MILISSA MCCLEMENTS V FORD MOTOR CO
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
MILISSA MCCLEMENTS,
UNPUBLISHED
April 22, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
V
No. 243764
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 01-034444-CL
FORD MOTOR COMPANY and DANIEL P.
BENNETT,
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Borrello, P.J., and White and Smolenski, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from the August 2, 2002, opinion and order of Oakland
Circuit Court granting defendants Ford Motor Company and Daniel P. Bennett’s joint motion for
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) regarding plaintiff’s claims of hostile work
environment and sexual harassment under the Michigan Civil Rights Act (CRA), MCL 37.2101
et seq., as to both defendants, and negligent retention of Bennett as to defendant Ford only. We
reverse the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s common law claim of negligent retention and
affirm the trial court on all other matters presented.
On March 9, 1998, plaintiff began working as a cashier for AVI Food Systems (AVI), a
contractor that operates the cafeterias at Ford’s Wixom Assembly Plant (the Wixom Plant). AVI
paid plaintiff’s wages, provided her benefits, and established her hours.
In November 1998, defendant Bennett, then a superintendent in the Pre-Delivery
Department at the Wixom Plant, chatted with plaintiff at her cashier station at the Wixom Plant
Café on three or four occasions, asking her to meet him after work at a Taco Bell. Plaintiff
alleges she declined Bennett’s invitations. Thereafter, in late November 1998, Bennett allegedly
entered the cafeteria when the cafeteria was closed, and came up from behind plaintiff and kissed
her. According to plaintiff, she pushed Bennett away and attempted to keep on working. A few
days later, Bennett again entered the cafeteria between break periods and attempted to kiss
plaintiff, asking this time where they could go to have sex. When plaintiff said “no” to Bennett’s
request for sex, he allegedly replied, “you know you want it.” Again, plaintiff pushed Bennett
away and continued to work. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff changed cafeterias at the Wixom Plant
to avoid seeing Bennett. Plaintiff did not complain to AVI or Ford about Bennett because she
was afraid to risk her job and hoped to get a job with Ford. According to plaintiff, she only
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mentioned that Bennett assaulted her to her union steward, Faith Marquis, and an hourly AVI co
worker.
On October 19, 1998, about six weeks before Bennett allegedly sexually assaulted
plaintiff, Justine Maldonado, a Ford production worker at the plant, reported to her uncle, Joe
Howard, a production manager at the Wixom Plant, and to her friend, David Ferris, who also
worked at the plant, that Bennett had exposed himself, grabbed at her blouse, and otherwise
sexually harassed her twice inside the plant and once when he followed her home from work.
Maldonado went on to list a number of other sexually explicit acts committed by Bennett against
her. A number of other female Ford employees came forward alleging that they too had been
sexually harassed by Bennett.
On December 8, 1995, three years before Maldonado complained to Howard and Ferris
about Bennett, Bennett was convicted of a misdemeanor offense of indecent exposure. Bennett’s
indecent exposure conviction arose from events occurring on August 23, 1995, when three high
school girls reported to the police that they had observed a “white male masturbating while
driving on S/B I-275.”
On September 4, 2001, plaintiff filed suit in the Oakland Circuit Court, alleging claims of
hostile work environment and sexual harassment as to both defendants Ford and Bennett and
negligent retention as to defendant Ford.
Shortly after plaintiff filed suit, Bennett brought a motion to strike reference to his
conviction for indecent exposure because the conviction had been expunged. Following a
hearing, the trial court issued an opinion and order granting defendant Bennett’s motion to strike
portions of the complaint that made reference to the expunged conviction and directing plaintiff
to file an amended complaint. However, the trial court noted that “at this time, the Court has not
ruled that the Plaintiff is precluded from introducing into evidence information regarding that
conviction since that issue is not before the Court.” As to defendants’ joint request that plaintiff
be ordered not to make reference to the underlying facts of Bennett’s expunged conviction in any
future pleadings, the trial court further ruled that while it was “too burdensome to amend every
pleading filed in this case,” plaintiff’s “future pleadings may not refer to the 1995 conviction.”
Thereafter, defendants brought a joint motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10) regarding plaintiff’s claims of hostile work environment, sexual harassment
as to both defendants, and her negligent retention claim as to defendant Ford. In an opinion and
order entered on August 2, 2002, the trial court denied defendants’ motion under MCR
2.116(C)(8), but granted their motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to defendant
Ford on plaintiff’s claim that Ford negligently retained Bennett in his position as superintendent.
Plaintiff asserts there was evidence that Ford knew that Bennett had a propensity to sexually
assault women, and thus the trial court erred in not submitting the issue to the jury. We agree.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo.
Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). Summary disposition of all or
part of a claim or defense may be granted when:
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[E]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a
matter of law. [MCR 2.116(C)(10).]
A motion under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests whether there is factual support for a claim.
