IN RE ELIZABETH R JARVIS MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of DANIEL GLEN DOUGHERTY,
Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
April 15, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 251195
Presque Isle Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-000005-NA
SUE ELLEN JARVIS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
BRIAN DOUGHERTY,
Respondent.
In the Matter of ELIZABETH R. JARVIS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 251197
Presque Isle Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 03-000004-NA
SUE ELLEN JARVIS,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
GRANT JUNIOR HAVEN,
-1-
Respondent.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Jansen and Murray, JJ.
MURRAY, J. (concurring).
I fully concur in the majority opinion affirming the trial court’s decision. I write
separately only to briefly point out that, although in rendering its decision the trial court
articulated an incorrect legal proposition, it did not apply that principle to the facts of this case.
Before making it’s ruling, the trial court stated:
The Court must now turn its attention to the issue of whether or not
termination of parental rights to the minor D.G.D. is clearly not in the child’s best
interests. With this change in statutory philosophy, courts in essence are focused
on comparing the parental abilities of the biological parent whose rights are
sought to be terminated with a set of adoptive parent whose identity is not yet
known. In light of this consideration, the Court must attempt to determine with a
projective analysis the type of life which the minor can expect if parental rights
are not terminated and he is left in the care and custody of his biological mother,
or in the custody of another person with the respondent mother being a part of his
life [emphasis added].
However, in In re JK, 468 Mich 202, 214 n 21; 661 NW2d 216 (2003), our Supreme Court stated
that it is inappropriate to perform any comparison between the natural parents and the adoptive
or foster parents:
Several of the trial court’s written findings of fact on remand suggest that
it may have been influenced by the relative advantages of the adoptive home
compared to the mother’s home. We remind the family division judges of what
we said nearly fifty years ago:
“It is totally inappropriate to weigh the advantages of a foster
home against the home of the natural and legal parents. Their
fitness as parents and question of neglect of their children must be
measured by statutory standards without reference to any particular
alternative home which may be offered to the [child].” [Fritts v
Krugh, 354 Mich 97, 115; 92 NW2d 604 (1958), overruled in part
on other grounds. In re Hatcher, 443 Mich 426; 505 NW2d 834
(1993).]
Thus, the principle articulated by the trial court was incorrect. However, the trial court did not
apply that principle because the foster parents were unknown, and thus no comparison could be
made. As such, the trial court’s decision is properly affirmed.
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
-2-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
