ARKAD HAWTHORN VENTURE LLC V FRANKLIN BANK NA
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
ARKAD HAWTHORN VENTURE, L.L.C.,
UNPUBLISHED
April 22, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 243137
Wayne Circuit Court
LC No. 00-037984-CZ
FRANKLIN BANK, N.A.,
Defendant/Third-Party PlaintiffAppellee,
v
METRO CREDIT UNION,
Third-Party Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
TINA KEILANI,
Third-Party Defendant.
Before: Hood, P.J., and Bandstra and Meter, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiff appeals as of right from an order of dismissal in this case involving a dispute
over a commercial paper. Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary
disposition in favor of defendant Franklin Bank and third-party defendant Metro Credit Union
and against plaintiff. We affirm.
As noted by plaintiff on appeal, “[t]he operative facts are not in dispute.” Plaintiff
purchased a cashier’s check from Franklin in the amount of $185,000, payable to plaintiff. A
member of plaintiff signed the check and endorsed it as follows: “Pay to the Order of SKMV
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Development L.L.C.”1 A member of SKMV, Samir Keilani, physically handed the check to his
wife, Tina Keilani, who endorsed it and deposited into her account at Metro. Franklin
transferred the $185,000 to Metro.
Plaintiff, suspecting fraud with respect to how the Keilanis used the funds, filed a lawsuit
against Franklin, demanding repayment of the $185,000. Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that
Franklin should not have honored the check without an endorsement by SKMV. Franklin, in
turn, filed a third-party complaint against Metro, alleging, inter alia, that Metro should not have
accepted the check without an endorsement by SKMV. Plaintiff moved for summary disposition
against Franklin, and, after several intervening proceedings and orders, Metro moved for
summary disposition against plaintiff. Franklin joined in Metro’s motion. The trial court
granted Metro and Franklin’s joint motion, ruling, in part:
In this case, it is clear the [sic] Sam Keilani was given the check as the
representative of SKMV. Therefore, he became a holder of that check. When he
gave the check to Tina to deposit into her account, she became a holder, and
Metro because a holder in due course. Therefore, Metro was entitled to cash the
check and is not obligated to Arkad for any fraud or misappropriation of those
funds by Tina Keilani and Sam Keilani.
That being the situation, summary disposition is granted in favor of Metro
and that being the situation, summary disposition is also granted in favor of
Franklin Bank.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary disposition to
Franklin and Metro because neither Sam Keilani nor Tina Keilani was a “holder” of the cashier’s
check and because Sam Keilani was not the intended payee of the check. We need not address
these arguments, however, because we find dispositive an issue raised on appeal by Franklin and
Metro.2 Specifically, Franklin and Metro argue that MCL 440.4401(1) and (3), on which
plaintiff based its lawsuit, do not apply to cashier’s checks.
This resolution of this issue involves statutory interpretation. We review issues of
statutory interpretation de novo. Roberts v Mecosta Co General Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 62; 642
NW2d 663 (2002). The rules of statutory construction require the courts to give effect to the
Legislature’s intent. Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc v Watersmeet Twp (After Remand),
217 Mich App 7, 12; 551 NW2d 199 (1996). “This Court should first look to the specific
statutory language to determine the intent of the Legislature,” which is “presumed to intend the
meaning that the statute plainly expresses.” Id. If the language is clear and unambiguous, “the
plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent, and judicial construction is not
1
Plaintiff and SKMV were working together to develop a hotel in Warren, and plaintiff had
agreed to loan money to SKMV.
2
An appellee may advance an alternative basis for affirmance without filing a cross-appeal as
long as he does not obtain a decision that is more favorable than the one rendered by the trial
court. Middlebrooks v Wayne County, 446 Mich 151, 166 n 41; 521 NW2d 774 (1994).
