PEOPLE OF MI V CHARLES DEO HYDE
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
UNPUBLISHED
March 25, 2004
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v
No. 238389
Kent Circuit Court
LC No. 01-000521-FC
CHARLES DEO HYDE,
Defendant-Appellant.
ON REMAND
Before: Smolenski, P.J., and Cooper and Fort Hood, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
This case is before us on remand from our Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave to
appeal, our Supreme Court partially vacated our opinion and remanded for reconsideration in
light of People v Mendoza.1 We affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Defendant Charles Deo Hyde and his girlfriend, Vicki Harig, spent the day of December
30, 2000, drinking in celebration of the decedent’s birthday. The facts surrounding her death
were set forth in our prior opinion as follows:
In the instant case, the decedent’s mother heard thumping coming from
her daughter’s upstairs apartment that she shared with defendant. The noises
lasted for approximately thirty to ninety minutes. The evidence revealed that the
decedent had extensive bruising on both sides of her face, multiple bruises to
other areas of her body, and injuries to the back of her hands that were consistent
with defensive wounds. According to the record, the bruises on her face were
most likely caused by at least five blunt force blows from a fist. There was
testimony that the pattern of the decedent’s injuries was more consistent with an
assault than a simple fall. Several witnesses also claimed that defendant admitted
that he must have caused the decedent’s injuries but that he could not remember.
Moreover, Krystal Hyde, defendant’s daughter, testified that when she stopped by
1
People v Hyde, 469 Mich 974 (2003), citing People v Mendoza, 468 Mich 527; 664 NW2d 685
(2003).
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the apartment that night she heard her father tell the decedent to “get up, bitch.”
Ms. Hyde then observed the decedent struggling to get off the floor and back into
a chair.[2]
The following morning, defendant found Ms. Harig lying on the couch. She was bruised and
was having difficulty breathing. Defendant said he had no recollection of the events of the prior
evening. Ms. Harig was brought comatose to the hospital where she subsequently died on
January 1, 2001.
At trial in this matter, defendant requested a jury instruction for the lesser offense of
involuntary manslaughter. The trial court denied defendant’s request citing the lack of evidence
to support the charge. The decedent’s death arose from a beating, which persisted over a
significant period of time and involved repeated severe blows to the head. The evidence showed
that the death did not arise from a simple assault and battery, and therefore, an instruction for
involuntary manslaughter was insupportable. Defendant was convicted of second-degree
murder3 and was sentenced to twenty-five to forty years’ imprisonment.
On appeal as of right, defendant contended that the trial court committed reversible error
in failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. Defendant
argued that the evidence showed that the death was the unintended result of a mere assault and
battery committed without an intent to kill. We concluded that the trial court properly denied
defendant’s requested instruction.4 Relying on People v Cornell, we limited jury instructions for
inferior offenses under MCL 768.32 to necessarily included lesser offenses.5 Involuntary
manslaughter was at that time considered a cognate lesser included offense of murder,6 and
therefore, we ruled that an instruction was not warranted.
Defendant filed a delayed application for leave to appeal. Our Supreme Court vacated
our opinion in part and remanded for reconsideration regarding defendant’s requested jury
instruction in light of Mendoza.
II. Legal Analysis
We review jury instructions in their entirety to determine whether the trial court
committed reversible error.7 “Jury instructions must include all elements of the charged offense
and must not exclude material issues, defenses, and theories if the evidence supports them.”8
2
People v Hyde, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued June 19, 2003
(Docket No. 238389), slip op at 2 (Hyde I).
3
MCL 750.317.
4
Hyde I, supra at 1.
5
People v Cornell, 466 Mich 335; 646 NW2d 127 (2002).
6
People v Cheeks, 216 Mich App 470, 479; 549 NW2d 584 (1996).
7
People v Piper, 223 Mich App 642, 648; 567 NW2d 483 (1997).
8
Id., citing People v Reed, 393 Mich 342, 349-350; 224 NW2d 867 (1975).
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Even if imperfect, jury instructions are not erroneous if they fairly present the issues and
sufficiently protect the defendant’s rights.9 However, a trial court is not required to give
requested instructions that are unwarranted by the facts.10 A jury instruction for a necessarily
included lesser offense is appropriate if “the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a
disputed factual element that is not part of the lesser included offense and a rational view of the
evidence would support it.”11
Our Supreme Court recently defined involuntary manslaughter as “the unintentional
killing of another, without malice, during the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a
felony and not naturally tending to cause great bodily harm.”12 The Court then found, contrary
to prior case law, that involuntary manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of
murder and is an inferior offense under MCL 768.32.13 All the elements of a necessarily
included lesser offense are subsumed by a greater offense.14 The elements of involuntary
manslaughter are completely subsumed by the greater offense of murder as murder’s greater
mens rea includes the lesser.15
Upon reconsideration, we affirm our previous ruling affirming the trial court’s denial of
defendant’s requested jury instruction. Although involuntary manslaughter is a necessarily
included lesser offense of murder, a rational view of the evidence does not support an instruction
for that charge. Defendant’s violent acts of aggression had a natural tendency to cause great
bodily harm. The evidence showed that the death was caused by a severe and prolonged beating,
not by a single blow or an accidental fall. The evidence showed that defendant continued his
assault even after Ms. Harig was unable to stand. Based on this evidence, an instruction for
involuntary manslaughter was not warranted.
Affirmed.
/s/ Michael R. Smolenski
/s/ Jessica R. Cooper
/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Cornell, supra at 357; see also Mendoza, supra at 533, 545.
12
Mendoza, supra at 536. A death arising from a negligently performed lawful act or the
negligent omission to perform a legal duty also amounts to involuntary manslaughter. Id.
13
Id. at 541-542.
14
Id. at 541.
15
Id. at 542.
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