KATHRYN SCHULTZ V CHARTER TWP OF MERIDIAN
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KATHRYN SCHULTZ,
UNPUBLISHED
April 13, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 245571
Ingham Circuit Court
LC No. 02-000455-NZ
CHARTER TOWNSHIP OF MERIDIAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Before: O’Connell, P.J., and Jansen and Murray, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Defendant appeals as of right the trial court’s denial of its motion for partial summary
disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We affirm.
I. Material Facts
On approximately May 15, 2001, or May 16, 2001, water and sewage allegedly entered
plaintiff’s basement through the sanitary sewage system operated by defendant (Plaintiff’s
Complaint and Jury Demand, filed March 27, 2002, lower court file I). On March 27, 2002,
plaintiff filed a complaint1 against defendant raising the following claims: count I for trespass,
count II for nuisance, count III for trespass-nuisance based upon operational control, count IV for
trespass-nuisance based upon ownership, and count V for unconstitutional taking (Complaint).
Defendant subsequently brought a motion for partial summary disposition pursuant to
MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). Defendant sought to have counts I through IV of plaintiff’s complaint
dismissed, reasoning that because the newly enacted statutory exception to governmental
immunity was in effect when plaintiff filed her complaint, MCL 691.1416 et seq., it provided the
sole remedy for plaintiff. (Defendant Meridian Township’s Motion for Partial Summary
Disposition Pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), May 16, 2002, lower court file I.) In
response, plaintiff countered that summary disposition was inappropriate because the statutory
exceptions to governmental immunity did not apply to claims that accrued prior to the effective
1
Although plaintiff’s complaint was designated as a “class action” complaint, a class was never
certified.
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date of the act, January 2, 2002 (Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s Motion for Partial Summary
Disposition Pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8), June 20, 2002, lower court file I). The trial
court denied defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition (Appendix A). In denying
defendant’s motion, the trial court agreed that the statute and Pohutski v Allen Park, 465 Mich
675; 641 NW2d 219 (2002), did not prohibit an action under common law brought during the
period between the effective date of the amendments and the date Pohutski was decided, i.e.,
Janurary 2, 2002, and April 2, 2002 (Appendix B).
II. Analysis
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for partial
summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and (8). Specifically, defendant argues that
plaintiff’s sole remedy is under MCL 691.1416 et seq.2 because plaintiff filed her complaint after
the effective date of that statute, which abrogates any common law exceptions relating to sewage
disposal system events. We disagree.
A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo on
appeal. Dressel v Ameribank, 468 Mich 557, 561; 664 NW2d 151 (2003). A motion for
summary disposition brought pursuant to “MCR 2.116(C)(7) tests whether a claim is barred
because of immunity granted by law, and requires consideration of all documentary evidence
filed or submitted by the parties.” Glancy v Roseville, 457 Mich 580, 583; 577 NW2d 897
(1998).3
MCL 691.1407(1) provides the following:
Except as otherwise provided in this act, a governmental agency is
immune from tort liability if the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise
or discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided in this act,
this act does not modify or restrict the immunity of the state from tort liability as
it existed before July 1, 1965, which immunity is affirmed.
Regarding MCL 691.1407(1), in overruling Hadfield v Oakland Co Drain Comm’r, 430 Mich
139; 422 NW2d 205 (1988), the Pohutski Court determined that the first sentence of the statute
operates to render municipal corporations immune from tort liability except as otherwise
provided in the act, but that the second sentence applied only to the state and not to governmental
2
Specifically, MCL 691.1417(2) provides, in pertinent part:
Sections 16 to 19 abrogate common law exceptions, if any, to immunity
for the overflow or backup of a sewage disposal system and provide the sole
remedy for obtaining any form of relief for damages or physical injuries caused
by a sewage disposal system event regardless of the legal theory.
3
The trial court did not indicate under what court rule it decided defendant’s motion. However,
because MCR 2.116(C)(7) specifically applies to motions brought on the basis of immunity, we
will review defendant’s motion under that subrule.
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agencies. Pohutski, supra at 689. Thus, according to Pohutski, any exception to governmental
immunity for governmental agencies such as municipal corporations must come from the
statutory scheme. Id.
Until January 2, 2002, there were five statutory exceptions to governmental immunity, at
which time 2001 PA 2224 took effect. Id. at 689, 697-699. “2001 PA 222 amends the
governmental tort liability act to provide a remedy for damages or physical injuries caused by a
sewage disposal system event.” Pohutski, supra at 697. Critical to this case, the Pohutski Court
specifically held that MCL 691.1416 et seq. is not to be given retroactive application:
2001 PA 222 does not contain any language indicating it is meant to apply
retroactively, but provides only that it is to take immediate effect. Section 19(1)
provides that a claimant is not entitled to compensation under the statute unless
the claimant notifies the governmental agency of a claim of damage or physical
injury, in writing, within forty-five days after the date the damage or physical
injury was or should have been discovered. Only two exceptions to the forty-fiveday limit are available: if the claimant notified the contacting agency during the
forty-five-day period or if the failure to comply resulted from the contacting
agency’s failure to comply with notice requirements. Given the absence of any
language indicating retroactive effect, the forty-five day notice limit, and the
presumption that statutes operate prospectively, we conclude that 2001 PA 222
does not apply retroactively. [Pohutski, supra at 698 (emphasis added).]
