MAXIM GRAHAM V LARRY FORD
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
GERALD ROBINSON,
UNPUBLISHED
April 13, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v
No. 239642
Ionia Circuit Court
LC No. 97-018284-NO
LARRY FORD and DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellees.
MAXIM GRAHAM, DARTHULA GRAHAM,
WILLIAM E. ENGLAND, GAYLE E.
ENGLAND, TIMOTHY M. TRAVIS, and CAROL
FREDERICK,
Plaintiffs,
and
ANTHONY M. BRANDON and BARBARA
BRANDON,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v
No. 239881
Ionia Circuit Court
LC No. 96-017488-NO
LARRY FORD and DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: Markey, P.J., and Murphy and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
These cases, consolidated both at trial and on appeal, involve claims of employment
discrimination under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. In Docket No. 239881,
defendants appeal by right from a judgment following a jury verdict awarding the eight plaintiffs
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damages in excess of $4 million. We affirm. In Docket No. 239642, plaintiff appeals by right
from an order granting summary disposition to defendants. We reverse.
I. Docket No. 239881
Several employees of the state Department of Corrections (DOC) brought suit against the
DOC and Larry Ford, a deputy assistant warden, alleging that Ford, a black man, used his
authority to discriminate against both white employees and black employees whom he regarded
as too friendly with whites. The trial court initially granted defendants’ motion for summary
disposition, but this Court reversed partially and reinstated plaintiffs’ discrimination claims.
Graham v Ford, 237 Mich App 670; 604 NW2d 713 (1999). On remand, the jury awarded
damages in excess of $4 million. Plaintiffs Anthony and Barbara Brandon were awarded
damages and interest totaling $613,562.24 and $70,091.77, respectively. Defendants only appeal
in connection with those awards.
Defendants assert that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of certain statements
because they were compound hearsay, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial. We disagree. This
Court reviews the trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. Price v Long
Realty, Inc, 199 Mich App 461, 466; 502 NW2d 337 (1993).
At issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting nearly identical
testimony by plaintiffs Graham and Brandon concerning a statement of Captain Pamela Duncan
made, who supervised an eight-hour shift of the uniformed prison staff. Thus, Duncan was an
intermediate-level supervisor above plaintiffs and below defendant deputy warden Ford.
According to both Graham and Brandon, after her car was “egged” and “keyed,” Duncan called
Graham and Brandon into her office and ordered them to retaliate against white corrections
officers she believed responsible and specifically ordered them to “slash all the white boy’s
tires,” or “cut all them honkie’s tires.” When Graham and Brandon resisted, Duncan purportedly
said, “Ford was right, you two are some weak niggers.”
In April 1995, after Graham was transferred off the third shift, Brandon went to see Ford
concerning racial tension on that shift. Brandon testified that Ford’s statements clearly implied
that Ford bore race-based animus against Graham for associating with “white folks.” Brandon
also testified that he confronted Ford regarding Duncan’s statement that Ford had referred to
Brandon and Graham as “weak niggers.” According to Brandon, Ford did not deny making the
statement but “began to laugh real loud and real hysterically.” Brandon also testified that Ford
said he had assigned Duncan to the third shift “to shake things up” and that Brandon and Graham
“were supposed to be watching out for [Duncan] and we let those white folks mess her car up.”
Plaintiffs offered several theories under which the testimony at issue was properly
admitted. Under Michigan’s rules of evidence, only one theory is required for the evidence to be
properly admitted. People v Starr, 457 Mich 490, 501; 577 NW2d 673 1998). “That our Rules
of Evidence preclude the use of evidence for one purpose simply does not render the evidence
inadmissible for other purposes. Rather, the evidence is admissible for a proper purpose, subject
to a limiting instruction under MRE 105.” People v Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich 43, 56; 614
NW2d 888 (2000).
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Moreover, where evidence is admissible under one theory but not another, the trial court
need not select the correct theory on peril of reversal. Instead, it is well settled that where the
trial court reaches the correct result, albeit for a wrong reason, this Court will not reverse.
People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 582; 629 NW2d 411 (2001); Ellsworth v Hotel Corp, 236
Mich App 185, 190; 600 NW2d 129 (1999).
