IN RE GATES MINORS
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JUSTIN RAY GATES, SHAWNA
RENEE GATES, HARLAND ROBERT GATES
and CHEYENNE MELENA GATES, Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 27, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 251111
Van Buren Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-013654
CHRISTINE GATES,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
DAVID GATES,
Respondent.
In the Matter of JUSTIN RAY GATES, SHAWNA
RENEE GATES, HARLAND ROBERT GATES
and CHEYENNE MELENA GATES , Minors.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 251366
Van Buren Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-013654
DAVID GATES,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
CHRISTINE GATES,
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Respondent.
Before: White, P.J., and Markey and Owens, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant Christine Gates (respondent-mother) appeals as of right in Docket
No. 251111, and respondent-appellant David Gates (respondent-father) appeals as of right in
Docket No. 251366, from an order terminating their parental rights to their children under MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We affirm.
I. Docket No. 251111
Respondent-mother argues that several of the trial court’s factual findings are clearly
erroneous. This Court reviews the trial court’s findings of fact in a parental termination case
under the clearly erroneous standard. A finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court is
left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Miller, 433 Mich
331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989); MCR 3.977(J).
Respondent-mother first argues that the trial court erred in concluding that there was
clear and convincing evidence to support termination of her parental rights. She challenges the
court’s finding that the family home was unsafe and unsanitary, given that she was living in a
new home at the time of the termination hearing. She further argues that the court’s observations
that she was uncooperative with the service provider, that she made threats, and that she was held
in contempt of court do not provide a basis for terminating her parental rights, and that certain
positive facts were at odds with the court’s findings. We disagree.
Given the history of this case, we conclude that the court properly found clear and
convincing evidence to support the termination. Although respondent-mother had finally moved
into an appropriate house at the time of the termination, there was no assurance that she would be
able to remain there. Further, respondent-mother’s history of uncooperative conduct explained
why she failed to make sufficient progress. Respondent-mother further argues that the trial court
erred in finding that the children had difficulty in school, given that a former teacher for three of
the children testified that they did well in school. However, it had been years since the former
teacher had taught two of the children. Her testimony had little relevance to the children’s
educational progress at the time of the termination hearing. The trial court did not clearly err by
giving her testimony little or no weight in its findings in contrast to other evidence supporting
that the children had attendance and behavioral problems.
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in considering an earlier finding of
contempt against her. We disagree. Respondent-mother was found in contempt for refusing to
comply with an earlier court order not to discuss the case with the children. Respondentmother’s noncompliance was further evidence of her inability to accept responsibility and parent
with the children’s best interests in mind.
Next, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in considering threats she made
against the caseworkers. Such evidence was part of the history of this case and helped explain
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why extreme measures had to be taken at visits and why the caseworkers did not visit the family
home.
While we agree with respondent-mother that she was not given a full opportunity to
respond to or learn more about the allegations of sexual abuse against respondent-father, it was
clear that respondent-mother regarded the allegations as unfounded. Further, the trial court did
not consider these allegations in its decision to terminate parental rights. We also agree with
respondent-mother that there was no evidence that she was physically abusive toward the
children. However, the trial court did not find that she was physically abusive, and there is no
indication that physical abuse was a factor in the trial court’s decision. Accordingly, these
arguments do not provide a basis for reversal.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that termination of respondent-mother's
parental rights was in the children's best interests. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 356-357; 612
NW2d 407 (2000). The trial court properly considered respondent-mother's refusal to cooperate
with the caseworkers and service providers because this evidence was relevant to whether she
could make the long-term changes necessary for the children. Respondent-mother has further
failed to show that the trial court clearly erred in finding that she had a pattern of failing the
children and that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests. However,
the court had sufficient basis to conclude that despite some recent progress on her treatment plan,
she failed to make sufficient progress to enable the children to be safe in her care.
II. Docket No. 251366
Respondent-father argues that, at the time he entered his plea of admission to the initial
petition to assume jurisdiction, the trial court failed to advise him that a consequence of his plea
was that it could later be used to terminate his parental rights, as required by former MCR
5.971(B)(4), now MCR 3.971(B)(4).
Because respondent-father never challenged his plea or otherwise raised this issue in the
trial court, he must show that a plain error affected his substantial rights. See People v Carines,
460 Mich 750, 761-767; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); Kern v Blethen-Coluni, 240 Mich App 333, 336;
612 NW2d 838 (2000).
Although the record discloses that the trial court failed to comply with MCR 5.971(B)(4),
respondent-father has failed to show that his substantial rights were affected. Notwithstanding
the trial court’s failure to provide the required advice, respondent-father does not allege that he
did not understand the consequences of his plea. Indeed, the record discloses that respondentfather was present when, just before tendering his plea, respondent-mother's attorney made a
statement on the record informing respondent-mother that, as a result of stipulating to the court
assuming jurisdiction, she was required to follow the court's orders, and that failure to follow
those orders could result in termination of parental rights. Although this statement was not
directed at respondent-father, it is an indication that he was aware of this possible consequence
when he subsequently tendered his plea of admission. Also, respondent-father never
subsequently moved to withdraw his plea in the trial court or requested review by a judge. See
former MCR 5.991, now MCR 3.991. See also In re Zelzack, 180 Mich App 117, 126; 446
NW2d 588 (1989).
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Furthermore, by now challenging his plea, respondent-father is attempting to collaterally
attack the trial court's exercise of jurisdiction over the children. Because the trial court entered
an order assuming jurisdiction over the children in August 2002, any challenge to the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction was required to be raised in a direct appeal from that order; the court’s
exercise of jurisdiction may not now be collaterally attacked in this appeal. In re Hatcher, 443
Mich 426, 439-444; 505 NW2d 834 (1993).
Next, respondent-father argues that the trial court improperly considered his
psychological evaluation, identified as petitioner's exhibit 1, because it was not admitted into
evidence. Although the court did not admit the psychological evaluation, it did admit, without
objection, petitioner’s exhibit 4, which included the information that respondent-father asserts
the court should not have considered. Because the challenged information was included in a
properly admitted document, we reject respondent-father’s claim that consideration of this
information was improper.
Respondent-father argues that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to reunite him
with his children. See In re Terry, 240 Mich App 14, 25-26; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).
Respondent-father claims that petitioner unreasonably required him to admit to sexually abusing
his child before petitioner would recommend reunification.
The record demonstrates that respondent-father was offered other services that did not
require him to admit to sexual abuse. Furthermore, throughout these proceedings, the trial court
declined to consider the sexual abuse allegations because they were dismissed when respondentfather entered his plea of admission. Petitioner offered reasonable services that did not require
respondent-father to admit to sexual abuse which, if successfully completed, could have allowed
him to be reunited with his children. However, respondent-father failed to fully participate in or
benefit from those services, thereby preventing his reunification with the children. Thus, we find
no merit to this argument.
Affirmed.
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ Donald S. Owens
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