PEOPLE OF MI V DANIEL GREGORY LEE
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 20, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 243964
Oakland Circuit Court
LC No. 02-182257-FH
DANIEL GREGORY LEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: Cooper, P.J., and Griffin and Borrello, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant Daniel Gregory Lee appeals as of right from his jury convictions for
possession with intent to deliver between 50 and 225 grams of cocaine1 and conspiracy to deliver
less than fifty grams of cocaine.2 Defendant was tried jointly with his alleged coconspirators,
Antonio Dean, Darryl Ervin and Thomas Brooks.3 Defendant was sentenced to consecutive
terms of five to twenty years’ imprisonment for the possession conviction and one to twenty
years’ imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction. We affirm.
I. Background Facts
On November 13, 2001, Royal Oak police officer Martin Lavin arranged to meet Mr.
Dean at an Oakland County Kentucky Fried Chicken to purchase two ounces of cocaine. Mr.
Dean arrived at the meeting with his codefendants in a black Lincoln. With several surveillance
officers listening over a radio transmission, defendant, along with his codefendants, encouraged
Officer Lavin to meet them at a Wendy’s within the city of Detroit to complete the transaction.
At the subsequent meeting, Mr. Dean attempted to sell Officer Lavin approximately fifty-five
grams of cocaine contained in two clear plastic bags. The officers immediately arrested all four
codefendants.
1
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii).
2
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iv).
3
All four codefendants were convicted of delivery and conspiracy. Mr. Dean has not appealed
his convictions or sentences. Our opinions in People v Ervin (Docket No. 243965) and People v
Brooks (Docket No. 245252) are being released with this opinion.
-1-
II. Coconspirator Statements
Defendant first claims that the trial court erred in permitting the prosecution to present
hearsay statements of codefendants. Specifically, defendant complains that statements made by
codefendants to Officer Lavin were hearsay and their admission violated his constitutional right
to confront the witnesses against him. We disagree. Generally, a trial court’s decision to admit
evidence will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion.4 However, when a trial court’s
decision regarding the admission of evidence involves a preliminary question of law, this court
reviews the issue de novo.5
On direct examination, Officer Lavin testified regarding his prior arrangement to
purchase cocaine from Mr. Dean. Officer Lavin further testified to various statements made by
defendant and his codefendants during the initial meeting at Kentucky Fried Chicken. Mr. Dean
indicated that the cocaine belonged to the other men and that they were not comfortable with the
location of the transaction. Mr. Dean encouraged Officer Lavin to follow them to another
location in the city of Detroit. Mr. Ervin also approached Officer Lavin’s vehicle to encourage
him to follow the men down the street to purchase the cocaine. Mr. Ervin later returned to
Officer Lavin’s vehicle, offering to allow him to hold onto $2000 as security for his safety. Mr.
Brooks also encouraged Officer Lavin to follow the men to another location to conduct the
transaction. The codefendants reentered the Lincoln. Defendant drove up next to Officer
Lavin’s vehicle. First, defendant encouraged Officer Lavin to follow the men stating, “Man,
let’s do this just follow us.”6 Defendant negotiated an alternate location for the transaction with
Officer Lavin. Defendant first requested that the meeting be moved to any other location on 8
Mile Road, but subsequently requested that the meeting be changed to a location in the city of
Detroit. Defendant then arranged to meet Officer Lavin at the Wendy’s location later that
evening.7 Defendant’s parting words were, “[D]on’t make us go get this shit and then you don’t
show up.”8
A statement is not hearsay under MRE 801 if made by a coconspirator of the party
against whom the statement was offered and if made during the course of and in furtherance of a
conspiracy.9 The independent proof must establish a conspiracy’s existence by a preponderance
of the evidence.10 Neither direct proof of the agreement, nor a formal agreement, need be shown
to prove the conspiracy.11 Circumstances, acts, and conduct of the parties can sufficiently
4
People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999).
5
Id.
6
[Trial Transcript July 2, 2002, p 72.]
7
[Trial Transcript July 2, 2002, pp 72-73.]
8
[Trial Transcript July 2, 2002, p 73.] Officer Lavin’s testimony regarding the substance of
these conversations was corroborated by the testimony of three surveillance officers.
9
MRE 801(d)(2)(E).
10
People v Vega, 413 Mich 773, 780-782; 321 NW2d 675 (1982).
11
People v Gay, 149 Mich App 468, 471; 386 NW2d 556 (1986).