Spiek v Dep’t of Transportation, 456 Mich 331, 337; 572 NW2d 201 (1998); Mino v Clio School
Dist, 255 Mich App 60, 67; 661 NW2d 586 (2003), lv den 469 Mich 897 (2003). A motion
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) must be supported by documentary evidence. MCR 2.116(G)(3)(b);
Meyer v City of Center Line, 242 Mich App 560, 574; 619 NW2d 182 (2000). We conclude that
plaintiff has presented genuine issues of material fact regarding her claim of common-law
negligent retention.
Our Supreme Court announced the common law doctrine of negligent retention in Hersh
v Hentfield Builders, Inc, 385 Mich 410; 189 NW2d 286 (1971). In Hersh, the Court stated,
‘“An employer who knew or should have known of his employee’s propensities and criminal
record before commission of an intentional tort by employee upon customer who came to
employer’s place of business would be liable for damages to such customer.’” Id. at 412,
quoting Bradley v Stevens, 329 Mich 556, headnote 2; 46 NW2d 382 (1951). The Court reached
its conclusion in reliance on 34 ALR2d 390 § 9, which states:
As has already been noted, a duty imposed upon an employer who invites
the general public to his premises, and whose employees are brought into contact
with the members of such public in the course of the master’s business, is that of
exercising reasonable care for the safety of his customers, patrons, or other
invitees. It has been held that in fulfilling such duty, an employer must use due
care to avoid the selection or retention of an employee whom he knows or should
know is a person unworthy, by habits, temperament, or nature, to deal with the
persons invited to the premises by the employer. The employer’s knowledge of
past acts of impropriety, violence, or disorder on the part of the employee is
generally considered sufficient to forewarn the employer who selects or retains
such employee in his service that he may eventually commit an assault, although
not every infirmity of character, such, for example, as dishonesty or
querulousness, will lead to such result.
Therefore, our Supreme Court in Hersh, supra, asks the courts to look at the employer’s
knowledge of “past acts of impropriety” . . . . when ascertaining whether such a cause of action
exists. In this case, plaintiff put forth evidence that Bennett had a criminal record for indecent
exposure, and furthermore, that a number of Ford employees came forward with claims of
Bennett sexually harassing them. It was therefore a question for the jury to determine, after
examining all the evidence, whether Ford knew or should have known of Bennett’s sexually
derogatory behavior toward female employees. Whether Ford had knowledge of Bennett’s
propensities based on Maldonado’s complaints was a question of fact. Further, we find a
genuine issue of fact regarding whether Ford negligently retained Bennett as a supervisor.
The trial court ruled that even if other female Ford employees reported Bennett’s sexual
assaults, the reporting of those incidents did not “meet the qualifications” of a “high management
official” as set forth in Sheridan v Forest Hills Public Schools, 247 Mich App 611; 637 NW2d
536 (2001). We find the court’s analysis misplaced. There is no authority to support that the
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notice requirements held applicable in hostile environment sexual harassment cases in Sheridan,
supra, apply to common law negligent retention claims. However, even if we were to agree with
the trial court that Sheridan is applicable, there was testimony indicating that Maldonado’s
complaints were referred to higher management authorities. Additionally, we find that whether
Ford had knowledge of female employees who complained of Bennett’s behavior was a question
of fact. We therefore reverse the decision of the trial court and reinstate plaintiff’s claim of
common-law negligent retention.
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s CRA claim
against Ford because she is an individual who was subjected to discrimination by Ford, despite
the fact that she was not a Ford employee. We disagree.
In Elezovic v Ford Motor Co, 259 Mich App 197, 192; 673 NW2d 776 (2003), this Court
stated:
The CRA prohibits an employer from discriminating because of sex,
which includes sexual harassment. MCL 37.2202(1); MCL 37.2103(i); Chambers
v Trettco, 463 Mich 297, 309; 614 NW2d 910 (2000); Chambers v Trettco, Inc
(On Remand), 244 Mich App 614, 617; 624 NW2d 543 (2001). MCL 37.2103(i)
provides:
“Discrimination because of sex includes sexual harassment. Sexual
harassment means unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and
other verbal or physical conduct or communication of a sexual nature under the
following conditions:
(i) Submission to the conduct or communication is made a term or
condition either explicitly or implicitly to obtain employment. . . .
(ii) Submission to or rejection of the conduct or communication by an
individual is used as a factor in decisions affecting the individual’s employment. .
..
(iii) The conduct or communication has the purpose or effect of
substantially interfering with an individual’s employment . . . or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment . . . environment.”
When sexual harassment falls under one of the first two subsections, it is
commonly referred to as quid pro quo harassment; when it falls under the third
subsection, it is commonly labeled hostile environment harassment. Chambers,
supra, 463 Mich 310.
To establish a claim of hostile environment harassment, an employee must
prove the following elements by a preponderance of the evidence:
(1) the employee belonged to a protected group;
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(2) the employee was subjected to communication or conduct on the basis
of sex;
(3) the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual conduct or
communication;
(4) the unwelcome sexual conduct or communication was intended to or in
fact did substantially interfere with the employee’s employment or created an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and
(5) respondeat superior.” [Id. at 311, quoting Radtke v Everett, 442 Mich
368, 382-383; 501 NW2d 155 (1993).]