First, plaintiffs argue the evidence was not hearsay as defined in MRE 801(c) because it
was not offered to prove of the matter asserted, i.e. that either that Brandon and Graham are
“weak niggers,” or that Ford made such a statement. Rather, plaintiffs contend the evidence was
admitted to show the effect the statement had on Brandon and Graham when they heard it. “An
utterance or a writing may be admitted to show the effect on the hearer or reader when this effect
is relevant. The policies underlying the hearsay rule do not apply because the utterance is not
being offered to prove the truth or falsity of the matter asserted.” People v Fisher, 449 Mich
441, 449-450; 537 NW2d 577 (1995). Here, plaintiffs Brandon and Graham claimed that the
stress of a hostile work environment ultimately caused them severe psychological problems and
forced them to leave their employment. Thus, the evidence was relevant, not hearsay, and
properly admitted as making more probable plaintiffs’ hostile work environment theory.
Plaintiff also argues that the evidence was properly admitted not for the truth of the assertion but
to show the context of his April 1995 meeting with Ford, whom he confronted with Duncan’s
statement. We agree the testimony was properly permitted for these non-hearsay purposes.
Plaintiffs also argue that in a discrimination lawsuit based on the theory of a hostile work
environment, the statement of a supervisor may be admitted as an admission of a party opponent.
“‘A statement is not hearsay if . . . The statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement
by his agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of his agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship . . ..’” McCallum v Dep’t of Corrections, 197 Mich App
589, 598-599; 496 NW2d 361 (1992), quoting MRE 803(d)(2)(D). Plaintiff relies on a trio of
federal cases: White v Honeywell, Inc, 141 F3d 1270 (CA 8, 1998); Zipf v American Telephone
& Telegraph Co, 799 F2d 889, 895 (CA 3, 1986), and Moore v Kuka Welding Systems, 171 F3d
1073 (CA 6, 1999). Each of these cases applies FRE 801(d)(2)(D) to unique facts and are of
little help in determining whether Michigan’s identical rule of evidence permits the admission of
the evidence here at issue under the unique circumstances of this case.
MRE 801(d)(2)(D) plainly requires more than a statement by an agent or servant during
the time period of the employment. The statement must also be “within the scope of [the
declarant’s] agency or employment.” While there is no dispute that Duncan was both the agent
of the DOC and under the command of deputy warden Ford, the statement at issue was made
during a discussion in which Duncan attempted to convince Graham and Brandon to “slash all
the white boy’s [sic] tires.” Although the DOC is in the business of housing criminals, it hardly
can be asserted that its business includes the type of criminal activity being discussed at the time
Duncan made the alleged statements here. Accordingly, the agency principles of MRE
801(d)(2)(D) do not apply.
Defendants argue that because Duncan was not a party and plaintiffs’ theory of recovery
did not include any conduct by Captain Duncan, whatever she did or did not do was irrelevant.
But defendants’ premise is contrary to plaintiffs’ argument and the evidence presented. Plaintiffs
argued that Duncan’s actions and statements helped create a hostile work environment that
injured them. Plaintiffs presented abundant evidence that Ford bore racial animus toward
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Graham and Brandon and acted on that animus both directly and indirectly through subordinate
intermediate supervisors such as Duncan. Brandon testified that Duncan’s actions created racial
tension on the shift he worked. Brandon also testified that during a critical April 1995 meeting
concerning this racial tension Ford told him that he had assigned Duncan to that shift to “shake
things up.” Further, Brandon testified that Ford told him that Brandon and Graham were, in
essence, not supposed to “let those white folks mess [Duncan’s] car up.”
In addition, plaintiff presented other evidence that Ford carried out racially motivated
actions through intermediate supervisors. For example, Captain William England testified that
Ford directed him to break up plaintiff Timothy Travis’ “white boy clique.” England also
testified that Ford ordered him to transfer Gerald Robinson, plaintiff in the companion case, to a
remote assignment because “I don’t like the boy. I don’t want to see him.” England testified
Ford’s use of the term “boy” had clear racial overtones to him, and he concluded Ford was using
him [England] to carry out a racial agenda.
Even a defense witness, African-American Sergeant Ronald Jones, testified that he had
the impression that Ford wanted him to take race into account, and that Ford had a hidden agenda
with respect to several white officers.
Against this background, whether Duncan had the state of mind receptive to carrying out
Ford’s racial animus was relevant because it made more likely that Ford created a hostile work
environment based on racial animus. MRE 803(3) excepts from the rule against hearsay “[a]
statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition
(such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed . . . .” See McCallum,
supra at 604-605. The testimony here was evidence of Duncan’s state of mind, i.e., that she bore
racial animus making it more probable that she acted to carry out Ford’s racial agenda.
