PEOPLE OF MI V THOMAS HOWARD WENDT
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
April 13, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 246342
Isabella Circuit Court
LC No. 02-000442-FC
THOMAS HOWARD WENDT,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Jansen and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant was found guilty by a jury on three counts of first-degree murder, MCL
750.316, and three counts of possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL
750.227b. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant argues that his confession should have been suppressed, as involuntary,
because the pain in his shoulder, resulting from his handcuffing, at the time of his arrest made it
impossible for him to voluntarily waive his Miranda1 rights. Because we hold that any putative
error on this issue would clearly have been harmless, it is unnecessary to decide whether the trial
court correctly found that the confession was voluntary.2
A trial court’s findings of fact following a suppression hearing can be reversed on appeal
only if they are clearly erroneous. People v LoCicero (After Remand), 453 Mich 496, 500; 556
NW2d 498 (1996). If the trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous, we must then consider
whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and whether fair-minded jurors might
have found defendant not guilty had the evidence not been admitted. People v Whitehead, 238
Mich App 1, 7-9; 212 NW2d 953 (1999).
1
Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).
2
Although it is unnecessary to address whether defendant's confession was voluntary, we note
that based upon the totality of the circumstances, People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 334; 429
NW2d 781 (1988), the reasons stated by the trial court, in finding that defendant’s confession
was voluntary, were not clearly erroneous. See People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 29-30; 551
NW2d 355 (1996).
-1-
Even if the trial court’s findings were erroneous, it was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt, and fair-minded jurors would not have found defendant not guilty on any of the counts
even absent evidence of the confession. The other evidence against defendant was
overwhelming. Defendant had made previous death threats against two of the victims on
numerous occasions, to several people. Some of the people who heard the threats made by
defendant and who knew defendant well, considered them to be credible. Defendant’s van was
witnessed at or near the murder scene by a number of witnesses around the time of the crime.
One witness saw defendant’s van parked, with its motor running, at the murder scene a few
minutes before the fatal shots were fired. A loaded shotgun matching the gauge of the spent
shells and the casings found in the back of defendant’s van and at the murder scene was found in
defendant’s home and near him when he was arrested. Defendant, before making his confession
to police, directly stated to two friends that he had committed the murders, and strongly implied
it to a third friend. Defendant also left a letter to a friend admitting guilt and asking forgiveness.
And, defendant implied, in his discussions with the police negotiator before his arrest, that he
was guilty of the murders. Blood was found on defendant’s van with DNA matching one of the
victim’s DNA, with the odds against it belonging to any other individual being at least 379.2
quadrillion to one.
Given all this evidence, if there was any error in the admission of defendant’s confession,
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no possibility that fair-minded jurors would
have voted to acquit defendant in the absence of the confession. Whitehead, supra at 7-9.
Therefore, there is no basis for reversing defendant’s convictions.
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a tape of a call
to a 911 operator by one of the murder victims regarding an earlier incident with defendant. We
disagree.
We review a trial court’s rulings on admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion.
People v Katt, 468 Mich 272, 278; 662 NW2d 12 (2003). An abuse of discretion exists when an
unprejudiced person, considering the facts on which the trial court acted, would conclude that
there was no justification or excuse for the ruling made. People v Tate, 244 Mich App 553, 559;
624 NW2d 524 (2001). Here, there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court.
First, we note that the claim which defendant now asserts is different from the one he
raised at trial. Although defendant did object to the tape’s admission at trial, he did not raise
issue with the authentication of the victim’s voice. On appeal, defendant argues that the voice of
the victim was not properly authenticated. Because this is a forfeited nonconstitutional issue, the
trial court’s ruling is subject to reversal only if defendant can show that he was actually innocent
or that the proceedings were seriously tainted. People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 774; 597 NW2d
130 (1999). Our discussion of the foregoing issue makes clear that defendant cannot show that
he was actually innocent. Nor is there any showing that the proceedings were seriously tainted.
In any event, there was a sufficient basis for authenticating the tape. A 911 officer
testified that the tape came from the department. The voice on the tape identifies herself as Vicki
Keller and states that defendant is violating a protective order prohibiting him from having
-2-
contact with her and identifies defendant as the voice in the background shouting obscenities.
There is sufficient evidence that this exhibit is what it purported to be, and, hence, it was
admissible. People v Berkey, 437 Mich 40, 50; 467 NW2d 6 (1991).
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
-3-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.