Since the Pohutski Court has already determined that MCL 691.1416 et seq. is
prospective, the key issue in this case is whether the prospective application of the statutory
scheme applies to all claims filed after the effective date of the statute regardless of the accrual
date, as defendant argues, or if it applies to claims that accrued prior to January 2, 2002, but filed
after the statute took effect, as plaintiff argues. We find that plaintiff’s interpretation is correct,
and that the statute does not apply to claims that had accrued prior to the effective date of the
statute.
“Michigan courts have followed the general rule that the relevant inquiry in determining
the applicability of a statute is the date on which the cause of action arose.” Hill v GMAC, 207
Mich App 504, 513-514; 525 NW2d 905 (1994). Thus, if as in this case a statute is to be applied
prospectively, the law at the time a claim accrues governs the case. See Bradfield v
Administrator or Personal Representative of Estate of Burgess, 62 Mich App 345, 352; 233
NW2d 541 (1975); see also In re Certified Questions from US Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, 416 Mich 558, 573-574; 331 NW2d 456 (1982) (noting general rule that once a cause of
action accrues, meaning that all the facts become operative and known, it becomes a vested
right); Devlin v Morse, 254 Mich 113, 115-116; 235 NW 812 (1931) (Court refusing to apply
newly enacted statute to the plaintiff’s common-law claim that accrued before but was brought
after the new act became effective); Chesapeake & Ohio R Co v Public Service Comm, 5 Mich
4
2001 PA 222 has been codified as MCL 691.1416 et seq.
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App 492, 506; 147 NW2d 469 (1967) (“The statutory amendment during the pendency of a suit
has no bearing upon the rights of the parties fixed by law before its enactment.”). Thus, pursuant
to a long line of Michigan case law, we must utilize the accrual date rather than the filing date as
the controlling date for purposes of prospective legislation. In other words, MCL 691.1416 et
seq. does not apply to plaintiff’s claim, which accrued prior to the effective date of the statute.
Defendant has failed to provide us with any case law opposite to that set forth above.
Indeed, the cases defendant relies upon would only be helpful to defendant’s position if MCL
691.1416 et seq. were retroactive. However, as noted, Pohutski precludes us from holding that
these amendments apply retroactively. In sum, defendant’s argument fails because (1) the only
distinguishing feature between plaintiff in this case and those in Pohutski is that plaintiff in this
case filed her complaint after the amendments were effective, and (2) defendant has neither
distinguished nor provided contrary authority to the case law cited above, which holds that the
controlling date is when the cause of action accrued, not when the case was filed.
Moreover, in Pohutski, our Supreme Court made it clear that in cases currently pending,
and plaintiff’s case was currently pending at the time Pohutski was decided, the Hadfield
analysis would apply. Pohutski, supra at 698-699. Specifically, the Court stated:
Thus, if we applied our holding in this case retroactively, the plaintiffs in
cases currently pending would not be afforded relied under Hadfield or 2001 PA
222. Rather, they would become a distinct class of litigants denied relief because
of an unfortunate circumstance of timing.
Accordingly, this decision will be applied only to cases brought on or after
April 2, 2002. In all cases currently pending, the interpretation set forth in
Hadfield will apply. [Id.]
In discussing the Court’s decision that Pohutski was to be given prospective application,
the Court indicated that prospective application was necessary, in part, because there had been
extensive reliance on Hadfield’s interpretation of the governmental immunity act. The Court
noted that “[i]n addition to reliance by the courts, insurance decisions have undoubtedly been
predicated upon this Court’s long-standing interpretation of § 7 under Hadfield: municipalities
have been encouraged to purchase insurance, while homeowners have been discouraged from
doing the same.” Pohutski, supra at 697.
Additionally, MCL 691.1417(4)(b) requires a claimant seeking compensation for
property damage or physical injury from a governmental agency to demonstrate compliance with
MCL 691.1419. That section, in turn, requires a claimant to provide notice to the governmental
agency “of a claim of damage or physical injury, in writing, within 45 days after the date the
damage or physical injury was discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
been discovered.” MCL 691.1419(1). Additionally, a governmental agency is required by the
statute to “make available public information about the provision of notice under this section” in
order to facilitate compliance with this section. MCL 691.1419(1). As the Pohutski Court noted,
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MCL 691.1416 et seq. would bar a plaintiff’s claim that accrued before the statute was enacted
because a plaintiff would not be able to comply with the statutory timetables. Id. at 698.5
Plaintiff would, in the words of the Pohutski Court, become one of the “distinct class of litigants
denied relief because of an unfortunate circumstance of timing.” Id. at 699. Accordingly, we
find that the trial court properly denied defendant’s motion for partial summary disposition.
Affirmed.
/s/ Peter D. O’Connell
/s/ Kathleen Jansen
/s/ Christopher M. Murray
5
We recognize that the Legislature is fully empowered to eliminate a tort claim, and nothing in
this opinion speaks to that subject. The question in this case is when the Legislature’s commands
become effective.
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