IN RE JERID STEPHEN TUPIS MINOR
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STATE OF MICHIGAN
COURT OF APPEALS
In the Matter of JERID STEPHEN TUPIS, Minor.
FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,
UNPUBLISHED
March 23, 2004
Petitioner-Appellee,
v
No. 251149
Wexford Circuit Court
Family Division
LC No. 02-016801-NA
GEORGETTE DENNISON,
Respondent-Appellant,
and
RUDY TUPIS,
Respondent.
Before: Zahra, P.J., and Saad and Schuette, JJ.
PER CURIAM.
Respondent-appellant appeals as of right from the trial court order terminating her
parental rights to the minor child under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j). We affirm.
The trial court did not clearly err in finding that the statutory grounds for termination
were established by clear and convincing evidence. MCR 3.977(J); In re Miller, 433 Mich 331,
337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). The trial court’s findings are clearly erroneous if the reviewing
court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Terry, 240
Mich App 14, 21-22; 610 NW2d 563 (2000).
Respondent-appellant clearly failed to provide proper care and custody for the minor
child as contemplated in MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) when she exposed him to domestic violence by
her two former husbands, constantly changed residences, and lacked a stable environment in
which to care for him. Moreover, the evidence indicated no reasonable likelihood that
respondent-appellant will be able to provide proper care and custody for Jerid in the reasonable
future. Respondent-appellant failed to obtain stable housing, moving ten times during the
pendency of this matter. At the time of the termination trial she was renting a room in a house
without a lease, paying on a weekly basis. Similarly respondent-appellant has obtained and lost
at least six jobs during the pendency of this matter. Respondent-appellant obtained stable
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income only through worker’s compensation benefits, which she acknowledges could end at any
time. The psychological testimony strongly indicated that respondent-appellant’s pattern of
instability may be expected to continue. Her psychological evaluation indicated that she has
severe impairments in reality testing and relationships. Dr. Simmons felt that her prognosis for
improvement was extremely poor. Respondent-appellant’s therapist similarly opined that
respondent-appellant’s prognosis for change and for becoming a capable parent was poor. This
conclusion is certainly reinforced by evidence that respondent-appellant discontinued counseling
after four and one-half sessions.1
We note that while respondent-appellant carried out some of the provisions of the parentagency agreement, she did not accomplish the most fundamental one of obtaining and
maintaining stable housing. A parent’s failure to carry out the parent-agency agreement is
evidence of the parent’s failure to provide proper care and custody for the child. In re JK, 468
Mich 202, 214; 661 NW2d 216 (2003). Moreover, respondent-appellant’s lack of investment in
her treatment goals was evident not only in her marginal attendance of Youth Enhancement
Support Services meetings but in her delay in obtaining an initial psychological evaluation, in
initiating therapy, and in entering a dual diagnosis treatment program, and then in her
discontinuation of therapy after four and one-half sessions. The testimony of various individuals
who attempted to assist respondent-appellant indicated that she persistently viewed herself as a
victim and blamed her problems on others. On this record, there is ample reason to conclude that
respondent’s inability to provide proper care and custody for Jerid will continue into the
foreseeable future. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that the grounds for
termination set forth in MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) were established by clear and convincing evidence.
We also conclude that trial court did not clearly err by finding a reasonable likelihood
that Jerid would be harmed if returned to respondent. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). The evidence quite
convincingly showed that Jerid was traumatized by the instability of his circumstances while in
respondent-appellant’s care. The social worker who conducted an assessment of the minor child
concluded that he was emotionally traumatized by abuse and neglect. Respondent-appellant and
the minor child had moved seven times in approximately fourteen months, and the child has
witnessed domestic violence against respondent-appellant at the hands of two of her former
husbands. He was withdrawn and fearful and would not speak back or smile when placed in
care. He stated that he would be dead soon and hoarded boxes in anticipation of his next move.
The evidence adduced in the trial court supplied ample reason to conclude that respondentappellant will continue in her pattern of instability, which has proven so harmful to Jerid in the
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We do not believe that these conclusions are contradicted by the testimony of Dr. Monteith,
who thought respondent-appellant was doing quite well considering the severity of her mental
illness, but made no assessment of her parenting abilities. Dr. Monteith diagnosed respondentappellant with posttraumatic stress disorder, nicotine dependence, excessive caffeine
consumption, history of alcohol and substance abuse, and self-defeating personality traits, and
noted that he would consider a full-blown personality disorder. He noted that her untruthfulness
regarding abstinence from marijuana was a “red flag” as was the fact that she does not parent her
five other children. He also noted that her inability to maintain stable and appropriate housing
would be a major stressor for a child.
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past. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err by finding a reasonable likelihood that the
minor child would be harmed if returned to respondent-appellant’s care.
Finally, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that termination was not clearly
contrary to Jerid’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b(5). We are cognizant of the evidence that
termination will be very difficult for Jerid because he is bonded to respondent-appellant as well
as to his siblings Samuel and Ariel. However, there was overwhelming evidence that Jerid’s
bond with respondent-appellant was at his own expense, as demonstrated by his emotional,
social, and academic conditions when he was taken from her care. By contrast, the testimony
indicated that he is now confident, happy, and interested in doing things. His behavioral
problems at school have lessened and he has gone from being expected to repeat kindergarten to
being the top reader and one of the top math students in his first grade class. As for the issue of
sibling bonds, Dr. Simmons opined that it would be preferable to risk completely terminating the
bond between Jerid and his siblings than to leave him in limbo. We note finally that Jerid’s
foster mother indicated a desire to adopt him. The opinion of the trial court indicates that the
court carefully considered the best interests of the minor child, which it considered a difficult
issue, and we are not left with the impression that a mistake was made in this regard.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brian K. Zahra
/s/ Henry William Saad
/s/ Bill Schuette
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