To determine whether defendant Ford is plaintiff’s employer for purposes of her CRA
claim, this Court applies the “economic reality” test. Ashker v Ford Motor Co, 245 Mich App 9,
14; 627 NW2d 1 (2001); Seabrook v Michigan Nat’l Corp, 206 Mich App 314; 520 NW2d 650
(1994); McCarthy v State Farm Ins Co, 170 Mich App 451, 455; 428 NW2d 692 (1988). As
stated in McCarthy, supra, 170 Mich App at 455:
The economic reality test looks to the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the performed work in relation to the statutory scheme under
consideration. While control of the worker’s duties is to be considered under the
economic reality test, other equally important factors include payment of wages,
authority to hire and fire, and the responsibility for the maintenance of discipline.
[Citations omitted.]
Contrary to plaintiff’s claim, there was no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was
Ford’s employee. In this case, the trial court dismissed plaintiff’s CRA claim, stating:
The Court finds in this case there is no question of fact that the Plaintiff is
employed by AVI Food Systems, not Defendant Ford. Thus, because only an
employer is subject to liability under the Act, Defendant Ford cannot be liable.
Plaintiff testified that she was hired by AVI on March 9, 1998, that AVI issued her
paychecks, that she was covered by a collective bargaining agreement negotiated between AVI
and AFL-CIO Local 1064, and that AVI’s managers determined which shift she would work and
disciplined her. Thus, the trial court did not err in granting summary disposition to defendant
Ford on plaintiff’s CRA claim because Ford was not plaintiff’s employer. We therefore affirm
the trial court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s civil rights action. Having found that Ford is not
plaintiff’s employer for purposes of her CRA claim, we need not address plaintiff’s contention
that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to defendant because Ford ignored
notices that Bennett was sexually harassing women.
Plaintiff also alleges that the trial court erred in striking the facts surrounding Bennett’s
misdemeanor conviction for indecent exposure from plaintiff’s complaint because they are part
of the totality of the circumstances demonstrating the notice that Ford had of the danger of sexual
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harassment posed by Bennett. We disagree. This Court reviews a motion to strike a pleading for
an abuse of discretion. Belle Isle Grille Corp v Detroit, 256 Mich App 463, 469; 666 NW2d 271
(2003).
In granting defendant Bennett’s motion to strike, the trial court ruled, in pertinent part:
The Court further finds, pursuant to MCL 780.622(1), because an Order
has been entered setting aside his conviction, Defendant Bennett is considered not
to have been convicted of the offense of indecent exposure.
Finally, the Court finds that the conviction is not relevant to either the
Plaintiff’s negligent retention or sexual harassment claim. In order for an
employer to be subject to liability for sexual harassment, the Plaintiff must show
notice of an offensive working environment. Again, Bennett’s conviction was the
result of behavior which occurred outside of the workplace. Thus that particular
behavior could not have caused or have been notice of an offensive working
environment.
Finally [sic], the Court finds, based on the fact that Defendant Bennett’s
conviction has been set aside, that it is not proper for the Plaintiff to include
information about his conviction in her Complaint. This does not necessarily
preclude the Plaintiff from pursuing her claim of negligent retention.
Furthermore, at this time, the Court has not ruled that the Plaintiff is precluded
from introducing into evidence information regarding that conviction since that
issue is not before the Court.
Pursuant to MCR 2.115(B), “On motion by a party or on the court’s own initiative, the
court may strike from a pleading redundant, immaterial, impertinent, scandalous, or indecent
matter, or strike all or part of a pleading not drawn in conformity with these rules.”
As the trial court noted, pursuant to MCL 780.622(1), on entry of the November 9, 2001,
order setting aside the conviction, Bennett, “for purposes of the law, shall be considered not to
have been previously convicted.” Further, while the expunged conviction was removed from the
public record under MCL 780.623, it was accessible as a non-public record to a limited class of
individuals for certain public purposes not present in this case. Moreover, MCL 780.623(5)
provides:
Except as provided in subsection (2), a person, other than the applicant,
who knows or should have known that a conviction was set aside under this
section and who divulges, uses, or publishes information concerning a conviction
set aside under this section is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by
imprisonment for not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or
both.
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Under these circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting
defendant Bennett’s motion to strike references in plaintiff’s complaint to his expunged
conviction.
As both defendants correctly point out, the trial court made clear that it was not ruling on
the admissibility or exclusion of the facts or evidence underlying Bennett’s conviction. Indeed,
as defendant Ford notes, the trial court allowed plaintiff to include facts about Bennett’s
conviction in her response to defendants’ joint motion for summary disposition.
Last, plaintiff argues that defendant Bennett should not have been dismissed from this
case. However, all parties now agree that pursuant to this Court’s opinion in Jager v Nationwide
Truck Brokers, Inc, 252 Mich App 464, 478, 485; 652 NW2d 503 (2002), defendant Bennett
should be dismissed from the case with prejudice.
Affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
/s/ Helene N. White
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
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