to demonstrate
that holding the termination hearing more than sixty-three days after the filing of the petition was
inconsistent with substantial justice. Consequently, they are not entitled to appellate relief.
II
Both respondents argue that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence of statutory
grounds to terminate their parental rights to the children.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination in MCL 712A.19b(3) has been met by clear and convincing
evidence. In re McIntyre, 192 Mich App 47, 50; 480 NW2d 293 (1993). We review the trial
court’s findings of fact under the clearly erroneous standard. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356357; 612 NW2d 407 (2000); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Under this
standard, the trial court’s decision must strike the reviewing court as more than just maybe or
probably wrong. In re Sours, 459 Mich 624, 633; 593 NW2d 520 (1999). This Court gives due
regard to the trial court’s unique ability to assess the witnesses’ credibility. MCR 2.613(C); In re
Miller, supra at 344.
Here, the trial court found grounds to terminate respondents’ parental rights under MCL
712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j) and (k)(iii). The court previously found that respondents physically
abused the children’s older sister, and this Court affirmed an order terminating respondents’
parental rights to that child. In re JML, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals,
issued May 29, 2003 (Docket Nos. 245551 and 245687). Respondents’ prior abuse of the older
child satisfied the prior abuse requirement of § 19b(3)(b)(i). Respondents contend, however, that
1
The rules governing child protection proceedings were amended and recodified as part of new
subchapter 3.900, effective May 1, 2003. Former MCR 5.974(F)(1)(b) is now codified as MCR
3.977(G)(1)(b).
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the evidence did not satisfy the anticipatory abuse prong of § 19b(3)(b)(i). We disagree. As this
Court observed in In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 588; 528 NW2d 799 (1995), how a parent
treats one child is probative of how that parent might treat another child. Furthermore, Drs.
Haugen and Henry both determined from their assessments of respondents that respondents were
unwilling to accept responsibility for their past abuse of the older child, and that this refusal
would prevent them from resolving the abuse issues. This evidence supported the trial court’s
finding that respondents were likely to abuse their younger children. Although Dr. Lazar
disputed Drs. Haugen’s and Henry’s findings, the trial court determined that Dr. Henry and Dr.
Haugen were more credible, and this Court defers to the trial court’s ability to assess witness
credibility. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s findings were clearly
erroneous. In re Miller, supra at 337.
Respondents also contend that their prior abuse of the older child was not probative of
how they would treat their younger children because the older child’s serious behavioral
problems made her more susceptible to abuse. The trial court inferred from Dr. Henry’s
testimony regarding Shawn Michael’s “disregulation” that the events relating to Jasmine’s abuse
were beginning to repeat themselves with Shawn Michael, and that respondents were not doing
anything to change the outcome. The trial court’s rejection of respondents’ “target child”
argument was thus supported by the evidence.
The same evidence that supports termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i) also supports
termination under §§ 19b(3)(g) and (j). Section 19b(3)(g) requires evidence that the parent failed
to provide proper care and custody, and that there is no reasonable likelihood the parent will
become able to do so within a reasonable time. The trial court inferred that Shawn Michael’s
disregulation related to the abuse in respondents’ home. This constituted a past failure to provide
proper care and custody. The same evidence that supports the anticipatory abuse prong of §
19b(3)(b)(i) applies also to the anticipatory neglect prong of § 19b(3)(g), and to § 19b(3)(j)
(likelihood of future harm to the children if returned to the parents’ care).
Respondents contend that the trial court erred in finding sufficient evidence under §
19b(3)(k), because it relied on the findings from the previous termination order, without making
specific findings that the abuse of the older child involved battering, torture, or severe physical
abuse. But, the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes relitigation of an issue in a subsequent,
different cause of action between the same parties when the prior proceeding culminated in a
valid final judgment, and the issue was actually and necessarily determined in the prior
proceeding. McMichael v McMichael, 217 Mich App 723, 727; 552 NW2d 688 (1996). We see
no reason why this rule would not apply here, where the trial court made a prior, valid final
judgment that respondents’ abuse of their older child rose to the level of battering, torture, or
severe physical abuse.
Respondent Shawn Lowe argues that termination of his parental rights was improper
because there had been no noteworthy change of circumstances since the trial court’s previous
decision to return Shawn Michael and Seth to respondents care. We understand respondents’
confusion and complaint that the successor judge seemingly abandoned her predecessor’s
movement toward reunification when there was no change of circumstances other than
respondents’ ninety-three-day incarceration. But, the trial court’s prior efforts at reunification
did not constitute a judicial determination that respondents were fit parents, nor did they bind the
future court’s actions.
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Respondent Shawn Lowe asserts in his statement of questions presented that termination
of his parental rights was contrary to the children’s best interests, but his brief does not include
any argument in support of this issue. It is therefore waived because a party may not merely
announce a position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for the claim.
In re Toler, 193 Mich App 474, 477; 484 NW2d 672 (1992). In any event, the evidence did not
show that termination of Shawn Lowe’s parental rights was clearly not in the children’s best
interests. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Trejo, supra at 353.
We affirm.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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