In summary, the evidence at issue was admissible because it was relevant for the nonhearsay purpose of showing its affect on Graham and Brandon, and to show Duncan’s state of
mind. MRE 401, 402, and 803(3). Because the evidence was highly relevant, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion by failing to exclude it under MRE 403. Unfair prejudice under that rule
does not mean “damaging” but rather evidence should be excluded only “‘when there exists a
danger that marginally probative evidence will be given undue or preemptive weight by the
jury.’” Waknin v Chamberlien, 467 Mich 329, 334 n 3; 653 NW2d 176 (2002), quoting People v
Crawford, 458 Mich 376, 398; 582 NW2d 785 (1998). Even if the question were close,
defendant has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the
evidence. Peña v Ingham Co Rd Comm, 255 Mich App 299, 303; 660 NW2d 351 (2003).
But MRE 803(3), in general,1 disallows “a statement of memory or belief to prove the
fact remembered or believed . . . .” Thus, that part of Duncan’s statement that is an assertion that
Ford made the derogatory racial comment at some point in the past is not admissible under MRE
803(3). A limiting instruction under MRE 105 would have been appropriate but defendants did
1
The only exception being statements concerning the declarant’s will.
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not request one. Moreover, error in admitting evidence will not merit reversal unless a
substantial right of a party is affected, MRE 103(a), and it affirmatively appears that failure to
grant relief is inconsistent with substantial justice, MCR 2.613(A). See Chastain v General
Motors Corp, 467 Mich. 888, 654 N.W.2d 326 (2002), and Lewis v LeGrow, 258 Mich App 175,
200; 670 NW2d 675 (2003). Because there exists so much other evidence2 of defendant Ford’s
racial discrimination, any error in admission of Duncan’s statement without a limiting instruction
was harmless.
II. Docket No. 239642
Plaintiff Robinson, a white man employed by the DOC as a corrections officer, filed this
discrimination lawsuit on May 19, 1997, alleging a pattern of race-based hostility on defendant
Ford’s part going back to 1989. The trial court initially granted defendants’ motion for summary
disposition, but this Court reversed, holding that the trial court should have allowed Robinson to
amend his pleadings to allege facts that were sufficiently specific and timely as to satisfy the
applicable statute of limitations. Robinson v Ford, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court
of Appeals, issued September 10, 1999 (Docket No. 207241).
On remand, plaintiff was permitted to file a third amended complaint, which included the
following instances of alleged misconduct by defendant Ford: (1) a May 1994 biased
investigation;3 (2) an unjustified, harassing and degrading memoranda about Robinson sent to
the prison chain of command regarding incidents on January 6 and 10, 1995; (3) a December 31,
1996 memorandum evidencing disparate treatment regarding Robison’s facial hair; (4) a May 5,
1997 unjustified, harassing memorandum regarding Robinson’s absence from work on May 2,
1997 because of illness; and (5) statements by Ford in June 1997 that as long as Ford was the
deputy warden at the prison, Robison would never see daylight, referring to Robison’s third shift
assignment.
Robinson asserts this last statement by Ford was made to Robinson’s supervisor, Captain
Ronald Overton.4 Defendant argues the statement is inadmissible hearsay and not evidence of
discrimination. But the claim is similar to Robinson’s first allegation of race-based harassment
which occurred in March or April 1989. At that time, Robinson was working first shift and
declined Ford’s offer of a promotion to lieutenant because it would require a transfer to second
shift and spending less time with his children. Robinson testified that Ford became enraged and
stated, “you people are all alike” and, “a few white boys should grow up not knowing their
father.” Ford transferred Robinson to second shift two weeks later. Shortly thereafter, Ford
ordered Robison’s supervisor, Captain England, to transfer Robinson to the remote, undesirable
“pole barn.” Sometime in 1993 Robinson returned to the day (first) shift but in September of
2
For a summary of additional evidence of Ford’s racial animus, see this Court’s prior opinion in
Graham v Ford, 237 Mich App 670, 678-681; 604 NW2d 713 (1999).
3
After a hearing on June 24, 1994, this investigation resulted in plaintiff receiving a two-day
suspension later reduced to one day on administrative appeal.
4
The record is unclear whether Overton confirms Ford made the statement.
