KENNETH SLATER V DEWITT CHARTER TWP
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
KENNETH SLATER and LORETTA SLATER,
UNPUBLISHED
April 1, 2004
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v
No. 244791
Clinton Circuit Court
LC No. 02-009423-CZ
DEWITT CHARTER TOWNSHIP,
Defendant-Appellee.
Before: Hoekstra, P.J., and Fitzgerald and Talbot, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Plaintiffs appeal as of right the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of
defendant under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10) in an action challenging the validity of § 6.1.1 of
defendant’s zoning ordinance. We affirm.
Plaintiffs first argue, in essence, that their proposed division of their property meets the
requirements of Michigan’s Land Division Act (LDA), MCL 560.101 et seq., and therefore
defendant has no authority to prescribe the additional requirement for land division of section
6.1.1 of defendant’s zoning ordinance that dictates that new lots have frontage on a public street,
except in one circumstance not at issue here. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that access by Old
County Access Road No. 1, which is not a public road,1 meets the requirement of accessibility as
defined in the LDA, MCL 560.109(1)(e). We disagree.
The LDA specifies several requirements for proposed divisions of land, including a
requirement that each new parcel be accessible. In relevant part, section 109 of the LDA, MCL
560.109, provides:
(1) A municipality shall approve or disapprove a proposed division within
45 days after the filing of a complete application for the proposed division with
the assessor or other municipally designated official. . . . A complete application
1
Apparently Old County Access Road No. 1 is not a public road as presently configured because
it is 33 feet wide and under a county requirement it must be 66 feet wide to be a public road.
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for a proposed division shall be approved if . . . all of the following requirements
are met:
* * *
(e) Each resulting parcel is accessible.
Section 102 of the LDA, MCL 560.102, defines “accessible” as follows:
(j) “Accessible”, in reference to a parcel, means that the parcel meets 1 or
both of the following requirements:
(i) Has an area where a driveway provides vehicular access to an existing
road or street and meets all applicable location standards of the state
transportation department or county road commission under Act No. 200 of the
Public Acts of 1969, being sections 247.321 to 247.329 of the Michigan
Compiled Laws, and of the city or village, or has an area where a driveway can
provide vehicular access to an existing road or street and meet all such applicable
location standards.
(ii) Is served by an existing easement that provides vehicular access to an
existing road or street and that meets all applicable location standards of the state
transportation department or county road commission under Act No. 200 of the
Public Acts of 1969 and of the city or village, or can be served by a proposed
easement that will provide vehicular access to an existing road or street and that
will meet all such applicable location standards.
Although the parcels resulting from plaintiffs’ proposed lot division would be accessible
by Old County Access Road No. 1, the means of access must also meet the “applicable location
standards” of the state, county, and municipal highway authorities. MCL 560.102(j)(i), (ii). This
specifically includes all applicable standards under MCL 247.321 to MCL 247.329. Relevant to
the instant case, MCL 247.322 expressly provides that means of access must comply with local
ordinances:
… Nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent the application of the
provisions of any other statute of this state or any local ordinance which is more
restrictive than this act nor to preclude any city or village from requiring city or
village permits with respect to any street or highway within its corporate limits.
No permit shall be issued pursuant to this act unless there is compliance with
other provisions of law or ordinances.
Despite plaintiffs’ contention that defendant has no authority to enact an ordinance
requiring frontage on a public street, the township zoning act, MCL 125.271 et seq., gives
defendant broad authority to zone for the public health, safety, and welfare. MCL 125.271(1);
Delta Charter Twp v Dinolfo, 419 Mich 253, 263; 351 NW2d 831 (1984). This includes “the
authority to enact ordinances pertaining to roadway standards.” Bevan v Brandon Twp, 438
Mich 385, 400 n 14; 475 NW2d 37 (1991). Therefore, a parcel may not be considered accessible
under the LDA unless it is also accessible under applicable township zoning ordinances.
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Contrary to plaintiffs’ assertion, their proposed lot division does not meet the requirements of the
LDA because it does not meet the requirements of defendant’s zoning ordinance.
Plaintiffs next argue, in essence, that their federal and state constitutional rights were
violated as a result of the application of defendant’s ordinance. However, for the reasons stated
in Bevan, supra at 397-405, we conclude that plaintiffs have not suffered an unconstitutional
taking without just compensation as a result of defendant’s ordinance. Nor do we find merit in
defendant’s claim of a violation of substantive due process. A substantive due process claim
requires proof “(1) that there is no reasonable governmental interest being advanced by the
present zoning classification or (2) that an ordinance is unreasonable because of the purely
arbitrary, capricious, and unfounded exclusion of other types of legitimate land use from the area
in question.” Frericks v Highland Twp, 228 Mich App 575, 594; 579 NW2d 441 (1998).
Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof. Defendant’s stated reasons for § 6.1.1 of its zoning
ordinance are legitimate and reasonable and bear a substantial relationship to the health, safety,
and general welfare of the public. Bevan, supra at 399-400; Frericks, supra. Plaintiffs are
entitled to no relief.
Affirmed.
/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra
/s/ E. Thomas Fitzgerald
/s/ Michael J. Talbot
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