HOON K JEUNG MD V MICHAEL H ALLEN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
HOON K. JEUNG, M.D. and YUN HEE JEUNG,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 2004
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
MICHAEL H. ALLEN, CAROLYN POLLOCK
CARY, and CURRIE KENDALL POLASKY
MEISEL PLC,
No. 245997
Saginaw Circuit Court
LC No. 02-043856-NM
Defendants-Appellees.
Before: Bandstra, P.J., and Sawyer and Fitzgerald, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right an order granting summary disposition to defendants pursuant
to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). We affirm.
This case arises out of plaintiff Hoon K. Jeung, M.D.’s suspension from the staff of a
hospital and the hospital’s refusal to purchase from plaintiff his medical practice and the building
that housed the practice. Defendants provided legal representation to the hospital. Plaintiffs’
claims were premised upon defendant Allen’s providing of legal services to plaintiffs in the past.
The trial court held that plaintiffs had failed to state a claim for legal malpractice and that there
was no genuine issue of material fact because all evidence necessary to support the claims was
barred from discovery by the peer review privilege and by the attorney-client privilege.
A trial court’s grant of summary disposition is reviewed de novo. Maiden v Rozwood,
461 Mich 109, 118; 597 NW2d 817 (1999). Under MCR 2.116(C)(8), a court examines the
pleadings to determine if the allegations in the complaint could be sufficiently developed to
justify recovery. Id. at 119-120. Under MCR 2.116(C)(10), a court examines all submitted
evidence to determine if it establishes a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 120. Under either
MCR 2.116(C)(8) or MCR 2.116(C)(10), the materials considered should be viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 119-120. Although a trial court’s order regarding
discovery is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of discretion, whether production of evidence is
barred by a statute is a question of law and is therefore reviewed de novo. Ligouri v Wyandotte
Hospital and Medical Center, 253 Mich App 372, 375; 655 NW2d 592 (2002). Application of
the peer review privilege is an issue of law reviewed de novo. Dye v St John Hospital and
Medical Center, 230 Mich App 661, 665-666; 584 NW2d 747 (1998). Whether the attorney-
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client privilege applies is reviewed de novo. Leibel v General Motors Corp, 250 Mich App 229,
236; 646 NW2d 179 (2002).
The peer review privilege is based on MCL 333.20175(8), MCL 333.21515, and MCL
331.533. The peer review privilege is broad, In re Lieberman, 250 Mich App 381, 390; 646
NW2d 199 (2002), and this Court has held that these statutes “evidence the Legislature’s intent
to fully protect quality assurance/peer review records from discovery.” Ligouri, supra at 376
(emphasis original). Although the mere fact that information was submitted to a peer review
committee does not automatically trigger the peer review privilege, Monty v Warren Hospital
Corp, 422 Mich 138, 146-147; 366 NW2d 198 (1985), plaintiffs seek information obtained by a
peer review committee pursuant to its peer review function. The privilege therefore applies.
Although a protective order might induce a party to waive a privilege, the hospital here has
explicitly not done so, and the privilege itself is absolute. The trial court properly applied the
peer review privilege.
The attorney-client privilege is narrowly applicable to confidential communications
between a client and the client’s attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, but where the
client is an organization, the privilege covers any of that organization’s agents or employees
authorized to speak for it on that subject. Leibel, supra at 236. The privilege further extends to
opinions, conclusions, and recommendations based on facts. Id. at 239. Only the client may
waive the privilege, and it may not be waived by accident. Id. at 240. If a document is
privileged, it retains the status of being privileged even if it is publicly disclosed or obtained by a
party from an independent source. Id. at 241. Defendants’ client, the hospital, expressly
declined to waive any privileges. Therefore, the trial court correctly found that any confidential
communications between defendants and the hospital pertaining to defendants’ representation of
the hospital is immune from discovery.
Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by dismissing their claim of tortious interference
with a business relationship. However, to prevail on that claim, plaintiffs must show a valid
business expectancy, that defendants were aware of that expectancy, that defendants
intentionally interfered with it, and resulting damage. Mino v Clio School Dist, 255 Mich App
60, 78; 661 NW2d 586 (2003). Plaintiffs must show that defendants engaged in an act that was
wrongful per se or an act that was lawful but malicious and not legally justified for the purpose
of invading plaintiffs’ rights. CMI International, Inc v Intermet International Corp, 251 Mich
App 125, 131; 649 NW2d 808 (2002). Plaintiffs are further required to “demonstrate specific,
affirmative acts that corroborate the unlawful purpose of the interference,” and plaintiffs are
required to do so in response to the motion. Id. at 131-132. Here, plaintiffs merely stated that
the facts would demonstrate defendants’ involvement in a scheme to interfere with the purchase.
Plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence to show that defendants involvement in the hospital’s
decision not to purchase Dr. Jeung’s building and practice was wrongful. Because defendants
were involved in their capacity as the hospital’s attorneys, any further discovery of
communications between defendants and the hospital on the matter would be barred by the
attorney-client privilege. Because there is no evidence showing the wrongfulness element of this
claim and no reasonable likelihood of discovering any, there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding this claim.
Plaintiffs next contend that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition of the
legal malpractice claim. To support this claim, plaintiffs had to show an attorney-client
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relationship, negligence in that legal representation, injury proximately caused by that
negligence, and the fact and extent of the injury. Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59, 63; 503
NW2d 435 (1993). Plaintiffs are required to show that, but for defendants’ actions, the claimed
injury would not have occurred. Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemko, 444 Mich 579, 586-587; 513
NW2d 773 (1994). Here, those injuries are apparently Dr. Jeung’s suspension from the hospital
and the hospital’s decision not to purchase Dr. Jeung’s building or practice. Plaintiffs did not
provide any evidence that either event would not have taken place if different attorneys with no
knowledge of plaintiffs had been employed by the hospital as legal counsel, and any
communications between the hospital and defendants regarding legal advice or the peer review is
privileged. Because there is no evidence showing that the hospital would have acted differently
but for defendants’ alleged actions and no reasonable likelihood of discovering any, there is no
genuine issue of material fact regarding this claim.
Plaintiffs next allege that the trial court should not have dismissed the case before
discovery was completed. Although a motion for summary disposition is generally premature if
granted before completing discovery regarding a disputed issue, “if a party opposes a motion for
summary disposition on the ground that discovery is incomplete, the party must at least assert
that a dispute does indeed exist and support that allegation by some independent evidence.”
Bellows v Delaware McDonald’s Corp, 206 Mich App 555, 561; 522 NW2d 707 (1994). Mere
conjecture does not entitle a party to discovery, because that discovery would be no more than a
fishing expedition. Pauley v Hall, 124 Mich App 255, 263; 335 NW2d 197 (1983). Summary
disposition may be appropriate before the completion of discovery where further discovery
stands no reasonable chance of resulting in factual support for the nonmoving party. Colista v
Thomas, 241 Mich App 529, 537-538; 616 NW2d 249 (2000). Here, the evidence in the record
does not show the possibility that any non-privileged evidence might be discoverable, and an
unsupported statement that certain facts can be proven is insufficient. Bellows, supra at 561.
Therefore, summary disposition was not premature.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that their claim of legal malpractice should not have been
dismissed because violations of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct constitute evidence
of negligence. Although violations of the former Code of Professional Responsibility gave rise
to a cause of action, Hooper v Lewis, 191 Mich App 312, 316; 477 NW2d 114 (1991), Rule
1.0(b) of the MRPC explicitly states that the current rules do not. Further, even if the MRPS’s
gave rise to a cause of action, as noted above, plaintiffs failed to establish the element of
proximate cause. Plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action for legal malpractice.
Affirmed.
/s/ Richard A. Bandstra
/s/ David H. Sawyer
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
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