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that year, Robinson claims Ford again became enraged at him. Robinson testified that Ford
informed him that he was being assigned to the Midnight (third) shift, and “every time you see
the black of night you’ll think of me.”
Robinson’s complaint alleges that Ford’s abusive treatment created a hostile work
environment and constituted discrimination based on race with respect to terms and conditions of
employment contrary to MCL 37.2202(1)(a). Thus, plaintiff alleges two causes of action: one
for disparate treatment based at least in part on racial animus and the other a hostile work
environment based on race motivated harassment. Each action has different elements.
Section 202 of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2202, provides in relevant part:
(1) An employer shall not do any of the following:
(a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an
individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or
privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex,
height, weight, or marital status. [Emphasis added.]
Unlawful discrimination under subsection (1)(a), in this case, disparate treatment because
of race, may be proved by direct or indirect evidence. Hazle v Ford Motor Co, 464 Mich 456,
462; 628 NW2d 515 (2001); Wilcoxon v Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co, 235 Mich App
347, 359; 597 NW2d 250 (1999). Direct evidence is “evidence which, if believed, requires the
conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's
actions.” Hazle, supra at 462, quoting Jacklyn v Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales
Corp, 176 F3d 921, 926 (CA 6, 1999). “For example, racial slurs by a decisionmaker constitute
direct evidence of racial discrimination that is sufficient to allow a plaintiff's case to proceed to
the jury.” Graham, supra at 677, citing Harrison v Olde Financial Corp, 225 Mich App 601,
610; 572 NW2d 679 (1997), citing Kresnak v Muskegon Heights, 956 F Supp 1327 (WD Mich,
1997).5
Where there is direct evidence of discrimination, the case is often called “intentional
discrimination” or a “mixed-motive” case. Wilcoxon, supra at 360; Harrison, supra at 611. In
such a case, “a plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s discriminatory animus was more likely
than not a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the decision,” but the defendant “may avoid a
finding of liability by proving that it would have made the same decision even if the
impermissible consideration had not played a role in the decision.” Sniecinski v Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Michigan, 469 Mich 124, 133; 666 NW2d 186 (2003).
The elements of a mixed-motive discrimination case are:
5
Although not binding precedent, Michigan courts have consistently looked to federal courts’
interpretations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e et seq., for guidance
in interpreting this state’s parallel legislation. See, e.g., Wilcoxon, supra at 364 n 8, and
Graham, supra at 676.
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(1) the plaintiff's membership in a protected class, (2) an adverse employment
action, (3) the defendant was predisposed to discriminating against members of
the plaintiff's protected class, and (4) the defendant actually acted on that
predisposition in visiting the adverse employment action on the plaintiff.
[Wilcoxon, supra at 360-361.]
A discrimination case may alternatively be proved by circumstantial evidence employing
the burden-shifting framework adopted in McDonnell Douglas v Green, 411 US 792; 93 S Ct
1817; 36 L Ed 2d 668 (1973). Under the McDonnell Douglas approach, a prima facie case
consists of evidence that the plaintiff (1) belongs to a protected class, (2) suffered an adverse
employment action, (3) was qualified for the position, and (4) the adverse employment action
was taken under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. See,
Hazle, supra at 462-463, and Wilcoxon, supra at 359. If a plaintiff produces evidence of a
prima-facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the burden shifts to the employer to come forward
with a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the employer
does so, the burden again returns to the plaintiff to establish that the employer’s stated legitimate
reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Sniecinski, supra at 134; Wilcoxon, supra.
Using either direct evidence or the McDonnell Douglas approach, an element of
plaintiff’s discrimination claim is an adverse employment action. Sniecinski, supra at 134-135;
Wilcoxon, supra at 362. An “adverse employment action” for the purposes of proving unlawful
discrimination “(1) must be materially adverse in that it is more than ‘mere inconvenience or an
alteration of job responsibilities,’ and (2) must have an objective basis for demonstrating that the
change is adverse, rather than the mere subjective impressions of the plaintiff.” Meyer v City of
Centerline, 242 Mich App 560, 569; 619 NW2d 182 (2000), citing Wilcoxon, supra at 364. On
this element the trial court found there was no dispute as to material facts and granted
defendants’ motion for summary disposition. MCR 2.116(C)(10).