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permitted.” Tryc v Michigan Veterans’ Facility, 451 Mich 129, 135; 545 NW2d 642 (1996). If
reasonable minds could differ regarding the meaning of a statute, judicial construction is
warranted. Yaldo v North Pointe Ins Co, 457 Mich 341, 346; 578 NW2d 274 (1998). A court
must not read into a statute anything “that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as
gathered from the act itself.” In re S R, 229 Mich App 310, 314; 581 NW2d 291 (1998).
MCL 440.4401(1) and (3) state that a bank may “charge against the account of a
customer” an item or check that is properly payable from the account. As stated in Pamar
Enterprises, Inc, v Huntingon Banks of Michigan, 228 Mich App 727, 735; 580 NW2d 11
(1998), “[i]mplicit in this rule is the notion that a bank may not charge against the account of its
customer a check or item that is not ‘properly payable’” (emphasis in original). “Accordingly,
the drawer of a check has a remedy against the drawee bank for recredit of the drawer’s account
for the unauthorized payment of the check in the amount of the improper payment.” Id. at 736.
Seeking this remedy described in Pamar, Arkad instituted the instant lawsuit.
However, the plain language of MCL 440.4401(1) and (3) indicates that the statutes do
not apply to cashier’s checks. Indeed, the statutes refer to a bank charging an item “against the
account of a customer.” As noted in Black’s Law Dictionary (5th ed), a cashier’s check is “[a]
check drawn by the bank upon itself[.]” See also Casarez v Garcia, 99 NM 508, 511; 660 P2d
598 (1983). Accordingly, when accepting a cashier’s check, a receiving bank is not charging the
account of the purchaser of the check (who has already paid the amount designated on the check)
but is charging the issuing bank itself. It is plainly evident from the language in MCL
440.4401(1) and (3), therefore, that the statutes do not apply to cashier’s checks. In light of the
clear language, judicial construction is not permitted. Tryc, supra at 135.
In its appellate reply briefs, plaintiff cites the following cases, arguing that they support
applying MCL 440.4401(1) and (3) to cashier’s checks: Kosic v Marine Midland Bank, 430
NYS2d 175; 76 AD2d 89 (1980), Jerman v Bank of America, 87 Cal Rptr 88; 7 Cal App 3d 882
(1970), and Casarez, supra. We disagree that these cases support plaintiff’s position. Indeed,
Kosic, although employing the phrase “cashier’s check,” did not involve a true cashier’s check.
Instead, the panel repeatedly referred to charging the customer’s account, see, generally, Kosic,
supra at 176-178, which does not occur in the case of a true cashier’s check, as discussed earlier.
Moreover, Jerman and Casarez, while apparently involving true cashier’s checks, did not
involve any application of MCL 440.4401(1) and (3) or its out-of-state Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) equivalents.
MCL 440.4401(1) and (3) simply do not apply to this case. Plaintiff based its lawsuit on
an untenable theory, and therefore we affirm the grant of summary disposition against it. See,
generally, Newman v Manufacturers Nat’l Bank of Detroit, 7 Mich App 580, 589; 152 NWd 564
(1967) (“[plaintiff] fails to cite any authority applying to the facts of this case which would hold
defendant liable other than under the UCC[, and s]ince we have determined that there was no
liability under the UCC, plaintiff cannot succeed on this appeal”).
We note that plaintiff unquestionably emphasizes on appeal and emphasized below the
“properly payable” provisions of MCL 440.4401(1) and (3). For example, in an August 2001
brief filed in the trial court, plaintiff stated that its motion for summary disposition “relies on
MCL 440.4401, a section of Article 4 of the [UCC].” To the extent that plaintiff might be
premising liability on a theory apart from MCL 440.4401(1) and (3), however (such as a breach
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of contract theory independent from MCL 440.4401), we conclude that it has provided
insufficient legal support for such a theory. Indeed, it cites only out-of-state cases, such as those
mentioned above, that might support an alternative theory. These cases are not strictly binding
on us, and we find them insufficiently persuasive for purposes of the instant appeal.
Affirmed.
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ Patrick M. Meter
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