-2-
demonstrate an agreement in fact.12 Furthermore, circumstantial evidence and inference may be
used to establish a conspiracy.13
We first note that the coconspirators’ statements were made during the course of and in
furtherance of the conspiracy. The statements were made in the course of arranging the actual
transaction. However, the trial court improperly admitted the statements of defendant’s
coconspirators without first determining that a conspiracy existed. A trial judge must determine
preliminary questions regarding the admissibility of evidence rather than leaving the decision to
the jury.14 The trial court must resolve preliminary questions of fact, including the existence of a
conspiracy, before admitting the evidence.15 The trial court erred as it failed to determine
whether the prosecution had proven the existence of a conspiracy by a preponderance of the
evidence before admitting the statements of defendant’s coconspirators.
However, the prosecution presented sufficient independent evidence to prove the
existence of a conspiracy. Evidence of the coconspirators’ concerted actions, independent of
their statements, demonstrates a common goal. Defendant’s own statements requesting Officer
Lavin to “follow us” in order to complete the transaction, arranging a new location for the
transaction, and telling Officer Lavin that the men needed to pick up the cocaine before the
Wendy’s meeting are evidence of a concerted action. Therefore, a conspiracy can be shown by
evidence independent of codefendants’ statements. Accordingly, the court’s procedural error
does not amount to reversible error.
III. Severance
Defendant also alleges that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to
sever his trial. We review a trial court’s decision to join or sever codefendants’ trials for abuse
of discretion.16 Severance is mandatory “only when a defendant provides the court with a
supporting affidavit, or makes an offer of proof, that . . . demonstrates that his substantial rights
will be prejudiced and that severance is the necessary means to rectifying the potential
prejudice.”17 As defendant failed to present such proof or affidavit, defendant must show that he
suffered actual prejudice at trial to warrant reversal of the trial court’s determination regarding
joinder.18
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
MRE 104(a); Vega, supra at 780.
15
Bourjaily v United States, 483 US 171, 175; 107 S Ct 2775; 97 L Ed 2d 144 (1987)
(construing FRE 104(a), which is identical to the Michigan rule); Vega, supra at 779-780.
16
MCL 768.5; People v Hana, 447 Mich 325, 331; 524 NW2d 682 (1994).
17
MCR 6.121(C); Hana, supra at 346-347.
18
Hana, supra at 346-347.
-3-
Defendant claims actual prejudice as he was unable to inculpate Mr. Dean in order to
exculpate himself. However, defense counsel presented the theory that defendant was innocent
and that Mr. Dean was the only codefendant who played a role in the transaction. Mr. Dean
defended on the basis of reasonable doubt, which did not conflict with defendant’s defense.
Furthermore, as discussed supra, the statements made by codefendants were properly admitted
into evidence, so their use against defendant was not a result of the joined trial. Defendant
suffered no actual prejudice at trial, and reversal of the trial court’s joinder decision is
unwarranted.
IV. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant next alleges that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
delivery and conspiracy. In sufficiency of the evidence claims, this Court reviews the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution and determines whether a rational trier of fact could
find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.19
“[C]ircumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from that evidence can constitute
satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime.”20
Possession with intent to deliver cocaine requires proof that the defendant “knowingly
possessed a controlled substance, intended to deliver that substance to someone else, and the
substance possessed [was] cocaine and defendant [knew] it was cocaine.”21 Either actual or
constructive possession may support a conviction.22 Constructive possession may be found
“when the totality of the circumstances indicates a sufficient nexus between defendant and the
contraband.”23 In this regard, “[t]he essential question is whether the defendant had dominion or
control over the controlled substance.”24 Possession of a controlled substance may be joint, with
more than one person possessing the substance.25
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was sufficient
evidence to support defendant’s conviction for possession with intent to deliver. Defendant
controlled the circumstances surrounding the cocaine transaction as he was the driver of the
Lincoln. Defendant encouraged Officer Lavin to conduct the transaction in another location, and
actually negotiated the selection of the alternate location. A reasonable trier of fact could have
found that defendant had a right to exercise control over the cocaine and intended to deliver the
cocaine to Officer Lavin.
19
People v Hunter, 466 Mich 1, 6; 643 NW2d 218 (2002).
20
People v Lee, 243 Mich App 163, 167-168; 622 NW2d 71 (2000).