Plaintiff argued Ford’s racial animus caused him to suffer two adverse employment
actions: (1) being relegated to the midnight (third) shift for the duration of Ford’s tenure as
deputy warden of the Michigan Training Unit (MTU), and (2) being subjected to harassing
criticisms and biased disciplinary actions, one of which resulted in a two-day, reduced to a oneday suspension. The trial court rejected plaintiff’s arguments relying on Wilcoxon and reasoned
“[t]here must be some objective basis for demonstrating that the change is adverse because a
plaintiff's subjective impressions as to the desirability of one's position over another are not
controlling.” The trial court noted that in Wilcoxon this Court did not find that an employee’s
transfer without loss of pay or benefits was an adverse employment action for purposes of a
discrimination claim and concluded, as to the case at bar, “I just don’t see the adverse
employment action.” The trial court viewed the evidence as demonstrating “a clash of
personalities” rather than a “materially adverse” employment action. The trial court thought the
incidents plaintiff alleged seemed unusual but “very possibly had a reasonable explanation” and
were “probably not that different from what happens already within the Department of
Corrections with other . . . employees.” Thus, although Ford’s racial comments and slurs are
sufficient to create triable issues of fact, Graham, supra at 677, the court nevertheless granted
defendants’ motion for summary disposition because the evidence did not demonstrate plaintiff
suffered an adverse employment action. The trial court did not specifically address plaintiff’s
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hostile work environment claim but did cite Crawford v Media General Hosp, 96 F3d 830, 834
(CA 6, 1996), a hostile work environment case based on alleged age discrimination.
“We review a trial court’s decision with regard to a motion for summary disposition de
novo as a question of law.” Ardt v Titan Ins Co, 233 Mich App 685, 688; 593 NW2d 215
(1999). A motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual
support of a claim. Decker v Flood, 248 Mich App 75, 81; 638 NW2d 163 (2001). “The
reviewing court considers affidavits, pleadings, depositions, admissions, and documentary
evidence filed in the action or submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party. The court should grant the motion only if the affidavits or other documentary
evidence show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (citations omitted). We conclude that the trial court erred by
not viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to plaintiff, by applying Wilcoxon too
narrowly, and by finding that plaintiff had not submitted sufficient evidence to raise material fact
questions under a hostile work environment theory.
This Court has noted that “adverse employment actions [are] not limited ‘to strictly
monetary considerations. One does not have to be an employment expert to know that an
employer can make an employee’s job undesirable or even unbearable without money or benefits
ever entering into the picture.’” Wilcoxon, supra at 364, quoting Collins v Illinois, 830 F2d 692,
703 (CA 7, 1987). In Collins, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals opined that “adverse job
action . . . can encompass other forms of adversity . . . [f]or example, . . . where there was no
reduction in salary or benefits, in an employer’s moving an employee’s office to an undesirable
location, transferring an employee to an isolated corner of the workplace, and requiring an
employee to relocate her personal files while forbidding her to use the firm's stationary and
support services.” Id. at 703 (footnotes and citations omitted).
The Wilcoxon Court relied heavily on Crady v Liberty National Bank & Trust Co, 993
F2d 132 (CA 7, 1993) in developing its two criteria to determine whether an employment action
in a discrimination case is “materially adverse.” The court in Crady opined:
[A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment must be
more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job
responsibilities. A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination
of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.
[Id. at 136 (emphasis added).]
Thus, while mere inconvenience or altered job responsibilities are insufficient, what constitutes a
materially adverse action will depend on the particular facts and circumstances involved. There
is “no exhaustive list of adverse employment actions.” Peña, supra at 312.
Here, plaintiff presented abundant evidence that Ford’s actions were motivated at least in
part by racial animus. There was documentary evidence indicating that plaintiff was reassigned
from the first shift to second shift because of racial discrimination where he had been working
the first shift. Also, there was documentary evidence that plaintiff was assigned to pole barn
duty, which allegedly was an undesirable assignment at a remote part of the facility and that,
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subsequently, after an altercation with defendant, plaintiff was indefinitely assigned, very much
contrary to his desire, to third shift (otherwise known as the graveyard shift). All along, it was
well known that plaintiff preferred the first shift for family reasons. Moreover, plaintiff alleged
he suffered unjustified harassment, and a biased discipline of a two-day suspension (reduced to
one day). Ford’s assigning plaintiff to different shifts, to a remote undesirable work area, and
unjustified disciplinary action, could be deemed “materially adverse.” See Wilcoxon, supra at
364 n 8, citing De La Cruz v New York City Human Resources Dep’t, 82 F3d 16 (CA 2, 1996),
holding that the plaintiff’s transfer from an “elite” adoption care unit to a foster care unit with
less prestige was a “quite thin” but “the transfer arguably altered the terms and conditions of his
employment in a negative way” and was sufficient to establish an adverse employment action.
