DANIEL ALLEN V RICHARD MACH
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
DANIEL ALLEN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 27, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 245049
Genesee Circuit Court
LC No. 96-046798-NO
RICHARD MACH,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order granting defendant’s motion for summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) with regard to plaintiff’s slander claim. We affirm.
This case arises from an altercation between plaintiff, a Flint Police Officer, and
defendant, a motorist, at an accident investigation scene. During the encounter, plaintiff issued
defendant a citation for ignoring a police barricade at the scene. Defendant, who is a licensed
clinical psychologist, later wrote a letter on his professional letterhead to the Flint Police Chief
and sent copies to other Flint officials complaining about plaintiff’s conduct. After recounting
his version of the incident, defendant stated in the letter that plaintiff “is a danger both to the
community at large and to the people he serves,” that “he should be taken off the street,” and that
he “should be sent into counseling where he can work out his issues with misplaced aggression
before he hurts or kills someone with cause.” Defendant contested his citation and was
subsequently found not responsible for ignoring a police barricade.
Plaintiff thereafter filed this action against defendant for slander based on the letter
defendant wrote to the Flint Police Chief. Defendant moved for summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(10), based on three separate grounds. First, defendant argued that the challenged
communication was absolutely privileged. Second, defendant argued that the letter was not
actionable because it contained only opinions and nonactionable rhetorical hyperbole. Third,
defendant argued that the challenged communication was subject to a qualified privilege and that
there was no genuine issue of material fact whether the statements were made with malice so as
to overcome the privilege. Following a hearing, the trial court disagreed with defendant’s claim
that the statements were absolutely privileged, but granted summary disposition on the basis that
defendant’s statements were expressions of opinion that were not actionable.
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On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in determining that the statements in
defendant’s letter were mere opinions, unprovable as true or false, and therefore protected by the
First Amendment. We disagree.
We review a trial court's grant or denial of a motion for summary disposition de novo.
Spiek v Dep't of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998). A motion under
MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim. Id. This Court must
consider the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, or any other documentary evidence
submitted by the parties in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists. Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73, 76; 597
NW2d 517 (1999).
To establish a claim of libel or slander, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the defendant made
a statement about the plaintiff that was false and defamatory in some material respect; (2) that
the statement was communicated to a third person without privilege; (3) fault amounting to at
least negligence; and (4) that the statement is actionable regardless of special harm or had a
tendency to cause special harm to the reputation of the plaintiff. Northland Wheels Roller
Skating Center, Inc v Detroit Free Press, Inc, 213 Mich App 317, 323; 539 NW2d 774 (1995).
“A communication is defamatory if, under all the circumstances, it tends to so harm the
reputation of an individual that it lowers the individual's reputation in the community or deters
others from associating or dealing with the individual.” Kefgen v Davidson, 241 Mich App 611,
617; 617 NW2d 351 (2000), citing Kevorkian v American Medical Ass'n, 237 Mich App 1, 5;
602 NW2d 233 (1999), and Ireland v Edwards, 230 Mich App 607, 619; 584 NW2d 632 (1998).
We conclude that the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to defendant
with regard to plaintiff’s slander claim because defendant’s statements regarding plaintiff were
not provable as false, and thus not actionable. In Ireland, supra at 616-617, this Court observed:
One of the difficulties in addressing defamation issues lies in determining
whether specific statements are actionable. The United States Supreme Court has
rejected the idea that all statements of "opinion" are protected. Instead, the Court
has directed that a statement must be "provable as false" to be actionable.
Milkovich [v The Lorain Journal, 497 US 1, 17-20; 110 S Ct 2695; 111 L Ed 2d 1
(1990)]. By way of example, the Court suggested that the statement "In my
opinion Mayor Jones is a liar" would be potentially actionable, while the
statement "In my opinion Mayor Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting
the teachings of Marx and Lenin" would not be actionable. Id. at 20. The Court
apparently intended these examples to illustrate the difference between an
objectively verifiable event, such as lying, and a subjective assertion like "shows
his abysmal ignorance. . . . " See id. at 21-22.
After reviewing the alleged defamatory statements in this case, we
conclude that several of them are not provable as false. The question whether
someone is a "fit mother," like the question whether someone is abysmally
ignorant, is necessarily subjective. Thus, defendant's statements regarding
plaintiff's fitness as a mother are not actionable.
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As in Ireland, a review of defendant’s statements indicates that defendant expressed opinions
about plaintiff, and that his comments amounted to subjective assertions that are not actionable.
Although plaintiff claims that defendant used his status as a clinical psychologist to
“imply the assertion of facts” that plaintiff was a danger to himself and the community at large
and that “Defendant made statements that he intended to be understood as authoritative fact,” the
trial court properly found “that the complained-of statements attributed to [defendant] are plainly
his personal impression of [plaintiff] with respect to the incident . . . .” See also Turner v Devlin,
174 Ariz 201; 848 P2d 286 (1993) (holding that statements in a letter written by a school nurse
complaining about the treatment of a student by police officers did not constitute defamation
because the nurse’s statements were not provable as false); Angelo v Brenner, 84 Ill App 3d 594;
406 NE2d 38 (1980) (finding that the statement by the angry defendant that “as a psychiatrist,
Officer Angelo is unfit to be a policeman,” could not be interpreted as a professional opinion).
Finally, contrary to what plaintiff asserts, defendant’s statements are not “provable as
false” just because plaintiff retained a psychologist, Dr. Terence Campbell, who disagreed with
defendant’s assessment of plaintiff’s psychological profile.
Indeed, Dr. Campbell’s
disagreement with defendant actually supports the position that defendant’s statements are not
actionable. As Dr. Campbell stated in his report, “Dr. Mach’s opinions regarding Officer Allen
ultimately amount to no more than his personal opinions as a private citizen.”
Because the trial court properly granted summary disposition to defendant on the basis
that defendant’s statements were not actionable, we need not consider plaintiff’s other issues on
appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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