21
People v Johnson, 466 Mich 491, 499-500; 647 NW2d 480 (2002).
22
Id. at 500.
23
Id.
24
People v Konrad, 449 Mich 263, 271; 536 NW2d 517 (1995).
25
People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 520; 489 NW2d 748, amended 441 Mich 1201 (1992).
-4-
To support a conviction for conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, the prosecution
must prove that:
(1) the defendant possessed the specific intent to deliver the statutory minimum as
charged; (2) his coconspirators possessed the specific intent to deliver the
statutory minimum as charged; and (3) the defendant and his coconspirators
possessed the specific intent to combine to deliver the statutory minimum as
charged to a third person.[26]
The prosecutor need only prove that the defendant cooperated to further the conspiracy’s object
with the knowledge that a conspiracy existed.27
Defendant was charged with conspiring to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine, a
charge for which there is no statutory minimum amount. Therefore, a rational trier of fact must
find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed the specific intent to deliver and to
combine with others to deliver some amount of cocaine.28 Mr. Dean, defendant’s coconspirator,
actually attempted to deliver approximately fifty-five grams of cocaine to Officer Lavin.
Defendant negotiated the alternative location for the transaction and used the same language as
his codefendants to refer to the cocaine. The requests of defendant and his codefendants for
Officer Lavin to follow the group suggest an intent to combine to deliver the cocaine. It is
reasonable to infer from the evidence presented that defendant was cooperating with the others to
bring about the delivery of cocaine. Therefore, sufficient evidence was presented to support
defendant’s conspiracy conviction.
As we have found no error on review, defendant’s claim of cumulative error must also
fail.
V. Sentencing
Finally, defendant argues that his sentence for possession with intent to deliver was
disproportionate as the trial court articulated substantial and compelling reasons for a downward
departure yet imposed a sentence above the minimum sentencing guidelines range. If a
defendant’s sentence falls within the appropriate sentencing guidelines range, we must affirm.29
However, if defendant’s sentence is not within the appropriate range, we must determine if the
trial court stated substantial and compelling reasons for the departure on the record.30
26
People v Mass, 464 Mich 615, 629-630, 633; 628 NW2d 540 (2001), citing People v Justice
(After Remand), 454 Mich 334, 349; 562 NW2d 652 (1997).
27
People v Meredith, 209 Mich App 403, 411-412; 531 NW2d 749 (1995), remanded on other
grounds 459 Mich 62 (1998).
28
See Mass, supra at 631 (“[I]f one conspires to deliver an unspecified amount of cocaine one
would, at a minimum, be guilty of conspiring to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine.”)
29
MCL 769.34(1); People v Babcock, 469 Mich 247, 256; 666 NW2d 231 (2003).
30
Babcock, supra at 256.
-5-
At the time of defendant’s sentencing, the offense of possession with intent to deliver
between 50 and 225 grams of cocaine carried a penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of ten
and a maximum of twenty years.31 Because defendant’s offenses were committed after
January 1, 1999, the legislative sentencing guidelines apply.32 Under MCL 777.13m,33 the
sentencing guidelines apply to convictions under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii), and make it a Class B
offense. Defendant was assigned two points for his PRV score and fifteen points for his OV
score. Accordingly, defendant was placed at PR level B and OV level I, which set his minimum
sentencing guidelines at fifteen to twenty-five months.
The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum of five years’ imprisonment. Although
defendant’s minimum sentence is above the guidelines range, defendant’s sentence does not
represent a departure. If a statute mandates a minimum sentence and authorizes the sentencing
court to depart from that term, the sentencing court does not depart by imposing a sentence
between the sentencing guidelines range and the minimum statutory sentence.34 MCL
333.7401(2)(a)(iii) mandates a minimum sentence of ten years, and MCL 333.7401(4) authorizes
a departure from that sentence. Defendant’s five year sentence clearly falls between the
minimum statutory sentence and the sentencing guidelines range. Therefore, defendant’s
sentence does not represent a departure from the sentencing guidelines range and must be
affirmed.
Affirmed.
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Richard Allen Griffin
/s/ Stephen L. Borrello
31
MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(iii).
32
MCL 769.34(2); People v Reynolds, 240 Mich App 250, 253; 611 NW2d 316 (2000).
33
At the time defendant committed the present offense, the relevant portion of MCL 777.13m
was a part of MCL 777.13, but was otherwise identical.
34
MCL 769.34(2)(a).
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.