Id. at 21.
Reasonable jurors could conclude defendants’ actions in this case were more than “mere
inconvenience.” Further, although plaintiff’s subjective impressions are not controlling,
reasonable jurors could find an objective basis to conclude that Ford’s actions against plaintiff
were adverse employment actions. Wilcoxon, supra at 364. Using an objective basis, reasonable
jurors could conclude that being forced to go from a day shift to the graveyard shift, with its
enormous impact on one’s life (changing sleep patterns, less family interaction, etc.), is an
adverse employment action. Similarly, reasonable jurors could objectively find an adverse
employment action in biased, unjustified disciplinary proceedings. In sum, the evidence plaintiff
produced, viewed in a light most favorable to him, established that material issues of fact
remained for trial to determine whether plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action, as
defined in Wilcoxon, which was racially motivated. Hazle, supra at 465.
That disputed material fact issues remain for trial is not altered by the trail court’s
observation that there might be a reasonable explanation for defendants’ actions and that other
employees probably had similar experiences. This reasoning applies more to a defense
allegation that there were legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the reassignments and
disciplinary action notwithstanding plaintiff’s prima facie case of discrimination. As this Court
stated in Wilcoxon:
[A] plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of prohibited discrimination
by demonstrating that the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. After the prima facie
case is established, the employer has the burden of coming forward with a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. If the
employer does so, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the stated reason is
merely a pretext for discrimination, and this burden then merges with the
plaintiff’s overall burden of proving the claim. [Id. at 359.]
Of course, that plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination does not
necessarily preclude summary disposition in defendants’ favor. Hazle, supra at 464. But here,
with the abundant evidence of Ford’s racial animus, a factual issue with respect to “pretext”
would remain. Not only has plaintiff raised a triable issue that any proffered reason was
pretextual, but also that reasonable jurors could conclude that it was a pretext for unlawful
discrimination. Id., at 465-466. The trial court erred by granting defendants summary
disposition.
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The trial court also erred because plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to create a jury
question on his hostile work environment theory. Harassment based on membership in any one
of the protected groups under MCL 37.2202(1)(a) is actionable. Malan v General Dynamics
Land Systems, Inc, 212 Mich App 585, 586-587; 538 NW2d 76 (1995). Plaintiff’s third
amended complaint alleges that “[d]efendant Ford’s treatment of Mr. Robinson . . . created a
hostile work environment, and was motivated in a substantial and significant manner by the fact
that Mr. Robinson is white.” To establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim, plaintiff
must show: (1) he belonged to a protected group; (2) he was subjected to communication or
conduct on the basis of the protected status; (3) the communication or conduct he received based
on the protected status was unwelcome; (4) the unwelcome communication or conduct was
intended to or in fact did substantially interfere with his employment or created an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) respondeat superior. Downey v Charlevoix Co
Bd of Co Rd Comm’rs, 227 Mich App 621, 627 n 3; 576 NW2d 712 (1998). See also, Quinto v
Cross & Peters Co, 451 Mich 358, 368-369; 547 NW2d 314 (1996), and Radtke v Everett, 442
Mich 368, 382-383; 501 NW2d 155 (1993). Under this theory, “whether a hostile work
environment was created by the unwelcome conduct ‘shall be determined by whether a
reasonable person, in the totality of circumstances, would have perceived the conduct at issue as
substantially interfering with the plaintiff’s employment or having the purpose or effect of
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive employment environment.’” Quinto, supra at 369,
quoting Radtke, supra at 394.
Moreover, under a hostile work environment theory of discrimination, proving a specific
adverse employment action is unnecessary. Under MCL 37.2202(1)(a), “the phrase ‘terms,
conditions or privileges of employment’ evinces a legislative intent to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring
people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment.” Downey, supra at 628,
adopting the reasoning of Harris v Forklift Systems, Inc, 510 US 17, 21; 114 S Ct 367; 126 L Ed
2d 295 (1993)(sexual harassment case under 42 USC 2000e-2(a)(1)). Just as the Supreme Court
explained with respect to Title VII, Michigan’s Civil Rights Act is not limited to “to ‘economic’
or ‘tangible’ discrimination.” Harris, supra at 21, citing Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson,
477 US 57, 64; 106 S Ct 2399; 91 L Ed 2d 49 (1986). The Harris Court explained:
A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously
affect employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will detract from
employees’ job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or
keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to
these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe
or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of
their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of
workplace equality. [Harris, supra at 23.]
Under a hostile work environment theory, “to survive summary disposition, plaintiff had
to present documentary evidence to the trial court that a genuine issue existed regarding whether
a reasonable person would find that, in the totality of circumstances, [Ford’s comments and
actions] were sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment.” Quinto,
supra at 369. Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence that reasonable jurors could find under this
standard that defendant Ford’s comments and actions were sufficiently severe or pervasive to
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have created an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment predicated on plaintiff’s
protected status such that summary disposition was improper.
Defendants’ claim that plaintiff failed to preserve his hostile work environment theory is
without merit. Although plaintiff in opposing defendants’ motion for summary disposition did
not strenuously argue this theory, he alluded in his written response to defendants’ motion that
Ford’s conduct exhibited a “consistent pattern of discrimination” and “ongoing harassment over
many years.” At oral argument on defendants’ motion, plaintiff’s counsel argued that “Ford was
discriminating against . . . plaintiff[] in the terms, conditions and privileges of [his] employment;
that [Ford] sought to intimidate and harass . . . through the things that he had authority over as
assistant deputy warden of custody.” Further, MCR 2.116(G)(4) requires that a party opposing a
motion for summary disposition under subsection (C)(10) “must, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”
Plaintiff did so in this case. Plaintiff was not required to take specific exception to the trial
court’s ruling to preserve this issue for appeal. “No exception need be taken to a finding or
decision.” MCR 2.517(A)(7).
Finally, defendants attempt unsuccessfully to revive the argument that plaintiff’s case is
barred by the statute of limitations as an alternative ground to affirm the trial court. Application
of the statute of limitations is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal. Collins v Comerica
Bank, 468 Mich 628, 631; 664 NW2d 713 (2003).
An action under the Civil Rights Act must be brought within three years after the cause of
action accrued. MCL 600.5805(10);6 Sumner v Goodyear Tire & Robber Co, 427 Mich 505,
510; 398 NW2d 368 (1986); Meek v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 193 Mich App 340, 343; 483
NW2d 407 (1992). Plaintiff filed this action on May 19, 1997. To the extent defendants’
argument relates to plaintiff’s allegations of conduct that transpired after May 19, 1994, it must
fail. This Court held in its prior decision that the trial court abused its discretion by not
permitting plaintiff to amend his complaint, and that “plaintiff alleged instances of actionable
misconduct that occurred in May 1994, January 1995, December 1996, May 1997, and June
1997.” Robinson, supra, slip op at 1, 3. “Under the law of the case doctrine, ‘if an appellate
court has passed on a legal question and remanded the case for further proceedings, the legal
questions thus determined by the appellate court will not be differently determined on a
subsequent appeal in the same case where the facts remain materially the same.’” Grievance
Administrator v Lopatin, 462 Mich 235, 259; 612 NW2d 120 (2000), quoting CAF Investment
Co v Saginaw Twp, 410 Mich 428, 454; 302 NW2d 164 (1981).
As to defendant’s conduct before May 19, 1994, an exception to the limitations period
exists for continuing violations. Meek, supra at 343-344. “The mere existence of continuing
harassment is insufficient if none of the relevant conduct occurred within the limitation period.”
Id. at 344, citing Sumner, supra at 359. But this Court has already held that conduct occurring
6
The applicable subsection provides in part: “The period of limitations is 3 years after the . . .
injury for all other actions to recover damages . . . for injury to a person or property.” This
subsection has been renumbered several times in recent years by amendments to § 5805.
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within the limitations period is actionable. Plaintiff’s evidence, if believed, showed an
intrinsically interwoven pattern of racially biased harassment before and after May 19, 1994.
Sumner, supra at 359; Meek, supra at 345. Accordingly, we hold the continuing violation
exception applies to the case at bar, and “that once jurisdiction is attained through the continuing
violations doctrine, the remedy should be designed to make the plaintiff whole for the entire
injury he has suffered.” Sumner, supra at 542 n 15.
Conclusion.
In Docket No. 239881, we affirm. In Docket No. 239642, we reverse and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
/s/ Jane E. Markey
/s/ William B. Murphy
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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